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Abstract
This research study presents a new model of immigration federalism which
integrates existing theories into a framework that emphasizes agency at the local level.
Unlike dominant models of federalism that observe the cascading effect of higher-level
policy on lower levels of government, this research focuses on empirical evidence at the
local level to understand its relation to policy at higher levels. Immigration federalism is
receiving substantial interest in scholarly work and in practice, but it lacks a cohesive and
comprehensive theory explaining variation at the community level. There is little reason
to expect sweeping changes in immigration policy at the federal level anytime soon, but
immigration policy continues to change in practice. Understanding changes in
immigration policy, particularly at the state and local levels of government, is valuable,
and a comprehensive theory of immigration federalism focusing on lower levels of
government expands perspectives of federalism.
The research for this study follows a nested case study design that involves
collecting and analyzing secondary and primary data at the federal, state, and local levels.
Secondary data were collected at three levels of government—federal, state, and local—
for each case study. Semi-structured interviews of public administrators and community
leaders were conducted at the local level. This primary data were analyzed using
grounded theory and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). The five case studies that
result from data collection and analysis frame immigration policy at the federal level,
across 50 U.S. states and in Oregon particularly, and in the Oregon cities of Sandy,
Nyssa, and Madras. These case studies are compared within and across levels of
government to construct a new model of immigration federalism.
i

Following this nested approach, I created and refined a theory of immigration
federalism by constructing an overarching framework reflecting the institutional context
of immigration policy at the federal, state, and local levels of government. Each level
yielded understanding which informed, modified, and optimized information gathering at
the next level, so construction of the framework was recursive throughout the research
project. The resulting model emphasizes a policy's connection to the public at the local
level and highlights the role of governance in balancing rather than resolving tensions.
This immigration federalism model helps describe the dynamic nature of the
intergovernmental influence and the reality of independent local authority in the United
States that results in different policy outcomes locally depending on polity perspectives
and civic capacity of the community. Therefore, this model offers a new perspective that
encourages scholars and practitioners to value local diversity and the knowledge and
expertise—even of complex and controversial policy issues like immigration—inherent
in the local community context.
The findings of this study reveal that there are more differences than similarities
in the capacity of local-level jurisdictions, which ensures that the experience in each
jurisdiction will be unique. With this known, the response to federal and state-level
immigration policy changes can differ in different localities. The findings of this study
also highlight the significance of factors relevant to civic capacity, which can impact
immigrants and immigration at the local level. Finally, the study finds that, where locallevel public administrators and civic leaders take the initiative to understand their city's
historical, racial, ethnic, and immigrant dynamics, informants in the community
expressed greater awareness of cross-cultural challenges. The study offers
ii

recommendations for public administrators for improving social equity across cultural
groups, building civic capacity, and building leadership capacity.
The theoretical framework for immigration federalism explains observed
relationships between and among levels of government while taking history and the
realities of local-level diversity into account. The immigration federalism framework is
born of empirical observation and drives theory that is empirically testable, so the
framework as it exists now can be built upon by constructing additional state and locallevel cases and making comparisons. The functionality of this model has implications for
understanding civic capacity and social equity in local jurisdictions and is transferable to
policy domains beyond immigration. Environmental policy, including climate change
policy, health policies such as maternal health policy, and Indian child welfare policy, are
a handful of examples of policy domains for which this model of federalism would be
helpful.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Background for the Study
In the context of federalism in the United States, there is conflict among legal and
political scholars, public administrators, and the general public regarding where authority
lies in immigration policy. Before the Civil War and the Naturalization Act of 1870,
states regulated who could immigrate into their respective jurisdictions (Waters &
Pineau, 2015). Restricted entry was most often related to an individual's lack of property
ownership, actual or perceived ill-health status, or race. From 1870 until 1965, the federal
government wrested authority for immigration regulation from the states, most often
citing federal dominance in immigration based on the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution (Waters & Pineau, 2015). During this period, U.S. immigration policy was
highly restrictive and limited entry to individuals based on national origin through
various legislative acts.
Since the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (also referred to as the HartCeller Act) abolished national origin quotas and replaced earlier restrictive measures with
a visa system, state involvement in immigration policy development and implementation
has returned, albeit at a less autonomous level than before 1870. The return to
immigration federalism and shared or dual responsibilities for immigration policy has
exacerbated institutional and fiscal tensions between the federal and state governments.
Federal-level policy decisions in 1986 (the Immigration Reform and Control Act) and
1996 (the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act) created room
for state participation in immigration enforcement and integration policies while
allocating little federal funding for such participation (Waters & Pineau, 2015).
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Finally, changes to immigration policy made with the movement of Citizenship
and Immigration Services to the Department of Homeland Security after the September
11 terrorist attacks have led many states to involve themselves in immigration policy
development and implementation while the federal government has failed to reach
bipartisan support for further immigration reform. As states push for more autonomy for
immigration policy in their jurisdictions, the courts have responded at times amiably and
at times claiming preemptive rule for the federal level, where states remain frustrated by
what they observe as a lack of federal action on immigration reform.
Authority for immigrant policy remains in question, yet scholars observe a
dramatic increase in state and local-level immigration policy since the turn of the twentyfirst century. There lacks consensus regarding the drivers of such policy. Some scholars
claim demographic change instigates state-level immigration policymaking (Ybarra,
Sanchez, & Sanchez, 2016; Chavez & Provine, 2009; Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013).
Spiro (2001) points more directly to the common assumption that federal-level inaction
on the topic has pushed states to act. Others have looked at industry interests (NicholsonCrotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011) or the political ideology of policymakers and of the
public as playing an integral role in immigration policy initiation and design at the state
level (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015). A number of the scholars cited above have
utilized the Reports on State Immigration Laws compiled annually for all 50 U.S. states
since 2005 by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL, 2020b), a dataset
deemed by these scholars as invaluable to the exploration of contemporary immigration
federalism. All of the elements these scholars point to likely play a role in policy
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decisions surrounding immigration, but an accurate assessment of how and under what
circumstances remains unclear.
The role of political ideology, ideological interest groups, and public opinion in
immigration policy deserves further explanation in the current politically divergent and
emotionally charged public atmosphere because they are potentially linked to changing
demographics across the country. Changing U.S. racial demographics are closely tied to
narratives about immigration across the country and can be linked to various antiimmigrant and pro-white constructions of the issue of immigration today (Hochschild,
2016; Norris, 2018; Root, 2019).
Because immigration policy is inherently attached to a group of people who are
immigrants, the process of identifying a problem and conceiving solutions involves the
framing, or the construction, of a narrative for that group of people. Schneider and
Ingram (1997) argue that the social construction and false or misleading framing involved
in policy design, including implementation, can affect democracy in multiple ways. First,
the resulting framing invariably defines the group regardless of how inaccurate it may be,
thus marking an entire population unfairly. Second, framing creation is vulnerable to the
influence of interest groups serving alternative interests. Third, once institutionalized,
constructed narratives framing a group of individuals are difficult to perceive, much less
alter, increasing inequity in policy implementation.
Interest in immigration federalism present in the scholarly literature mirrors a
presence in grey material such as newspapers, magazines, and online news outlets and is
also represented as a subject for syndicated TV shows and a topic of discussion on social
media. The broad level of interest in immigration policy—and more specifically in
3

understanding how immigration policy is created and implemented in a federalist
context—suggests that the institutional structure for immigration policy is in flux and,
therefore, vulnerable to change. According to Jordan (1993), "self-conscious examination
seems to be a characteristic of systems undergoing change" (p. 45). While inevitable from
a constructionist perspective, institutional change is inherently complex and has real
ramifications for individuals served by those institutions.
Further complicating the understanding of immigration federalism is that the
function of federalism in the United States itself is disputed. Stewart (1982) compiled and
categorized 326 metaphors and models of federalism to illustrate the difficulty scholars
and practitioners have simply thinking about federalist institutions. CunninghamParmeter (2011) describes various perspectives of federalism, including forced
federalism, dual federalism, cooperative federalism, and interactive federalism. Each type
of federalism maintains different assumptions about the relationship between federal and
state or local rulemaking. Incidentally, Wright (1988) criticizes the broad use of
adjectives preceding the term federalism, claiming it interferes with the overall
intergovernmental, or federalist, perspective. For this reason, Wright (1988) argues that
"intergovernmental relations" is a more accurate term for what most scholars label
federalism. The term intergovernmental relations also redirects the focus from
relationships with the federal level toward relationships with more local levels of decision
making and policy implementation.
Immigration policy in the United States is a wicked problem. Rittel & Webber
(1973) define a wicked problem as not solvable. It is impossible to define because
identifying the problem is mainly dependent on the perspective and needs of the group
4

defining it. The history of immigration policy in the United States indicates that the
policy domain has never been free from the pressures and tension created by a plurality
of interests and values. However, like Morgan, Ingle, and Shinn (2019) argue, wicked
problems are becoming more typical in a public landscape made more complex by the
devolution of governance and the rise of interdependence, globalization, and ideological
shifts within and among populations.
The notion of wicked problems creates a new challenge for public administrators
and others tasked with the responsibility to design, interpret, and implement efficient,
effective, and equitable public policy. If unsolvable, then wicked problems "are only resolved—over and over again," Rittel and Webber (1973, p. 168) argue. The implication
for U.S. immigration policy is the recognition that what some deem the immigration
problem, presumably with a (singular) solution, is an ongoing policy issue rather than a
situation fixable with infrequent, albeit drastic, policy shifts. As a wicked problem, U.S.
immigration policy should be managed in an ongoing fashion, an improbable strategy
under the organization of federal-level institutions responsible for immigration policy
development and management (Papademetriou, Aleinikoff, & Meyers, 1998; Jayapal,
2021).
As a domain, immigration policy in the United States is inherently challenging
because of plurality and dogmatic ideologies. Immigration emerged as a national policy
issue through the early twenty-first century, and the Trump administration amplified it
from 2017 through 2020. In the space of four years, the Trump administration banned
nationals of eight mostly majority-Muslim countries and reduced refugee admissions
allowances, increased arrests of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. interior, attempted
5

to cancel Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), ended temporary protected
status for some nationals, and poured funds into building a wall on the United StatesMexico border. Much of this policy occurred via executive order and, therefore, without
bipartisan Congressional support for immigration reform, which creates an ever more
unsure context for federal immigration policy going forward. However, it is essential to
note that earlier administrations, including the Obama and G.W. Bush administrations,
were unsuccessful in achieving immigration reform and led immigration policy through
executive order. A profoundly complex situation reveals itself when the federalist history
and contemporary federalist context of immigration policy are considered.
Without strong Congressional agreement, federal-level immigration policy is left
to the will of the executive administration in power. The contemporary political climate is
growing more polarized, making such bipartisan agreement unlikely soon. While federallevel immigration policy changes from one presidential administration to another, state
policy may temper the effects of federal-level policy changes while simultaneously
responding to the needs and values of the electorate. Compounding the challenge is the
increase in local-level immigrant-related policy, a high level of activity from various
interest groups to affect policy at each level of government, and the issue framing that
occurs when an issue is presented to stakeholders via traditional and modern modes of
communication.
Immigration policy is balanced within a federalist system of institutions that
appears to be reorganizing while the pressures of plurality and public interest intensify. A
precise analysis of contemporary theories of federalism is an integral part of
understanding how immigration federalism has been considered until now. Developing
6

an institutional approach to immigration federalism will most clearly illustrate how
various levels of government interact in the immigration policy domain.
The contemporary context of immigration federalism opens many questions.
There lacks a theoretical framework to understand the federalist dynamic. For example,
how do immigrant individuals at the local level survive and thrive in the face of federal
and state immigration policy presumed by scholars to be driven by 1) ideology, 2)
population change, or 3) industry and other interest groups? Do socially constructed
narratives of immigrants align with beliefs and actions taken by individuals at the local
level? Are we implementing community values within the context of a federalist system?
If so, how does this manifest itself? These questions lead to inquiries about the
institutions of immigration policy. I outline my research agenda and structure in the next
section and follow it with an explanation of the value of this study.
Research Problem
The academic goal of this research was to develop a theoretical framework for
contemporary immigration federalism that identifies immigration policy mechanisms
more accurately than current theories and illustrates complex relationships among levels
of government and policy stakeholders, particularly at the community level. The
framework and the research are organized by three levels of government (local, state, and
federal) and by the three pillars of institutions outlined by Scott (2014) (socio-political,
socio-economic, and socio-cultural). In doing so, the framework incorporates elements
tested by other scholars of immigration federalism and which are deemed significant
causal mechanisms for immigration policy action (e.g., demographic change, political
ideology, industry interests). The research goal was to integrate these aspects of
7

immigration federalism and build a theory that incorporates the level of interaction
inherent to such a complex institutional system.
The framework is divided into three primary levels of government (federal, state,
and local) to understand how immigration policy at one level affects policies and actions
at other levels. The following research questions drive this research:
1) When the history and institutional context of federal, state, and local-level
immigration policy are observed and compared, what conclusions can be drawn
about the impacts and influences of one upon the other?
2) Is immigration policy at the local level generalizable in the United States, or are
local contexts so diverse that generalizations about immigrants and immigration
cannot be reliably constructed?
The following sub-questions help to frame the path toward answers to the first two
questions:
a. What role does historicity have in federal, state, and local-level policy as it relates
to immigrants and immigration?
b. What impact, if any, does demographic change have on civic capacity as it relates
to immigrants and immigration at the local level?
c. What impact, if any, does political ideology have on civic capacity as it relates to
immigrants and immigration at the local level?
d. What impact, if any, do local representation and leadership have on civic capacity
as it relates to immigrants and immigration at the local level?
e. What impact, if any, do local industry and the foreign-born labor force have on
civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration at the local level?
8

f. What are the overarching narratives relating to immigration at the national, state,
and local levels, and do they reflect or conflict with one another?
The strength of the resulting framework will be the ability to observe policy
interactions and shifts in the attitudes and actions of the public and public administrators
among various levels of government between 2005 and 2019 while also illustrating the
current context of immigration federalism as a snapshot of how institutions are
functioning today. The 2005-2019 time period is optimal for representing the current
context of immigration federalism for four reasons.
First, the time frame begins shortly after post-9/11 era changes in immigration
enforcement at the federal level, which invited an increase in state-level participation in
immigration policy and continues to the present. Covering 15 total years of policy
development provides a substantial period for analyzing policy dynamics resulting from
the aforementioned change in federal and state relationships. Second, the NCSL dataset,
which includes all enacted state immigration policies, covers these years (NCSL, 2020b).
The selection of this timeline and this dataset serve my broader interest in exploring the
relevance of the dataset to immigration federalism. Third, an increase in scholarly
publications on state and local-level involvement in immigration policy within this period
reflects its significance to the federalism discussion. Many studies employ the NCSL
dataset, making its use here relevant. Finally, the time period is recent enough that local
actors, including public administrators and community leaders, can refer to it.
The outcome of this research reveals multiple histories and contemporary contexts
driven by the broad differences in the realities and experiences of U.S. communities. One
aspect of analysis for this research is to identify whether an updated history can facilitate
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the development of inferences about the link to narrative, ideology, and policy practices
relating to U.S. immigration or whether the nature of immigration federalism is simply
too complex to achieve such goals. The study explores state and local-level immigration
policy intimately while basing its exploration on a somewhat more static context of
federal immigration policy. Thus, this research offers a new perspective that will
encourage scholars and practitioners to value the knowledge and expertise—even of
complex and controversial policy issues like immigration—deeply rooted in the
community context. While a natural next step for this research would involve an
opportunity to test and operationalize the new model using deductive research strategies,
such an activity is outside the scope of this study.
Significance of this Study
Immigration federalism is a topic receiving substantial interest in scholarly work
and in practice, but it lacks a cohesive and comprehensive theory integrating the
community level. There is little reason to expect sweeping changes in immigration policy
at the federal policy level anytime soon. Because immigration policy is expected to
continue developing in practice via policy formation at multiple levels, an attempt at
comprehensive theory building for improved understanding is worthwhile.
Demographic change in the population, particularly changes in racial
demographics, is a known mechanism for immigration policy initiation and decision
making. By 2050, the U.S. population is projected to be no longer majority white for the
first time in American history. (Frey, 2015), and this fact has already led to various social
and political narratives framing immigrants and immigration in ways that directly impact
immigration policy at federal, state, and local levels. Finally, climate change is expected
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to exacerbate immigration (and migration) issues worldwide, and the United States will
not be immune to the resulting demographic pressures climate change causes (Blitzer,
2019; Ferris, 2015). With these developing challenges in mind, the urgency of the present
study cannot be overemphasized. Perhaps more significant to the field of public
administration, demographic change and its impacts on culture are already prompting
many public sector organizations to take action to increase diversity and cultural
awareness (Nishishiba, 2012).
The research proposed in this study integrates an institutional perspective into the
immigration federalist literature, which assists scholars in viewing the broader federalist
context and reminds us that local interactions between and among individuals and public
administrators are significant to understanding policy development and outcomes.
The research proposed in this study also emphasizes policy’s connection to the
public and highlights the role of governance in balancing tensions rather than resolving
tensions. Current immigration federalism theory typically explores policy in a macrovacuum that stops short of observing affected populations directly, or at least in relation
to the institutions that affect them. Immigration policy decisions at state and local levels
are discussed in the literature. Still, the actions and thoughts of public administrators and
residents are not explored in relationship to the broader institutional context(s).
Constructing a comprehensive theory focusing on the public takes the spotlight off policy
itself and refocuses it on the populations that policy is meant to affect. This approach
provides scholars and others interested in immigration policy with a more efficient and
accurate understanding of the domain.
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Definitions
This research study centers around the capacity of U.S. places to serve
immigrants, the population of individuals in the United States who were not born with
legal U.S. citizenship, regardless of their documentation. This study employs the terms
immigrant and foreign-born individual synonymously. Foreign-born and U.S.-born are
used as adjectives to describe the nativity of individuals in this study because these terms
are frequently used in U.S. Census data to refer to these populations. The U.S.-born label
includes all individuals who have been U.S. citizens since birth, regardless of whether
they were born on U.S. soil or not.
This research study frequently uses standard labels to refer to populations of
specific ethnic and racial backgrounds. In this study, Latino and Hispanic are terms used
interchangeably to refer to individuals in the United States whose common language is
Spanish and whose countries of origin are in Latin America and Spain. This label is
imperfect at best. The decision to use Latino and Hispanic in this work rests in the
resources used for this historical review. Some sources cited for this case study refer to
this minority group as Hispanic while others refer to this group as Latino, so the case
study follows. See Mora (2014) for an in-depth exploration of the term Hispanic in the
United States and Vidal-Ortiz and Martinez (2018) for further discussion regarding the
evolution of Latin American identity, including a more recent term, Latinx, used among
academic and activist circles.
Indigenous American and American Indian are interchangeably used in the
research case studies to refer to those native to the land eventually settled as the United
States. Wherever possible, the names of specific tribes are used in this study. Lastly,
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Anglo refers to white U.S. Americans whose first language is English, regardless of
ethnicity. I chose to use this term in this research because it is common in literature
relaying the history of the American west, the location of my state and local case studies.
Several of my interview informants also used the term to describe their populations. As
with other labels used to delineate populations, it is imperfect. However, the use of the
term throughout this research project by many who self-identify as Anglos gives credence
to its respectful use.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
Federalism in the United States
There can be no question that federalism in the United States is an intentionally
constructed governing system. Before the Constitutional Convention, self-governed U.S.
states struggled to thrive in a union without sufficient authority to levy and collect taxes
and lacked the legitimacy to compel citizens to participate in efforts to support an army.
A national government with the power to do these things as well as to negotiate foreign
relations on behalf of all union members seemed ideal. Yet, existing states remained wary
of what would be lost if they handed control to a unified government.
The founders of the United States and the writers and debaters involved in
constructing the Constitution and, thus, the nation, understood the diverse interests of the
citizenry of their states and localities. Still, they also understood the need to balance
various interests to keep the public peaceful and prosperous (Morgan, Green, Shinn, &
Robinson, 2013). Federalist thought, advocated for by Founders Madison and Hamilton,
relies on procedure, highly trained and elite administrators, and assumes expertise in
policymaking and implementation (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson, 2013). Federalist
governing practices are intended to protect society from the tyranny of the majority and
from dictatorial leadership through a complex system of checks and balances and
multiple branches of government. Anti-federalist thought, most notably supported by the
Founder Jefferson, views democratic governance from a bottom-up perspective, valuing
local governance that involves citizen participation and decision making (Morgan, Green,
Shinn, & Robinson, 2013). The U.S. federalist system incorporates the anti-federalist
value of local knowledge and participation into governing while at the same time
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entrusting the federal government with the authority to manage particular affairs as
outlined in the Constitution.
Morgan, Green, Shinn, and Robinson (2013) point out that the U.S. Constitution
is flexible, although challenging to change. This flexibility intentionally allows for
interpretations to change with the needs of the people in a given time (p. 73). The
nation’s Founders recognized that the proper form of government depends on the values
and character of the people, which invariably change over time (Morgan, Green, Shinn,
& Robinson, 2013, p. 3). The Constitution divides authority among three branches of
government. It outlines the extent of the federal government's authority, but in a federalist
context, the boundaries of this authority are often unclear and frequently tested. The
conflicting notions of federalism and anti-federalism are still alive and well among the
U.S. citizenry today, as reflected in the fact that many Americans continue to participate
actively in their local communities. Yet, they remain frustrated with organized politics,
especially the national government (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson, 2013).
To build on the ambiguity of boundaries of authority, U.S. Courts since the 1990s
have been observed to interpret the Constitution in such a way that provides states with a
more substantial role to play in the U.S. federalist system (Morgan, Green, Shinn, &
Robinson, 2013). This point illustrates how the separation of powers into three branches
of government can continuously shift the federalist context in one direction or another.
Shifting roles at the state level invariably results in increased tension and confusion in
policymaking at other levels of government; this is a symptom of any system in flux.
Single-issue interest groups often take advantage of the tension and confusion of a system
in flux to influence policy decisions at various levels of government and multiple points
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of policymaking. At the local level, however, the experience of the public remains
unchanged, and the likeliness that the public is aware of or interested in shifting roles
within the governance system is low, especially when the anti-federalist propensity of the
people to distrust organized government is considered.
The preference for local-level policy-making is strong throughout the United
States. While participatory and collaborative governing processes are still nascent in
many localities, their value for managing challenging policy decisions grows stronger
(Sirianni, 2009). However, Morgan, Green, Shinn, and Robinson (2013) remind us of the
added challenge of hyperpluralism, where the persuasive power and flexibility of singleissue interest groups can undermine the capacity of citizens to think and act with the
larger community in a manner more conducive to the common good (p. 75). Colbern and
Ramakrishnan (2021) outline the perceived “dark side” of U.S. federalism as an agent of
racial and other inequities (p. 6) while also highlighting the relatively robust literature
covering progressive federalism, which understands that “states serve as political and
policy laboratories that function to advance the rights and interests of disenfranchised
populations” (p. 9).
The historical context of U.S. federalism notwithstanding, Krane (1993) observes
little convergence between policy studies and federalism, arguing that federalism is rarely
integrated into models of policy formation. Furthermore, Krane (1993) argues that the
states’ role is not recognized among public policy scholars as having the policy impact
that scholars of federalism know states to have.
Federalism is a complex and dynamic system. Three levels of government
negotiate their respective policy-making authority within this system of shared power.
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More than 560 federally recognized sovereign Indian Nations in the United States play a
role in the U.S. federalist system (Wilkinson, 2005). And while not governing bodies,
interest groups and related policy-making opportunists will invariably present themselves
in a system as dynamic as the federalist system for the benefit of their respective causes.
Theories of Immigration Federalism
A thorough history of immigration policy throughout the nineteenth century
illustrates the development of the federal government’s interest and power in immigration
policy. It explains the “continually contested division of labor” between national-level
and state and local-level governments (Law, 2013, p. 3). Contemporary scholars of
immigration federalism explore two aspects: (1) types of immigration federalism that
express the policy-making relationships between federal and subnational governments
and (2) recent shifts in the U.S. federalism context due to globalization.
Spiro (2001) outlines the nature of central government hegemony, cooperative
federalism, and devolutionary federalism as they relate to immigration federalism and
argues that the United States, once a central government hegemony, is now functioning
under cooperative federalism. The cooperative federalist model allows for some level of
policy-making participation from subnational entities (i.e., states), although the central
government maintains primary policy-making power. Spiro (2001) points to the 1996
immigration reform act as an effective changer of the U.S. institutional context for
immigration policy because, under this law, states and localities are invited to play a role
in defining eligibility for some services.
Spiro (2001) illustrates the strength of local sentiment in passing immigration
policy at the federal level. California’s Proposition 187 passed in 1994 and prohibited
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undocumented individuals from using many state public services, including public
schools and healthcare. The policy was never enacted because courts found it
unconstitutional, but Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 only two years later. This federal-level legislation targeted
undocumented immigrants and expanded how states and local governments could
coordinate with federal enforcement agencies to enforce immigration policies. With this
in mind, Spiro (2001) suggests that even in a central government hegemony state, U.S.
immigration policy is impacted by state and local sentiments.
The author asks if further unwinding authority for immigration policy to the state
and local levels to the point of devolutionary federalism is possible and preferable, noting
two institutional constructs whose changes may impact immigration federalism. With
today's less hostile foreign relations context, Spiro (2001) argues, national-level
immigration controls intended to manage contentious foreign relations issues are no
longer necessary. In addition, state and local-level decisions are less likely to be
interpreted as national-level decisions by an act of extension than they would likely have
been in the past. Given the shifts in institutional constructs and the United State’s history
of local influence in immigration policymaking, Spiro (2001) predicts greater immigrant
rights with devolution to a shift of greater authority to the local level.
Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) rejects the notion of states as “laboratories of
democracy” in the context of immigration federalism (p. 1673). In the article,
Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) describes the functionality of governance constructs under
dual federalism and cooperative federalism, two constructs common among federalist
scholars. Under dual federalism, the federal government and states each have authority.
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The boundaries between what falls to the federal government's purview and what falls to
states are evident. States act as sovereigns in this model of federalism. Under cooperative
federalism, states work in service to the federal government, primarily delivering services
and carrying out federal programs. In this fashion of federalism, state governments have
little authority regarding policy development and act not as sovereigns but as servants.
Cunningham-Parmeter’s (2011) findings claim that states cannot act as sovereigns
because they act under the constraints of federal policy. This fact alone prevents states
from acting with sovereignty, but constraints also hamper state innovation on many
levels. States do not work as servants Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) claims since they
often act in defiance of the wishes and mandates of the federal government. Analyzing
the functions of federalism through the domain of immigration policy, CunninghamParmeter (2011) describes a different context altogether.
Forced federalism, Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) claims, is “a division of powers
between the two levels of government in which subnational jurisdictions attempt to force
the federal government to accept state-defined immigration enforcement schemes” (p.
1673), and comes as a result of the devolution of enforcement responsibilities to state and
local governments. Spiro (2001) highlights this in his example of California’s influence
on federal immigration policy. However, Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) argues this type
of federalism is often ineffective as a bottom-up policymaking strategy. Instead, forced
federalism creates a context in which state governments attempt to push their preferred
policies on the federal government while being limited by federal requirements in their
policy creation. Overall, Cunningham-Parmeter (2011) describes a context for
immigration federalism that is both limiting and uncooperative.
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Globalization, and therefore transnational politics, directly impacts U.S.
immigration and policy. Yet, at the same time, local communities are experiencing
immigration from a perspective of local—not transnational—politics. Rosenblum (2004)
observes a difference in policymaking at national and grassroots levels that results in
different immigration policies at each level. The author introduces a two-level policy
production “game” that illustrates this difference in policymaking and illuminates a stark
contrast among the policy focus of various governing levels.
Rodriguez (2008) appears to support the notion of contrasting policy directions
explored by Rosenblum (2004), stating, “global forces, as exemplified by the migration
of people across borders, are putting pressure on the national in ways that require
multiple forms of disaggregated decision making” (p. 642). Here, Rodriguez (2008)
expresses her understanding that globalization has led to a more significant divergence in
the interests and responsibilities of national and local-level policymakers, a notion that
shows the author to be a strong proponent of conferring greater authority to the local
level where immigration policy is concerned.
Papademetriou, Aleinikoff, and Meyers (1998) take a functional approach to
immigration federalism and argue that the location of immigration policymaking
institutions at the federal level, both historically and at the time of publication, were too
stratified and, therefore, too weak for consistent and effective policymaking. This is in
line with Neuman's (1993) and Law’s (2013) historical reviews. Papademetriou,
Aleinikoff, and Meyers (1998) argue for the nation’s immigration function to be
consolidated in a single agency dedicated to immigration policymaking. While a shift of
the immigration functions at the federal level occurred in 2003, the institutions
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responsible for immigration policy continue to be stratified across three separate agencies
within the Department of Homeland Security. Jayapal (2021) outlines strategies for
reorganizing immigration functions for more efficient and effective service and
emphasizes the value of creating a cabinet-level department for immigration services and
integration.
Theories of State-Level Immigration Policy
The steam-valve theory is an early theory claiming to predict the development of
state-level immigration policy. The steam-valve theory assumes that demographic
changes at the local level cause disruptions and tension among groups of citizens (Spiro,
2001). This tension rises to the state level, where politicians are pressured to provide
relief in the form of policy changes, in large part, it is argued, because of federal inaction.
Therefore, state immigration policymaking serves as a steam valve, releasing tension felt
at the local level by providing some semblance of political response to the stress citizens
feel. Once released, citizens begin to normalize their new demographic reality, and the
pressure at the state level is relieved for the time being (Spiro, 2001).
The polarization change model introduces an alternative theory (Gulasekaram &
Ramakrishnan, 2015). The polarization change model states that demographic changes
have little to do with state immigration policy and that, instead, the dominant state
political ideology drives immigration policy (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015).
Under the polarization change model, state immigration policy is initiated by
ideologically driven interest groups that target states with similar ideological views. The
process counts on the federal government’s inaction since action on immigration policy at
the federal level would potentially hinder the work of the interest groups at the state level.
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The polarization change model reflects policy process theories such as multiple
streams and punctuated equilibrium since interested actors seek to enter into a state
policy-making context at the right time to integrate their pre-packaged policy options into
the system. Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) note that the federalist context
provides many places for issue entrepreneurs to shop and test their ideas (p. 93). So the
authors’ observation of ideologically driven immigration policy development extends to
the local and state levels. Issue entrepreneurs are, for Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan
(2015), individuals who are closely connected to political actors and who seek to change
policy by framing challenges, disseminating information (sometimes disinformation), and
networking across jurisdictions (p. 97), and they are a crucial element to the functionality
of the polarization change model.
Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) argue that weighting state-level restrictive
and integrative immigration policies equally is an error. Restrictive policies, the authors
argue, are born of group stereotypes and misperceptions and are typically structured to
impact specific groups. In contrast, integrative policies tend to be structured for universal
impact and avoid the harms of identifying particular groups based on stereotypes and
misperceptions. In a context more ideologically driven as the political context responds to
demographic changes, policy framing plays a more significant role in understanding the
institutional context of state-level immigration policy (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan,
2015).
A weak point in both the steam-valve theory and the polarization change model
involves their place in the policy process itself. While the steam-valve theory suggests
that local demographic changes initiate state immigration policy action, it does little to
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describe the process and policy decisions themselves. The theory has little to say
regarding whether demographic changes of a particular type or intensity result in more or
less restrictive or integrative policy. The polarization change model argues that different
state ideologies will result in more or less restrictive or integrative state policies. Still, the
details regarding how policy change is initiated are less clear. The theory suggests that
issue entrepreneurs act as initiators but work in those states ideologically primed for their
success. Yet, the process of framing challenges and disseminating (dis)information
requires several additional actors, not all of whom are likely to submit to the claims and
requests of issue entrepreneurs.
Research intending to describe and understand state immigration policy related to
immigration federalism has increased along with the expansion of state immigration
policymaking in the past decades. I reviewed one group of such studies, which I will
discuss in the next section. The review reveals a wide variety of research interests and
findings, emphasizing the need for more theorizing and structured discussion. Existing
theoretical explanations for immigration federalism deserve further exploration.
Understanding State-level immigration Policy Drivers
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL, 2020b) has published
yearly reports covering state legislation, including resolutions related to immigration and
immigrants for all 50 states since 2005. The data are available to the public and are
presumed to be comprehensive, giving scholars and individuals interested in exploring
state-level immigration policy decision-making a dataset covering 13 years of state
legislation. Several scholars have employed this NCSL dataset as an assessment tool for
state immigration policy analysis. Yet, the lack of cohesive theory and the lack of
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inspection of the broader context of federalism (most studies look at state policy
concerning federal policy or state policy concerning other state policies) leaves some
question about the utility of research outcomes.
A recent search for academic policy research employing the NCSL data resulted
in 14 studies published between 2005 and 2017. These studies are reviewed in-depth in
this section to outline the perceived value of the NCSL dataset in understanding
immigration federalism and the broad and sometimes disjointed theoretical context in
which scholars are working on the subject.
Four studies are Ph.D. dissertations (Hendrick, 2017; Marquez, 2017; Silva, 2016;
De Trinidad Young, 2018), and one is a published book (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan
2015), while the remainder are articles published in peer-reviewed journals. The studies
all join the NCSL data with additional data relating to demographics, citizen and
legislator political ideology, health statistics, or other population-related statistics as
called for in individual studies. Therefore, census data, American Community Survey
data, citizen ideology scores, and several other data sources were employed for various
projects.
All the studies recognized the need to differentiate restrictive legislation from
integrative legislation, although the terms used for these policy types varied in the
literature. The purpose of the studies also varied to some extent, thus impacting research
outcomes. Four studies looked at the impact of legislation on immigrants, while the
remainder focused on the causes or triggers of state immigration policy decision-making.
Two studies explored the effect of restrictive immigration policy on demographics
(Leerkes, Leech, & Backmeier, 2012; Carter-Chau, 2012), while two others explored the
24

impact state immigration legislation had on health outcomes (De Trinidad Young, 2018)
and immigrant homeownership (Allen & Ishizawa, 2015). In their findings, both Leerkes,
Leech, and Backmeier (2012) and Carter-Chau (2012) claim that there is no substantial
evidence that restrictive immigration policies affect demographic change. States with
more restrictive state immigration policies do not observe a decrease in immigrants
moving in, nor do they cause immigrants to move out of those states.
Newton and Adams (2009) questioned the nature of immigration federalism by
asking whether state immigration legislation indicates cooperation or conflict with the
immigration policies of the federal government. The authors claim that states appear to
cooperate with federal policies rather than in conflict with them in their findings. While
the authors point out that “even states that have taken the hardest line on immigration—
Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, and Oklahoma—all have passed laws that attempt to
increase cooperation with federal authorities” (p. 426), they do not take into account the
fact that it will likely be those states who take the hardest line with immigration policy
who choose to work with the federal government for enforcement purposes. Newton and
Adams (2009) point out that conflict exists predominantly around fiscal matters, which
makes sense given the proliferation of unfunded mandates from the federal level
(including in areas other than immigration). Newton and Adams (2009) is the only study
in the review group that directly explores the relationship between state immigration
policy and federal immigration policy. Its results are found unsupportive of assumptions
claiming that states work in defiance of federal policy or out of frustration of federal
inaction.
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Another study in the review group focuses on public opinion and interest groups
and claims that these institutions shape immigration policy at the state level (Hendrick
2017). It appears, however, that the influence of these factors is inversely related. The
author states, “where interest groups were strong and active, policy climates tended to be
more welcoming. Where they were weak, public opinion dominated the tone of the
immigration policy climate” (p. 116). This statement also indicates that public opinion is
more likely to lead to restrictive or unwelcome policy than policy influenced by strong
interest groups. This research outcome appears in tension with other studies, including
Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan’s (2015) polarization change model, which suggest that
interest groups play a significant role in disseminating ideological perspectives like the
ones theorized to drive state immigration policy (which is restrictive as often as it is
integrative). Reconsidering the impact of public opinion and interest groups on state
immigration policy outcomes with the guidance of a more comprehensive theory
describing immigration federalism would improve our understanding of the influence of
these factors on policy.
Both Preuhs (2005) and Silva (2016) examined how citizen initiatives, a common
tool of direct democracy, effectively curbed minority representation and immigration
rights. It should be noted that Preuhs (2005) employed earlier NCSL data covering the
years 1984-2002 and focused only on “English only” laws in the states. While the data
used by Preuhs (2005) is not included in the dataset currently accessible to the public, the
methods and questions are in line with other studies discussed in this section.
Five of the remaining studies (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015; Chavez &
Provine, 2009; Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013; Marquez, 2017; Ybarra, Sanchez, &
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Sanchez, 2016) were interested in understanding the drivers of immigration
policymaking, or policy decisions, seeking primarily to identify whether demographic
change or ideology acted as a strong driver of state immigration policy decisions. The
focus on ideology and demographic change reflects the two overarching theories of
immigration federalism discussed in the previous section. Of the five studies reviewed,
four stated that demographic change is the driving force behind immigration policy at the
state level. One of these studies argues that citizen ideology is as influential as
demographic change, while another claims citizen ideology does not affect immigration
policy. The Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) study claims state political ideology
is the driver. Most of the scholars focusing on demographic change limited their
exploration to changes in the Hispanic population of states. However, some studies also
employed more comprehensive foreign-born statistics as a constant variable.
The final study in the review group considers the strength of industry in
influencing state-level U.S. immigration policy and finds industry influence to be more
significant to policy outcomes than citizen ideology and public opinion (NicholsonCrotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011). Another important finding in this research is that state
immigration policy is as likely to benefit immigrant groups as it is to attempt to restrict
them.
This review does not discuss statistical outcomes for specific studies in the group,
but noting the reported outcomes substantiates the following argument calling for more
attention to theorizing before modeling factors for state immigration policy outcomes.
While all the reviewed studies employed quantitative inferential analysis using the NCSL
dataset, only ten included details relating to the statistical results in the publications.
27

Model variances for these studies varied widely and were reported as low as .17,
explaining a mere 17% of the model variance. This is not unexpected in social science
research. Still, the variety of variables explored in the review group indicates room for
improvement with greater focus and a more developed theoretical perspective.
The review of these studies clarifies two critical factors relating to understanding
immigration federalism and state immigration policy in particular. On the one hand, there
is significant and broad-based interest in understanding the role of states in immigration
policy, both in terms of their position within the institution of U.S. federalism and more
directly in their relationship to local institutions and civil society. It also appears that the
NCSL dataset has proven a valuable tool in analyses relating to state immigration policy.
On the other hand, the studies represent multiple models for testing the influence of
various variables relating to the development of state immigration policy (to name only
those defined as significant influencers in the studies in this review group: state political
ideology, citizen ideology, Hispanic population change, non-Hispanic white population
change, foreign-born health outcomes, U.S.-born health outcomes, foreign-born
population change, Hispanic homeownership, Asian homeownership, legislative
professionalism, minority representation among state legislators, citizen initiatives,
industry influences). To develop their respective models for analysis, researchers employ
various theories, culling from legal, political, and other social science resources and
outlining support and direction for their work. While this process is valid and well tested
throughout the history of social science research and practice, there also comes a time
when substantial interest in a topic area builds enough literature to go the next step in
theory development.
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Furthermore, to date, there is a growing number of publications and dissertations
focusing on the role of state-level legislation in the immigration policy arena. But in a
federalist system, the state cannot be discussed in isolation of the federal and local policy
spaces related to it. While there is value in examining state-level immigration policy in
isolation for some purposes, it does not help make claims about how state policies
interact within the greater federalist context and how they affect the overall perspectives
on federal or local immigration. For a broader picture of the context of immigration
federalism, exploring institutions at all levels of government and creating an institutional
structure from which one can more accurately theorize the challenges, opportunities, and
existing relationships in the functioning of immigration federalism will be helpful.
Local Immigration Policy
Rodriguez (2008) and Parlow (2007) argue for greater authority to manage
immigration policy at the local level, citing the nature of plurality in the United States
and the inherent difficulty in creating policy to fit every locality as a driver for this
preference. This notion reflects the anti-federalist impressions of citizen-centered
policymaking espoused by Jefferson (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson, 2013). The
legal argument against such devolution of immigration policy to local or even state levels
can be linked to an interpretation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
While the federal government is typically assumed to hold total authority over U.S.
immigration policy based on a preemptive structural interpretation of the Supremacy
Clause, Huntington (2008) outlines an argument that supports initial authority for
immigration policy at both the local and state levels, leaving preemptive powers to the
federal level only when deemed necessary or desired. The presence of this legal
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perspective in the immigration federalism literature makes room for broader discussions
about the role of various levels of government in immigration policy decision-making.
Still, it does not help define or frame the institutional context in which immigration
federalism exists today.
Rodriguez (2008) argues that local immigration regulations, including state and
municipal regulations, carry greater significance in contemporary and global contexts
than in the past. While the author does not discount the federal government’s role in
controlling who may and may not enter the country, she warns against taking federalist
norms for granted in a changing and increasingly global context. “Strong local
institutions and local power have become necessary,” Rodriguez (2008) claims, “both to
integrate immigrants into the body politic and to manage the human and social
consequences of a federal immigration policy full of contradictions” (p. 641).
Lynch’s (2011) examination of U.S. incarceration rates through a federalist lens
illustrates the extent to which even micro-locale matters when it comes to framing
criminal policy “premised on and promulgated by a single, local, sensationalized, crime
case” (p. 683). Miller (2008) points to such framing as a clear equity issue and argues that
only local-level criminal justice policy reforms will serve disproportionately victimized
and targeted minority populations who lack influence at higher levels of the
policymaking process. The federalist perspective of criminal law is considered in this
review because it is a fitting parallel to immigration law due to similarities in their
impacts on minority populations.
A critical perspective on immigration federalism and the consequences of the
devolution of authority to state and local governments is expressed by Varsanyi (2008),
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who argues that the nature of devolution limits states and communities to discriminate
against immigrants rather than develop innovative policy fitting of their communities.
The unwinding of responsibility for immigration policy to lower levels of government
provides an opportunity for individual localities to either provide sanctuary or become
more exclusive in their immigration policies, thus, discriminating in a fashion once
reserved for the federal government alone (Varsanyi, 2008, p. 892). Varsanyi (2008)
argues that this effectively creates a second class of citizens, which, the author notes,
works against the democratic values of the United States and poses challenges to equity.
Reich (2019) and Farris and Holman (2017) also examine the nature of
policymaking at the state and local levels and find potential for institutional divergence in
the face of federal level inaction. Broad policy differences and policy conflict are likely
in a context where states and smaller communities are granted authority to—or lack
penalty of—independent immigration policymaking (Reich, 2019).
Where Varsanyi (2008) posits that devolution of authority to lower levels of
government makes it more likely that those governments will discriminate against
immigrants, Reich (2019) frames a context in which lower levels of government make
policies they deem necessary in the absence of coordinated action from the federal level.
Either way, the persistence of immigration policymaking at lower levels leads to two
challenges over time: the federal government consistently loses validity as the controller
of immigration policy, and the high instance of variability from one locale to the next
becomes long-lasting through institutionalization.
Conlan and Posner’s (2016) study of the effects of growing partisanship on
federalism focuses on policy differences in states becoming institutionalized. The authors
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introduce the notion of “variable speed federalism” (Conlan and Posner, 2016, p. 299), in
which the federal government permits states to act on new policies at their own pace.
This creates a context in which the federal government allows for more significant
divergence with the intention of reaching policy convergence among states over time.
Conlan and Posner (2016) argue this practice could lead, instead, to the
institutionalization of state policy differences.
Public attitudes and opinions are most salient at the local level. Farris and
Homan’s (2017) findings that a sheriff’s ideology and personal characteristics play a
significant role in shaping their attitudes around immigration and, therefore, directly
affect their decisions relating to immigration policy enforcement serve to exemplify the
overwhelming power some individuals have in immigration policy implementation at the
local level.
Local immigration policy perspectives illustrate the tension among governing
institutions in a federalist state while highlighting the ability of such a system to
overcome inevitable contradictions by allowing multiple forms of disaggregated
decision-making to occur at various levels of government (Rodriguez, 2008). Rodriguez
(2008) calls for a shift in thinking about federalist institutions, arguing against increased
control of immigration policy beyond authorization for entry at the federal level and for
greater appreciation of local immigration policymaking. Schuck (2007a) concurs,
suggesting that Congress leaves to the states the authority to manage “employment-based
admissions, enforcement, and employer sanctions” (p. 59). State immigration policies,
Schuck (2007a) argues, tend to be less hostile to immigrants than policies passed by
Congress, and they tend to reflect state interests more directly.
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Meeting Rodriguez’s (2008) call for greater reliance on state and local
immigration policy requires a broader understanding of immigration policy decision
making and exchange at the state and local levels, which, invariably, also requires a
deeper understanding of institutional aspects of state and local-level policymaking
relating to immigration.
Institutions and Polity
Immigration is a value-laden issue in the United States and globally.
Understanding how values relating to the issue are constructed and then reified requires
an awareness of institutions and the local context in which they exist. Scott (2014) views
institutions as the organizers of social life. They maintain our traditions and customs and
help us navigate social interactions, whether public or private. In essence, institutions
shape societal values. However, traditions, customs, and values do not come out of
nowhere. Members of society construct them. The social construction of knowledge
claims that reality and knowledge result from a dialectical relationship between society
and the members of that society (Berger and Luckmann, 1967). Through interaction,
individuals and society create meaning together, resulting in shared world views, values,
and norms. This meaning is ever-evolving, assuming interaction is continuous. Ideas are
shared and, once habituated, become integrated into societal expectations so firmly to
become taken for granted and, thus, institutionalized (Scott, 2014).
The explanation above illustrates the evolution of ideas into institutionalized
assumptions and the dialectic nature of the relationship between individuals in society
and the institutions in which they live their lives. Still, it does little to explain how
assumptions, expectations, and political perspectives can so greatly diverge that it feels as
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if they have been constructed in different realities. Selznick (1994) takes on a naturalist
perspective that posits values emerge or are discovered rather than imposed upon an
individual or group.
Therefore, institutions do not exist autonomously from the people for the purpose
of framing their norms and values. Instead, as is in line with the dialectical nature of
social construction, the public experiences existing institutions in the context of their own
broader expertise, and from that, their values emerge, ready to be pressed back onto the
institutions in the process of legitimating (or challenging) those institutions as they stand.
Similarly, Perrin (2014) argues that government and institutions form the constraints
within which citizens derive meaning and develop values and norms (p. 12). The social
construction of knowledge contends that meaning and value are constructed in a
dialectical context where the institutions forming constraints are continuously reified as
citizens interact with, and at the same time, are shaped by the same institutional
conditions (Berger and Luckmann, 1976).
There is little reason to expect interactions between institutions and residents of a
large urban area to emulate the interactions between institutions and those living in very
rural areas. The federalist system allows such localities to implement policy according to
their unique values. This is a fact, Selznick (1994) argues, that results in federal and statelevel policies that become functionally different policies at the local level. The
institutions managing policies are, in turn, different because they are based on different
values and norms and because they serve different populations.
Morgan, Green, Shinn, and Robinson (2013) emphasize the importance of the role
of public administrators and public servants in the local context since they are the arbiters
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of local values and norms at the institutional level. Frederickson (2010) also emphasizes
the public administrator’s role in equitable policy interpretation and implementation.
Those providing services have a unique position in the institutional dialectic because they
serve the public while also representing the institutions themselves, a particularly
challenging task in increasingly diverse and demographically changing jurisdictions.
A similar notion of dialectic is also present in Perrin (2014), who asserts
citizenship is a social process resulting from mutual obligations between a society and
members of that society (p. 12). Perrin (2014) views democracy as a cultural and social
construct that only later becomes political in nature, thus, emphasizing a polity
perspective. Polity refers to the interorganizational relationships that facilitate service
delivery in a resource-tight and network governance context, and polity-making is the
process of constructing and maintaining these relationships (Morgan, Green, Shinn, &
Robinson, 2013). The result is a complex combination of systems and relationships in
which public administrators must interpret embedded values and norms by making
meaning out of the confusion of polity. Only with shared meaning will public
administrators and citizens be able to work together toward common goals. Without a
shared meaning of governance and its processes, communities are more likely to find
meaning and create value elsewhere, sometimes with incongruent and inequitable goals
as a result.
A necessary element of functional polity and successful meaning-making is a
healthy civil society. Civil society consists of various informal organizations and
programs that fill in service gaps where governance has not (Morgan, Green, Shinn, &
Robinson, 2013). These informal institutions also provide an essential conduit for citizens
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to engage in social activities and participate in meaning-making and value construction.
Putnam (2000) and Skocpol (2003) find evidence that Americans are participating in
voluntary associations and other informal institutions with less frequency than in the past,
which is problematic for the health of civil society, particularly in the disjointed context
of immigration federalism. Again, only by engaging with polity do citizens have the
opportunity to share in meaning-making.
Through civic engagement, citizens declare their commitment as members of
society and agree to a shared system of governance (Perrin, 2014, p. 50; Morgan, Green,
Shinn, & Robinson., 2013, p. 49). Perrin (2014) further develops the complexity of
citizens’ role in meaning-making from their position in civil society, observing that
citizen preferences originate not from wanting but from wanting to want; thus, citizens
project the values of a group or community they may not yet be a member of (p. 61). The
author argues that by engaging in political activities that reflect the person they believe
they are or want to be, citizens help to evolve social reality in accordance with their
perceived group identity (Perrin, 2014, p. 77). This process can strengthen shared values
within civil society and ties directly to discussions surrounding the integration of
immigrants in local communities (Waters & Pineau, 2015).
Civic capacity is the ability for a community to face change and solve problems in
ways that influence the impact of change (Morgan, Green, Shinn, & Robinson., 2013, p.
49). Civic capacity includes not only social capital (Putnam, 2000) but also the social
requirements for successful democratic governance, thus, representing the relationship
among polity, a healthy civil society, and all participants (Shinn, 1999). Perhaps the most
challenging aspect concerning civic capacity is that it is best observed when values and
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norms are being tested in times of change. Public Administrators will find the need to
construct associations and build trust in the polity-making world to ensure that civic
capacity is robust and resilient. Public administrators can facilitate civic capacity by
facilitating trust and participation in informal organizations (increasing social capital),
developing the level of citizen commitment and awareness (improving civic
competency), and encouraging a willingness to act creatively and with flexibility
(building civic enterprise) (Shinn, 1999).
Changing demographics across the United States challenge public administrators’
role in fostering civic capacity on all levels. Because the effects of history play a
significant role in meaning-making, the values and norms that a locality embodies have
roots in institutions constructed so far in the past that community members are not aware
of where they originate. Sometimes these influences become ideologies of which
individuals are hardly aware and that harm integrative community building.
Institutions and Institutional Change
Scott (2014) outlines the three pillars of institutions, including the regulative,
normative, and cultural-cognitive. He argues that the three elements are integral to the
success of an institution and its legitimacy. The three elements and their respective
rationale for legitimacy illustrate the different ways in which an organization may come
to a decision (“complying out of expedience, from a moral obligation, or because its
members cannot conceive of alternative ways of acting,” Powell, 2007, p. 2). The
institutional mechanisms are present in varying degrees over time, and institutional
analysis requires understanding which mechanisms are serving to reinforce or deteriorate
the prevailing institutional order at a given time (Powell, 2007).
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This could be challenging in the federalist U.S. context since understanding the
institutional position of each of the 50 states is a great task. Furthermore, immigration
policy has never been central to federal policy, meaning that the offices responsible for
immigration policy are not housed within the same agency, a fact bemoaned by scholars
interested in functional immigration reform (Papademetriou, Aleinikoff, & Meyers,
1998). Is, then, federal immigration policy subject to an overarching institution of control
and command at the federal level? And, if so, what does that mean?
The Regulative Pillar
The regulative pillar is defined by the extent to which institutions constrain and
regularize behavior, most often employing coercive mechanisms related to rule-setting,
monitoring, and sanctioning activities (Scott, 2014, p. 59). Regulative processes are
legally sanctioned, providing them legitimacy while also engendering the fear of guilt in
actors. Examples of the regulatory pillar at work in immigration policy exist heavily at
the federal level, where requirements for obtaining a visa and eligibility for naturalization
are the basis for legal processes. At the state level, policies relating to driver’s licenses
and occupational licensing fall into the arena of the regulative pillar. A challenge to the
regulative pillar, of course, is the cost of monitoring for compliance and the enforcement
for incompliance. This challenge is observed in discussions about the estimated 10.5
million undocumented immigrants in the United States (Budiman, 2020).
Institutional theorists argue that the regulative pillar may be functional for
outlining values and collective interest through coercive, legal mechanisms. Still, they
suggest reliance on the mechanisms of the normative and cultural-cognitive pillars may
be more functional than coercive mechanisms for obtaining compliance (Scott, 2014, p.
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62). In this way, the pillars work together to maintain the structure and integrity of the
institution.
The Normative Pillar
The normative pillar is based on a collective sense of social obligation and
appropriateness. Where the regulative pillar is legally sanctioned, the normative pillar is
morally governed and induces feelings of shame or honor depending on how actions
relate to norms (Scott, 2014). Under the normative pillar, behaviors are expected
according to norms typically codified in certification and accreditation processes. While
such documents do not legally bind individuals to act in a particular manner, they
represent the collective concept of what is right and good.
Inherent in values and norms is the development of roles particular to specific
individuals in society (Scott, 2014). Roles serve as societally defined prescriptions about
what an individual in a particular position should do and how. While the normative pillar
can be constraining, it is also empowering because values and norms grant rights and
responsibilities and privileges and duties to individuals across society (Scott, 2014, p.
64). Advocates of the normative perspective place shared values and norms as the
foundation of human collectivism and institutionalization, or overall social order.
What happens to the integrity of institutions, then, in the context of social
plurality? Where values and norms drift apart to the extreme, how do states and local
public administrators understand their mandate to fulfill the normative expectations of
their positions? Does the presence of active interest groups affect the determination of
policy outcomes? Immigration policy is a distinctly well-positioned policy domain for
exploring such questions in the United States.
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The Cultural-Cognitive Pillar
Compliance under the cultural-cognitive pillar is based on a shared understanding
that is taken for granted. Participants only assume that beliefs and logics of action are
shared due to orthodoxy and habit. Actions under the cultural-cognitive pillar are
legitimized by being universally recognized and culturally supported (Scott, 2014). Social
construction is observable at the institutional level through the cultural-cognitive pillar of
institutions. Scott (2014) links cultural and cognitive influences to the construction of
reality when he states, “internal interpretive processes are shaped by external cultural
frameworks” (p. 67).
Social roles are perceived differently by theorists supporting the culturalcognitive perspective than by normative theorists (Scott, 2014). The cultural-cognitive
perspective argues that roles develop as the result of an interrelationship between existing
roles present in a given institution and the individuals who fill those roles; the theory
presumes that the individuals taking on the roles will act following their interpretation of
the set obligations and actions that come with that role. In this sense, an individual’s
internal understanding of a role affects the expected outcome.
This shared construction of reality in an institutional setting does not rely solely
on the institutional interpretation of a role, on the one hand, and an individual’s
interpretation, on the other hand. If this were the case, it could be assumed that in a
context such as that under U.S. federalism, different states and localities would, over
time, develop vastly different understandings of their social reality. It must be
remembered that “wider institutional frameworks that provide prefabricated organizing
models and scripts” operate at various stages of the social structure (Scott, 2017, p. 69).
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Federalism as an institution serves to constrain the cultural-cognitive pillar in one way,
and diffusion and adaptation of policy from state to state and from locality to locality
serve as mechanisms for maintaining or sharing interpretations across jurisdictions.
The Three Pillars of Institutions
Scott (2014) emphasizes that, while some theorists focus on an individual pillar to
frame their perspective on institutions, the reality is that all three pillars are typically at
work in institutional forms, albeit at different levels. The author argues that, where the
three pillars are aligned, an institution is likely to be stable and its strength tremendous.
However, where the pillars are not aligned, interest groups and other political influences
can utilize resources available via a given pillar to pursue their interest, potentially
leading to institutional change (Scott, 2014, p. 71).
Minimal literature integrates institutional effects into immigration federalism
research. Silva (2016) and Preuhs (2005) explore the influence of institutional rules at the
state level, finding that referendum policies directly affect immigration policy. Still,
neither of these studies analyze the effects of the state-level referendum process as it
relates to federal or local contexts of immigration policy. Jiang (2018) aptly explores
institutional dynamics in Illinois and Arizona and notes how state-level institutional
dynamics in immigration policymaking have been influenced by federal-level
institutional action in the courts. The local-level institutional context is left unmentioned.
The current state of immigration policy in the United States leaves institutions
vulnerable to change. As regulatory changes become less predictable and more volatile at
the federal level, state and local-level policymakers scramble to create policies that meet
the demands of the public while providing an overall sense of normalcy based on values
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and norms within that jurisdiction. This may lead to institutional creation for jurisdictions
that have not worked on immigration-related policy in the past. For jurisdictions with a
history of immigration policy, policy development will be vulnerable to the framing of
immigrants and immigration by interest groups and other political influences hoping to
change existing institutions to suit their preferences.
The Framing of Immigrants and Immigration through Public Opinion
Public opinion as it relates to immigration policy has been difficult to generalize.
Segovia and Defever (2010) claim that public opinion of immigration policy is divided,
yet overall confidence in policy makers’ ability to handle immigration is decreasing.
Public opinion is significant to the understanding of immigration federalism in the United
States because it links the policy domain to society, and it also helps to contextualize
intergovernmental relationships.
Schuck (2007b) points out that immigration law scholars, interest groups
interested in immigration rights, the American Bar Association, and other entities with a
political interest in immigration almost all support expansion policies while the opinion
of the general U.S. public tends to support restrictionist policies. The 2019 Public
Research Religion Institute survey suggests the public opinions of Democrats now
endorse expansion policies more frequently while Republicans remain loyal to
restrictionist policies (Jones, Jackson, Orcés, & Bola, 2020). This “political disconnect,”
as Schuck (2007b, p. 1) calls it, leaves to question what informs the public opinion.
Reyna, Dobria, and Wetherell (2013) explore the public’s conflicted attitudes
toward immigrants and immigration in the United States and the impact of this on
immigration policy choices. The authors find that the public perceives all immigrant
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groups not as monolithically good or bad, but rather, all groups are seen both positively
and negatively by the public. This makes immigration issues less polarizing and more
ambivalent because a community member’s attitude toward or position on a given
immigration-related topic may depend on the stereotypes linked to it. An example from
the article is illustrative:
If people endorse both positive and negative stereotypes about these
groups, then whichever stereotypes are salient might affect the policies
toward which people lean. Children of illegal immigrants who wish to
attend college or serve in the military might remind people of stereotypes
suggesting hard work or intelligence. Images of the inhumane conditions
that migrant workers often endure might trigger sympathy toward the
overall group, making them appear more exploited and in need of
protection. On the other hand, news reports of terrorist attacks around the
globe or crime in the Latino community might prioritize very different
stereotypes, making more negative attitudes salient and the desire to
protect the country more urgent (Reyna, Dobria, & Wetherell, 2013, p.
351).
According to this work, the priming of public opinion through public narratives
about immigrant groups and individuals is significant, making survey responses only one
piece of understanding public opinion. Important events, media representation of
immigrants and immigration, and administrative messaging are reviewed here to add
depth to the nature of public attitudes about immigrants and immigration in the United
States.
The Center for Inclusion and Belonging finds that when a perceived threat
interferes with one’s social identity, as immigration frequently does, policy stances
become sacralized, or non-negotiable (Argo & Jassin, 2021). The authors argue that
Americans have become sacralized in their attitudes toward immigration, in many cases
along political party lines, to the extent that political discourse of any kind is not possible.
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Haynes, Merolla, and Ramakrishnan (2016) argue that the language and attitudes
with which immigrants and immigration are discussed in news coverage and by
policymakers and interest groups greatly influence the public’s opinion of immigrant
populations and immigration policies. The authors call how an issue is talked about
framing and suggest that, because public opinion is poorly developed on its own, the
influence of the framing of immigration policy on public opinion is significant.
Furthermore, individuals will be most influenced by the ideological perspective of the
media outlets they choose to watch the most. Due to their observed influence of framing
on public opinion, Haynes, Merolla, and Ramakrishnan (2016) call for greater attention
to understanding the framing of immigration policy and questions relating to public
opinion of immigration.
While Haynes, Merolla, and Ramakrishnan (2016) focus attention on the increase
in attention paid by the media and policymakers to the undocumented immigrant
population in the last decade, Chavez (2001) analyzes popular media images relating to
immigration more generally from 1965 through the end of the twentieth century.
Chavez’s (2001) work illustrates the framing of various immigrant populations and
shows that public sentiment shifts over time.
General public opinion of immigration is rarely positive. In a study reviewing the
public opinion of immigrants in seven countries, including the United States, negative
impressions about immigrants dominated within every population (Simon and Lynch,
1999). In the United States, more recently arrived immigrants were typically viewed by
the U.S.-born population more negatively than immigrants who had arrived some time
ago (Simon and Lynch, 1999). Fouka, Mazumder, and Tabellini (2018) suggest that the
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arrival of new groups whose social ranking is lower than the ranking of the existing
groups can lead to assimilation and greater social acceptance of the existing groups.
Evidence suggests that the greater the social difference between an immigrant group and
the native society, the more negatively the native society views the immigrant group
(Simon and Lynch, 1999).
Related to the native population’s responses to the presence of socially near or
socially distant immigrant groups is the concept of “compositional amenities” (Card,
Dustmann, and Preston, 2012). “Compositional amenities” refer to the geographical
presence of new immigrant arrivals and is shown, in Europe, to influence public opinion
of immigrants negatively to a greater extent than even economic factors do (Card,
Dustmann, and Preston, 2012). The notion of “compositional amenities” would be
interpreted, from the U.S. perspective, as inherently race-based since the composition, or
visual make-up, of neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces (Card, Dustmann, and
Preston, 2012, p. 78) is at risk of change in these cases. Jones and Brown (2019) examine
the government’s reinforcement of racialization through immigration policy, finding that
“individual state institutions may do different work as race makers, but race-making
efforts by federal, state, and local actors interact to produce both racialized subjects and
racial hierarchies” (p. 531).
The framing of immigrants in a country as racially and geographically diverse as
the United States has implications for how values and policies are interpreted and who
has access to relevant institutions. Tenants of old institutionalism claim that institutions
impose values, while new institutionalism suggests a more nuanced relationship in value
making, where values embodied in the culture and history of a place constrain institutions
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(Powell, 2007). In a homogenous context, the notion of culture and history as shapers of
institutions is entertaining. However, in the contemporary United States, where minority
populations are increasing faster than the politically dominant white population and
where values and interests are diverging, the answers to questions relating to institutional
change become unendingly complex.
Considering the divergent effects of intersectionality (see Crenshaw, 1989), the
increasingly diverse U.S. population suggests the presence of multiple interpretations and
patterns of adaptation of policy and institutions challenge the dynamics of framing in a
context of competing values. Based on the literature, one could posit that the framing of
various populations serves to ensure dominance over institutional influence while, at the
same time, promising or limiting access based on the nature of the framing. Friedman
(2007) observes the need for engaging framing for deliberative purposes over persuasive
purposes in a democratic context and explores practices that would adjust the nature of
framing for more equitable outcomes.

46

Chapter 3: Research Methods
This chapter introduces the methodology for this study and the study design. It
also describes the research instruments and data sources. First, I outline the research
objective, including research questions. Next, I describe the nested, multi-level approach
selected for this research, which involves case study development. Finally, I share a
summary of my methods for data collection and analysis at each level of government. I
close with a concluding discussion highlighting the design and quality of this research
strategy.
Research Objective
This research aims to explore, understand, and codify immigration federalism
from the perspective of the local community level from 2005 through 2019. The
framework will integrate elements tested by other scholars of immigration federalism,
which are deemed significant causal mechanisms for immigration policy action (e.g.,
demographic change, political ideology, industry interests). In addition to these elements,
the framework will include details specific to local-level policy attitudes and actions of
the public, public administrators, and other public leaders. Finally, the framework will be
organized by types of institutions.
The framework is divided into three significant levels of government (federal,
state, and local) to understand how immigration policy at one level affects policies and
actions at other levels. The following research questions drive this research:
1) When the history and institutional context of federal, state, and local-level
immigration policy are observed and compared, what conclusions can be
drawn about the impacts and influences of one upon the other?
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2) Is immigration policy at the local level generalizable in the United States, or
are local contexts so diverse that generalizations about immigrants and
immigration cannot be reliably constructed?
The following sub-questions help to frame the path toward answers to the first two
questions:
a. What role does historicity have in federal, state, and local-level policy
as it relates to immigrants and immigration?
b. What impact, if any, does demographic change have on civic capacity
as it relates to immigrants and immigration at the local level?
c. What impact, if any, does political ideology have on civic capacity as
it relates to immigrants and immigration at the local level?
d. What impact, if any, do local representation and leadership have on
civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration at the local
level?
e. What impact, if any, do local industry and the foreign-born labor force
have on civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration at
the local level?
f. What are the overarching narratives relating to immigration at the
national, state, and local levels, and do they reflect or conflict with one
another?
The strength of the resulting framework will be the ability to observe policy
interactions and shifts in the attitudes and actions of the public and public administrators
among various levels of government between 2005 and 2019 while also illustrating the
48

current context of immigration federalism as a snapshot of how institutions are
functioning today.
Research Approach
I employed a nested case study design involving collecting and analyzing
secondary and primary data in this study. Methods of analysis include grounded theory
and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987/2014). Following this nested
approach, I can refine a theory of immigration federalism by constructing an overarching
framework reflecting the institutional context of immigration policy at three levels of
government: federal, state, and local. Each level yielded understanding which informed,
modified, and optimized information gathering at the next level, so construction of the
framework is recursive.
Figure 3.1 depicts the nested approach employed for this research. The solid
arrows indicate the direction of the overall data collection process, while the patterned
arrows indicate the iterative and reflexive nature of data collection. As the figure
suggests, research focuses on the dynamics of immigration policy at the federal, state,
and local levels. At the state level, I review immigration-related legislation and
demographic statistics in all 50 U.S. states and then create a deep-dive case study for one
U.S. state based on findings from that review. The state case study data collection and
case study development process informed my interest in local-level case study locations.
Based on current demographics and historical immigration histories, several counties and
cities in the state were identified as interesting.
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Figure 3.1
The Nested Approach for Case Study Data Collection and Framework Development

Note. In this nested approach, research focuses on the dynamics of immigration policy at the federal, state,
and local levels. The small arrows indicate the direction of the overall data collection process, while the
large arrows indicate the iterative and reflexive nature of data collection. At the state level, data are
reviewed for all 50 U.S. states, and then, based on findings from that review, the focus turns to a deep-dive
case study for one U.S. state. The state case study data collection and case study development process
inform interest in local-level case study locations.

The approach at the local level in the case study state is twofold. First, I
conducted semi-structured interviews with public administrators and other local leaders
in six localities in the case study state. I began by interviewing a city manager (in five of
the cities) or the mayor (in one of the cities) and built out my list of interviewees based
on recommendations from the individuals I had already spoken with. I also followed up
on critical organizations identified as significant through reviews of local news outlets
and internet searches or mentioned in interviews when contact names were not shared. In
three cities, I interviewed multiple individuals (five, three, and nine, respectively). I
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interviewed only one city manager (two current and one former, respectively) in each of
the remaining three cities. Semi-structured interviews in this study help construct a
picture of civic capacity and immigrant populations through individuals responsible for
working closely with and serving the public (Yin, 2018).
In-depth case studies were constructed for three of the cities. I collected
secondary data and statistics for these cities, similar to those collected at the state level.
The purpose for doing so is to build a snapshot of the prevailing local perspectives on
immigration that can be compared with the snapshots reflecting immigration at the state
level while also reflecting on the federal institutional context. The nested approach results
in five case studies representing immigration federalism in the United States from 2005
through 2019. The nested approach allowed for recursive observations and adjustments
throughout the process of data collection, case study construction, analysis, and theory
generation for this research.
Part 1: Research Methods Summary—Data Collection by Level of Government
This section outlines data collection practices for each level of government,
beginning with the federal level and followed by the state and local levels, respectively.
After explaining data collection for a given level of government, I discuss the case
development process involving that data. The data collected at each level varies
somewhat from other levels. Still, one aspect all cases have in common is a historical
review of immigration policy and history at that level and in that place. Lloyd (2003)
argues, “the present has to be understood as historically contingent, continuous and
transformative… Historicity is at the very core of social reality in all its complexity and
multi-dimensionality” (p. 86). This notion is carried through my research. The process for
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cross-case analysis, relevance to the study, and reflective journaling are also discussed in
this section.
I utilize a variety of reports and data sources for observing demographic change,
including data downloaded from the U.S. Census Bureau via Social Explorer, Migration
Policy Institute (MPI), American Immigration Council (AIC), and Pew Research Center.
All of the sources employed in this research to observe demographic change utilize U.S.
Census data to prepare their reports. I chose to use MPI data in many cases instead of
working directly with U.S. Census data as I did in some cases because MPI is a trusted
data resource. Also, MPI regularly calculates and publishes comparisons of foreign-born
and U.S.-born demographics. U.S. Census data are available via Social Explorer and
accessible at Portland State University. It provides foreign-born population numbers but
does not provide foreign-born data cross-tabbed by race, education, income, or other
demographic details. However, cross-tabbed foreign-born Census data are accessible
through other data tools. Furthermore, institutional shutdowns caused by the COVID-19
pandemic limited me to the search mechanisms and statistical capacity I had on my home
computer. So utilizing the MPI reports allowed me to access high-quality demographics
data of interest and saved me time in the process.
One point regarding the nature of the U.S. Census Bureau’s American
Community Survey (ACS) should be highlighted in light of the multi-level data
collection and analysis process I outline in this chapter. The margin of error, or the
measure of possible variation around the statistic value, for ACS data increases as the
population studied decreases (Fuller, 2018). That is, the statistical data I report in this
study at the county and local levels are less reliable due to margin of error than the
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statistical data I report at the national and state levels. While each of the data statistics
used in the case study development and analysis for this project has a margin of error, I
do not examine these values as part of my analysis. This is mainly because my interests
here concern how statistics change over time and against one another and do not use the
data to observe statistical significance or analyze inferential statistics.
For this study, U.S. Census data are downloaded via Social Explorer, where
decennial census data are available for 2000, and 5-year American Community Survey
(ACS) estimates are available for 2006-2010, 2011-2015, and 2015-2019. Where
decennial census data reflect a snapshot in time because all data were collected in the
target year, 5-year ACS estimates reflect data pooled over five years (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2020a). In brief, the U.S. Census collects ACS data for geographic areas with
populations greater than 65,000 each year, resulting in 1-year ACS estimates. For 5-year
estimates, the U.S. Census pools data collected over five years to sufficiently represent
the populations present. This affects the precision of the data since it includes outdated
statistics and is, in part, why the margin of error for smaller populations is greater (Fuller,
2018). Yet, it remains sufficiently reliable for this research study. In fact, for geographic
areas with a population smaller than 65,000, like most Oregon counties, utilizing the 5year ACS estimates to explore demographic statistics is the only available option (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2020a).
One outcome of Part 1 is the completion of a comprehensive framework for
immigration federalism, depicted in Appendix A, and the development of five discrete
case studies, one federal-level case, one extended state-level case, and three local-level
cases. Part 2 of this chapter explains the cross-case analysis and employs Qualitative
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Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987/2014) and other strategies for qualitative
analysis, which are described in turn.
Federal-level Case Study
The federal-level case study opens with a historical review of immigration policy
in the United States. While the focus of this study is limited to 2005 through 2019,
understanding a fuller history of immigration policy at the federal level provides the
necessary context for what we observe at other levels of government more recently. The
historical review reflects a comprehensive inspection of federal immigration legislation
history. It illustrates shifts in the federal government’s claim to preemptive authority
relating to the policy domain throughout U.S. history. The review also serves as a
literature review for the history of federal-level immigration policy and national
sentiment from the nation’s inception through the 1990s. It draws on a wide variety of
existing references to contextualize the federal government's role in immigration
federalism at various points in time.
Data collected for the analysis of federal-level policy from 2005 through 2019
include a full review of administrative policy shifts and executive administration, an
assessment of court cases challenging federal-level immigration rules and actions, and
executive and legislative representation. State and local policies are expected to work
within the space constructed by federal policies. The extent to which state and local
policies align with or are in tension with the federal policies should be observable. In this
section of the study, federal-level policies are linked to national statistics relating to
socio-economic and demographic change, industry trends, and national trends in public
attitudes and opinions toward immigrants and immigration.
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Federal-level case Study Data Collection
Both the historical perspective of immigration policymaking in the United States
and the contemporary context of political gridlock in Congress make understanding the
practice of executive administration critical. I first accessed all presidential documents
signed from 2005 through 2019 via the National Archives Federal Register Reader Aid
(National Archives, n.d.). I reviewed presidential documents, including executive orders,
proclamations, determinations, memoranda, notices, and orders, by title and then flagged
rules or notices that related in any way to immigrants or immigration under the name of
the president who signed them. I built a database for each president by document type
and noted trends I observed while searching every kind of document under each
president.
Search practices for each document type included reviewing at least two years of
presidential document titles to identify keywords employed in the document type. Once a
list of keywords was developed, the search function was used to find and review all
documents. When new keywords were identified under other presidents, it was added to
the list of keywords, and all documents were examined again. Documents that included
keywords were reviewed more closely for their significance to immigrants and
immigration policy. This process ensures that documents directly affecting immigrants or
immigration policy are captured in the data pool. There may be some uncaptured
documents that distantly affect immigrants or immigration policy. This is acceptable
since this work aims to identify those orders that would trigger a policy response or a
response in public attitudes or opinions related to immigrants and immigration.
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I also included documents that targeted inclusivity or diversity more generally
because such policy shifts indirectly impact immigrant populations. Once presidential
documents were organized by year and according to the signing president, observations
could be made regarding policy trends throughout the 2005-2019 timeline. Conclusions
could be drawn about each president’s overarching immigration policy direction,
allowing for a detailed analysis of presidential executive administration from 2005 to
2019.
The review of presidential documents revealed that executive documents from
federal agency heads (e.g., the Secretary of Homeland Security) could also have a
significant impact on immigration policy, so I followed the analysis of executive
administration of presidential documents with a review of literature relating to executive
administration through agency heads. The scope of this project does not leave room for
an in-depth review of agency-led executive administration during the target timeline.
Still, two examples are included in the case study analysis to exemplify just how
significant such rules can be to federal-level immigration policy. The 2012 memorandum
facilitating Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), signed by Secretary Janet
Napolitano (Napolitano, 2012), and the 2018 memorandum including a citizenship
question on the 2020 decennial census, signed by Secretary Wilbur Ross (Ross, 2018),
provide context to the federal-level case study.
The second data source was civil court cases challenging federal-level rules
affecting immigrant rights. These data were collected and explored to provide context for
trends indicated in the previous section. Three active legal organizations serving
immigrants’ rights at the national level in the United States were selected: the American
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Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the American Immigration Council (AIC), and the
National Immigration Law Center (NILC). In this research, the activities of these
organizations serve as indicators of federal-level policy trends as they relate to immigrant
rights. I reviewed the number of cases for each of these organizations from 2005 through
2019 resulting from searches in Nexus Uni on June 2, 2021. The purpose of doing so is to
identify to what extent legal challenges to federal-level policies were present throughout
the target timeline. The work of the AIC and NILC is limited to immigration, so my
search in Nexus Uni was restricted only by the dates of interest, federal-level cases, and
the names of those organizations. The ALCU, however, interests itself in civil rights
more generally, so I used the search term “immigra*” to limit Nexus Uni search returns
for ACLU cases involving immigrants and immigration.
The search included in this study is precursory at best. It signifies the level of
litigious activity for each of the three organizations centering their work on immigrants’
rights during the target timeline. Still, it does not describe the types of rules being
challenged. I analyzed ACLU case filings accessible to the public through the
organization’s website (American Civil Liberties Union, 2021a) for a closer look at what
federal-level rules are challenged from 2005 through 2019. The ACLU is among the most
prolific civil rights organizations in the country and has a trove of case data relating to
immigrants’ rights accessible online. The organization leads litigation but also joins many
other organizations, including but not limited to the NILC and AIC, in supporting cases
in various ways. For these reasons, it is assumed that the ACLU cases reviewed for this
case study are representative of the kinds of rules being challenged by immigration rights
organizations in the United States.
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The organization’s online index includes all cases the ACLU was involved in,
whether the organization served as a primary attorney or submitted an amicus brief for an
existing case. Many of the cases challenge state-level laws or actions taken at the local
level, and they are not relevant to this case study. I first downloaded all federal-level
court cases from 2005 through 2019 that the ACLU site indicated related to immigrants’
rights.
All relevant cases downloaded from the ACLU website were organized in a single
spreadsheet and analyzed for the outcome, if available, the rule challenged in the case,
related administrative rules of note, and other related court filings. A significant amount
of the analysis described here was less impactful for the federal-level case study. Still, it
proved valuable to understanding the nature of non-presidential executive administration
mentioned in the previous section of data collection.
Each case was connected to the executive administration that initiated the rule
being challenged. Due to an observation that piqued my interest, I created a typography
of types of defendants named by case. Federal level civil cases challenging the
administration directly named defendants as one or more of the following 1) a U.S.
agency or department as an entity, 2) the secretary, or head, of an agency, 3) the U.S.
attorney general, 4) the United States as an entity, or 5) the president of the United States.
I analyzed defendant trends in cases from 2005 through 2019 and reported on findings in
the federal-level case study. This analysis was of interest because of the shift in trends
observed throughout the timeline.
Executive administration and civil court cases, instead of being reflected as a
chronological narrative, are each described in the context of the G.W. Bush, Obama, and
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Trump administrations, respectively. Policy changes and policy preferences under each
administration were reviewed and coded for their restrictive or integrative nature. The
nature of how each president appeared to employ mechanisms for executive
administration is compared and discussed in depth.
The third kind of data collected for the federal-level case study relates to federallevel executive and legislative representation. Having a clear understanding of racial and
gender representation at the federal level is significant to this research because it frames,
to some extent, the nature of federal-level executive and legislative leadership. I utilize
membership profile reports regularly prepared by the Congressional Research Service
(CRS) for this research study. I have attempted to use the report released most recently
for each year. This is the last report released before the change over to the new
Congressional class in most cases. However, because the reports represent Congress at a
specific place and time, vacancies and party membership are reflected in a fashion that
may conflict with other sources whose snapshot of Congressional membership represents
a different moment. Such discrepancies are minor and not significant to the observations
made in this case study. Delegates and resident commissioners are not included in this
data except in the case of Asian and Pacific Native Islander representation in the House
of Representatives in the 112th, 114th, 115th, 116th, and 117th Congresses. This is due to
the nature of the CRS data and does not affect the direction of discussion or outcomes for
this project.
The rationale for collecting details about political representation is that the
literature highlights state-level representation as one mechanism for initiating and
directing immigration policy decisions. Awareness of party divisions and representation
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during significant federal immigration policy changes may prove helpful in
understanding party ideology in policy decisions over time, particularly when compared
to state-level representation trends. On the other hand, the balance of federal-level
executive representation and Congressional representation at a given point in the timeline
may indicate strategies taken to reach policy goals. These two possibilities make
gathering and exploring representation details valuable to this study.
Fourth, I collect and analyze statistics relating to national socio-economic status
and demographic change for the target timeline from 2005 to 2019. Because immigration
policy scholars observe population change as an influencer of immigration policy
(Ybarra, Sanchez, & Sanchez, 2016; Chavez & Provine, 2009; Marquez & Schnaufnagel,
2013) and because the U.S. population is currently experiencing unprecedented
demographic changes (Frey, 2015), including data that represents population change and
race/ethnicity in this research is imperative. Given the history of racialized immigration
policy in the United States and because Latinos have accounted for more than half of
U.S. population growth between 2000 and 2008 (Fry, 2008) and again between 2010 and
2019 (Krogstad, 2020a), a focus on the Latino population in the United States is
noteworthy to this research.
Since policy actions do not respond to population change immediately, I review
U.S. Census data reflecting national demographics from as early as 1990 through 2019 to
help contextualize any relation to policy actions taken between 2005 and 2019. In this
way, demographic change is essentially a lag variable in this research study. The data
sources that I use for data collection relating to demographics include the U.S. Census
Bureau via Social Explorer for data concerning U.S.-born, foreign-born, and
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Hispanic/Latino populations in 2000, 2010, and 2019 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a;
2021b, 2021d) and the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) State Immigration Data Profiles
(Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021) for data concerning U.S.-born, foreign-born, and
Hispanic/Latino populations in 1990. Reports from the American Immigration Council
(AIC), the Pew Research Center, and information published by the U.S. Census Bureau
are referenced in the case study where they add context. In conjunction with this data
collection section, I also completed a literature review on the racialization of immigration
in the United States to contextualize findings relating to demographic change.
I am also interested in trends in the socio-economic status of foreign-born and
U.S.-born populations in the United States for the federal-level case study. Income and
education levels are common proxies for an individual’s socio-economic classification. I
observed the change in the educational attainment of foreign-born and U.S.-born
populations in 1990, 2000, and 2019 via the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) State
Immigration Data Profiles (Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021) and Grieco (2012) for
data concerning the education attainment of U.S.-born, foreign-born, and Hispanic/Latino
populations in 2010. Of the population over the age of 25, I was interested in what
percentage held less than a high school diploma, held a high school diploma or GED, had
a bachelor’s degree, or had a graduate or professional degree in each of the four years
observed. If educational attainment changed over time, it would be essential to speak to
these changes for immigrants and immigration in the United States.
I sourced data for the median household income for foreign-born and U.S.-born
populations from the Foreign-born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics reports
published annually by the U.S. Department of Labor (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
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n.d.). The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) releases an annual report comparing the
foreign-born labor force to the native-born labor force, using data collected as part of the
Current Population Survey (CPS). These data are far more detailed than data I could have
accessed from the U.S. Census via Social Explorer. Data from BLS Labor Force
Characteristics news releases for the years 2005 through 2019 are used in this case study
to illustrate the role of immigrants in the U.S. workforce. The reports include data for
foreign-born and U.S.-born populations by race, which allows me to compare the weekly
wage earnings and labor force participation rates of those populations by race and
provides more context than simply comparing foreign-born to U.S.-born populations.
Fifth, understanding the role of immigrants in the U.S. workforce is informative
to the federal-level case study. Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2011) find that
industry interest groups may significantly impact the immigration policy process at the
state level, so including a snapshot of national industry trends for immigrant workers
from 2005 through 2019 is worthwhile. The same BLS reports I used to analyze
immigrant and U.S.-born income are utilized in this section focusing on industry.
Additional reports explaining immigrant workers in the United States are included where
it has been deemed helpful.
My initial data collection and analysis for industry included comparisons of
foreign-born and U.S.-born labor force participation rates, details relating to employment
rates by occupation, and top immigrant employing industries in the United States. The
details relating to participation rates by occupation were informative for my
understanding of U.S. industry. Still, I excluded it from the final case study because it
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was less helpful for the comparative analysis process. This is due to the kinds of data
available at the states and local levels.
The federal case study includes a review and discussion of foreign-born and U.S.born labor force participation rates from 2005 through 2019 by race and ethnicity, which
allows for connections to be drawn to the previous section focusing on demographic
change and the literature discussing the racialization of immigrants. I also collect and
discuss national industry statistics for the top immigrant worker industries in the United
States in 2019. I was unable to find comparable immigrant employing industry data for
earlier years. This data prompts a conversation around the over- and underrepresentation
of immigrants in specific industries. The overarching purpose for understanding which
industries rely on immigrants at the national level is to compare the state and local levels
later in the research process.
Sixth, I selectively sampled to the point of saturation polling and research reports
relating to immigration policy and attitudes and opinions toward immigration and public
political ideologies at the national level during the target period. This section is
constructed through the comparison of results from multiple polling and survey tools,
including the General Social Survey (GSS) and PRRI’s American Values Atlas, to
observe repeated trends if they exist, and it includes literature framing our understanding
of public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the United States. Including
such literature is necessary to contextualize this complex aspect of immigration
federalism.
News media coverage is also integrated when it reflects a public sentiment that
may not be directly linked to executive-led policy changes, and non-partisan
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organizational reports are included to provide depth of understanding that mainstream
media may not achieve. Collecting such reflections of public opinion on the national level
helps me connect public sentiments to the dominant political ideology of Congress and
the executive administration mentioned above. Furthermore, a national-level picture of
public opinion and political ideology will provide a point of comparison with state and
local levels.
Saturation in qualitative research is defined as the point at which enough
information is gathered that the study can be replicated at another point in time (Fusch &
Ness, 2015). Reaching saturation helps to ensure that qualitative research remains valid
and without undue bias. The saturation of news sources for this project was almost
immediate. I carried out this research during the years of 2020 and 2021, a volatile period
for the United States when “fake news” became a frequent point of discussion, the
restrictive and racist Trump-era policies were heavily responded to by scholars
(Milkman, Bhargava, & Lewis, 2021), and other scholars found voice in openly
challenging the legacy of white supremacy in the United States (Jones, 2020). This
atmosphere affected my research in multiple ways. Still, where the utilization of media is
concerned, I include media references only where an article helps to exemplify a point
indicated by statistics or another data indicator. Otherwise, I rely on scholarly articles and
texts that speak to specific issues in this research to ensure that I am including balanced
and legitimate information.
Data collection for the federal level is detailed and multi-faceted. Table 3.1
illustrates the breadth of data collected at the federal level. Data collected in each step of
this process, while they may resemble variables for quantitative analysis, are treated in
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this study as sensitizing concepts and are continuously refined and interpreted to build a
historical case study for immigration policy at the federal level during the years 2005
through 2019. The writing of the federal-level case study began with case data collection
and continued throughout the data collection process and the writing of other case
studies. Weick (2007) describes the value of the comparative approach to the evolution of
richness in case studies. My iterative case study development process ensures I reach the
maximum amount of richness. Richness, in turn, allows for a deeper kind of knowing on
the part of the reader.
The eventual goal of this research is to have a collection of sensitizing concepts
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967) for three levels of government, which can then be compared to
one another, allowing for the observation of hierarchical policy influences passed from
the federal and state levels to the state and local levels, respectively, and allowing for the
observation of recursive influences from lower levels to higher levels that may be
present. The notion of influences mentioned here is unobservable without comparing the
federal-level data to the state and local-level data. The following sections outline statelevel data collection and local-level data collection. The process for formulating case
studies for this research study is detailed in this chapter after the state and local-level data
collection descriptions.
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Note. This table illustrates data collection and institutional influence in the comprehensive state-level data collection
process and in the deep state-level data collection process.

Schematic for Federal Level Data Collection

Table 3.1

State-level case Studies
State-level data collection is organized in two ways in this study:
1) Comprehensive coverage of all 50 states, including the collection of
enacted immigration legislation, state legislative partisanship, grey
material, and some demographic statistics,
2) Deep coverage of one state, including a more comprehensive collection
of grey material, media output, and demographic statistics.
A comprehensive analysis of immigration policy, industry trends, and
demographic change in all 50 states provides a broader backdrop for understanding the
nature of federalism in the United States. If I limited my data collection and analysis to
only one state, I would have only a siloed perspective to draw theory from. With this
research design, I can make observations about the diversity (or lack thereof) at the state
level, utilize those observations to select a case study state, and then reflect on
comprehensive coverage in the process of constructing a case with a deep range.
As is the case with the federal level, the deep coverage of the state of Oregon
includes a historical review of immigration policy and the treatment of non-Anglo
populations more generally in the state. The focus of this study is limited to 2005 through
2019, but understanding a fuller history of attitudes toward immigrants and immigration
in Oregon provides the necessary context for what observations are made at other levels
of government.
State policies are expected to work within the space constructed by federal
policies. Yet, noting the conversations around policy at the state level is valuable because
this space is ambiguous. Local policies are expected to work within the space constructed
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by federal and state policies. The extent to which policies align with or are in tension
with one another should be observable. In this section of the study, state-level policies are
linked to state-level statistics relating to socio-economic and demographic change,
industry trends, and state trends in public attitudes and opinions toward immigrants and
immigration.
State-level case Study: Comprehensive Coverage Data Collection
The comprehensive coverage of all 50 states was designed with two purposes in
mind. First, it is a strategy for informing decisions regarding focus in the deep coverage
state-level case studies. Second, the results of this analysis provide a backdrop for
understanding the diverse nature of federalism in the United States. Data of interest for
case study selection and, therefore, explored in this section included data about legislative
sentiment toward immigrants and immigration, statistics relating to the socio-economic
status of the foreign-born population in the state (population change over time, median
household income, and changes in education levels of immigrants), the presence of
immigrant workers in the state’s industries, legislative control in the state over time, and
public opinion across each state. I collected data for all 50 states to construct a broad
picture of state-level immigration in the United States from 2005 through 2019. This
process allowed me to identify states and regions of the United States that are particularly
interesting for the case study development and analysis process.
First, I downloaded all relevant legislation data from the National Conference of
State Legislatures (NCSL) Immigration Laws and Current State Immigration Legislation
searchable database (NCSL, 2020b). The NCSL publishes annual reports that cover state
legislation related to immigration and immigrants for all 50 states since 2005, including
68

resolutions. The data are available to the public and are presumed to be comprehensive,
giving scholars and individuals interested in exploring state-level immigration policy a
dataset covering more than 15 years of state legislation. For this study, only enacted
legislation, not resolutions, from 2005 through 2019 are included in the data analysis. I
also chose to eliminate bills that passed through the state legislature but were then vetoed
by the state governor, thus, having never gone into effect.
I organized the NCSL legislative data in an Excel spreadsheet that included
details of each bill such as state, the bill’s name, the year enacted, the bill’s title, the
author and author’s political affiliation, any associated bills, and a summary of the bill.
NCSL also categorizes each bill as one or more of 11 groups: budgets; education;
employment; health; human trafficking; identification, drivers’ licenses, and other
licenses (identification); law enforcement; legal services; miscellaneous; public benefits;
and voting and elections.
Organizing the data was tedious, as the fashion in which NCSL stored data has
developed over the years. For years 2005 through 2007, data were available in separate
pdf reports published by NCSL. For years 2008 through 2019, I downloaded all
applicable legislation into a single pdf file. I programmed Excel to read the information
on the larger pdf and transpose it onto a spreadsheet. The content from 2005 through
2007 was not overwhelming, so I input that data by hand. With minor adjustments, I
organized all 2,452 bills passed at the state level in a searchable spreadsheet.
Once legislation for each state was organized, I described it and noted how many
laws each state passed and when. I also reviewed each piece of legislation and coded it as
restrictive, integrative, or neutral. In this research, restrictive laws are those laws that add
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a barrier to achieving the goals of full participation in society. An integrative bill is a bill
that reduces barriers to full participation in society. A neutral bill has no apparent impact
on immigrant populations in the state. Some of these are, for example, bills creating a
specific fund or agency. If the bill summary does not clarify the intended impact of the
new creation, then it is labeled neutral for this research. The way a bill is marked
depends, in part, on the direction of the language in that bill. Consider AL S 286 (2013),
labeled integrative because it expands gun permits to lawfully present non-citizens. AL S
115 (2012) is labeled restrictive because it limits applicants for electric licensure to be a
citizen or legally present. The same population is affected, but the presumably intended
outcome leaves that population either more or less limited than before.
Because some states pass several laws in a given year and no state passes solely
restrictive or solely integrative laws, it could be challenging to assess the extent to which
a state is overall restrictive or integrative without further calculation. For this reason, I
calculated a ratio effect value (Hendrick, 2017) or sentiment score (Marquez, 2017), as
other scholars have done, to represent the extent of a state’s sentiment toward
immigration policy in a given year. Following Marquez (2017), I calculated a sentiment
score by subtracting the number of restrictive laws from the number of integrative laws
by state each year. Marquez (2017) calculates one score for each state over the breadth of
his target timeline, but since my interest, in part, is observing change over time,
calculating a state score for each year from 2005 through 2019 provides more
comparative value. To reach a sentiment score, the total number of restrictive laws for a
given state is divided by the total number of restrictive laws for all states in a given year.
Next, the total number of integrative laws for a given state is divided by the total number
70

of integrative laws for all states in a given year. The integrative output is subtracted from
the restrictive output, and the total is multiplied by 1000 to yield a whole number. The
resulting value represents the overall intensity and direction of enacted immigration
policies each year, with a score of 1 being very restrictive and -1 being very integrative.
A sentiment score of 0 is neutral. The equation used to calculate state sentiment scores is
as follows:

Once calculated, sentiment scores were added to the state-level working
spreadsheet where calculations relating to sentiment were stored. I used sentiment scores
to identify the intensity with which a state is integrative or restrictive and compare states
over time.
Following a descriptive explanation of state sentiment scores, I explored
population and socio-economic change in foreign-born populations in each state,
including the change in income and education levels from 2005 through 2019. Data were
collected from Migration Policy Institute’s (MPI) State Immigration Data Profiles (20202021) between November 16, 2020, and November 20, 2020, and updated in October
2021. Collecting demographic data from the same MPI source as I used in the federallevel case study ensures compatibility in comparing trends.
Singer (2013) and Suro and Singer (2002) discuss geographic shifts in immigrant
settlement. Those locations that were once common landing points for immigrants to the
United States are less popular contemporarily. Some areas of the country that historically
saw very little immigrant settlement are now experiencing much more significant
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increases. These authors find that new immigrant regions respond to changes differently,
so exploring whether state sentiment correlates with heavy increases in immigrant
populations is of interest in my research study. For this reason, I assessed which states
experienced a foreign-born population increase of more than 100% between 1990 and
2000 and again between 2000 and 2019 and then charted the extent of each state’s
population growth from 2000 to 2019 against the state’s sentiment score. The goal was to
assess whether there was a correlation between foreign-born population change and state
sentiment.
In addition to population change, I explored the socioeconomic status of the
foreign-born population in each state. Like I did at the federal level, I used education and
income to proxy for socioeconomic status in this section. I calculated the percent change
in the foreign-born population with a college degree or higher and without a high school
degree or GED from 2005 through 2019. I felt it was essential to identify correlations
between education level and state sentiment score, so I graphed the output in both cases. I
did the same for the foreign-born population median household income. MPI only makes
the latest year income data available, so my analysis here compares the 2019 median
household income to the overall 2019 state sentiment score to observe whether there may
be a relationship between immigrant wages and state sentiment. This relationship is
viewed with caution in this study since the opportunity for longitudinal bias increases
with only one reference year. Additional descriptive statistics were analyzed, including a
comparison of foreign-born median household income to U.S.-born median household
income in each state. In many ways, exploring these data allowed me to develop a
snapshot of recent immigration history in each state.
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Next, I collected employment-related and industry statistics for the industries
employing the most immigrant workers in each state in 2019. Nicholson-Crotty and
Nicholson-Crotty (2011) consider industry’s strength in influencing state-level U.S.
immigration policy and find industry influence may be more significant to policy
outcomes than citizen ideology and public opinion, so this section is integral to testing
that notion. Changes in the foreign-born population in the labor force in each state were
calculated using data from MPI State Immigration Data Profiles and then charted against
state sentiment scores to observe correlations.
Industry statistics were collected from the American Immigration Council’s State
by State Fact Sheets (American Immigration Council, n.d.-b, n.d.-c), the same source
used to record federal-level top employing industries in 2019. The data result in a list of
the top five immigrant-employing industries in each state and include the percent make
up of immigrant workers in each industry. The nature of these data did not lend them to
statistical analysis, so these data could only be compared visually to one another. To
compare them, I printed each state’s top five industries and the percent of their worker
populations that were immigrants on a card. I organized the cards based on similarities or
differences with the national level example. I paid attention to the volume of the
immigrant worker population and the industries that employed the most immigrants
overall. Data relating to demographics, labor participation, and industry statistics were
stored in the state-by-state assessment spreadsheet.
Fourth, I attempted to collect data reflecting political ideology in each state for the
target years to explore the theory that political ideology drives state-level immigration
change via what Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) name the Polarization Change
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Model. To do so, I reviewed legislative control in each state from 2005 through 2019.
Because historical trends are significant to understanding a state’s specific politicalideological leanings, I reference legislative control reaching back to 1992. Data relating
to legislative control by state were collected from Ballotpedia.org, a digital encyclopedia
of American politics and elections created to provide unbiased and accurate information
about politics at all levels of government since 2007.
Legislative representation by state and over time was recorded in the state-bystate assessment spreadsheets. I had also hoped to utilize an additional NCSL dataset that
detailed representation by gender and race in state legislatures, but this dataset proved
incomplete to the extent that it was not helpful for this research. In each state, historical
trends in party dominance were analyzed, categorized, and then included in the state-bystate assessment spreadsheet. Once in the spreadsheet, correlations can be drawn between
dominant party ideology and state sentiment.
A related object of my interest in this work is identifying which states permit
mechanisms for direct democracy, particularly through ballot initiatives. Silva (2018)
argues that those states with direct democracy mechanisms in place may observe more
significant action on the part of the state legislature because lawmakers are more
motivated to prevent citizens from acting on their own through ballot initiatives. The
author would expect the states without direct democracy mechanisms to have passed
fewer statutes than those with direct democracy mechanisms. So I included an analysis in
this section of my research assessing which states have direct democracy and the nature
of their immigration policy-making.
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Finally, I reviewed the public opinion of immigrants by state in two areas
highlighted in the 2015 Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) American Values Atlas
survey. The first area I focus on is the support of a path to citizenship for unauthorized
immigrants and the second is whether one thinks that immigrants strengthen America.
PRRI was one of few reports I found that had a clear breakdown of public opinion of
immigrants and immigration by state (Jones, Cox, Cooper& Lienesch, 2016). The items I
focused on for the comprehensive coverage of 50 states are also the same as those I
focused on at the federal level. However, the federal-level data include public opinion
perspectives from multiple years in the target timeline. The comprehensive state-level
case is limited to the 2015 snapshot provided by the PRRI report. While this is less than
ideal, the 2015 snapshot of state-by-state public opinions toward immigrants offers two
advantages to this work. First, it provides a preliminary comparison to federal-level
public opinion trends. Second, plotting public opinion regarding these two survey items
against the 2019 sentiment score in each state allowed for the observation of possible
trends in how public opinion may correlate to state-level policy sentiment later in the
timeline.
My initial intention with this research project was to use the comprehensive
coverage of the 50 states to assess which states were of greatest interest and select a state
for the next section of my research: the deep coverage state case study. When I developed
and ran through the case study selection process after compiling and synthesizing the
comprehensive 50 state coverage data results, Oregon was identified as one of six top
prospects along with Washington, Colorado, Tennessee, Arkansas, and North Dakota.
Adding convenience as a criterion in the period of COVID restrictions was pragmatic and
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warranted, so I chose to focus on my home state of Oregon for the deep coverage data
collection and case study development. The next section of this chapter discusses the
state-level deep coverage data collection process and methods in detail.
State-level case Study: Deep Coverage Data Collection
The purpose of delving deeply into one state after reviewing state-level data for
all states is to provide a specific example of state-level policy mechanisms in action from
2005 through 2019 and to observe potential historical influences reflected in the
comparison between the federal-level case and this state-level case. Also, in the nested
study design, in-depth coverage of the state informs the selection of local cities and
guides data collection within the state at the local level. This framework is intended to
allow eventual deep coverage of several states and selected local communities, thus
facilitating the development of additional local-level case studies and further framing the
contemporary context of immigration federalism.
I focused on the state of Oregon in part out of convenience, as Oregon is currently
my home state and the COVID-19 pandemic prevented travel of any kind during the data
collection process for this research. An in-depth review of a familiar state allowed me
greater perspective and resources for making connections at the local level. Indeed, when
I reached out to potential informants for interviews at the local level, my initial list
included the names of contacts known to me personally or to professors I work closely
with. This would not have been the case in many other states. In-depth coverage of
Oregon includes the collection of statistical data and collecting grey material from which
to build a historic case. I completed a literature review including journal articles and
dissertations that spoke to the histories and the movement of specific immigrant
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populations in Oregon. I maintained a running list of localities mentioned to identify local
case study sites of interest.
Data specific to the state of Oregon that were collected during the comprehensive
coverage of all 50 states are discussed in depth in the Oregon case study. I reviewed
Oregon state legislative data from the NCSL State Laws Related to Immigration and
Immigrants database by topic group and year to identify trends in integrative and
restrictive law-making over time. I also discuss industry data collected during the
comprehensive coverage process in the Oregon case study, and I integrate industry data
for Oregon counties collected from the U.S. Census Bureau.
Next, I collected demographics for 2000, 2010, 2015, and 2019 at the county level
from the U.S. Census via Social Explorer (Social Explorer Tables 2021a; 2021b; 2021c;
2021d). Initially included in the data reviewed for the in-depth coverage of Oregon were
total population by race, Hispanic or Latino population by race, educational attainment of
the total population over the age of 25, employed workers by industry, median household
income by race and ethnicity (in 2019 dollars), and nativity. Data reflecting the foreignborn population’s education attainment, industry participation, and median household
income are not available from Social Explorer at the county level. Still, analysis of the
data collected for the total state population was presumed to be a helpful reflection of
which Oregon counties are experiencing population changes relating to immigrants and
immigration over time.
After a basic descriptive analysis of demographics-related variables at the county
level, it became clear that counties in Oregon are so diverse that a thorough review of all
36 of them would be less valuable for this deep coverage case study. Instead, the deep
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coverage state-level case study reports county population by percentage of immigrants
and percentage of Hispanics in 2000, 2010, 2015, and 2019 to identify the counties with
the largest immigrant populations by percentage. I also confirm assumptions about
immigrant populations by detailing the percentage of each county population that speaks
a language other than English at home. As I have mentioned elsewhere, I include
statistics reflecting Hispanic populations in my analyses to help frame the context for the
immigrant experience in those places because the most populous immigrant population in
most Oregon counties is Hispanic. While Asians now comprise the largest share of
immigrants in the United States compared to people from Central and South America
(Budiman, 2020), substantial Asian immigrant populations in Oregon are centered in the
urban areas of Washington and Multnomah counties and near university campuses in
Benton and Lane counties. This case study project was interested in exploring more rural
spaces, so focusing on statistics about Hispanic demographics in the state is worthwhile.
Next, I chose to review educational attainment and median household income data
at the state level rather than at the county level for two reasons. One was for the value of
data, and the other was for the preservation of time. As noted earlier, the initial
descriptive analysis of income and education levels at the county level was not revealing.
In addition, remaining at the state level felt like a more legitimate choice because I was
limited to using the Hispanic population to proxy immigrant incomes and education
levels. Finally, I reported the study of top industries for four counties selected from the
12 counties identified to have the largest immigrant populations in the state by
percentage. Limiting the analysis to these four counties allowed me to sample industry
trends in more populous and diverse counties while saving time. I chose to look into
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Hood River and Malheur Counties because of their frequent mention in the literature
about immigrants in Oregon (Tamura, 1993; Ng, 1989; Rojas-Burke, 2014; Sifuentez,
2016; Garcia & Garcia, 2005). I also chose to look at Washington County because it is
among Oregon's most populous and diverse counties. Finally, I decided to look at
Jefferson County because it was representative of central Oregon.
Census data are downloaded via Social Explorer, where decennial census data are
available for 2000, and 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) estimates are
available for 2006-2010, 2011-2015, and 2015-2019. The 5-year estimates have been
released only since 2009, prohibiting a comparable 2005 data set. 1-year ACS estimates
have been available since 2005, but there are reasons that this data does not suffice for
the work at hand. First, 1-year estimates represent the smallest sample size of all
available U.S. Census estimates and are only available for areas with a population of
greater than 65,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020a). This leads to many Oregon counties
being omitted from the 1-year estimate. The 1-year estimate 2005 data, for example,
includes data representing only 15 of 36 counties in Oregon. The 5-year ACS estimates
are the only U.S. Census option for demographic statistics in the smallest of my target
geographies (Oregon cities) due to their small populations.
For reasons described here, the population change assessment for Oregon includes
decennial U.S. Census data for the year 2000 as a baseline year and 5-year ACS estimate
data for the years 2010, 2015, and 2019. It should be noted that the utilization of 5-year
estimates requires that data in the 2019 estimate overlaps data in the 2015 estimate since
the former also includes the ACS data collected in 2015. This overlap is not expected to
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cause an issue in providing a snapshot of the state's demographic change since I do not
intend to explore the data with inferential statistical analysis.
Once population data were downloaded, I calculated the average foreign-born
population by percentage of the total population in each county in 2000, 2010, 2015, and
2019. I chose to use the average to identify a baseline for counties of interest to my locallevel case study selection because I intended to look more closely at counties with
percentages above the state average each year. Looking at the foreign-born population by
percent of the total population is preferred to observing the change in whole numbers
because population increases of any number will be absorbed more efficiently in a more
populated county like Washington County (pop. 589,481 in 2019) (Social Explorer
Tables, 2021d) and more noticeable in counties with smaller populations, like in Malheur
County (pop. 30,412 in 2019) (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d).
Next, I calculated the percent change in the foreign-born population in each
county from 2000 to 2019. This analysis allowed me to observe where foreign-born
populations were increasing, decreasing, and staying the same by the percentage of the
total population in each county. I explored the Hispanic population in each county in
Oregon in the same fashion as the foreign-born population, focusing on the counties with
the highest percent Hispanic population each year. Correlations observed between
increasing foreign-born and Hispanic populations are discussed by county in the Oregon
case study.
I downloaded and explored data reflecting levels of education and median
household income by county. These data were not available for the foreign-born
population by county, and levels of education were not available by race via Social
80

Explorer. Therefore, these data may be helpful to provide context in the state of Oregon
once the framework is constructed. Still, I chose to remain at the state level, where I had
data specific to the foreign-born population for initial research. Data relating to
immigrant education levels and median household income in Oregon are sourced from
Migration Policy Institute’s State Immigration Data Profile for Oregon (Migration Policy
Institute, 2001-2021). This is the same source I utilized for the comprehensive coverage
for the state level.
To provide a point of comparison with federal and local-level leadership
representation, I attempted to identify Oregon state legislative representation by gender
and by race from 2005 through 2019. This proved rather unfruitful. The NCSL tracked
legislative representation in all 50 states in 2015 and 2020, but the 2020 data for race are
largely missing (NCSL, 2020b). What evidence of legislative representation at the state
level is available through triangulation of news articles is included in the Oregon case
study.
Finally, I reviewed to the point of saturation major news outlets discussing
immigrants or immigration in Oregon and other grey material for messaging relating to
immigration policy and attitudes or opinions toward immigration at the state level during
the target time period. Resources for immigrants in Oregon, including legal and advocacy
organizations, were identified through internet searches and cataloged within a timeline,
so it was clear when each organization was established. Doing this served to frame the
nature of advocacy in the state over time. I also searched for details relating to immigrant
detention facilities in the state to understand where and when Oregon may have housed
immigrant detainees for the federal government.
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As with the federal level and comprehensive coverage for state-level data
collection processes, the in-depth coverage of the state-level data collection process is
detailed and multi-faceted. Table 3.2 illustrates the breadth of data collected at the state
level with comprehensive and deep coverage detailed separately. The writing of the statelevel case study began, as the federal level did, with the initial data collection and was
developed iteratively to allow for the evolution of richness (Weick, 2007) and the
realization of sensitizing concepts (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The case study development
process is discussed thoroughly in a later section of this chapter after the local case study
data collection is exhausted.
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Note. This table illustrates data collection and institutional influence in the comprehensive state-level data collection
process and in the deep state-level data collection process.

Schematic for Comprehensive and Deep Data Collection at the State Level

Table 3.2

Local-level case Studies Data Collection: Sandy, Nyssa, and Madras
The case study development at the local level included the collection of new
primary data in concert with secondary data. The study is exploratory in nature and was
limited by COVID restrictions at Portland State University. Therefore, data collection
relied on accessible resources and convenience. The logic of purposeful sampling drove
case study site selection and allowed comparative analysis to observe differences. This
section explains data collection methods before detailing the case study location
identification and interview processes.
The case study method for this research is informed by the data collected relating
to federal immigration policy and the analysis of national and state demographics
collected in the first sections of this study. A literature review and collection of local
reports, historical and contemporary news articles, and other grey material deemed
helpful in constructing a historical review of case study cities was completed in a fashion
similar to that at the federal and state levels. I also targeted grey material to help me
understand local industry trends and information accessibility within the city. I
interviewed public administrators and local leaders to understand how the community
functions concerning immigration policy at the local level.
The process of data collection at the local level was particularly iterative. Initial
analyses were completed before I completed interviews, and then additional and more
targeted data collection was completed after interviews. In some cases, a thorough review
of city council meeting minutes, committee reports, and other government documents
was deemed necessary only after informant interviews were completed. I developed six
local-level case studies for this research study. I collected primary data in the form of
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interviews and completed light coverage of secondary data collection in all six cities. In
three of the cities, I exhausted secondary data collection and developed rich case study
narratives which are presented in the case study chapter.
The population statistics employed in the development of case studies in this
research are drawn from the 2000 decennial Census (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a) and
2010 American Community Survey 5-year estimates (Social Explorer Tables, 2021b) and
2019 American Community Survey 5-year estimates (Social Explorer Tables 2021d).
ACS 5-year estimate data are collected by the U.S. Census Bureau continuously over five
years and then pooled to create a 5-year estimate. I reviewed guidelines for comparing
ACS data to confirm that the 2000 decennial census is compatible with the ACS 5-year
estimate data for the items discussed in this case study (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020b). For
case study cities, data were downloaded from the U.S. Census by ‘place,’ which means
the statistics reflect populations living within Sandy, Nyssa, and Madras city limits.
Where it is applicable for descriptive purposes, county statistics are also included in the
case studies.
I downloaded and reviewed historical population growth in each city from 1910 to
the present and included a descriptive analysis of the foreign-born population in 2000,
2010, and 2019. The foreign-born population in all of my case study cities was
predominantly Mexican, and the Latino population in each city was also increasing. For
this reason, I also included a descriptive analysis of the Hispanic population in 2000,
2010, and 2019. Foreign-born industry participation rates were not available for this
study, but I included a discussion of industry trends for the overall population in each
case study city. I can draw inferences about foreign-born worker trends from the
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triangulation of historical work practices, known foreign-born industry and employment
trends at the national and state levels, and industry trends for the overall population in the
city.
Primary data collection involved 20 interviews in six Oregon cities with public
administrators and other local leaders using a semi-structured interview format and with
the intent to produce knowledge through interaction (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015).
Appendix B includes sample interview probes, although interview questions were
adapted for each community and were altered based on informant expertise and direction
due to the semi-structured nature of the process. Morgan, Green, Shinn, and Robinson
(2013) identify city administrators and other public administrators as integral to meaningmaking at the local level. Furthermore, public administrators act as facilitators of robust
and resilient civic capacity through increasing social capital, improving civic
competency, building civic enterprise (Shinn, 1999). Therefore, talking directly with city
administrators and other local leaders helped me assess civic capacity in the city, gain
perspective relating to public opinion about immigrants and immigration within the
community, and probe to identify other local insights into immigration policy at the local
level.
I employed purposive sampling in each case study community to identify interview
subjects. Patton (2002) describes purposive sampling as the selection of subjects based on
what is “‘information rich’ and illuminative” (p. 40). With the understanding I gained
about the community context that emerged from my secondary data collection and
analysis process, I built a list of possible contacts, including city and county managers,
other city administrators, and non-profit administrators in each of these locations that
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could facilitate conversations that produced knowledge and induce meaning. I reflected
on early case learning and refined my interview process as I worked. I built case
momentum by ending each interview with an inquiry into who else I should talk to about
the topic and then reaching out to those individuals with interview requests. The first
location where I gathered community case study data led to early case learning, resulting
in targeted guidance for the following cases. Throughout my process, I thoughtfully and
cautiously designed and implemented case study interviews to avoid the problems of
groupthink or extremely deviant examples—both of which would be unrepresentative of
the community in question.
I recorded each interview with the informant’s agreement. Eighteen of the
interviews occurred via zoom and were recorded on that platform, and two interviews
were conducted by telephone and audio recorded with a phone app. I took notes during
each interview, and after each interview, I transcribed audio files in total.
Data collection at the local level was recursive in that what I learned from
informants directed what I searched for online to build a community case study. For
example, I looked for supporting evidence of events, meetings, or organizations in local
news publications, city council meeting minutes, or elsewhere within the community
when they were mentioned during an interview. This practice of combing secondary data
in tandem with the creation of primary data revealed aspects of social capital (Putnam,
2000; Skocpol, 2003) and community resilience (Shinn, 1999) deemed significant in the
civic capacity literature. More explicitly, through this practice of recursive data collection
and analysis, I recorded the kinds of social interactions likely to produce social capital
(Johnson, 1999).
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Table 3.3 illustrates the breadth of data collected at the local level. Local-level data
analysis directed the iterative data collection and analysis process back to state-level and
federal-level data. In some cases, data needed to be refined or updated based on what was
available at the local level. Once cases studies were constructed, the three levels were
compared and analyzed to identify conceptual categories and conceptual properties
significant to immigration federalism. The analysis process at this stage resulted in a
more complex narrative of federalism and highlighted the diversity present among and
within U.S. localities. The methods chapter moves next to data analysis, beginning with a
qualitative analysis of interview data followed by case study methods and, finally, a
review of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987/2014) employed in the
comparison of case studies.
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Note. This table illustrates data collection and institutional influence in the local-level data collection process.

Schematic for Data Collection at the Local Level

Table 3.3

Part 2: Methods of Analysis: Case Study Development and QCA
This section describes methods of analyzing five case studies, beginning with a
cross-case analysis of local-level case studies. A qualitative analysis of interview data
and a description of my methods for case study construction are included. The
comprehensive framework analysis is broken into two sections. The first focuses on
local-level cross-case analysis employing QCA (Ragin, 1987/2014). The second
describes the analysis of state and federal-level cases against each other and the local
cases.
Qualitative Analysis of Interview Data
Once interviews were transcribed and before constructing local-level case studies,
I uploaded 19 of the interview transcripts to ATLAS.ti, the qualitative data analysis
software. An important note regarding the qualitative analysis of interview data at this
stage must be included. I chose to omit one interview from the analysis because the
informant did not fit the definition of serving as a local government or community leader.
Instead, this individual was an entry-level employee who was recommended as a valuable
informant due to their unique position within the community. Indeed, the interview was
informative, and the informant is cited in the relevant case study for this reason.
However, the initial qualitative analysis of interviews using ATLAS.ti does not include
their interview data, so only 19 of the 20 interviews I completed are represented in the
initial qualitative data analysis.
Following grounded theory analysis practices outlined by Glaser and Strauss
(1967), I used an inductive analysis approach to code each of the interviews to identify
conceptual categories and conceptual properties as they emerge from the datasets
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(Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 36). I also explored co-occurrence using ATLAS.ti software
to assess whether I might observe interaction among conceptual categories. The
precursive qualitative analysis was informative in the case study development process.
Methods for Case Study Development
Yin (2018) defines case study research as the following:
A case study is an empirical method that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context,
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not
be clearly evident (p. 15).
The problem laid out in the introduction of this study outlines the lack of overall
understanding of immigration federalism and the context within which it works,
suggesting that, according to Yin’s (2018) definition, a case study structure may be a
good fit. Furthermore, the boundaries and the context of immigration federalism are illdefined, and the research surrounding immigration federalism lacks an in-depth review of
the domain. The task of unwinding the parts at play in contemporary immigration
federalism is quite complex. The case study method offers the opportunity to nest one
piece of the puzzle into the next, resulting in several state and local perspectives from
which one can draw meaning.
A case study approach for this project's federal, state, and local levels is
appropriate because I am interested in the context of immigration federalism and in
illustrating immigration policy responses and reactions and demographic details and how
they interact at different levels. Showing the relationships between and among these
elements is possible through the construction and comparison of case study narratives.
Throughout case study development, I constructed a history of immigration federalism
91

within which the case studies are framed and, indeed, a part. Finally, case studies are a
powerful research method for theory building because they serve the researcher in
illustrating “the rich, real-world context in which phenomena occur” (Eisenhardt &
Graebner, 2007, p. 25), thus highlighting the empirical nature of the phenomena (Yin,
2018).
For each of the five case studies constructed for this project, I first constructed a
historical review of the case using literature and grey material to help me frame a
contemporary context. Neustadt and May (1986) argue for the concept of thinking in
time-streams and emphasize the value of working with the full knowledge of the past
rather than allowing an idealized past to guide one’s understanding of the present and
direct one’s interests in the future. Looking back at history is as crucial to understanding
the present and imagining the future as is looking around at the present.
Next, I wrote the results of demographic and other statistical analyses in a
narrative format, being sure to note where contemporary trends spoke in any way to
movements of the past. Triangulation of first-person informant comments, local news
articles, government documents, scholarly publications, and historical references helped
me avoid tunnel vision or the narrating of only one perspective (Patton, 2002). Lastly, I
used conceptual categories identified in the qualitative analysis of interviews to guide my
construction of a narrative of federal and state-level immigration policy (in the federal
and state-level cases) and civic capacity related to immigrants and immigration (in locallevel cases). The writing process was iterative. With each completed case study draft, I
returned to previously written case studies to ensure data sources were comparable across
cases and information was parallel where it could be. Through this iterative writing
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process, I was able to envelope myself in my data to ensure discipline and objective
analysis (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) in my work and to foster a richness (Weick,
2007) not otherwise possible.
My final step in the local-level case study writing process was to review interview
transcripts and highlight responses that spoke to the topic at hand. Then I checked the
case studies to ensure that those notions were included, and I added them where they
were missing. An editing team reviewed Local-level case studies before I sent them to
my informants for comments. In instances where informants responded with edits or
further information, I researched and integrated information where appropriate. Cases
(federal, state, and local) were considered completed when iteration ceased. Much like
the saturation of data in the collection process, the construction of cases eventually grows
silent when cases have said all they need to say to one another.
Comprehensive Framework Analysis: QCA of Case Studies
The constructed case studies at three levels of government serve as the dataset
from which a case for contemporary immigration federalism is drawn. The schematic for
the complete dataset for this study is located in Appendix A. At completion, I have five
case studies to explore: one federal-level case study, one state-level case study, and three
local-level case studies. Analysis proceeded within and across case studies, employing
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987/2014) practices at the local level
and comparative description across other levels of government. The analysis process is
described in this section.
QCA is a data analysis technique designed to identify which logical conclusions a
data set supports. It is based on set relations and Boolean algebra rather than statistical
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correlations (Ragin, 1987/2014). The goal of the data analysis in this part of the study is
to explore the combinations of characteristics present in each case and compare them to
other cases present in the framework to explain any observed variation between cases.
Conceptual categories revealed in the qualitative analysis of informant interview
transcripts indicate likely variables for QCA at the local level. Still, the cases themselves
were coded through inductive analysis to draw out the variables used for QCA. QCA is
an appropriate method of analysis for this research due to its qualitative and comparative
nature (Ragin, 1987/2014).
QCA involves exploring each case as a combination of characteristics, which,
Ragin (1987/2014) argues, is an essential element of the qualitative tradition. Where
quantitative research following statistical methods treats relevant conditions as
independent of one another, qualitative case analysis investigates combinations of
conditions holistically (Ragin, 1987/2014, p. 15). QCA serves as an important bridge
between qualitative and quantitative analyses because, with it, one seeks to identify the
necessary and sufficient conditions for a given phenomenon (Legewie, 2013). A
necessary condition “is a condition that must be present for the outcome to occur, but its
presence does not guarantee that occurrence” (Rihoux and Ragin, 2012, p. 22), while
sufficient conditions (usually combinations of conditions) must always produce the
expected outcome (Ragin, 2000). Once an exhaustive explanation of the phenomenon
under investigation is complete, characteristics identified via QCA as necessary and
sufficient can then be analyzed through quantitative techniques to ask what influence a
characteristic has on the phenomenon in question (Legewie, 2013), thus closing the gap
between qualitative and quantitative methods.
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The bridge between qualitative and quantitative analysis is significant to the goal
of this study because existing research in the area of immigration federalism, and
research employing the NCSL state legislation dataset, in particular, is overwhelmingly
quantitative. The settings for these works are firmly seated in the established theoretical
practices of the researchers’ respective fields (i.e., political science, criminal justice, etc.).
Legewie (2013) points out that quantitative analysis, particularly in regression-type
analyses, assesses the influential power of a causal factor on some variable given the
presence of other factors rather than evaluating the complex causality of a phenomenon
(p. 2). This study employs QCA to test whether supposed causal mechanisms for
immigration policy development identified in existing research are present in the
combinations of conditions that produce immigration policies of various types in the
context of the developed framework. Thus, subsequent quantitative analyses will be more
confidently representative of the empirical setting(s) of immigration federalism.
While QCA is a qualitative method, it is also clearly comparative. Ragin
(1987/2014) argues that a comparative approach is required to explain variation in
combinations of characteristics and their outcomes. One does this through a case-oriented
method like QCA. QCA assumes complex causality and requires in-depth case
knowledge from the researcher (Legewie, 2013), which means the utmost care needs to
be employed when making methodological decisions—even those as seemingly simple as
defining terms used to represent conditions (Ragin, 1987/2014). Because QCA makes
research more systematic and transparent (Legewie, 2013), methodological decisions can
be justified clearly and easily monitored when needed.
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Finally, QCA is an appropriate method of analysis for this study because it is
ideal for cross-case comparisons for medium-N data sets). Both Legewie (2013) and
Ragin (1987/2014) argue that case analysis methods such as QCA can lead to the
development of new substantive theories, which is the desired outcome of this study.
Local-level case studies are analyzed using QCA, and state and federal-level cases are
cross-analyzed using descriptive methods.
Local-Level Cross-Case Analysis Employing QCA
Before the cross-case analysis, all local-level case studies were inductively
reviewed and coded to highlight aspects of the case that impacted civic capacity related to
immigrants or immigration. Because the case studies were constructed with this topic in
mind, the coding process drew out influential elements, or sensitizing concepts (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967), for comparison. Sensitizing concepts could be identified as pairs of
conceptual categories and conceptual properties. For example, historicity and economy
were identified as critical conceptual categories impacting a city’s civic capacity related
to immigrants and immigration. Within historicity, conceptual properties include
agriculture, the Bracero Program, the forced removal of tribes, and several others.
The QCA process is designed to qualify which of these conceptual properties are
present in which local contexts. Sensitizing concepts in each case study were added to a
truth table, a valuable tool for QCA (Ragin, 1987/2014). The truth table created for QCA
analysis for this project is included in Appendix K. Once the truth table is complete, it is
possible to identify and discuss sensitizing concepts that are present in all three local case
studies, present in only two of the three case studies, or present in only one of the studies.
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Cross-Case Analysis of Federal and State-Level Trends against Each Other and the
Local Cases
I analyzed federal-level immigration policy trends against Oregon state trends in
immigration policy through a qualitative descriptive analysis of the two case studies. I
used a timeline comparison approach. I mapped federal-level policy changes onto a
timeline, added the Oregon state events and policy changes, and described my
observations. For the target period of 2005 through 2019, I wrote out trends for all
federal-level factors that could be made visual, including trends in executive
administration, trends in the number of court filings made, changes in legislative
representation, various demographics, and industry and employment trends. I completed
the same process for the state-level data and described my observations of the
comparison. This proved to be an effective way to observe times-streams (Neustadt &
May, 1986) at the federal and state levels and, more importantly, an effective way to
explore how they might interact.
Once the federal-level data were compared against the state-level data, I
integrated the local-level data into the timeline comparison analysis. In effect, I visually
observed all five cases within the space and timeline. Because I had already analyzed
similarities and differences at the local level, and because I had compared the federal and
state levels, I felt entrenched enough in the data and the process to observe and record
any interactions present. The cross-case analysis of federal and state-level policy and
demographic trends against each other and the local cases culminated the analysis for this
study. The chapter briefly turns to the vital role journaling played in my work before
noting points significant to the research quality of this project.
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Journaling
Journaling is included here as a subsection because it is an integral aspect of my
research project from beginning to end. Journaling is reflective practice and imperative to
inductive qualitative research, particularly where one attempts to build theory from a
context as unclear as that of U.S. immigration federalism. Jordan (1993) describes
examples of researcher interference in qualitative case study research she carried out in
the Yucatan and then reflects on those experiences in her writing in ways that lead the
reader to appreciate the complex nature of being the researcher recognizing her own
interference in the research. Ben-Ari and Enosh (2011) discuss the benefit of employing
reflexive practices like journaling for understanding others’ perspectives and
interpretations of culture. Whether seeking to understand one’s level of interference or
seeking to understand different interpretations of culture, journaling presents itself as a
useful and valuable tool in qualitative research.
Given the breadth and generative nature of this research project's data collection
and analysis processes, my commitment to a journaling regime is essential. Particularly at
the local level, where I enter the field to interview community members, I need to be
entrenched in a practice that helps me observe my own bias in the process and understand
the perspectives and lived context of others. Ortlipp (2008) uses journaling and reflective
practice to create transparency for her academic audiences, claiming that journaling
makes her thoughts and feelings about the work visible. Thus, the author’s interpretations
and deductions are left open to the audience’s scrutiny. Journaling, therefore, assists the
researcher in holding close to the data and helps to ensure a disciplined and objective
analysis (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).
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Research Quality
Patton (2002) claims that “methods, no less than knowledge, are dependent on
context” (p. 12), meaning that there is no single, ideal standard regarding how qualitative
research ought to be designed and how qualitative data ought to be analyzed. The
researcher is left to make decisions based on the imperfect interaction between and
among “resources, capabilities, purposes, possibilities, creativity, and personal
judgements by those involved” (Patton, 2002, p. 12). With this in mind, I attempt to
qualify my research design decisions in this section.
Federalism in general, and immigration federalism more specifically, is inherently
complex. The nested construction of this design is a logical attempt to organize the more
common levels of government (federal, state, and local) to examine their relationships to
one another more closely. The collection of various data aids in triangulation, or the
capturing and respecting of multiple perspectives for analysis (Patton, 2002). While this
research design covers a broad range of data, the case study approach allows for in-depth
analysis and understanding of state and local contexts.
As mentioned in an earlier section, Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007) find case
studies a valuable research method for theory building and empirical observation. Where
multiple cases are analyzed and compared (as is the case in this research project), the case
study method benefits from replication logic, or the ability for each case to serve as a
distinct experiment (Eisenhardt, 1989), which, in turn, holds the researcher close to the
data and helps to ensure discipline and objective analysis (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).
Finally, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) note that inductive theory building
through case studies is popular within the social sciences in large part because such
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theory provides a solid link to deductive research. The authors argue that inductive and
deductive research mirror one another in the service of developing theory and then
creating a space within which it can be tested. The inductive nature of this research
project is expressly intended to lead to a testable theoretical model that lends itself to
deductive research. Furthermore, the theory developed through this research is itself
constructed from comparative observations of complex empirical settings rather than
existing purely on inference.
Research quality depends on the criteria by which it is being assessed, and these
criteria depend on how the assessor perceives truth (Patton, 2002). For my part, I have
designed the project with criteria for traditional scientific research in mind. Yet, social
constructivist and artistic and evocative criteria are also considered in the design of this
project. Criteria for traditional scientific research include objectivity of the researcher,
systematic field procedures, reliability of coding and pattern analyses, correspondence of
findings to reality, generalizability, and contributions to theory (Patton, 2002, p. 544), all
of which are reflected in this methods section.
While I reflect on how I met such criteria throughout the project in this paper, I
have also included design elements that acknowledge and serve to ease the tension
between these criteria for research and criteria from alternative perspectives. For
example, the integration of a process for reflective journaling throughout data collection
and analysis serves to balance the need for objectivity from the traditional scientific
research perspective with the call for subjectivity from the social constructivist
perspective by acknowledging awareness of researcher bias and creating a context in
which that bias may be explored, and a more objective truth derived. Additionally, in my
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desire to create a narrative for contemporary immigration federalism, the artistic and
evocative perspective values interpretive vitality and output that feels true or authentic
(Patton, 2002). The notion of feeling true over being true puts this latter perspective at
odds with the values of, and, therefore, the criteria for quality of the project’s dominant
perspective, traditional scientific research.
Throughout the data collection and analysis process, I have committed to a
reflective journaling process to understand better how the many parts of this research
interconnect. This reflective journal allowed me to consider the following steps and
record decisions made, thus making my process transparent. I intend to form a reasonable
representation of the institutional context of immigration federalism through broad data
collection. My theory building was guided by Glaser and Strauss (1967). They refer to a
“continual intermeshing of data collection and analysis” that closes when the researcher
has expired her ability to draw new and meaningful knowledge from the material (p.
224).
Finally, the interview process was illuminating, sometimes for unexpected reasons.
I had not anticipated the stark divide I experienced between informants who understood
the history and social and economic interests of immigrant populations and those who
seemed unaware that immigrant populations may have different social and economic
interests or that history or their interests would affect service delivery needs. When
talking with informants of color, I was humbled by the privilege they granted me as a
witness to their experiences. I was surprised at my own emotions leading me to
understand my whiteness differently. I am a white, U.S.-born American woman whose
research training is dominated by traditional scientific research methods. I am, however,
101

also an individual whose educational and professional career has spanned four continents,
involved the learning and use of at least five languages to various capacities, and always
centered on cross-cultural understanding and service to others. I have struggled to
understand my role as a meaning-maker for this project, yet I have not doubted for a
moment that I could do it justice. Nevertheless, this pause I was granted through the
experience of working with diverse informants encouraged in me a more sophisticated
awareness of race as a social construct and the extent to which “society responds to an
individual’s racial identification” (Zuberi & Bonilla-Silva, 2008, p. 7). I have attempted
to center the richness of my informants’ many voices and the tension among them in my
work.
Constraints of my research design invariably limit my findings in specific ways.
As Patton (2002) argues, every design comes with trade-offs, and no design is perfect (p.
223). My findings section reflects this sentiment by representing the context of my
research closely, meaning that any constraints dependent on particular situations, effects
of my timeline, or the selectivity of document sampling in data collection will be
reflected as limitations of my findings. My resulting case studies are presented in the next
chapter, followed by the findings and discussion chapter.
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Chapter 4: Case Studies
This chapter presents the six case studies that I constructed after data collection
and analysis at each level of the institutional framework designed for this purpose. The
chapter is divided into three levels of government: federal, state, and local. In the federallevel case study section, I present one case study that focuses on immigration policy at
the federal level. The state-level section includes two sub-sections. The first covers all 50
states in a comprehensive review case study, and the second is a focused case study
covering immigration policy in Oregon. The final section of this chapter focuses on the
local-level. Three community case studies describing immigration policy and local civic
capacity are located in this section.
Federal-Level Case Study
This federal-level case study provides a foundation against which state and local
policies and actions can be compared from 2005 through 2019. The federal policy level
serves this purpose since the U.S. Constitution has been interpreted as granting the
federal government preemptive authority over issues relating to immigration and
citizenship. For this reason, state and local policies are expected to work in the space
constructed by federal policies. With the following analysis of the federal immigration
policy context, the extent to which state and local policies align with or are in tension
with federal policies and sentiments should be observable.
This case study begins with a review of the historical context of U.S. federal-level
immigration and policy from the founding of the United States to the present day. The
historical review is followed by a comprehensive review of factors relating to
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immigration at the federal level from 2005 through 2019. The case study closes with a
summary of federal-level immigration policy in the United States.
The Historical Context of Federal-level immigration and Policy
The history of immigration policy in the United States is well documented, at
least from the perspective of the roles and responsibilities of the federal government and
its relationship to state governments. Waters and Pineau (2015) include such a history in
the report, The Integration of Immigrants into American Society, edited for a research
panel organized by the National Academy of Science. Neuman (1993) focuses historical
attention on the first century of U.S. immigration law, reporting the development of
immigration federalism from 1776 through 1875. Throughout the twentieth century and
into the twenty-first century, conversations around immigration became more focused on
the effects of immigration on the U.S. population, the role of racism in immigration law,
and, more generally, demographic change. Smith and Edmonston edit a panel report on
the economic, demographic, and fiscal effects of immigration (National Research
Council, 1997). Okrent (2019) examines historically racist laws that banned Jews,
Italians, and certain European immigrants from the United States, while Frey (2015)
takes a demographic-focused perspective in outlining how racial demographics are
changing the nation. This section of the proposal references these scholars and others to
frame the contemporary context of federal immigration policy and demographic change
in a way that serves as a foundation for the development of a theoretical framework for
immigration federalism and this research going forward.
Before the end of the American Civil War and the abolition of slavery in the
United States, states and localities were the primary immigration regulators of their
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jurisdictions (Neuman, 1993). The Naturalization Act of 1790 that granted state and local
common law courts the authority to naturalize citizens within their jurisdictions, caused a
wide variation of naturalization regulations (Waters & Pineau, 2015). It also reflects the
relative unimportance of immigration status and citizenship at the outset of the young
nation.
At the state and local levels, immigration regulations were created to allay public
health concerns brought on by new arrivals carrying contagious diseases, taxes were
levied to prevent the entry of individuals without financial means, and rules were
designed to keep out individuals of certain races and ethnicities. Neuman (1993) argues
the shift toward federal government control of immigration came only after the close of
the Civil War because of slave states’ adamant insistence on maintaining state control
over the movement of free Blacks (p. 1866).
While this proposal does not include the treatment of the Black population in
depth, it is important to recognize the link between early U.S. state immigration
regulation and restrictions on the movement of the Black population already present,
often since birth, in the nation. While southern slave states designed policies to prevent
Blacks from leaving their jurisdictions, northern states designed policies to prevent
Blacks from entering their jurisdictions. Furthermore, many states with ports along the
Atlantic coast designed restrictions to prevent Black seamen from disembarking while
their ships docked in local harbors (Neuman, 1993). The literature shows the reasoning
behind such regulations as being seated in the fears of the existing, white, protestant
population and parallels twentieth century policy confrontations relating to racism,
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fairness, and equity (Neuman, 1993; Kendi, 2016), a fact that will be considered
throughout this research project.
Federal control over citizenship and naturalization processes evolved rapidly after
the close of the Civil War and the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, in which the
federal government defined U.S. citizenship for the first time. In 1868, the passing of the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed U.S. citizenship to anyone born on U.S. soil,
regardless of race. The first federal bureau relating to immigration regulation was
established in 1890, more than a century after the signing of the Constitution (Waters &
Pineau, 2015).
The increase in immigration policy participation at the federal level quickly led to
limitations at the state level, thereby initiating the complex relationship of immigration
federalism that we continue to see today. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Chy Lung
v. Freeman (1876) granted the federal government exclusive control over people entering
the United States and introduced the differentiation between immigration law (the exit
and entry of individuals into and out of the country and entirely the purview of the federal
government) from alienage law (relating to how citizens and noncitizens may be treated
differently) (Waters & Pineau, 2015). After Chy Lung v. Freeman (1876), it appeared that
states would remain limited to alienage law in their authority to enact immigration policy.
However, a later court decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) acknowledges dominance
of the federal government authority as it relates to alienage, leaving only limited room for
the creation of state and local laws treating citizens and noncitizens differently (Waters &
Pineau, 2015). Such laws are subject to review under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but this requirement does not eliminate the ambiguity stemming
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from the decision and courts continue to struggle with the delineation of federal and state
and local authority in alienage law.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 granted citizenship to Black individuals in the
United States, but exclusion based on race continued at the federal policy level. The Page
Act of 1875 was intended to prevent unfree laborers and women who worked as
prostitutes from entering the United States, but its language more broadly prohibited
entry to anyone brought to the country for “lewd and immoral purposes” (Waters &
Pineau, 2015). The rule was effectively utilized to prohibit entry to immigrants from
various Asia countries, primarily China. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was more
explicitly race-based (Waters & Pineau, 2015). Asian exclusion laws, and Chinese
exclusion laws in particular, were largely the consequence of lobbying by California and
they gained the support of other states throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century
and into the twentieth century. Even though state immigration policy-making had been
truncated, states that had the ability to influence federal level decision-making continued
to do so. Neuman (1993) describes the efforts of states to exclude individuals of certain
origins as embarrassing to the federal government because these state laws sometimes
conflicted with existing treaties designed to promote commerce and friendship at the
national level. Courts were again asked to define the unclear boundaries between federal
and state authority in immigration policy.
Restrictive policies were not limited to the perceived threat of Asian migration to
the west coast of the United States. From 1850 through to 1914, the majority of
immigrants to the United States came from Ireland, Italy, Spain, and eastern Europe
(Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014). This was a drastic demographic shift from the
107

arrivals of previous decades. Between 1800 and 1860, almost 90% of immigrants to the
United States were British or German, but the rise of the industrial age and the need for
workers led many industries and businesses to seek willing overseas employees in yet
untapped European markets (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014). Okrent (2019) describes
the role that eugenics and racism played in framing the newly arriving populations as
degenerate, unclean, and undesirable. Coupled with the presence of an immigrant
population that looked different than the previous immigrant population was the fact that,
between 1861 and 1920, the United States experienced the largest immigration numbers
in its history, granting entry to around 30 million people. By 1920, the U.S. Census
showed that 13.2% of the total U.S. population was foreign-born (Castles, De Haas, &
Miller, 2014), an overwhelming statistic for much of the nation’s existing population.
National anxiety concerning immigration is illustrated by the passage of the
Immigration Act of 1917, which further restricted immigration from Asian regions and
introduced a literacy test requirement, and the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, which set
into motion a system for establishing annual numerical limits on new entries by national
origin (Okrent, 2019). The passage of the 1924 Immigration Act formalized national
origin quotas and greatly reduced immigration numbers and affected demographics over
the following years. Okrent (2019) describes Ellis Island one year after the passage of the
1924 act. Where twenty ships had docked every day to disembark passengers a year
earlier, only two per day did so by 1925 (Okrent, 2019, p. 2). In 1921, 76% of all
immigrants had come from southern and eastern European nations, while by 1925, those
nations accounted for only 11% of immigrants (Okrent, 2019, p. 3). Historians recognize
that demographic changes alone did not cause exclusionary or restrictive immigration
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policy in the United States, but rather, it was demographic changes coupled with the
historical and false social constructs on racial and biological differences among
populations (Okrent, 2019; Kendi, 2016).
At the federal level, immigration policy often reacts to perceived threats driven by
national ethnocentric ideologies, while states are left with the fiscal costs of integrating
immigrants who choose to settle within their jurisdictions. As the foreign-born population
increased dramatically in the early twentieth century, states — that had no control over
who settled within their jurisdictions once allowed into the United States — bore the
brunt of the fiscal burden of immigration. Some states responded by limiting immigrant
access to licenses, public employment, benefits, and other aspects important to successful
integration. While limiting the ability of immigrants to integrate in a certain jurisdiction
was intended to reduce costs to the existing population and deter immigrant settlement in
those jurisdictions, creating barriers to integration often resulted in higher costs without
reducing the immigrant population (Waters & Pineau, 2015). Ironically, preventing
immigrant integration prevents civic participation, which is a key aspect of an
immigrant’s ability to support themselves financially and socially (Batalova, Fix, &
Bachmeier, 2016), thereby increasing social and economic costs for the existing
population and likely heightening ethnocentricity in the process.
The 1924 Immigration Act played a role in changing the face of immigration in
the United States, in part by slowing the flow of immigrants. The total foreign-born
population in the United States dropped to 11.6 million in 1940 (representing 8.8% of the
total U.S. population) and 9.7 million by 1960 (representing 5% of the total U.S.
population) (Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019). By 1965, the notion that the United
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States was being overwhelmed by immigrants was not as pervasive as it had been at the
passing of the Immigration Act of 1924. In addition, the United States was experiencing
major shifts in thought and action related to race and poverty. President Lyndon B.
Johnson launched proposals for the Great Society, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed
discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin, and the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1965 abolished existing immigration restrictions based on national origin.
Other federal-level policy changes of the Civil Rights era have had a lasting
impact on the lives of immigrants in the United States. The Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) calls for the non-discriminatory education of all children
in the United States. To ensure that migrant children and their families benefit from the
benefits of the ESEA, the Office of Migrant Education administers grant programs to
facilitate continuity in education for the migrant population in the United States
(Department of Education, 2021).
Perceived threat or lack thereof may facilitate a population’s thoughts and
feelings about immigrant populations and immigration more generally, but institutional
tensions resulting from the relationships involved in immigration federalism also have a
significant impact on the overall context. One federal-state institutional tension has
evolved from the dual challenges of enforcing immigration rules and integrating
immigrants into society. While this paper has already noted the federal government focus
on immigration enforcement and the states’ responsibility to integrate immigrants, the
boundary is by no means clear. The passage of the 1980 Refugee Act established formal
criteria for the entry and placement of refugees and constructed an asylum system. This
remains the only integration-focused federal immigration law and remains the only
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program with direct federal oversight (Waters & Pineau, 2015). State, local, and nongovernmental organizations are tasked with the responsibility of implementing
integration programs for refugee groups within their jurisdictions but receive federal
funding. In other areas of immigration law and policy, the reality of state responsibility is
not as clear.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (also known as the Hart Celler Act)
changed the context of U.S. immigration by eliminating origin quotas and expanding the
potential for new immigration. What followed was the introduction of numerous visa
statuses and laws relating to these statuses that effectively made immigration policy more
complex and in greater need of enforcement. Since the 1965 law went into effect, the
federal government has occasionally limited state and local government ability to respond
with jurisdictional policies and sometimes encouraged such policymaking at those levels
of government (Waters & Pineau, 2015). Further complicating the landscape of
immigration policy in the United Sates was that the creation of visa statuses inadvertently
created the undocumented status, which represents those immigrants who are not covered
under a legal visa program (Waters & Pineau, 2015).
Federal level laws enacted in the 1980s and 1990s reflect some of the challenges
that resulted from growing numbers of undocumented immigrants, in addition to the
lasting intergovernmental tensions surrounding immigration policy. The 1986
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) provided a path to legal status for three
million undocumented persons, sanctioned employers of undocumented workers for the
first time, and granted states permission to penalize businesses employing undocumented
workers by restricting operating licenses (Waters & Pineau, 2015). The law also provided
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for an increase in enforcement resources along the U.S.-Mexican border and in the U.S.
interior. However, a New York Times journalist reported that lawmakers considering
similar legislation in 2007 argued that sanctions and enforcement never came through
after the passage of the 1986 law, and while the hope was that the undocumented
population would be absorbed through the documentation process, deportation, or
voluntary return, the 2007 undocumented population total stood at fourfold the 1986
number (Pear, 2007). The IRCA was introduced with no enforcement mechanisms to
effect change, yet the enforcement-related permissions would be expanded in later
legislation.
The number of immigration statuses expanded again in the 1990s when new highskilled labor categories were introduced along with the diversity lottery, temporary
protected status for individuals from certain countries of origin, and an expansion to the
program to reunite families (Waters & Pineau, 2015). Due to the legal and institutional
developments over the past decades—including a proliferation of immigrant statuses,
each with different allowances in terms of permanence and security in the United
States—states have born the greater fiscal burden of immigration (Smith & Edmonston,
1997). Federal immigration policy changes in the latter half of the 1990s and into the
twenty-first century would open opportunities for states and localities to cooperate more
readily with the federal government on issues relating to immigration enforcement, and
changes in demographics and the political mood would strain different parts of the
country in different ways.
By 1980, the foreign-born population in the United States was estimated to be
14.1 million, 6% of the total population, and by 1990, the foreign-born population had
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risen to 19.8 million, representing 7.8% of the total population (Radford & NoeBustamante, 2019). Meanwhile, the undocumented population continued to grow and
public sentiment becoming increasingly concerned by this relatively new group was
reflected in popular images and national discourses (Chavez, 2001). The foreign-born
population, reaching 39.9 million and 13% of the total population by 2010 (Radford &
Noe-Bustamante, 2019), continues to increase in relation to the total population, and the
national sentiment toward the undocumented population in particular and immigration
more generally continues to garner media attention and that of policymakers and the
greater public, even as the undocumented population declines (Budiman, 2020).
The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsiblity Act (IIRCA)
expanded border protections and interior enforcement while allowing cooperative
agreements between federal, state, and local authorities to aid immigration enforcement
(Waters & Pineau, 2015). The 1996 law also opened the door for federal, state, and local
governments to coordinate action and information relating to undocumented immigrants,
a concept expanded in the 2008 Secure Communities legislation (Waters & Pineau,
2015). Yet, tensions remain between federal, state, and, more frequently, local
governments.
The modern era of immigration federalism is defined by state and local policies
designed to manage immigration in one of two capacities: assisting with enforcement of
federal laws and applying restrictions to or enabling immigrant integration. Waters and
Pineau (2015) report unprecedented increases in federal funding, technology, and
personnel directed toward immigration law enforcement since the 1980s. While the
United States has experienced an increase in deportations since 1990, courts continue to
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block the majority of attempts to pass enforcement laws at the state level (Waters &
Pineau, 2015). The federal government continues to dominate the domain of immigration
enforcement, seeking only cooperation from states and localities to support existing
federal laws.
While states lack the authority to pass immigration enforcement legislation, they
have significant leeway in determining immigrant access to social benefits (Waters &
Pineau, 2015), which results in state-level immigration legislation that can be logically
separated into restrictive and integrative policies. The National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL) annual immigration legislation reports cover state-level immigration
legislation for all states since 2005 and show a steady increase in enacted state-level
immigration legislation. Some states have passed resolutions and policies allowing local
law enforcement to cooperate with federal agencies (for example, Arizona State Bill
1070) while others have passed resolutions and policies prohibiting local law
enforcement to assist federal agencies (for example, Oregon Revised Statute 181A.820),
thereby acting in defiance of the federal government’s request to cooperate. In general,
enactment of restrictive legislation was more common at the state level prior to 2012,
while the frequency of integrative legislation lagged until that year (Gulasekaram &
Ramakrishnan, 2015). To date, no one has comprehensively updated how states are
utilizing restrictive and integrative immigration legislation, although my research
indicates integrative legislation has continued to increase since 2012, an updated
perspective would help to describe the current landscape of immigration federalism.
Waters and Pineau (2015) describe “enforcement federalism,” dominated by the
federal government (p. 2-8) and “integration federalism,” managed at the state level (p. 2114

12). Under enforcement federalism, Waters and Pineau (2015) explain, the list of
removable offenses for immigrants has continually increased to the point that anyone not
naturalized may have reason to feel at risk of deportation. Most recently, administrative
discretion directs to what extent enforcement is carried out at the federal level, which
means the nuances of how immigration policy affects various immigrant populations
changes with the U.S. president’s policy preferences. For example, President Barack
Obama focused enforcement efforts at the U.S.-Mexico border rather than in the interior
via work raids and other actions that interrupt the efforts of integrative policy (Waters &
Pineau, 2015). When President Donald Trump came into office, immigration
enforcement strategies became considerably more aggressive, and President Joe Biden
then attempted to “undo” some of Trump’s policies and processes. The extreme shifts
occurring over the past few administrations stress state and local systems as they respond
to differing directives. Such administration-driven immigration policy shifts are common
in the institutional landscape of contemporary immigration federalism.
At the federal level, there seems to be an effort to “fix” the problem of
immigration while ignoring immigration as a regular function of national maintenance.
The history of federal immigration policy is interspersed with major policy shifts across
time rather than regularly managed, incremental policy changes, and the structure of
federal institutions designed to manage immigration support such dispersed processes.
From its inception in 1864, the position of Commissioner of Immigration was housed
under one of many other federal agencies, initially the State Department, then the
Treasury Department, and later the Department of Commerce and Labor (Papademetriou,
Aleinikoff, & Meyers, 1998). Most recently, immigration functions are divided into three
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agencies housed with several other agencies unrelated to immigration in the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (Jayapal, 2021). Papademetriou, Aleinikoff,
and Meyers (1998) illustrate how historical institutional structures stratified immigration
functions to such a degree that coordinated and long-term planning could not take place.
Jayapal (2021) outlines strategies for reorganizing immigration functions for more
efficient and effective service and emphasizes the value of creating a cabinet level
department for immigration services and integration, just as Papademetriou, Aleinikoff,
and Meyers (1998) suggested more than 20 years prior.
The federal government has traditionally held authority for defining regulations
relating to citizenship and permission for entry while state and local governments have
been responsible for facilitating the integration of immigrants within their jurisdictions.
Laws regulating access to citizenship, a domain of the federal government, directly affect
an immigrant’s opportunities for political integration and indirectly affect opportunities
for social and economic integration, outcomes for which states absorb the costs (Waters
& Pineau, 2015). The success or failure of achieving social and economic integration has
important fiscal impacts on state and local governments in the form of social cohesion
and tax revenue, and in a country as demographically diverse as the United States,
federal-level policy can impact different localities differently.
Looking to the future, the Pew Research Center (2015) projects that by 2065 the
United States will be home to 78 million immigrants, making up about 17% of the total
population. By 2050, the United Sates will—for the first time in history—no longer be
majority white, meaning the total population will be less than 50% white (Frey, 2015).
Increasing racial diversity is an almost certain aspect of the country’s future. History tells
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us that immigration is tightly woven into the patterns of racist expression in the United
States, and so examining the context of contemporary immigration federalism from an
integrative and institutional approach will help frame a new understanding of
immigration policy as it relates to this history and the future.
Federal-level immigration reform last occurred in 1986 with the IRCA, while
additional regulations and allowances related to enforcement and border protection were
passed in the 1996 IIRCA. Since then, changes in immigration policy have occurred
through executive administration at the federal level, via policymaking at the state level,
and through policy implementation and reactions at the local level. Court decisions have
played a large role in policy outcomes during this time, particularly at the federal and
state levels. The following section explores the shifts in policy and sentiment at the
federal level between 2005 and 2019 and serves as the federal-level case study for the
immigration federalism framework.
U.S. Immigration Policy: 2005-2019
This research recognizes that policy is born of a wide variety of administrative
and political decisions, and that policy is also interpreted differently depending on
various aspects of the political atmosphere, including but not limited to demographics
and public opinion. For these reasons, this federal-level case study involves more than a
comprehensive review of administrative policy shifts as indicated by executive orders,
presidential proclamations or memos, and fact sheets related to immigration policy from
2005 through 2019. This case study also integrates major court challenges to
administrative policy shifts during the target time period and a comprehensive review of
available grey material such as pertinent legislative reports, select reports from study
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groups, commissions, congressional committees and other panels, and whitepapers
related to immigration policy published by policy experts within the target timeline to
assist in framing the context of federal immigration policy changes. Demographic
population changes and legislative and executive representation are considered for the
target years, and public attitudes and opinions toward immigrants and immigration and
related narratives represented in major news media outlets are touched on.
Executive Administration: Policy Shifts
The question of executive administration, or government by decree, has been
taken up by scholars interested in understanding the significance of and the extent to
which U.S. presidents have utilized their policy-making power via mechanisms such as
executive orders and proclamations (Cooper, 1986; Kagan, 2001). Mayer (1999) and Moe
and Howell (1999) explore the use of executive orders as a mechanism for unilateral
policy-making by presidents. Cooper (1986) and Kagan (2001) each reflect on historical
context and the foundational arguments of the framers of the nation, but note that the use
of mechanisms for executive administration increased considerably with the Reagan and
Clinton administrations, respectively. Furthermore, Kagan (2001) argues, employment of
presidential power is not limited to presidential-level mechanisms but includes
coordination with federal agency leaders to effectively govern via executive order,
memoranda, and proclamations. The constitution states little regarding presidential power
and unilateral action (Moe & Howell, 1999), and what it does state is open to
interpretation (Kagan, 2001). However, the robustness of the literature on this topic
suggests that reviewing presidential documents issued within the target timeline will help
frame the federal-level context of immigration federalism in the United States.
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This section reviews executive administration practices undertaken by federal
level leadership from 2005 through 2019. Since Congress was unable to pass immigration
reforms within this time period and update systems that impact immigration in the United
States, policy shifts came as the result of executive orders, memoranda from the president
or federal agency leadership, and proclamations. It should be noted, however, that the
executive administration of immigration policy is not a recent development in U.S.
immigration policy. Under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Executive Order 9066
ordered the internment of individuals of Japanese descent, including U.S. citizens, from
1942 to 1945 (U.S. National Archives, 2021) and the Bracero Program was created by
executive order in 1942 to avoid wartime labor shortages in agriculture (Bracero History
Archive, n.d.). The Bracero Program was eventually formalized with Public Law 78 in
1951, but the effects of these immigration programs initiated by executive order have had
substantial impacts on U.S. immigration history.
Presidential documents such as proclamations, executive orders, and
determinations, memoranda, notices and presidential orders for the years 2005 through
2019 are reviewed in the following section. In some cases, memoranda from the heads of
federal agencies outside of the executive office have caused significant changes to the
immigration processes. Selected memoranda are discussed in this section as well. The
aim of this review is to assess if and how executive administration practices have been
employed to direct immigration policy at the federal level throughout the target time
period. This comparison in policy-making practices among three presidents offers insight
into the mechanisms available and the evolution of their use for immigration
policymaking.
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Executive Orders—2005 through 2019
Presidential executive orders are issued to manage the operations of the federal
government (Georgetown University Law Library, 2021). From 2005 through 2019, 533
executive orders (EO) were signed by Presidents Bush (120), Obama (276), and Trump
(137). EO titles were reviewed for indications that the order may affect immigrants of
immigration policy. Where a title indicated potential impacts to immigrants or
immigration policy, the order was reviewed in full to ensure this was the case. EOs
indicating support for diversity and inclusion more generally are also included in the
findings.
Bush EOs (2005-2008)
Of 120 executive orders issued by President George W. Bush from 2005 through
January 2009, three were found to impact immigrants or immigration policy in the United
States, and they are shown in Table 4.1. In 2006, Exec. Order No. 13404 called for the
establishment of a Task Force for New Americans within the Department of Homeland
Security. The sentiment of the order is considered integrative in this case study because it
seeks to improve access to information and resource for new immigrants to the United
States.
Table 4.1
President Bush EOs Impacting Immigrants or Immigration Policy 2005-2008
Year

Citation

2008 73 FR 33285
2007 72 FR 56165
2006 71 FR 33593

EO No.

EO Title

13465
13445
13404

Amending Executive Order 12989, as Amended
Strengthening Adult Education
Task Force on New Americans

Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)
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In 2007, President Bush issued Exec. Order No. 13445 titled Strengthening Adult
Education, sought to increase efforts to help new Americans to improve English language
proficiency. Adult Basic Education is the primary federal funding source for English as a
Second Language (ESL) classes in the United States as enacted in Title II of the
Workforce Investment Act of 1998. Exec. Order No. 13445 is not expressly supportive of
immigrants because it benefits adult learners more generally. However, it is integrative in
nature for the support that it does indirectly offer immigrants in English language
learning.
Finally, President Bush signed Exec. Order No. 13465, Amending Executive
Order 12989, as Amended in 2008. Executive Order 12989 was issued in 1996 and
entitled Economy and Efficiency in Government Procurement Through Compliance with
Certain Immigration and Naturalization Act Provisions. The 2008 amendment integrates
the use of an electronic employment eligibility verification system, also known as EVerify, for the purpose of economy and efficiency in government procurement. The
implementation of E-Verify is observed as restrictive because it increases barriers to
entering the workplace for some immigrants.
Of three EOs issued by President Bush between 2005 and 2009, two were directed
at immigrants and immigration and the third was indirectly supportive of immigrants.
Bush’s 2006 and 2007 EOs were integrative in nature and focused on supporting
immigrants’ access to information and materials that would aid their integration in the
United States. Bush’s 2008 EO implements a compliance tool that increases barriers for
some employers and some immigrants.
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Obama EOs (2009-2016)
Over the span of two terms, President Obama issued three EOs directed toward
the support of specific racial groups and one EO promoting diversity and inclusion more
generally, although none of these orders are explicitly directed at immigrants or
immigration policy. Table 4.2 shows EOs signed by President Obama that may relate to
immigrants or immigration policy from 2005 through 2019.
Table 4.2
President Obama EOs Impacting Immigrants or Immigration Policy 2005-2019
Year
2012
2011
2010
2009

Citation

EO No.

77 FR 45471

13621

76 FR 52845

13583

75 FR 65415

13555

74 FR 53635

13515

EO Title
White House Initiative on Educational Excellence for
African Americans
Establishing a Coordinated Government-Wide Initiative
to Promote Diversity and Inclusion in the Federal
Workforce
White House Initiative on Educational Excellence for
Hispanics
Increasing Participation of Asian Americans and Pacific
Islanders in Federal Programs

Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)

In 2009, Exec. Order No. 13515 intends to increase participation of Asian
Americans and Pacific Islanders in federal programs. This order was amended in 2011
and 2013 and continued through 2017. The White House initiative on educational
excellence for Hispanics was created by Exec. Order No. 13555 in 2010 and continued
through 2017. This was followed in 2012 by Exec. Order No. 13621, the White House
initiative on educational excellence for African Americans. Lastly, Exec. Order No.
13583 establishes a coordinated government-wide initiative to promote diversity and
inclusion in the federal workforce in 2011. Earlier EOs targeted to increase opportunity
for individuals with disabilities to be employed in the federal government (e.g. Exec.
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Order No. 13078 and Exec. Order No. 13171) served as a framework for the 2011 EO
issued by Obama.
All Obama-era EOs found to potentially impact immigrants and immigration
policy are inclusive in nature because they seek to integrate individuals of diverse
backgrounds into federal programs and the federal workforce, and they seek to elevate
the educational success of Hispanics and African Americans. These EOs are, in fact, not
related to immigrants or immigration policy other than the fact that they serve as
mechanisms for the expansion of inclusivity at the federal level.
Trump (2017-2019)
From 2017 through 2019, President Trump issued 137 EOs, 13 of which have
ramifications for immigrants or immigration policy. Table 4.3 shows EOs signed by
President Trump that relate to immigrants or immigration policy from 2005 through
2019. Three of the Trump issued EOs (Exec. Order No. 13899, 2019; Exec. Order No.
13898, 2019; and Exec. Order No. 13872, 2019) reflect notions of inclusivity, but they
are not directed explicitly at immigrant populations. One is designed to combat antiSemitism, another to establish a taskforce on missing and murdered American Indians
and Alaskan Natives, and the third focuses on the economic empowerment of Asian
Americans and Pacific Islanders, respectively. Exec. Order No. 13872 (pertaining to the
economic empowerment of Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders) supersedes Obama’s
Exec. Order No. 13515 (increasing participation of Asian American and Pacific Islanders
in federal programs).
The supersession of a new EO over an old EO is common and necessary, and a
comparative analysis of the language in Exec. Order No. 13872 and Exec. Order No.
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13515 is beyond the scope of the current project, but an initial review suggests that there
is value in looking more closely at the construction and function of such taskforces under
different administrations. The Obama EO defines the mission of an advisory commission
on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders in terms of ensuring access to federal programs
and funding, while the Trump EO references economic success as a more general mission
of a commission.
Table 4.3
President Trump EOs Impacting Immigrants or Immigration Policy 2005-2019
Year

Citation

2019 84 FR 68779
2019

EO No.
13899

84 FR 66059

13898

84 FR 52355

13888

84 FR 33821

13880

84 FR 22321

13872

83 FR 29435

13841

82 FR 50055
2017 82 FR 28747
2017 82 FR 18837

13815
13802
13788

2019
2019
2019
2018
2017

2017
2017
2017
2017

82 FR 13209

13780

82 FR 8977

13769

82 FR 8793

13767

82 FR 8799

13768

EO Title
Combating Anti-Semitism
Establishing the Task Force on Missing and Murdered
American Indians and Alaska Natives
Enhancing State and Local Involvement in Refugee
Resettlement
Collecting Information About Citizenship Status in
Connection With the Decennial Census
Economic Empowerment of Asian Americans and Pacific
Islanders
Affording Congress an Opportunity To Address Family
Separation
Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions
Program With Enhanced Vetting Capabilities
Amending Executive Order 13597
Buy American and Hire American
Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into
the United States
Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into
the United States
Border Security and Immigration Enforcement
Improvements
Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United
States

Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)

Trump issued a decidedly more restrictive EO directing federal agencies to Buy
American and Hire American (Exec. Order No. 13788, 2017). This order details visa
124

requirements for hiring practices and may result in restrictions for certain types of nonimmigrant work visas. It calls for the rigorous enforcement of section 212(a)(5) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, which defines inadmissible aliens to the United States.
Exec. Order No. 13788 is restrictive in nature, particularly in relation to immigrant
workers.
The remaining nine EOs issued by President Trump involve actions or practices
affecting the ease of entry to the United States. These were, in many cases, criticized in
the media. Exec. Order Numbers 13768 (2017) and 13767 (2017) call for increased
border security and also describe individuals seeking to cross the southern border into the
United States, as well as those who enter the country legally and overstay their visa, as
devious and dangerous. Exec. Order Numbers 13769 (2017) and 13780 (2017) are both
constructed to protect the nation from foreign terrorist entry into the United States. The
first is designed to initiate a review into the adequacy of information provided by foreign
governments of their nationals who seek entry into the United States and the second is
designed to prevent entry to nationals whose countries are deemed insufficient in terms of
the information they provide. These EOs are precursors to Trump’s Presidential
Proclamation 9645, which calls for Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for
Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety
Threats (2017). This document is discussed further in the following section, but it is
significant to note that President Trump coordinated his use of executive tools to achieve
goals related to immigration policy in ways that other presidents did not. Later in 2017,
Exec. Order No. 13815, Resuming the United States Refugee Admissions Program with
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Enhanced Vetting Capabilities, addresses “the risks presented by certain categories of
refugees” (2017).
In 2017, President Trump amends Exec. Order No. 13597 by deleting subsection
(b)(ii), which “ensures that 80 percent of nonimmigrant visa applicants are interviewed
within 3 weeks of receipt of application, recognizing that resource and security
considerations and the need to ensure provision of consular services to U.S. citizens may
dictate specific exceptions” (Establishing Visa and Foreign Visitor Processing Goals and
the Task Force On Travel and Competitiveness, 2017). This effectively removes the
burden from federal agencies to process visa applications within a reasonable time frame,
thereby restricting entry to individuals.
Exec. Order No. 13841 titled Affording Congress an Opportunity to Address
Family Separation (2018) shunts blame for family separations at the border to Congress,
arguing "it is unfortunate that Congress's failure to act and court orders have put the
Administration in the position of separating alien families to effectively enforce the law".
Days before this EO was issued, national media outlets reported on the separation of
families and were largely critical of the Trump administration for initiating and
supporting this policy (Domonoske & Gonzales, 2018; Rizzo, 2018).
Two Exec. Orders issued in 2019 relate to the 2020 U.S. Census citizenship
question and state and local government rights and preferences regarding refugee
settlement. Exec. Order No. 13880 follows the striking of U.S. Attorney General William
Barr’s memorandum calling for a citizenship question to be included on the census and
directs the Department of Commerce “to strengthen its efforts, consistent with law, to
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obtain State administrative records concerning citizenship” (Collecting Information
About Citizenship Status in Connection With the Decennial Census, 2019).
Finally, Exec. Order No. 13888 recognizes state and local-level responsibility in
refugee settlement processes and requires state and local elected officials to affirmatively
opt in if they wish to receive newly arriving refugees. The EO is entitled “Enhancing
State and Local Involvement in Refugee Resettlement,” and it furthers the Trump
administration’s narrative about refugees being financially burdensome while offering
state and local governments the agency to accept or deny refugee settlement within their
jurisdiction. Migration Policy Institute reports that a majority of U.S. governors, both
Republicans and Democrats, affirmatively opted into the refugee resettlement program
after the issuance of Exec. Order No. 13888, much to the surprise of the White House
(Chishti & Pierce, 2020).
Presidents Bush and Obama invested little in immigration reform via executive
orders. Obama, the only democrat, engaged in immigration policy by EO in an indirect
manner. Bush used EOs to support the integration of New Americans but also to
implement the use of E-Verify technology in federal contracting. Trump’s utilization of
EOs is vastly different and more aggressive than his predecessors, and he engaged in
primarily restrictive immigration policymaking via executive orders. The following
discussion covering executive use of presidential proclamations further outlines the
uniqueness of the Trump administration’s employment of executive documents in
immigration policy-making.
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Presidential Proclamations—2005 through 2019
According to the Georgetown University Law Library (2021), a presidential
proclamation is typically limited to the recognition of ceremonial events and days of
remembrance, but some proclamations have substantive effects on policy. A total of
1,890 presidential proclamations were signed from 2005 through 2019. President Bush
signed 484 proclamations over four years, President Obama signed 1,000 over eight
years, and President Trump signed 406 over three years. Proclamation titles were initially
scanned for key words indicating a focus on race or ethnicity or immigration and
suspension of entry, and a keyword search strategy was later employed to ensure all
relevant instances were recorded.
In each of these three presidencies, a number of proclamations that reference
American ethnic groups or other aspects of American heritage are present. Most of these
(Irish-American Heritage Month, Jewish Heritage Week, National Korean War Veterans
Armistice Day, for example) recur each year. Table 4.4 illustrates the proclamations
related to ethnicity and race in the United States. The list includes those proclamations
honoring African American and Black heritage in the United States, since it has been
noted that this history relates to the discussion of immigration in the United States. A
check mark is present if a president created a proclamation for a given topic during his
presidency. In most cases, presidents made such proclamations every year. However,
there are two relevant proclamations unique to President Bush for Black Music Month
and National American Indian Heritage Month. There is a proclamation unique to
President Obama, the National Hispanic-Serving Institutions Week, and four relevant
proclamations unique to President Trump, including the Days of Remembrance of Victims
128

of the Holocaust, National Day of Patriotic Devotion, National Historically Black
Colleges and Universities Week, and Missing and Murdered American Indian and Alaska
Natives Awareness Day.
Table 4.4
Presidential Proclamations and Use by Presidents 2005-2019
Bush

Proclamation Topic
National Hispanic Heritage Month
National Hispanic-Serving Institutions Week
National African American History Month
Irish-American Heritage Month

2005-2008

Greek Independence Day: A National Day of Celebration
of Greek and American Democracy
Jewish Heritage Week
Asian/Pacific American Heritage Month
Black Music Month
German-American Day
National American Indian Heritage Month
Martin Luther King, Jr., Federal Holiday
National Korean War Veterans Armistice Day
The Centennial of Korean Immigration to the United
States
Caribbean-American Heritage Month
Days of Remembrance of Victims of the Holocaust
National Day of Patriotic Devotion
National Historically Black Colleges and Universities Week
Missing and Murdered American Indians and Alaska
Natives Awareness Day
Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of
Persons Responsible for…
Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for
Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by
Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Proclamation
9645, 2017)

Obama

2009-2016

Trump

2017-2019


-








-














-
--




-
--
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 (1)
 (3)
 (1)

2
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Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)

The proclamations noted in the previous paragraph are largely symbolic in nature
and many honor immigration history in the United States. For Example, President Ronald
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Reagan issued the first proclamation for German-American Day in 1983 (GermanAmerican Hall of Fame, 2021), and in 1987 Congress codified the day of honor when it
passed a joint resolution honoring “the contributions made by German immigrants to the
life and culture of the United States” since the first arrival of German immigrants 300
years prior (A Joint Resolution, 1987). Since most of the proclamations honoring
individuals, heritages, or ethnicities are repeated throughout all administrations, it can be
assumed these days and months of remembrance and honor are expected by and popular
with the U.S. public.
Some proclamations call for the suspension of immigrant or non-immigrant entry
of people who, most often, support a particular political regime. Proclamations of this
nature typically affect only small, specific populations attempting to enter the United
States, are political in nature, and are not typically intended to control immigration to the
United States. President Trump’s Proclamation 9945 is an exception to this norm.
Proclamation 9945, titled Suspension of Entry of Immigrants Who Will Financially
Burden the Unites States Healthcare System, in order to Protect the Availability of
Healthcare Benefits for Americans (2019), prevented entry to individuals who were
unable to show proof of adequate healthcare insurance or sufficient funds to cover
potential healthcare costs while in the United States.
In 2017, President Trump also utilized a presidential proclamation to follow Exec.
Order No.s 13780 and 13769, which temporarily suspended entry to the United States by
nationals from specific countries and called for a review to ascertain which nationals of
foreign countries might pose a security threat to the United States. Proclamation 9645,
titled Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into
130

the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (2017), placed long-term
restrictions on nationals of eight foreign states whose systems for managing and sharing
information about their nationals was deemed inadequate by the Trump administration
deemed inadequate. The use of a presidential proclamation for such a substantive rule is
highly unusual and unique to the Trump administration throughout the target timeline for
this case study.
Determinations, Memoranda, Notices and Presidential Orders—2005 through 2019
Determinations, memoranda, notices, and presidential orders signed by George
W. Bush in the years from 2005 through 2008, Obama from 2009 through 2016, and
Trump from 2017 through 2019 were reviewed for this case study and documents
indicating direct relevance for immigrants or immigration policy were analyzed.
Presidential Determinations
Determinations are mostly international in scope, and the employment of
presidential determinations appears to be uniform across the G.W. Bush, Obama, and
Trump administrations. Of 132 determinations from 2005 through January 2009,
President G.W. Bush signed 13 determinations, including the term “refugee.” Four of
these respond to unexpected and urgent refugee and migration requirements related to
specific geographic locations outside of the United States, four are determinations
regarding annual refugee admissions numbers, and five are pursuant to the Migration and
Refugee Assistance Act of 1962 allowing for the release of funds “to provide
contributions to international, governmental, and non-governmental organizations, and,
as necessary, for administrative expenses of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
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Migration” (The White House, 2006). There are no other references to immigration
outside of those referring to refugees in Bush presidential determinations.
President Obama signed 137 determinations throughout both his terms in office.
Twenty-two determinations relate to refugee admissions numbers and authorizations.
Sixteen of the 22 determinations relate to “unexpected urgent refugee and migration
needs,” 11 of which are linked to refugee populations from a specific geographic location
outside of the United States. There are no other references to immigration outside of
those referring to refugees.
From 2017 through 2019, President Trump signed three presidential
determinations, all relating to refugee admissions for the fiscal years 2018, 2019, and
2020, which was signed in 2019.
Presidential determinations are the mechanism by which annual refugee
admission numbers are set. Table 4.5 shows the annual refugee allowance numbers
indicated by presidential determinations from 2006 through 2019. The refugee admission
numbers oscillated between 70,000 and 80,000 through 2015 before being increased to
85,000 and 110,000 by the Obama administration in 2016 and 2017. Trump reduced
refugee admissions to record lows since the refugee resettlement program was enacted
with the Refugee Act of 1980. And although actual refugee admissions typically fall
below the established ceiling values (Baugh, 2020), Trump’s significant reductions were
reportedly criticized by immigrant and human rights groups as an abdication of the
nation’s position as a global leader and an indication of national xenophobia (Miroff,
2020; Hesson, 2019).
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Trump’s administrative use of presidential determinations is not unusual in
function when compared with how other presidents employed this mechanism, but
Trump’s stark reductions to refugee allowances are in line with executive orders and
proclamations that are aggressively more restrictive toward immigrants and immigration
policy than his predecessors.
Table 4.5
Annual Refugee Allowance as Indicated by Presidential Determinations 2006-2020
Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

President
Bush

Obama

Trump

Annual Refugee
Allowance
70,000
70,000
80,000
80,000
80,000
80,000
76,000
70,000
70,000
70,000
85,000
110,000
45,000
30,000
18,000

*2005 allowance set by 2004 determination
and not included in this dataset

Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)

Presidential Memoranda
Presidential memoranda are primarily used for the assignment of functions or
designation of officers to various administrations or agencies. Of 75 Bush memoranda,
none include references to key words or topics related to immigrants or immigration as
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could be ascertained by document titles. All but three of the 2005-2008 memoranda were
assignments of functions, many related to various Acts or reporting activities.
Table 4.6
Obama Presidential Memoranda Indicating the Value of Inclusion and Diversity and in
Support of New Americans (2009-January 2017)
Citation
82 FR
6179
82 FR
7623
81 FR
95849
81 FR
69993
81 FR
26993
79 FR
70765

Year
2017

79 FR
70769
79 FR
12923

2014

78 FR
7987

2013

2017
2016
2016
2016
2014

2014

Obama Memoranda
Promoting Diversity and Inclusion in Our National Parks, National
Forests, and Other Public Lands and Waters
Continuing To Expand Opportunity for All Young People
Supporting New American Service Members, Veterans, and Their
Families
Promoting Diversity and Inclusion in the National Security Workforce
Promoting Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Formerly Incarcerated
Individuals
Creating Welcoming Communities and Fully Integrating Immigrants and
Refugees
Modernizing and Streamlining the U.S. Immigrant Visa System for the
21st Century
Creating and Expanding Ladders of Opportunity for Boys and Young Men
of Color
Coordination of Policies and Programs To Promote Gender Equality and
Empower Women and Girls Globally

Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)

Obama utilized presidential memoranda more broadly than Bush, signing 257
such documents during his eight-year tenure. Obama memoranda include a variety of
documents indicating the value of inclusion and diversity, expanding opportunity, and
supporting New Americans, a population that includes not only newly naturalized U.S.
citizens but also individuals anywhere in the process of naturalization. Nine Memoranda
fall into these categories and are shown in Table 4.6. While inclusion and diversity might
not directly impact immigrants, a broad focus on inclusion and diversity across
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generations, racial groups, and geographies inherently benefits immigrants because they
make up a significant portion of the diversity in the United States. Three of the Obamaera Memoranda are specifically directed at immigrant populations. The modernization of
the U.S. immigrant visa system, the creation of welcoming communities and the
integration of immigrants and refugees, and support for immigrant service members and
veterans were points of focus in Obama’s memoranda. Obama’s use of Memoranda is
overarchingly positive and integrative in nature.
Eighty-eight memoranda were signed by President Trump from 2017 through
2019, including three documents relating to immigration. The three memoranda focus on
curbing overstay rates, implementing heightened screening and vetting for visas and other
benefits, and ending “catch and release” practices. Table 4.7 includes the titles and
Federal Register citation for each of Trump’s memoranda of note. The memoranda
signed by Trump are decidedly more restrictive than those signed by Obama. The 2017
Trump memorandum calls for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to “submit
to me a report detailing the estimates long-term costs of the United States Refugee
Admissions Program as the Federal, State, and local levels, along with recommendation
about how to curtail those costs” (Implementing Immediate Heightened Screening…,
2017), which reflects an anti-refugee sentiment similar to that shown in his stark
decreases in annual refugee allowances conferred through presidential determinations.
Tellingly, the Trump administration rejected the requested OMB report when findings
showed that from 2005-2014 refugees brought in $63 billion more through taxes than it
cost the government to resettle them (Davis & Sengupta, 2017). Once again, Trump’s
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coordinated utilization of presidential documents is observable in a way that is not seen
under Bush or Obama.
Table 4.7
Trump Presidential Memoranda Indicating the Restrictive Immigration Preferences
(2017-2019)
Citation
84 FR
19853
83 FR
16179
82 FR
16279

Year
2019

Trump Memoranda
Combating High Nonimmigrant Overstay Rates

2018

Ending ``Catch and Release'' at the Border of the United States and
Directing Other Enhancements to Immigration Enforcement
Implementing Immediate Heightened Screening and Vetting of
Applications for Visas and Other Immigration Benefits, Ensuring
Enforcement of All Laws for Entry Into the United States, and Increasing
Transparency Among Departments and Agencies of the Federal
Government and for the American People

2017

Note. Data sourced from National Archives (n.d.)

Presidential Notices and Presidential Orders
Neither presidential notices nor presidential orders were found to impact
immigrants or immigration policy in the United States during the target timeline.
Presidential notices primarily relay continuations of national emergencies and, on
occasion, to express the intention of entering a free trade or similar agreement with a
given nation. President Bush has 82 Notices on file, President Obama has 210, and
President Trump has 83. No notice was found that related to immigrants or immigration
policy.
There are only two presidential orders included in the target timeline, one under
President Obama and one under President Trump. Neither order relates to immigration.
Executive Documents from Agency Heads
Some rules that have greatly impacted immigrants and immigration policy are
memoranda signed by heads of federal agencies and then supported by the president.
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Kagan (2001) recognizes coordination between the president and independent agency
leadership as a common strategy for executive administration, while Shah (2020) claims
that independent executive agency leaders also seek control at times and do not always
work in tandem with the executive administration.
The memorandum allowing for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
is one such document signed not by the president but by Secretary of Homeland Security
Janet Napolitano in 2012. The memorandum sets forth how “in the exercise of our
prosecutorial discretion, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should enforce the
Nation’s immigration laws against certain young people who were brought to this country
as children and know only this country as home” (Napolitano, 2012). The rule continues
to face political contention, and the rights conferred on childhood arrivals by the 2012
DHS Memorandum remain at risk without Congressional action to solidify the rights of
these immigrants to remain in the U.S without fear of deportation.
Evidence of such administrative rule-making that has an impact on immigrants or
immigration policy is also present in the Trump administration. For example, the
memorandum entitled Reinstatement of a Citizenship Question on the 2020 Decennial
Census Questionnaire (Ross, 2018) served to include the citizenship question on the 2020
decennial census. The question was later eliminated when the U.S. Supreme Court found
the administration’s reasoning for including it to be inadequate (Department of
Commerce v. New York, n.d.), but the memorandum can be seen as having helped move
the Trump administration agenda forward by raising the salience of this issue in public
opinion.
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Concluding Thoughts on Presidential Documents and Immigration Policy
The overall tendencies and attitudes of a certain administration toward
immigration policy appear to be indicated through the review of presidential
documentation. Some of the most significant policy changes may not be represented in
presidential documents, and the scope of this research does not include memoranda of all
other administrative leaders throughout the target timeline, so a concise representation of
all policies relating to immigrants and immigration policy cannot be expected. Even so,
the review of presidential documents completed in this section sufficiently provides an
overall gist of each administration’s goals to illustrate how sentiment toward immigrants
and immigration may change over time at the federal level.
The Bush administration employed presidential documents for immigration policy
in limited yet traditional ways. Bush used EOs to support the integration of New
Americans and to implement E-Verify. His use of proclamations, determinations, and
memoranda were quite usual and limited to honoring traditional heritages and ethnicities
through proclamations and setting refugee allowance numbers through determinations.
Obama employed presidential documents more widely for the purpose of facilitating
inclusion and diversity within and throughout federal institutions. There is evidence of
the use of memoranda between him and agency heads for the purpose of granting rights
to some immigrant populations, and these actions are integrative in nature.
Trump’s use of presidential documents for making immigration-related rules
stands out as untraditional and overwhelmingly restrictive in nature. Trump not only
employs EOs, proclamations, memoranda, and determinations in immigrant policy rulemaking, he does so in a coordinated manner in which one document references another
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document, which is linked to yet another document. This manner of policy building is
simply not viewed in the Bush or Obama administrations where immigration policy is
concerned. The striking changes observed in the Trump administration’s employment of
executive power are paralleled by the way courts were utilized to challenge
administrative decisions related to immigration from 2005-2019.
Executive Administration: Responding Legal Challenges
Because the U.S. Constitution says little about the executive powers of the
presidency to govern unilaterally, policies created through executive administration are
vulnerable to legal challenges. Kagan (2001) outlines some of the history involved in
challenging presidential orders. Because the review of executive orders and
proclamations makes clear that executive actions taken by President Trump have a
significant impact on immigrants and immigration policy, while the actions of President
Bush and President Obama do not, reviewing the legal response that each administration
garnered is a worthwhile activity for framing the context of immigration federalism.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the American Immigration Council
(AIC), and the National Immigration Law Center (NILC) are three active legal
organizations that seek to advocate for immigrants’ rights at the national level in the
United States. Other organizations provide legal assistance to immigrants and in relation
to immigration policy in the United States, but this review is limited to three
organizations prominent at the national level. This section reviews the case numbers for
each of these organizations from 2005 through 2019 as represented in Nexus Uni on June
2, 2021. The purpose of doing so is to identify to what extent legal challenges to federal
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level policies were present throughout the target timeline. Table 4.8 illustrates case
activity at the federal level for all three of the organizations of interest.
The NILC, established in 1979, defends and advances the rights of low-income
immigrants (National Immigration Law Center, n.d.). A Nexus Uni search for "National
Immigration Law Center" showed a total of 230 federal-level cases filed by a
representative of the organization between 2005 and 2019, with four cases in 2005 alone.
The number of cases increased in 2010 (5), 2015 (9), and 2019 (33). Each year the
number of NILC cases increase, but the number of cases in 2019 (33) is more than 3.5
times the number of cases in 2015, just four years before.
Table 4.8
Federal-Level Case Activity from 2009-2015, NILC, AIC, and ACLU
Search
Total
Organization Name
Term
2005-2019
"National Immigration Law Center" n/a
230
"American Immigration Council"
n/a
137
"American Civil Liberties Union"
immigra*
1,067
^
American Immigration Council first reports in 2006

2005 2010 2015 2019
4
5
9
33
1^
2
27
57
22
50
49 171

Note. Data sourced from Nexus Uni, June 2, 2021

The mission of the AIC is more broadly directed at “shaping how America thinks
about and acts towards immigrants and immigration” (American Immigration Council,
n.d.-a) and litigation appears to have begun in 2006 when the organization brought one
federal-level case. In 2010, the AIC brought only two cases. The number of cases jumped
substantially to 27 in 2015, and in 2019, the AIC brought 57 cases to federal circuit
courts. In total, the AIC brought 137 federal-level cases from 2005 through 2019.
The ACLU was created in 1920 and has “evolved in the years since…into the
nation’s premier defender of the rights enshrined in the U.S. Constitution” (American
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Civil Liberties Union, 2021b). Because the ACLU litigates for civil rights more
generally, the Nexus Uni required that the search term “immigra*” be included in order
to limit cases to those with a focus on immigrants or immigration. From 2005 through
2019, the ACLU was responsible for 1,067 federal-level cases related to immigration. In
2005, the ACLU brought 22 immigration-related cases to federal circuit courts. In 2010
and 2015, the number of cases increased to 50 and 49, respectively. In 2019, the ACLU
brought 171 cases relating to immigrants or immigration to federal circuit courts.
The number of cases brought by all three organizations litigating for the rights of
immigrants in the United States markedly increased from 2005 to 2019. For the AIC,
some of this drastic increase is due to it being a new organization. Other notable factors
include the increase in the salience of immigration as a policy issue during the same
timeline. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, U.S. national sentiment toward
immigrants and immigration shifted (this factor is discussed in depth in a later section
reviewing public attitudes) and presidential administrations responded to this shifting
sentiment differently, Obama with more broadly inclusive policies and Trump with more
restrictive immigrant-focused policies.
The search included here is precursory at best. It signifies the level of litigious
activity for each of three organizations centering their work on immigrants’ rights during
the target timeline, but it does not describe the types of rules being challenged or even
whether they challenge local, state, or federal rules. ACLU case filings, accessible to the
public through the organization’s website, are analyzed for a closer look at which federallevel rules were challenged from 2005 through 2019 and how.
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From 2005 through 2020, the ACLU has 132 records of cases related to
immigrants’ rights in their online search index (ACLU.org, initially accessed November
22, 2020 and updated June 2, 2021) that were brought to court. The organization’s online
index includes all cases the ACLU was involved in, whether the organization served as a
primary attorney or whether the organization submitted an amicus brief for an existing
case. Many of the cases challenge state-level laws or actions taken at the local level and
they are, therefore, not relevant to this case study. The only records included were those
in which the defendants included 1) a U.S. federal agency or department as an entity, 2)
the secretary, or head, of a federal agency, 3) the U.S. attorney general, 4) the United
States as an entity, or 5) the President of the United States. During the target timeline, 59
cases directly challenged the executive administration.
The number of cases brought against the executive administration each year
confirms the trend observed in the review with NILC and AIC, in which cases relating to
immigration increase over the case study timeline. Because the courts move slowly, cases
are sometimes decided years after an administration has left power, but this analysis
reveals that cases are frequently brought speedily when rules perceived to be unfair have
been implemented through executive administration.
Table 4.9 shows the number of relevant ACLU cases in each case study year.
From 2005 through 2013, there were no more than three cases brought in a given year
and 2011 and 2013 have no relevant cases brought against the executive administration.
In 2014 the ACLU had a role in five cases that were brought against the executive
administration. In 2017, however, 10 immigration related cases are brought against the
executive administration. 2018 and 2019 follow with five and eight cases, respectively.
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An additional 10 cases brought in 2020 are included in this review because they help to
support an observed evolving trend. The number of immigrants’ rights cases brought
against the executive administration held steady during the end of the Bush
administration (2005-2008) through the Obama administration (2009-2016), but it
skyrocketed during the Trump administration.
Table 4.9
The Number of ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Cases Challenging Federal Level Rules by
Year (2005-2019)

Year
2020
2019
2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
TOTAL:

Federal Level Immigration
Rights Cases (ACLU)
10
8
5
10
4
2
5
0
2
0
3
3
2
3
1
1
59

Note. Data sourced from ACLU.org

All defendants named in the cases brought from 2005 through 2008 were federal
agency or department leaders or the serving U.S. attorney general. A case in 2009 is the
first case in this dataset to include an agency as the defendant rather than the secretary or
another leader of that agency. In 2010, 2012, and 2015 a total of four immigration related
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cases were brought against the United States rather than an agency or individual
executive leader. In 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020, the ACLU had a role in cases in which
President Trump was named as the defendant. There are no incidents of Bush or Obama
being named as the defendant in immigration-related cases during the target timeline for
this case study.
This analysis is an imperfect snapshot of litigation against federal-level
immigration policies, but it is not without value. The ACLU is among the most prolific
civil rights organizations in the country and has a trove of online case data relating to
immigrants’ rights. The organization leads litigation but also joins many other
organizations, including the NILC and AIC, in supporting cases in various ways. For
these reasons, it is assumed that the ACLU cases reviewed for this case study are
representative of the kinds of rules being challenged by immigration rights organizations
in the United States.
This case study does not include a review of cases brought by the executive office
of the federal government against state governments for the purpose of challenging statelevel laws affecting immigrants or immigration, but it should be noted that at least some
examples of this have occurred and are relevant to this framework for immigration
federalism. In 2010, the Department of Justice under President Obama sued Arizona for
enacting AZ SB 1070, arguing that the law “conflict[s] with and undermine[s] the federal
government’s careful balance of immigration enforcement priorities and
objectives,” (Gerstein, 2010). The Act was partially enjoined (Arizona v. United States,
n.d.). In 2018 and 2020, the Trump administration sued California and other states and

144

local governments for the enactment of so-called sanctuary laws (Benner & Medina,
2018; Benner, 2020).
Federal Level Executive and Legislative Representation
Understanding executive and legislative representation at the federal level is of
interest in this study because policy choices matter to people living at the local level. This
is particularly true in an era when immigrants and their families are left to manage
frequent administrative changes relating to immigration policy in lieu of lasting
Congressional action on immigration reform. A 2015 The Atlantic Magazine article cites
the Pew Research Center in claiming that the 114 th Congress had the fewest immigrant
members in the last 40 years (Gao et al., 2015). Pew’s infographic shows a decreasing
share of Congressional membership held by immigrants from a peak in 1887 to a historic
low—almost 0%—in 1967. Immigrant membership remains below 2% through the 114 th
Congress, according to Pew (Pew Research Center, 2015). Yet, four years later, Pew
Research Center reports that 13% of 116th Congressional members are immigrants or the
children of immigrants (Geiger, 2019). The metric by which the share of immigrant
representation has changed to include the U.S.-born children of immigrants, but rightly
so. Where questions of political representation arise, the children of immigrants are well
suited to serve as a conduit for communicating the unique needs and desires of a
changing population.
The significance of political representation is well documented regarding gender
and race. Swers (1998) finds that women are more likely to vote for women’s issue bills
than their male counterparts. Celis et al. (2008) agree, but push for a more holistic
practice of policy exploration that acknowledges and seeks to identify the various actors
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acting for women throughout a given problem-solving process. Tate (2001) asks “Does
Race Matter?” where the political representation of Blacks in Congress is concerned. The
author finds that race does matter. This study is unique in that Tate (2001) turns to
constituents to understand their personal perspectives on the work of Black
representatives regardless of their voting patterns, rather than analyzing representatives’
voting patterns and making assumptions regarding how constituents value those votes.
Latino representation has been found to be direct and indirect (Kerr & Miller,
1997), not unlike Celis et al.’s (2008) observations of women’s representation. Griffin
and Newman (2007) explore the descriptive and substantive representation of Latinos,
finding that Latinos are largely underrepresented and that Congressional representatives
demonstrate voting practices that are more frequently in line with the political
preferences of their white constituents than their Latino constituents. In a more recent
study, Wallace (2014) finds that partisanship is the main driver of voting behavior for
Latino representatives and an increase in the Latino constituent population does not
influence this behavior. Moreover, Wallace (2014) suggests that African American and
Democratic legislators may serve Latino interests as substantive representatives.
While only a fraction of social science scholarly work relating to political
representation is included in this case study, it is clear that political representation does
matter. While this study doesn’t aim to explore how representation matters to immigrants
and their families, the organization and analysis of how it has changed throughout the
target timeline is a significant aspect of the framework. Beyond individual political
representation, Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, 2015 argue that the political ideology of
policy makers plays an integral role in immigration policy initiation and design at the
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state level. For a sound case study comparison, awareness of the political ideologies of
federal legislators for the target time period is necessary.
Awareness of party divisions and representation during major federal immigration
policy changes may prove helpful in understanding party ideology in policy decisions
over time, particularly when compared to state-level representation trends. On the other
hand, the balance of federal level executive representation and Congressional
representation at a given point in the timeline may prove indicative of strategies taken to
reach policy goals. These two possibilities make gathering and exploring representation
details even more valuable to the baseline federal case study in this research.
In general, executive representation for the target years begins with George W.
Bush, a Republican, in office from 2005 through 2008. The following eight years see a
Democrat-controlled executive level with Barack Obama in office. Donald Trump, a
Republican, held the presidency from 2017 through the end of the target timeline. Table
4.10 shows the target timeline and illustrates administrative control in the column titled
executive.
Data concerning diversity and representation in each Congress falling within the
target timeline for this study is collected from the Congress membership profile reports
prepared by the Congressional Research Service. I have attempted to utilize the report
released most recently; in most cases this is the last report released prior to the change
over to the new Congressional class. However, because the reports are representations of
Congress at a specific place and time, vacancies and party membership are reflected in a
fashion that may be in conflict with other sources whose snapshot of Congressional
membership represents a different moment. Such discrepancies are minor and not
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significant to the observations made in this case study. Delegates and resident
commissioners are not included in this data except in the case of Asian and Pacific Native
Islander representation in the House of Representatives in the 112 th, 114th, 115th, 116th,
and 117th Congresses. Details regarding the inclusion of these numbers are discussed
below.
Table 4.10
U.S. Administrative and Legislative Control from 2005 through 2019
Year EXECUTIVE
R
2005
R
2007
D
2009
D
2011
D
2013
D
2015
R
2017
R
2019
2021
D

Congress
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

R
55
41
41
47
45
54
51
52
50

SENATE
D I/L
Total
44
1
100
57
2
100
57
2
100
51
2
100
53
2
100
44
2
100
47
2
100
46
2
100
100
48
2

R*
230
180
180
241
234
247
236
195
212

HOUSE
D* I/L* Total
202
1
433
255
0
435
255
0
435
192
0
433
201
0
435
187
0
434
197
0
433
233
2
430
431
219
0

Note. Grey boxes indicate party in control. Data sourced from Congressional Research Service reports
(Amer, 2006, 2008; Manning, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021)
*R--denotes republican; D--denotes democrat; I/L--denotes independent or libertarian

Party control of the House of Representatives and U.S. Senate are also illustrated
in Table 4.10. In 2005, the 109th Congress was controlled by the Republican party, but
this level of control flipped in the 110th Congress in 2007, when Democrats took majority
of the House and, due to independent senators caucusing with democrats, gained a slim
majority in the Senate. Control of the House again shifted to the Republicans in 2009,
where it remained until the 116th Congress in 2019 became majority Democrat. The
Senate, on the other hand, remained majority Democrat until the 114 th Congress in 2015,
when it came under the control of the Republican party. Table 4.10 reflects these shifts,
with shaded boxes denoting the party in control of the Senate and House in a given
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Congress. The 109th, 114th, and 115th Congresses were majority Republican in both the
Senate and the House, while the 110th Congress was the only Congress dominated by
Democrats during the target timeline. All other Congresses between 2005 and 2019 were
split between Democrat and Republican control.
Table 4.11
Representation of Women in U.S. Congress from 2005 through 2019
Year EXECUTIVE Congress R*
R
109
5
2005
R
110
5
2007
D
111
4
2009
D
112
5
2011
D
113
4
2013
D
114
6
2015
R
115
6
2017
R
116
2019
8
2021
D
117
8

SENATE
HOUSE
D* Total R* D*
Total % Senate % House
9
14 25
43
68
14.0%
15.7%
11
16 20
52
72
16.0%
16.6%
13
17 17
56
73
17.0%
16.8%
12
17 24
50
74
17.0%
17.1%
16
20 19
61
80
20.0%
18.4%
14
20 22
62
84
20.0%
19.4%
17
23 23
64
87
23.0%
20.1%
25
13
101
17
88
25.0%
23.5%
24 31
118
16
87
24.0%
27.4%

Note. Representation in Senate and House of Representatives from 2005 through 2019, including
percentage make-up of each chamber. Data sourced from Congressional Research Service reports (Amer,
2006, 2008; Manning, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021)
*R--denotes republican; D--denotes democrat; No independent or libertarian in data

This case study returns to administrative and party control in the section that
follows in which administrative policy shifts are more closely reviewed via an analysis of
executive orders and other policy-making mechanisms. Before moving to those policy
shifts, however, understanding the gender and racial diversity in each Congressional class
during the target timeline is valuable to understanding representation more broadly. Table
4.11 reflects consistent increases in the share of Senate and House seats occupied by
women since the target timeline began with the 109th Congress, where 14% of senators
and almost 16% of representatives were women, and ending with the 116 th Congress,
where 25% of senators and 23.5% of representatives were women.
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The Congressional Research Service reports note that each successive
Congressional class reached a new historical high in terms of women’s representation in
Congressional membership. While every class had republican and democrat members,
women were more often democrats. No women were identified as independent or
libertarian party members.
Based on 2019 U.S. Census estimates, women make up 50.8% of the overall
population in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019). While scholarly discussions
surrounding the significance of descriptive representation do not argue that representation
necessarily need be the same ratio as that found in the overall population, it should go
without saying that, having only achieved 25% representation of women in the 116 th and
117th Congresses, the nation has a way to go before women will be overrepresented.
Current Census statistics are utilized in this discussion to provide a baseline for what
“representation” might look like.
Representation by Black members in the House of Representatives also increased
throughout the target time period, although it did so at a slower rate. Table 4.12 shows
Black representation in the House rising from 9.2% in the 109 th Congress to 12.8% in the
117th Congress. Representation in the Senate, however, remains quite low at 3%.
Individuals who identify as Black or African American alone or in combination made up
about 14% of the overall U.S. population in 2019 (Tamir, 2021). While Black
representation in the House is approaching a level reflecting the share of Black
individuals in the overall U.S. population, the Senate remains far behind.
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Table 4.12.
Representation of Black Individuals in U.S. Congress from 2005 through 2019
SENATE
Year
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017

EXECUTIVE Congress R*
R
R
D
D
D
D
R

109
110
111
112
113
114
115

2019

R

116

2021

D

117

D*

HOUSE

Total

1
Women:
1^
Women:
1
Women:

R* D* Total
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
3
1
3
1
3
0

Women:
1
1
Women:
1
1
Women:
1
2
Women:
2
1
Women:
1
2
Women:

40
42
39
2

40
41

2

44

2

45

1

51

2

53

40
14
42
12
39
12
41
13
41
14
44
18
47
19
52
22
55
24

%
%
Senate
House
1.0%
9.2%
0.0%
3.2%
0.0%
9.7%
0.0%
2.8%
1.0%
9.0%
0.0%
2.8%
0.0%
9.5%
0.0%
3.0%
2.0%
9.4%
0.0%
3.2%
2.0%
10.1%
0.0%
4.1%
3.0%
10.9%
1.0%
4.4%
3.0%
12.1%
1.0%
5.1%
3.0%
12.8%
0.0%
5.6%

Note. Representation in Senate and House of Representatives from 2005 through 2019, including
percentage make-up of each chamber. Data sourced from Congressional Research Service reports (Amer,
2006, 2008; Manning, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021)
*R--denotes republican; D--denotes democrat; No independent or libertarian in data
^Barack Obama resigned from the senate on November 16, 2008

The vast majority of Black representatives in the House were democrats and most
in the Senate were as well. The representation of black women in Congress, while
increasing, is moving much more slowly and remains at 5.6% in the House in the 117 th
Congress. There are only two Congresses during the target timeline, the 115 th and the
116th, in which a black woman represented constituents in the Senate. No Black
representatives were identified as independent or libertarian party members.
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Table 4.13
Representation of Latino Individuals in U.S. Congress from 2005 through 2019
SENATE
Year
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017

EXECUTIVE Congress R*
R
R
D
D
D
D
R

109
110
111
112
113
114
115

2019

R

116

2021

D

117

D*

HOUSE

Total

1
2
Women:
1
2
Women:
1
2
Women:
1
Women:
3
1
Women:
3
1
Women:
3
2
Women:
3
2
Women:
3
4
Women:

R* D* Total
3
0
3
0
3
0
1
0
4
0
4
0
5
1
5
1
7
1

5

21

4

22

3

21

4

22

7

24

9

23

10

29

8

35

12

32

26
7
26
7
27
7
26
6
31
9
32
9
39
9
43
13
44
13

%
%
Senate House
3.0%
6.0%
0.0%
1.6%
3.0%
6.0%
0.0%
1.6%
3.0%
6.2%
0.0%
1.6%
1.0%
6.0%
0.0%
1.4%
4.0%
7.1%
0.0%
2.1%
4.0%
7.4%
0.0%
2.1%
5.0%
9.0%
1.0%
2.1%
5.0% 10.0%
1.0%
3.0%
7.0% 10.2%
1.0%
3.0%

Note. Representation in Senate and House of Representatives from 2005 through 2019, including
percentage make-up of each chamber. Data sourced from Congressional Research Service reports (Amer,
2006, 2008; Manning, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021)
*R--denotes republican; D--denotes democrat; No independent or libertarian in data

The share of Latino Congress members, shown in Table 4.13, increases over time
in a similar fashion to the share of women and Black individuals. Latino representation in
the House lags slightly behind Black representation, but more Latinos are members of the
Senate. The vast majority of Latino representatives in the House are members of the
democratic party, while Latino senators lean slightly Republican. The 115 th Congress was
the first to see a Latina represent constituents in the Senate, a trend that has been
maintained into the 117th Congress. Latina representation in the House has increased
slowly but consistently throughout the target time period. No Latino representatives were
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identified as independent or libertarian party members. In 2019, 18.5% of the total U.S.
population identified as Latino (U.S. Census Bureau, 2019), proving Latino
representation in Congress to be quite behind, particularly in the Senate.
Table 4.14
Representation by Asian Pacific American Individuals in U.S. Congress 2005-2019
SENATE
Year
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015

EXECUTIVE Congress R^

D^

0

2

2

1

4

%
%
Senate
House
5
2.0%
1.2%

0

2

2

0

5

5

2.0%

1.2%

0

2

2

2

7

9

2.0%

2.1%

2 1*
0
1
0
1
1 1*
1
3 1*
3
3 1*
3
2 3*
2

9*

8
4
10
6
10
7
13
8
14
7
16
9

2.0%
0.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
3.0%
3.0%
3.0%
3.0%
2.0%
2.0%

1.8%
0.9%
2.3%
1.4%
2.3%
1.6%
3.0%
1.8%
3.3%
1.6%
3.7%
2.1%

R
R
D
D
D
D

R^ D^

Total

110
111
112
113
114

R

115

2019

R

116

D

Total

109

2017

2021

HOUSE

117

0
2
Women:
0
1
Women:
0
1
Women:
0
3
Women:
0
3
Women:
0
2
Women:

10
11*
14*
16*
16*

Note. Representation in Senate and House of Representatives from 2005 through 2019, including
percentage make-up of each chamber. Data sourced from Congressional Research Service reports (Amer,
2006, 2008; Manning, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021)
^R--denotes republican; D--denotes democrat; No independent or libertarian in data
*Delegates are included in these numbers

Table 4.14 shows Congressional representation by Asian Pacific American
individuals, including those who are of Asian, South Asian, or Native Hawaiian or other
Pacific Islander ancestry. About 6.8% of the U.S. population identifies as Asian alone or
in combination (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020c), and another 0.4% identify as Native
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Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander alone or in combination (Health and Human Services,
2021). As with other groups, House representation of Asian Pacific Americans in
Congress has steadily increased from the 109th Congress to the 119th Congress, yet still
falls short by holding at the 3.7% mark. (A quick note regarding Table 4.14—delegates
are included in the republican and democrat House values for the 112 th and 114th-117th
Congresses, but the delegates are not included in the House total value and, therefore, are
not reflected in the overall representation by percentage. This is due to the nature of the
CRS data and does not affect the direction of discussion for this project.)
Asian Pacific American women have only been represented since the 112 th
Congress but have gained seats in both the Senate and the House since then. Finally,
while there have been a handful of republican House members who identify as Asian
Pacific American, the majority are members of the democratic party and no Asian Pacific
American senators have been republican. No Asian Pacific American representatives
were identified as independent or libertarian party members.
American Indians and Alaska Natives alone or in combination make up only 1.7%
of the overall U.S. population (Health and Human Services, 2022), and their
representation in the House has increased from 0.2% (one member) in the 109 th Congress
to 1.2% (five members) in the 117th Congress. Table 4.15 shows representation of
American Indians and Alaska Natives in the U.S. Congress from 2005 through 2019. No
senators during the target time period represent American Indian individuals. American
Indian representatives tend to be members of the republican party, although increased
representation gained in the 116th and 117th Congresses are owed to Democrat
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representatives. Women are not represented among American Indian Congressional
representatives in this data.
Table 4.15
Representation of American Indian and Alaska Native Individuals in U.S. Congress from
2005 through 2019
SENATE
Year
2005
2007
2009
2011
2013
2015
2017
2019
2021

HOUSE

EXECUTIVE Congress R^ D^ Total
R
R
D
D
D
D
R
R
D

109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

R^ D^ Total
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2

1
1
1
1
2
2
2
4
5

%
%
Senate House
0.0%
0.2%
0.0%
0.2%
0.0%
0.2%
0.0%
0.2%
0.0%
0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
0.0%
0.9%
0.0%
1.2%

Note. Representation in Senate and House of Representatives from 2005 through 2019, including
percentage make-up of each chamber. Data sourced from Congressional Research Service reports (Amer,
2006, 2008; Manning, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021)
^R--denotes republican; D--denotes democrat; No independent or libertarian in data

When all representation data is analyzed, women and representatives who identify
as a race other than white are 4.8 times more likely to be Democrat than Republican
when elected to the House and 2.3 times more likely to be Democrat than Republican
when elected to the Senate. Only two senators elected to office during the target time
period are foreign-born (U.S. Senate, n.d.), meaning they were born abroad and not to
parents who were themselves U.S. citizens. Reflecting again on Geiger’s (2019)
celebration of immigrant diversity in the 116th Congress, it is clear that the House of
Representatives remains a more accessible venue for diverse representation.
Current U.S. Census statistics have been utilized in this discussion to provide a
baseline for what “representation” might look like in the Congress, but there are three
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cautions to be noted. First, Individuals who identify as being two or more races are not
included in those counts and, therefore, risk being overlooked in this discussion. These
are individuals who may look to Black or Asian Pacific American representatives or
Latino or American Indian representatives, for example. Some representatives also
identify as more than one race. In these cases, these representatives are included in the
tables for each race included in their identity. The greater the diversity of the U.S.
Congress, the greater the chance that individuals may feel represented. It is for this reason
that the overall diversification of representation observed in the 109 th-117th Congress data
is valuable to minorities, including immigrants, in the United States.
Second, it can be misleading to rely on overall group populations in a country as
large as the United States because groups are not evenly dispersed throughout the
country. When one considers that American Indians and Alaska Natives make up only
1.3% of the overall U.S. population, it could be easy to assume that little representation is
needed. However, when one considers that in a small city such as Madras, Oregon
(population 7,051) American Indians represent 9.5% of the population, it is easier to see
how necessary representation is.
Finally, integration of the concept of political representation and Census data into
this discussion is functional and designed to help the reader make sense of the context of
representation in the United States during the target time period. It should by no means
serve as a suggestion that increases in the representation of women or of people who are
not “white alone” should stop when representation in the Congress is a descriptive copy
of representation in the overall population. On the contrary, surpassing these values
should be celebrated. White men have been trusted to serve as substantive representatives
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for all other groups throughout history and there is no reason that representatives from
any groups discussed in this section, who are not men or are not white, could not
substantively represent the whole. The data detailed in this section show that immigrants
of color and their descendants in the U.S. continue to lack representation in Congress at
parity with their representation within the U.S. population.
National Socio-economic and Demographic Change
Because immigration policy scholars observe population change as an influencer
of immigration policy (Ybarra, Sanchez, & Sanchez, 2016; Chavez & Provine, 2009;
Marquez & Schnaufnagel, 2013) and because the U.S. population is currently
experiencing unprecedented demographic changes (Frey, 2015), discussing population
change and socio-economic trends during the target timeline is imperative to framing the
federal-level case in this study. In this section, U.S. Census data reflecting national
demographics from as early as 1990 through 2019 are reviewed to help contextualize any
relation to policy actions taken between 2005 and 2019.
The data sources for this section include reports from the Migration Policy
Institute (MPI), reports from the American Immigration Council (AIC), the Pew
Research Center, and reports and data from the U.S. Census Bureau. All sources utilize
U.S. Census data to prepare their reports although the methods of analysis may differ.
In the past 30 years, the share of the U.S. population comprised of foreign-born
individuals has increased from 7.9% in 1990 to 13.7% in 2019 (Migration Policy
Institute, 2001-2021). In actual numbers, the foreign-born population in 2019
(44,932,901) is twice the size that it was in 1990 (19,767,316). The share of the foreignborn population that have become naturalized U.S. citizens has also increased over this
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time period. In 1990, fewer foreign-born individuals were U.S. citizens (40.5%) than
were non-citizens (59.54%), while in 2019, 51.6% of the foreign-born population were
naturalized and 48.1% remained non-citizens (Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021).
Table 4.16 shows population change, including nativity and citizenship from 1990 to
2019.
Table 4.16
Foreign Born and U.S.-born Citizenship, Including Latino Origin 1990-2019
Year
U.S.-born

2019

2010
2000
1990
269,393,835
283,306,622
250,314,017 228,942,557

% of total population
86.31%
87.08%
88.95%
92.05%
Foreign Born
39,955,854 31,107,889 19,767,316
44,932,901
% of total population
13.69%
12.92%
11.05%
7.95%
Naturalized
23,182,917 17,476,082 12,542,626
7,996,998
% of FB population
51.59%
43.74%
40.32%
40.46%
Noncitizen
21,749,984 22,479,772 18,565,263 11,770,318
% of FB population
48.41%
56.26%
59.68%
59.54%
Total U.S. Resident
Population
328,239,523 309,349,689 281,421,906 248,709,873
Latino Origin
50,740,089 35,305,818 22,354,059
60,481,746
% of total population
18.43%
16.35%
12.55%
8.99%
Latino Origin (U.S.-born)
40,639,701
% of U.S.-born
14.34%
Latino Origin (Foreign Born)
19,842,045
% of Foreign Born
45.50%
44.16%
Note. 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2019 U.S. Census statistical data were sourced from Social Explorer Tables
2021e; 2021a; 2021b; 2021d, respectively.

The number of immigrants as part of the overall U.S. resident population has
gained steadily since the 1970s, an effect of federal-level immigration policy changes
introduced by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. The share of immigrants to
the total population is, for the first time since the 1924 Immigration Act was enacted,
approaching 15% and continues to rise. The United States first collected data on the
nativity of the population in the 1850 decennial census and, since that time, the share of
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immigrants to the total population has not exceeded 15% (Gibson & Jung, 2006).
Between 1870 and 1910, the foreign-born population reached a sustained high of 14.4%
to 14.8% before decreasing substantially after the introduction of the 1924 Immigration
Act and further enforcement of other exclusionary laws like the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882. Okrent (2019) describes an early twentieth century U.S. social context that was
riddled with anxiety about the rising number of immigrants and fearful of losing a
common social order. The author’s description shares parallels with the contemporary
U.S. social context.
As the number of Irish, Italian, Jewish, and eastern European immigrants
increased, Okrent (2019) explains, the study of eugenics gained support as a method for
qualifying individuals as superior or inferior based on nativity. The practice was blatantly
racist, as white individuals from northern and western European countries were labeled
superior, and all others, including the ethnic white groups named above, were labeled
inferior. Eugenics, therefore, played a significant role in the creation and enforcement of
the 1924 Immigration Act and served as the rationale for limiting entry by individuals of
all races other than the preferred white race. Coupled with Asian exclusion laws, the 1924
Immigration Act served to decrease the share of immigrants in the United States to record
lows.
The contemporary United States has experienced similar social anxieties as the
immigrant population increases into the twenty-first century. Political deadlock in
Congress and the inability for Democrats and Republicans to balance an agreement on
immigration reform is one indicator of an electorate whose divisions on the issue of
immigration are entrenched in difference. The popularity of President Trump’s derisive
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comments about Latinos, Muslims, and Asians, and his executive orders excluding entry
to individuals from certain Muslim-majority countries are another indicator that national
anxiety around immigration is reaching a tipping point. What is more, Trump’s
incendiary comments are directed not toward immigration as a construct but, rather,
directly toward racial and ethnic groups. Political rhetoric, specifically that from the
forty-fifth president and his supporters, has served to qualify all individuals not perceived
to be white as inferior. The history of eugenics in the United States continues to play a
role in racist immigration practices as observed in recent allegations of sterilization
forced on immigrant women in an ICE detention center (Manian, 2020). These practices
mirror the sentiment portrayed through the immigration -related policy decisions of the
Trump administration such as the executive orders and proclamations discussed in the
section of this paper reviewing executive administration.
Given the history of racialized immigration policy in the United States, and
because Latinos have accounted for more than half of U.S. population growth between
2000 and 2008 (Fry, 2008) and again between 2010 and 2019 (Krogstad, 2020a), a focus
on the Latino population is noteworthy to this discussion. Frey (2015) identifies the
Latino population as the driver of the most significant demographic changes over the
coming years, even as growth of the Latino population is slowing due to a recent decrease
in immigration from Latin America and decreases in fertility rates (Noe-Bustamante,
Lopez, & Krogstad, 2020).
The share of the total U.S. population that identifies as being of Hispanic or
Latino origin has increased from 1990 (9%) to 2019 (18.4%) (Social Explorer Tables,
2021e; 2021d). About two thirds of the Latino population was U.S.-born in 2019, while
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the remaining one third was foreign-born. Foreign-born Latinos made up about 44% of
the total foreign-born population in the United States in 2019 (Social Explorer Tables,
2021d), a slight decrease from 2000, when foreign-born Latinos made up 45.5% of the
foreign-born population (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a). Refer again to Table 4.16 for
data and sources relating these demographic details.
The story of immigration in the United States is one constructed not of nativity
but rather one constructed of race. While only one third of Latinos in the United States
are immigrants, the impact of racist rhetoric and policies that are directed toward that
population and limit access to services are also felt by Latinos who are not immigrants.
This follows for other racial and ethnic groups in the United States. For example, antiAsian (Cai, Burch, & Patel, 2021), and anti-Semitic (Graham & Stack, 2021) violence is
drastically increasing in the United States at the time of this writing in response to the
origins of the COVID-19 virus from China and attitudes about recent clashes in Israel and
the Gaza strip, respectively. The violence observed is not directed toward individuals
known to carry actual responsibility for either situation and it is not limited to individuals
who are or were present in the parts of the world where each situation unfolded. Instead,
violence is directed at any individual who looks to be of East Asian decent and at all Jews
in the United States, reinforcing the notion that national boundaries hold far less weight
than race and ethnicity in terms of who belongs in the United States.
Education attainment—Population 25 and older
In general, immigrants and people born in the United States are better educated
today than in the past. Table 4.17 shows educational attainment for foreign born and
U.S.-born residents over the age of 25 in 1990, 2000, and 2019. Throughout the target
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timeline, an increasing percentage of the foreign-born population has attained a graduate
or professional degree at a greater rate than has the U.S.-born population. It should be
noted, however, that recredentialing degrees and professional licenses earned abroad can
prove challenging for immigrants in the United States, so the type of employment an
immigrant holds may not reflect their level of education attained (Friedman, 2018). The
remaining percent of individuals not represented in Table 4.17 are those who have
completed some college beyond high school but have yet to complete a bachelor’s
degree. The facts regarding the U.S. educational attainment of immigrants counter
stereotypes of immigrants as predominantly undocumented and uneducated.
Table 4.17
Educational Attainment for Foreign-Born and U.S.-born Residents Over Age 25 by
percentage of the population
2019

2010

Educational Attainment
Pop (age 25 and older)
Less than HS diploma
HS diploma or GED
Bachelor's Degree or More

ForeignBorn
U.S.-Born
39,553,892 185,344,676
26.3%
8.2%
22.3%
27.9%
32.7%
33.2%

ForeignBorn
na
31.7%
22.5%
27%

Educational Attainment
Pop (age 25 and older)
Less than HS diploma
HS diploma or GED
Bachelor's Degree or More

2000
1990
ForeignForeignBorn
U.S.-Born
Born
U.S.-Born
24,363,109 157,819,105 15,267,154 143,244,094
38.2%
16.7%
41.2%
23%
19.2%
30.1%
19.7%
31.1%
24%
24.4%
20.3%
20.4%

U.S.-Born
na
11%
29.7%
28.4%

Note. 1990, 2000, 2019 data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021); 2010 data sourced from
Grieco (2012)

The percentage of foreign-born individuals in the United States who have less
than a high school diploma has fallen from 41.2% in 1990 to 26.3% in 2019, while the
percentage of those with a bachelor’s degree or more has increased from 20.3% to 32.7%
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over the same time period (Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021). Since 1990, the
percentage of the foreign-born population that has completed a bachelor’s degree has
only been slightly behind the percentage of the U.S.-born population with the same
degree, but a greater percent of foreign-born individuals has attained a graduate or
professional degree than have U.S.-born individuals.
Median Household Income
Based on data published in the annual Bureau of Labor Statistics News Release
relaying details about labor force characteristics, median weekly earnings for all workers
have risen since 2005, although at different rates. For foreign-born earners, White, nonHispanic and Asian, non-Hispanic employees have observed a faster increase in pay than
Black, non-Hispanic and Hispanic employees. Foreign-born Hispanic workers earn the
lowest median income. A similar trend is reflected in median weekly earnings for U.S.born workers, although U.S.-born Asian non-Hispanics earnings outpace White nonHispanic earnings throughout the target timeline and U.S.-born Hispanic workers earn a
fraction more than U.S.-born Black non-Hispanic workers. See Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for
details related to weekly wage earnings.
When foreign-born and U.S.-born median earnings are compared by race and
ethnicity, distinct trends become visible. Figure 4.3 shows foreign-born and U.S.-born
median earnings as compared by race and ethnicity. Foreign-born Hispanic employees
yield distinctly lower median weekly earnings than all other groups, while the foreignborn Black non-Hispanic, the U.S.-born Black non-Hispanic, and the U.S.-born Hispanic
worker populations earn almost $100 more per week. Foreign-born White non-Hispanic
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Figure 4.1
Weekly Wage Earnings of Foreign-born Workers from 2005-2019

Note. The figure reflects weekly wage earnings of four foreign-born groups (Hispanic/Latino; Asian, nonHispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; and White, non-Hispanic) in 2019 dollars from 2005 to 2019. Data sourced
from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.).

Figure 4.2
Weekly Wage Earnings of U.S.-born Workers from 2005-2019

Note. The figure reflects weekly wage earnings of four U.S.-born groups (Hispanic/Latino; Asian, nonHispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; and White, non-Hispanic) in 2019 dollars from 2005 to 2019. Data sourced
from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.).
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workers, foreign-born Asian non-Hispanic workers, and U.S.-born Asian non-Hispanic
workers are the highest median wage earners throughout the timeline. U.S.-born White
non-Hispanic workers earn increasingly less in comparison to the top three groups. In
2005, U.S.-born White non-Hispanic workers earned a median weekly wage of $720,
while the top three groups earned $740 (foreign-born White non-Hispanics), $747
(foreign-born Asian non-Hispanics), and $777 (U.S.-born Asian non-Hispanics). By
2019, the gap grew significantly. U.S.-born White non-Hispanic workers earned a median
weekly wage of $1,016, while the top three groups earned $1,141 (foreign-born White
non-Hispanics), $1,198 (foreign-born Asian non-Hispanics), and $1,168 (U.S.-born Asian
non-Hispanics).
The data visualized in Figure 4.3 help underscore several main points. First,
racial/ethnic wage disparities are based on nativity but to different degrees by racial
group. For example, foreign-born Hispanic workers earn consistently less than all other
groups, including U.S.-born Hispanic workers, while foreign-born Black non-Hispanic
workers’ and Foreign-born Asian non-Hispanic workers’ earnings are closer to parity
with, and often more than, their U.S.-born counterparts. Second, the data reflect the
underlying differences in the labor market of individuals by race and nativity. Foreignborn and U.S.-born Asian non-Hispanic workers and foreign-born and U.S.-born White
non-Hispanic workers earn significantly more because they dominate employment in
high-skilled work. Employed Black non-Hispanic and Hispanic counterparts, regardless
of nativity, populate low-skilled positions and earn less. The disparities in earnings
discussed here have direct ties to current immigration policy, including the availability of
visas and perspectives about temporary workers and the undocumented population.
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Figure 4.3
2005-2019 Foreign-born and U.S.-born Median Earnings Compared by Race and
Ethnicity

Note. The figure reflects weekly wage earnings of four U.S. and foreign-born groups (Hispanic/Latino;
Asian, non-Hispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; and White, non-Hispanic) in 2019 dollars from 2015 to 2019.
Data sourced from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.).

National Industry Statistics for Immigrant Workers
Understanding the role of immigrants in the U.S. workforce is informative to the
federal-level case study. Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2011) find that industry
interest groups may have a significant impact on the immigration policy process at the
state level, so including a snapshot of national industry trends for immigrant workers
from 2005 through 2019 is worthwhile. Data from BLS Labor Force Characteristics news
releases for the years 2005 through 2019 are used in this case study to illustrate the role
of immigrants in the U.S. workforce. All BLS reports were sourced as pdf files from the
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U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.). Additional reports explaining immigrant workers
in the United States are included where it has been deemed helpful.
The U.S. labor force is complex and the target timeline for this case study is
punctuated by the Great Recession, which affected the labor force significantly in 2008
and in the following years. This case study reviews general trends in occupational roles
of the foreign-born population and compares these trends to those of the native-born
population. The case study also reflects on the impact the Great Recession had on the
foreign-born population in comparison to the native-born population.
Since 1990, the percent of the U.S. foreign-born population in the civilian labor
force has increased from 63.9% to 66.7%, while the percent of the U.S.-born population
in the civilian labor force has decreased from 64.4% to 62.4% (Migration Policy Institute
2001-2021). During that time, the share of foreign-born individuals participating in the
civilian workforce grew greater than the share of U.S.-born individuals participating in
the civilian workforce in the United States. This shift likely reflects the fact that the
foreign-born population is younger on average, while the U.S.-born population is
growing older with decreasing fertility rates (Frey, 2015). It is, nevertheless, confirmation
that the U.S. labor force is changing, and that immigrants and their children are expected
to play a significant role in the nation’s future labor force (Wilson, 2014).
A closer inspection of labor force participation rates for foreign-born and U.S.born populations is noteworthy. The CPS includes data for Black, non-Hispanic, Asian,
non-Hispanic, White, non-Hispanic, and Hispanic respondents. From 2005 through 2019,
the foreign-born Black, non-Hispanic civilian workforce population had the highest
participation rates of all racial and ethnic groups, ranging from 70% to 74.6%. Foreign167

born Hispanics followed with participation rates ranging from 67.9% to 71.5%. The
foreign-born Asian, non-Hispanic population held the third highest participation rate
throughout the target time period, ranging from 62.6% to 68.2%. The foreign-born White
non-Hispanic population held the lowest participation rates, ranging from 58.7% to
61.4%. At no point during the target time period do the participation rates overlap. All
groups experienced a slight downturn in participation rates during the recession, but the
White, non-Hispanic population suffered the smallest decrease in labor force
participation and maintains a 2019 participation rate that is almost identical to the
population’s 2005 participation rate. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate the comparison of
foreign-born and U.S.-born labor force participation rates by race and ethnicity.
Trends for U.S.-born labor force participation by race and ethnicity look quite
different from their foreign-born counterparts. First, the participation rates for the four
groups are more similar than they are in the foreign-born population, meaning that the
rates overlap frequently. In 2005, the U.S.-born White, non-Hispanic population held the
greatest rate of participation in the labor force at 66.3%. The U.S.-born Hispanic (65.6%),
Black, non-Hispanic (63.1%), and Asian, non-Hispanic (61.2%) populations followed,
respectively. Of the U.S.-born population, only the White non-Hispanic group held a
higher participation rate in the labor force than its foreign-born counterpart in 2005.
All groups suffered a decrease in labor force participation during the recession
that began in 2008, and the Asian, non-Hispanic and Hispanic groups saw a return to
2005 participation rates by 2019. By the end of the target timeline in 2019, the U.S.-born
Hispanic population’s labor force participation rate stands at 65.5% and the U.S.-born
Asian non-Hispanic participation rate exceeds the 2005 value at 63%. The U.S.-born
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Figure 4.4
2005-2019 Foreign-born Labor Force Participation Rates by Race and Ethnicity

Note. The figure reflects labor force participation rates of four foreign-born groups (Hispanic/Latino;
Asian, non-Hispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; and White, non-Hispanic) from 2015 to 2019. Data sourced
from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.).

Figure 4.5
2005-2019 U.S.-born Labor Force Participation Rates by Race and Ethnicity

Note. This figure reflects labor force participation rates of four U.S.-born groups (Hispanic/Latino; Asian,
non-Hispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; and White non-Hispanic) from 2015 to 2019. Data sourced from U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.).
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White, non-Hispanic and U.S.-born Black, non-Hispanic populations have fared less well
since the recession. The U.S.-born Black, non-Hispanic participation is steadily rising but
remains lower than the 2005 rate at 61.1%. The U.S.-born White, non-Hispanic may only
have stabilized in 2019. The group’s participation rate fell to a low of 62.2% in 2018 and
rests at 62.2% in 2019, behind the U.S.-born Hispanic and U.S.-born Asian non-Hispanic
populations in that year.
Foreign-born jobs gains with U.S.-born jobs losses have been observed and
explored in a report published by the Pew Research Center (Kochhar, Espinoza, & HinzePifer, 2010). The report suggests that foreign-born groups may fare better in economic
downturns for reasons related to worker flexibility, employment volatility, or
demographic changes, but notes that reasons for differences in post-recession
participation rates of the foreign-born as compared to the U.S.-born are not clearly
understood. The U.S.-born White non-Hispanic labor force participation rate response to
the recession is striking because it is the only group to suffer a sustained decrease in
participation for a decade following the start of the recession. During this period of
sustained disconnect from the labor force, the United States also experienced an increase
in pro-white and anti-immigrant rhetoric.
Foreign-born workers made up 17% of the U.S. workforce in 2019 (American
Immigration Council, 2021). The American Immigration Council (2021) reported that in
2019, immigrants made up 26% of the agriculture, fishing, and forestry industry
workforce. Immigrants made up 23% of the administrative support and waste
management and remediation services workforce, 22% of the construction industry
workforce, 20% of the workforce in other services (not public administration), 19% of
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the transportation and warehousing industry workforce, and 19% of the accommodation
and food services industry. Table 4.18 shows the share of immigrant workers in each of
the six top immigrant-employing industries in the United States in 2019. These statistics
are significant when considering that foreign-born individuals only made up 13.7% of the
U.S. population in the same year (Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021).
Table 4.18
Share of Foreign-Born Workers in the Six Top Immigrant-Employing Industries in the
United States in 2019
Immigrant Share (%)
Industry
(of all industry workers)
Agriculture, Fishing, and Forestry
Administrative support and Waste
management and Remediation services

26

Construction

22

Other services (not public administration)

20

Transportation and Warehousing

19

Accommodation and Food services

19

23

Note. The six industries listed here employ greater numbers of immigrants than other industries in the
United States. The share of each industry that immigrant employees make up is reflected in the ‘immigrant
share’ column. Source: American Immigration Council, 2021

Immigrants are over represented in both high-skilled and low-skilled occupations,
and their representation in the workforce is on the rise. Frey (2015) argues newcomers
will not only be responsible for growth in the U.S. labor force between 2010 and 2030,
their presence will actually prevent the U.S. labor force from shrinking, a challenge many
advanced countries like Japan and Germany are facing due to a decrease in natural
fertility rates in those countries. Immigrants in the U.S. workforce also have an
increasingly significant impact on the nation’s overall economic position. Immigrant
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households contribute billions of dollars in taxes to the federal and to state and local
governments each year, and consumer spending power of immigrant households is
estimated to be over a trillion dollars and rising (American Immigration Council, n.d.-b).
As the U.S. workforce evolves and immigrants and their children make up an increasing
percentage of it, public attitudes and opinions about immigrants and immigration will
also evolve.
National Trends in Attitudes and Opinions toward Immigration
A broad understanding of the attitudes and opinions toward immigration at the
national level during the target time period is integrated into this federal-level case study
through the review of a selective sample of national polling reports and non-partisan
organizational reports to understand the messaging relating to immigration policy. News
media coverage is also integrated where it is found to reflect a public sentiment that may
not be directly linked to executive led policy changes and non-partisan organizational
reports may provide depth of understanding that mainstream media might not achieve.
Such details will be valuable when exploring the state and local-level contexts against the
federal level baseline.
Research focusing on public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration reveal
that individual attitudes toward immigration are diverse and contradictory (Reyna,
Dobria, & Wetherell, 2013; Dempster, Leach, & Hargrave, 2020). On the one hand,
public attitudes are found to be relatively fixed to an individual’s values and worldview
(Dempster, Leach, & Hargrave, 2020), making them difficult to change. On the other
hand, individual attitudes are found to be complex enough that they can be altered with
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adequate priming as long as priming is in line with that individual’s values (Reyna,
Dobria, & Wetherell, 2013).
A number of surveys and assessment tools engage the U.S. public in an effort to
understand public opinion about immigrants and immigration over time. Dempster,
Leach, and Hargrave (2020) warn that public opinion surveys can be unreliable
depending on question wording, ordering, and changes in timing but that such data can
also be valuable for assessing general public sentiment with certain datasets. This case
study relies on data collected by the General Social Survey (GSS) (GSS Data Explorer,
2018) and reports from the American Values Atlas and the Pew Research Center to create
a snapshot of national public sentiment about immigrants and immigration from 2005 to
2019.
While this case study does not discuss the undocumented immigrant population in
detail apart from the greater immigrant population in the United States, data around
public attitudes make clear that undocumented immigrants are viewed more negatively
than immigrants overall except for the DREAMERS, individuals brought the United
States as children and raised in the country without documentation. Granting legal status
to immigrants brought to the United States without documentation as children is broadly
supported by U.S. respondents (Krogstad, 2020b). More than three quarters (77%) of
immigrants currently in the United States are documented (Budiman, 2020), yet polls
suggest that more U.S. American respondents believe that most immigrants are in the
country illegally (45%) than legally (35%) (Pew Research Center, 2018). These data
reflect a respondent population that is simply unaware of facts relating to the immigrant
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population in the United States, a fact which could further influence respondent attitudes
and opinions about immigration.
The GSS has monitored societal change since 1972 and provides a consistent
observation of public attitudes over time (GSS Data Explorer, 2018). In 2004 and 2014,
the GSS included two items related to attitudes toward immigration in the United States,
each asking respondents to identify to what extent they agree or disagree with the
following statements:
a) Immigrants are generally good for America’s economy.
b) America should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants.
Responses to these items are explored in this case study for two reasons. First, they make
a comparison of attitudes toward these issues at the beginning of the case study timeline
(2004) and in the middle of the case study timeline (2014) possible. And, second, the first
item primes respondents to consider an aspect of immigration positively, while the
second primes respondents to consider an aspect of immigration negatively. The GSS
does not make immigration-related data available after 2014, so additional resources that
consider attitudes toward immigrants and immigration in the United States are also
discussed to provide broader context for the target timeline.
The analysis of responses for the noted GSS items reveals that in 2004 and 2014 a
majority of respondents agreed that immigrants are generally good for America’s
economy and agreed or strongly agreed that America should take stronger measures to
exclude illegal immigrants. There is no statistical difference in respondent outcomes from
2004 to 2014, which indicates public attitudes on these topics remained static throughout
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the decade. These findings illustrate positive attitudes toward immigrants in the United
States but also reflect values relating to the enforcement of the rule of law.
A 2019 report exploring how Americans view immigrants illustrates a public far
more supportive of immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, today than in the
past. The PRRI American Values Atlas has collected public opinion data about attitudes
toward immigrants and immigration regularly since 2013. The breadth of data collected
for the American Values Atlas makes attitudes toward immigration by age, religious
group and political party affiliation observable over time (Jones, Jackson, Orcés & Bola,
2020). Jones, Jackson, Orcés and Bola (2020) reports that attitudes toward immigrants
are overall positive in the United States and consistent regardless of partisanship,
ideology, religious affiliation, age, education, and race (p. 16).
On issues related to immigration reform, PRRI’s American Values Atlas reports
that a majority of Americans (67% in 2019) believe immigrants who currently live in the
United States should have a path to citizenship, while 13% say immigrants in the United
States without documentation should be allowed to become permanent legal residents but
not citizens. Only 20% of respondents believe that undocumented immigrants should be
identified and deported, and the remainder did not respond to the survey item (Jones,
Jackson, Orcés & Bola, 2020).
While Democrats are more likely to support a path to citizenship (with 71% in
favor in 2013 and 80% in favor in 2019), Republican support has also remained steady
(with 53% in favor in 2013 and 51% in favor in 2019). The response to this item has held
steady since 2013 for all political party affiliations, age groups, and religious groups
(Jones, Jackson, Orcés & Bola, 2020, p. 21).
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The PRRI report illustrates the complexities of public attitudes toward a policy
issue like immigration, reporting that since 2010 agreement that immigrants strengthen
American society has increased among Democrats from 55% to 79% but not among
Republicans (Jones, Jackson, Orcés & Bola, 2020). In 2010, 35% of Republicans agreed
that immigrants strengthen American society while 31% agreed in 2019. The report also
notes that white Americans were less likely than Americans of any other racial
background to agree that immigrants strengthen America. In 2019, 53% of white
Americans agreed that immigrants strengthen society, while 78% of Hispanic Americans,
65% of black Americans, 68% of multiracial Americans, 67% of Americans of other
races agreed with the sentiment (Jones, Jackson, Orcés & Bola, 2020). And among white
Americans, those without a college degree were the least likely to agree that immigrants
strengthen society at 44%, compared to 70% of white Americans with a college degree
(Jones, Jackson, Orcés & Bola, 2020).
Religious affiliation and age matters, too. According to PRRI, white evangelical
Protestants are the least likely religious group to agree that immigrants strengthen
America, and Americans under the age of 30 are more likely to view immigrants as
strengthening America (Jones, Jackson, Orcés & Bola, 2020). Taken together, survey
sources suggest that an individual’s attitude toward immigration may be impacted by age,
religion, party affiliation, and other aspects of identity, although these views do not
change much over time.
Reyna, Dobria, and Wetherell (2013) argue that narratives about immigrant
groups and immigration policy prime public opinion in particular contexts, making
survey responses only one piece of understanding public opinion. Significant events and
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the representation of immigrants and immigration in public spaces, through the media
and administrative messaging, are reviewed here to add depth to the nature of public
attitudes about immigrants and immigration in the United States.
Significant to this case study are findings from Hitlan et al. (2007) showing that
since the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, attitudes toward Middle Eastern, Arab,
and Muslim immigrants have grown increasingly negative in the United States Hitlan et
al.’s (2007) findings suggest that public attitudes about immigration can be influenced by
shared national experiences or perceived threats. Immigration became a focal point of the
Trump administration, beginning with campaign messaging in 2015 and escalating
through policy changes and rhetoric through 2019. During this time period, the
administration’s messaging relating to immigrants and immigration increasingly framed
immigration as a threat to the United States, and it appears that this shift in narrative may
have shifted at least some public attitudes on immigration in the United States.
A 2019 National Immigration Forum report showed that American attitudes on
immigration remained steady but that they were showing more partisan divides (National
Immigration Forum, 2019). Overall, the report found, the United States public
increasingly agrees that immigrants are good for the country and fewer respondents
support a reduction in immigration numbers (National Immigration Forum, 2019).
However, Democratic and Independent respondents are more likely to follow these
trends, while Republican respondents are less likely to agree that immigrants are good for
the country (National Immigration Forum, 2019), which suggests that the negative
narratives pushed by the Trump administration successfully influenced a segment of the
population who identifies as Republican.
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Lastly, the 2019 PRRI Immigration Report also includes a finding that 56% of all
Americans surveyed support restrictive immigration policies (PRRI, 2020, March). This
was the first time PRRI included items asking specifically about attitudes relating to
support for restrictive immigration policies. Furthermore, four survey items that PRRI
indexed to create the composite score on attitudes toward restrictive immigration policies
were reflective of high-profile immigration policies implemented by the Trump
administration, including:





Passing a law that places stricter limits on the number of legal immigrants
coming to the United States,
Temporarily preventing people from some majority-Muslim countries
from entering the United States,
Building a wall along the U.S. border with Mexico, and
Passing a law to prevent refugees from entering the United States
(PRRI, 2020, p. 30)

Without a measurement of public attitudes to serve as a point of comparison, we
have no tool to gauge if public response to these items would have been similar prior to
the policy actions and public rhetoric of the Trump administration. However, there is
good reason to infer that the actions of the Trump administration and presence of those
actions within the media served as a kind of priming discussed by Reyna, Dobria, and
Wetherell (2013). PRRI, as a nonpartisan research and education organization, has been
interested in public attitudes and opinions relating to immigration since its founding in
2009.
It can be assumed that they had not included items relating to restrictive
immigration policies in earlier surveys because the topic did not appear to be salient to
the public. Only after the Trump administration did they observe the issue as salient. The
public response suggests that the topic is indeed salient, but it is unclear if public attitudes
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are simply reflecting the sentiment of the message (in the case of the Trump
administration the message was forceful and negative) against personal values. Reyna,
Dobria, and Wetherell (2013) may argue that contemporary attitudes toward restrictive
immigration policy in the United States are more a function of respondents’ response to
the past several years of priming on the topic, led by executive administration and helped
by the media. The PRRI finding exemplifies the complex nature of public attitudes and
opinions, but it also suggests that political ideology, when communicated with the public
broadly, can have lasting impacts on public opinion.
Case Study Closing Comments
A comprehensive review of factors relating to immigration at the federal level
help to frame immigration policy and national sentiment toward immigrants and
immigration nationally from 2005 through 2019. A historical review of immigration
policy is included to serve as a backdrop to immigration federalism and the contemporary
policy context.
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 resulted in the reversal of decades
of isolationist immigration policy in the United States and initiated an increase in the
national diversity of incoming immigrant populations. International worker programs
such as the Bracero Program had already laid the groundwork for chain migration from
Mexico and other countries in Latin America, and the expansion of visa programs under
the 1965 law created a context in which being undocumented was possible for the first
time. By the 1990s, federal immigration policy was inviting states to cooperate in the
enforcement of some federal immigration laws, but substantive immigration reform
remains elusive at the federal level through to the present.
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In lieu of comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level, presidents have
increasingly engaged in the executive administration of immigration policy. While
Presidents Bush and Obama differed in the substance of their executive administration
practices (Bush tended toward more traditional policies supporting the integration of
immigrants while Obama focused additionally on policies that would diversify the federal
government more broadly), their use of executive orders, proclamations, and other
presidential documents for immigration-related tasks was banal. President Trump
employed presidential documents far more frequently and his work was found to
coordinate more readily with rule-making documents created by agency leaders within
his administration. Immigration-related rules created via executive administration by the
Trump administration were overwhelmingly more restrictive than rules created under
Bush or Obama, and a dramatic increase in litigious action challenging new rules can be
observed as a response during the period of the target timeline that Trump was in office.
Representation of people of color and women in the House of Representatives and
the Senate is increasing, albeit slowly. The House of Representatives is diversifying more
rapidly than the Senate, and those who identify as democrat are more likely to be women
and/or people of color than are those who identify as republican. This diversification is,
however, fairly recent, and no racial group is represented at parity with that group’s level
of representation within the U.S. population more broadly. Furthermore, the growth in the
rates of representation parity are divergent, since representation within the general
population is increasing more quickly than representation in Congress.
Demographic change in the United States is altering what it means to be
represented. More Americans are identifying as more than one race, and the nation is
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expected to be majority non-white by 2050, meaning that understanding representation
may require a more nuanced approach than leading scholars have allowed for in the past.
Both foreign-born and U.S.-born individuals are better educated than in the past, and,
while wages have increased for all groups, two clear groups—high wage earners and lowwage earners—are notable throughout the target timeline. Among high wage earners,
U.S.-born White non-Hispanics earn less than foreign-born White non-Hispanics, U.S.born Asian non-Hispanics, and foreign-born Asian non-Hispanics. Among the low wage
earners, foreign-born Hispanics earn less than U.S.-born Hispanics, U.S.-born Black nonHispanics, and foreign-born Black non-Hispanics.
As demographics are shifting, so are public attitudes toward immigrants and
immigration. Data suggest that immigration is becoming more politicized and, therefore,
a more challenging topic to discuss outside of ideological framing. Because state and
local policies are expected to work within the space constructed by federal policies, the
extent to which state and local policies align with or are in tension with federal policies
and sentiments should be contextualized within this case study.
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State-Level Case Study
The state-level case study is presented in two sections. First, a comprehensive
review of all 50 states frames the diverse nature of state-level policymaking and
demography inherent to U.S. federalism. Next, a deep coverage review of the state of
Oregon is included to provide a case for comparison against local-level cases and the
federal-level case.
Comprehensive Coverage State-level Case Study
A thorough review of materials relating to the comprehensive coverage of the 50
states informed my decisions regarding case study states because the comprehensive
coverage step may reveal some details important to the selection of target cases. Criteria
of interest for case study selection included 1) the presence of substantial immigration
legislation enactment (states with very little immigration legislative history are not
expected to be revealing) and legislative sentiment, 2) statistics relating to socioeconomic status of the foreign-born population in the state (population change over time,
median household income, and changes in education levels of immigrants), 3) the
presence of immigrant workers in the state’s industries, 4) legislative control in the state
over time, and 5) public opinion about immigrants and immigration across each state.
Legislative Sentiment in the States
Legislative sentiment refers to the level to which a state’s immigrant-related
policies enacted by the state legislature are restrictive (1) or integrative (-1). Between
2005 and 2019, the 50 U.S. states passed 2,452 bills that impacted immigrant populations
in the states in some way. States varied, however, in the number and nature of bills
passed. California passed the most bills (n = 300) within this time period, while Alaska
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and Wisconsin each passed the least (n = 7). The average number of bills passed per state
is 48.7 and the median is 34.5. At first glance, it may be logical to eliminate for case
study consideration the states with the lowest number of bills passed or to focus more on
the states nearest the average or median. However, creating a framework for
understanding immigration federalism is not a function of averages, and outliers cannot
be easily eliminated. Table 4.19 shows U.S. states according to the number of immigrantrelated policies their legislatures passed between 2005 and 2009. The categories reflect
each state’s relationship to the median and the average (which fall roughly 14 bills apart).
In Table 4.19, the states falling closest to the median and average for bills passed are
presented in bold.
Table 4.19
U.S. States by Number of Immigration-Related Bills Passed from 2005 to 2019 and in
Relation to the Average and the Median Number of Laws Passed
Below Median

Median +/-7

Average +/-7

Above Average

Alaska (7)
Wisconsin (7)
Wyoming (11)
Ohio (12)
Delaware (13)
Kentucky (14)
South Dakota (14)
Montana (21)
West Virginia (21)
Massachusetts (23)
New Hampshire (23)
Vermont (25)
North Carolina (26)

Rhode Island (27)
North Dakota (28)
New Jersey (28)
New Mexico (28)
Mississippi (29)
South Carolina (29)
Alabama (30)
Hawaii (31)
Iowa (32)
Idaho (33)
Kansas (33)
Pennsylvania (34)
Nebraska (35)
Connecticut (37)
Indiana (40)
Oklahoma (41)

Nevada (42)
Maine (47)
Minnesota (48)
Louisiana (51)
Tennessee (51)
Arkansas (52)
Michigan (56)

Missouri (60)
Florida (62)
Maryland (62)
Texas (66)
Georgia (67)
New York (70)
Oregon (70)
Washington (83)
Virginia (96)
Colorado (97)
Utah (105)
Arizona (108)
Illinois (110)
California (300)

Note. The average number of bills passed per state = 48.7; The median number of bills passed per state =
34.5. Data sourced from NCSL (2020b).
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Once all bills were coded as restrictive, integrative, or neutral, a sentiment score
(Sentiment score = (∑restrictive-∑integrative) / ∑bills enacted), adapted from Marquez
(2017), was calculated for each state by year. The scores presented in this document
represent the culminating sentiment score for each state in 2019. Not all states pass
immigrant-related legislation in every year. When a state does not pass such legislation in
a year, the sentiment score remains the same as in the previous year. For the purposes of
developing a state-level case study for this project, 2019 sentiment scores are analyzed
since they represent the culmination of bills passed over time so far. Table 4.20 shows
state sentiment scores from the most integrative to the most restrictive and includes the
average and median values for reference. The 2019 U.S. sentiment score was calculated
using all of the bills at once.
I also compare the extent to which a state’s sentiment has change since 2005. For
example, California begins with integrative legislation in 2006, earning the state a
sentiment score of -1, and ends with an overall sentiment score of -.81, still very
integrative, although less so. There are few peaks throughout the period to suggest
segments of more restrictive sentiment in California over this time period, and a
calculation of the range of sentiment from 2008 to 2019 shows that the difference
between the state’s highest sentiment and the state’s lowest sentiment within that time
period is quite low at 0.15. Missouri, on the other hand, begins with integrative
legislation in 2005 (sentiment score = -1), is rather restrictive in bills passed in 2007
(sentiment score = 0.67), and ends with an overall score of -0.12. The range for Missouri
sentiment scores reflects a 0.58 difference between the state’s highest and lowest scores.
For this reason, California is recognized in the data as having changed little over time,
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while Missouri is recognized as having changed more over time. Table 4.20 depicts
changes in state sentiment scores from 2008 through 2019. The table includes the score
for the United States, which was calculated using the same equation but included all
2,452 bills.
Table 4.20
State Sentiment Scores in 2019, Including the United States Sentiment Score for
Comparison
Integrative

Restrictive

Connecticut (-0.92)
Wisconsin (-0.43)
Virginia (0.01)
Oklahoma (0.24)
California (-0.81)
Delaware (-0.38)
North Dakota (0.04)
Montana (0.29)
Washington (-0.72)
Ohio (-0.33)
North Carolina (0.04)
Mississippi (0.41)
New Jersey (-0.71)
Iowa (-0.28)
New Hampshire (0.04) West Virginia (0.52)
Illinois (-0.65)
Pennsylvania (-0.26)
Arkansas (0.06)
Tennessee (0.53)
Rhode Island (-0.63)
Louisiana (-0.22)
Kansas (0.06)
Wyoming (0.55)
Maryland (-0.63)
United States (-0.21)
Texas (0.06)
South Carolina (0.59)
New York (-0.61)
Florida (-0.15)
Kentucky (0.08)
Arizona (0.59)
Massachusetts (-0.61) Missouri (-0.12) [avg]
Hawaii (0.1)
Alabama (0.63)
Vermont (-0.60)
Maine (-0.09)
Nebraska (0.11)
Nevada (-0.57)
South Dakota (-0.08)
Alaska (0.14)
Oregon (-0.56)
Colorado (-0.07) [med] Indiana (0.15)
Minnesota (-0.50)
Utah (-0.07) [med]
Idaho (0.18)
New Mexico (-0.43)
Michigan (-0.04)
Georgia (0.22)
Note. States are listed in order of sentiment scores. The closer to -1, the more integrative the state
sentiment. The closer to 1, the more restrictive the state sentiment. State sentiment data is sourced from
NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author.

It should be noted that the first year of sentiment is a stilted observation of state
sentiment due to lack of data. States that pass few bills in their first year on record in the
present data will appear unnaturally integrative or restrictive because the sentiment score
reflects a small number of bills passed. As time goes on, a state’s sentiment score
becomes more representative of actual state sentiment since it carries along with it the
history of previous years’ sentiment. To avoid misrepresenting the extent to which a state
changes sentiment over time, Table 4.21 reflects the range of sentiment by state between
2008 and 2019. This allows for state sentiment scores to normalize somewhat.
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Table 4.21
Range within State Sentiment Scores from 2008-2019, Organized for Each State by Level
of Restrictiveness
Consistently Integrative

Shifting less integrative

Shifting less restrictive

California (0.15)
Connecticut (0.15)
Illinois (0.15)
Washington (0.21)
Minnesota (0.3)
Maryland (0.33)
New Mexico (0.35)
Vermont (0.38)
New Jersey (0.38)
New York (0.41)
Massachusetts (0.41)
Oregon (0.56)
Nevada (0.58)
Rhode Island (0.63)
Iowa* (0.67)
Wisconsin (0.75)

South Dakota (0.25)
Pennsylvania (0.32)
Texas (0.4)
Michigan (0.4)
Delaware (0.44)
North Carolina (0.54)
Alaska (0.75)
North Dakota (0.72)
New Hampshire*
(1.38)

Virginia (0.17)
Maine (0.3)
Georgia (0.3)
Ohio (0.33)
Colorado (0.35)
Utah (0.38)
Idaho (0.39)
Nebraska (0.44)
Florida (0.44)
Kansas (0.54)
Missouri (0.58)
Kentucky (0.61)
Louisiana (0.82)
Arkansas (0.94)

Consistently
Restrictive

Indiana (0.09)
Mississippi (0.14)
South Carolina (0.16)
West Virginia (0.17)
Montana (0.21)
Tennessee (0.22)
Wyoming (0.23)
Alabama (0.23)
Arizona (0.23)
Oklahoma (0.24)
Hawaii (0.25)

Note. States are grouped according to sentiment trends (“consistently integrative” states have become more
integrative over time while “shifting less integrative” have become more restrictive over time) and ordered
by range of sentiment. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by
this author.
* Range from 2010-2019 due to lack of earlier data.

In general, enactment of restrictive legislation was more common at the state level
prior to 2012, while the frequency of integrative legislation lagged until that year
(Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015), and the sentiment scores calculated in this project
reflect this trend. When calculated all together, the total number of bills passed at the
state-level between 2005 and 2019 result in a national level sentiment of -0.21, a value
slightly more integrative than both the average and median of the 2019 state sentiment
values. This indicates that state sentiment is somewhat more integrative than it is
restrictive when taken as a whole. At the same time, it is important to note that many
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states appear to reflect consistently integrative or restrictive sentiment and other states
reflect movement from integrative to restrictive and vice versa over time.
Overall state sentiment and sentiment range over time is not sufficient
information for observing inferential trends or identifying deep coverage state case study
states. The following analysis uses overall state sentiment to explore other factors
significant to the state-level immigration policy and the state case study decision-making
process. First, I explored statistics relating to change in the socio-economic status of the
foreign-born population in each state. Next, I reviewed legislative control in each state
over time and made note of other law-making mechanisms that may affect how the state
legislature works. Third, I discuss public opinion of immigrants and immigration in each
state. Finally, I examined top immigrant employing industries in each state.
Change in socio-economic status of the foreign-born population in each state
In this section I look at the percent change in the foreign-born population in each
state from 2000 to 2019. Because changes in policy often have a delayed effect, I also
look at the change in the foreign-born population from 1990 to 2000 to identify which
states have experienced greater population change over longer durations. Change in the
foreign-born population is historically presumed to drive changes in public opinion and
attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, presumably resulting in changes in the
sentiment of state policies. Several scholars explore this notion, yet only in the past two
decades have scholars begun to explore more readily the complexity of the state
immigration policy process by looking beyond demographic change for influences on
state immigration policy.
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Population change data were collected from Migration Policy Institute’s (MPI)
State Immigration Data Profiles. Singer (2013) discusses geographic shifts in immigrant
settlement in the United States from 1900 through 2010 and finds that those locations that
were once common landing points for immigrants to the United States are less popular
today, and areas of the country that historically saw very little immigrant settlement are
experiencing much greater immigrant population increases today.
Table 4.22
Foreign-Born Population Increases of More Than 100% by State (1990-2019)
1990-2000: 100% or greater increase
Oklahoma
Arizona
Alabama
Colorado
Delaware
Nebraska
Oregon
Tennessee
Iowa
Utah
Kansas
Arkansas
Idaho
Nevada
Minnesota
Georgia
South Carolina
North Carolina
Kentucky

2000-2019: 100% or greater increase
Arkansas
North Carolina
Delaware
Kentucky
Tennessee
South Carolina
South Dakota
North Dakota

Note. States listed in bold appear in both groups, meaning the foreign-born population in those states more
than double from 1990 to 2000 and then again from 2000 to 2019. State sentiment data is sourced from
NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author.

I chose to focus on states in which the immigrant population increased by more
than 100% within each time frame in this research study. This value is arbitrary but
convenient for assessing which states experienced greater population increases than other
states. Trends of population change greater than 100% are observed in 19 states between
1990 and 2000 and in eight states between 2000 and 2019. Table 4.22 lists states that
experienced significant immigration population growth from 1990 to 2000 and from 2000
to 2019. Six states are represented in both time periods, which are identified in bold in
Table 4.22. While the list makes it clear that the growth of immigrant populations was far
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more expansive in the ten years between 1990 and 2000, it also reveals that the following
19 years, from 2000 to 2019 brought steady increases. All states experience increases in
their immigrant population in both time frames. In the United States, the overall change
in the foreign-born population from 1990-2000 was 57.4% and from 2000-2019 it was
44.4%.
Awareness of the historical immigrant population change in each state is valuable
when plotted against each state’s 2019 sentiment score. Figure 4.6 plots the change in the
immigrant population by percent in each state from 1990 to 2000 against that state’s 2019
sentiment score. Figure 4.7 plots the change in the immigrant population by percent in
each state from 2000 to 2019 against that state’s 2019 sentiment score. The scatterplots
indicate that states that experienced greater increases in immigrant populations in both
time periods also have more restrictive 2019 sentiment scores.
Overall, more restrictive states (12) observed an immigrant population increase of
greater than 100% from 1990 to 2000 than integrative states (7), but the 1990-2000
population changes appear not to be indicative of lasting restrictive sentiment. Only four
of the restrictive states remain consistently restrictive today. The remaining states that
experienced significant foreign-born population change from 1990-2000 have become
less restrictive in sentiment, and most integrative states in 2019 that experienced
significant population change from 1990-2000 have remained consistently integrative.
Table 4.23 depicts the change in state sentiment scores like Table 4.22 does, but it also
includes immigrant population percentage change details so comparisons can be made.
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Scatterplot Representation of Percent Change in Foreign-born Population by State from 1990 to 2000 by 2019 State Sentiment Score

Figure 4.6
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Scatterplot Representation of Percent Change in Foreign-born Population by State from 2000 to 2019 by 2019 State Sentiment Score

Figure 4.7

Table 4.23
Range within State Sentiment Scores from 2008-2019, Organized by Level of
Restrictiveness and with Added Population Change Details for 1990-2000 and 20002019
Consistently
Integrative
California (0.15)
Connecticut (0.15)
Illinois (0.15)
Washington (0.21)
Minnesota (0.3)
Maryland (0.33)
New Mexico (0.35)
Vermont (0.38)
New Jersey (0.38)
New York (0.41)
Massachusetts (0.41)
Oregon (0.56)
Nevada (0.58)
Rhode Island (0.63)
Iowa* (0.67)
Wisconsin (0.75)

Shifting less
integrative
South Dakota (0.25)
Pennsylvania (0.32)
Texas (0.4)
Michigan (0.4)
Delaware (0.44)
North Carolina (0.54)
Alaska (0.75)
North Dakota (0.72)
New Hampshire*
(1.38)

Shifting less
restrictive
Virginia (0.17)
Maine (0.3)
Georgia (0.3)
Ohio (0.33)
Colorado (0.35)
Utah (0.38)
Idaho (0.39)
Nebraska (0.44)
Florida (0.44)
Kansas (0.54)
Missouri (0.58)
Kentucky (0.61)
Louisiana (0.82)
Arkansas (0.94)

Consistently
Restrictive
Indiana (0.09)
Mississippi (0.14)
South Carolina (0.16)
West Virginia (0.17)
Montana (0.21)
Tennessee (0.22)
Wyoming (0.23)
Alabama (0.23)
Arizona (0.23)
Oklahoma (0.24)
Hawaii (0.25)

Note. States that experienced >100% foreign born population change 1990-2000 are underlined; states that
experienced >100% foreign born population change 2000-2019 are italicized; states that appear in both
1990-2000 and 2000-2019 population change lists are bolded. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL
(2020b) and coded and calculated by this author.
*Range from 2010-2019

If changes in the immigrant population drive policy at the state-level, then we
may expect to observe similar shifts in sentiment among the eight states that experienced
greater than 100% immigrant population increases from 2000 to 2019. Returning to Table
4.22, which reflects the range of state sentiment scores from 2008 to 2019, the eight
states do not fall into the same sentiment category and their sentiments scores have
shifted at different rates. South Dakota, Delaware, North Dakota and North Carolina are
shifting more restrictive, but they are doing so at different rates. Kentucky and Arkansas
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are growing more integrative over time, and Tennessee and South Carolina are
consistently restrictive.
Because demographic change is prominent in the literature as having an influence
on state-level immigration policy and, more broadly, on public opinion and attitudes
about immigrants and immigration, noting the states that have experienced more drastic
increases in the immigrant population is meaningful to the process of identifying case
study states. In addition to population change, change in foreign born education levels
over time and median household income are explored in this case study decision analysis.
I was interested in trends relating to the percentage of the adult immigrant
population that did not complete high school in 1990, 2000, and 2019 as well as the
percentage of the adult immigrant population that completed a college degree or more in
the same years. Data from MPI State Immigration Data Profiles were used for this
analysis (Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021). While having a 2010 data point would
have been convenient for comparison, MPI does not make this statistic available in their
publicly accessible data profiles.
Overall, the immigrant population in U.S. states is more educated than in the past.
From 1990 to 2000, nine states recorded a decrease in the percentage of the adult
immigrant population with less than a high school degree. From 2000 to 2019, 12 states
saw a decrease in the percentage of adult immigrants without a completed high school
education. Restrictive and integrative states observe decreases in less than high school
education attainment in both time frames. Of the 12 states in which a decrease in the
percent of foreign-born individuals who have not finished high school are observed from
2000 to 2019, eight have an integrative sentiment score and four are restrictive. Of those
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that are integrative, six states are very integrative with sentiment scores falling over the 0.6 mark. Maine and Michigan have sentiment scores closer to neutral at -0.09 and -0.04,
respectively. The restrictive states with falling “less than high school” rates by percentage
of the immigrant population tend to be less restrictive with Hawaii (0.10), Alaska (0.14),
Montana (0.29), and Wyoming (0.55).
In both time periods, every state observed an increase in the percentage of the
immigrant population that holds a bachelor’s degree or higher. The states that
experienced greater increases in immigrant populations during the 1990s or from 2000 to
2019 also experienced greater increases in the percentage of immigrant adults without a
high school degree or with a college degree or more in the same time period. The level of
education attainment new arrivals have can indicate the nature of their work and
construct a fuller narrative of what changes in the immigrant population looks like at the
state-level.
Adult immigrants without a high school education are overwhelmingly low-wage
workers and may be migrant workers, whereas immigrants with a college degree or more
are more likely to have stable employment. A descriptive analysis of adult immigrant
education attainment is valuable to understanding this dynamic in each state. Of the 19
states that experienced immigrant population changes of more than 100% from 1990 to
2000, 18 of them saw more than 100% increase in the percentage of the adult immigrant
population that had not attained a high school education. In North Carolina, the
percentage of adult immigrants that had not attained a high school education increased by
457%, the immigrant population increased by 274%, yet the percentage of adult
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immigrants that had attained a college degree or more increased by only 153%
(Migration Policy Institute, 2001-2021).
Figure 4.8
Scatterplot representation of 2019 Foreign-born Median Household Income by 2019
State Sentiment Score

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Foreignborn median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021).

Six of the states that experienced immigrant population changes of more than
100% from 1990 to 2000 were integrative states and the remaining majority were
restrictive. Scatterplots showing the change in educational attainment from 1990 to 2000
and from 2000 to 2019 against 2019 state sentiment scores are included in Appendix C.
The figures indicate that more restrictive states may observe greater increases in the
percentage of the adult immigrant population with less than a high school degree, but I
did not run a statistical analysis to confirm that this was the case or that the percent
change in immigrant population was not a co-occurring variable. The scatterplots for
education attainment for college or more do not indicate a relationship to the state
sentiment score.
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Finally, I explored 2019 median household income for the immigrant population
in my state-by-state demographics review. Publicly available MPI data only include
median household income for the year 2019, so this section looks for trends in median
household of the foreign-born population relative to each state’s 2019 sentiment score.
Figure 4.8, showing immigrant median household income against 2019 state sentiment
scores, shows evidence of a trend suggesting that integrative states yield higher earning
immigrant households than restrictive states.
Immigrant households in Maryland have the highest median household income at
$84,256 and immigrant households in New Mexico have the lowest at $38,877. Both of
these states have integrative state sentiment scores. The U.S. immigrant median
household income is $63,550, and the median value of all U.S. state immigrant median
household incomes is $58,006. Table 4.24 reflects the breadth of immigrant median
household income values across the 50 states.
Table 4.24
2019 Foreign-Born Median Household Income
High
$84,256
U.S. immigrant median household income
$63,550
Median
$58,006
Low
$38,877

Maryland
(average)
Rhode Island
New Mexico

Note. 2019 foreign-born median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (20012021).

A comparison of immigrant median household income to U.S.-born citizen
median household income in each state proved revealing. Table 4.25 lists the states in
which median household income is higher among naturalized citizens than for U.S.-born
citizens and those states in which immigrant median household income is overall higher
than that for U.S.-born citizens. In 27 states the median household income of naturalized
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citizens is greater than the U.S.-born median household income for that state.
Furthermore, there are seven states in which the foreign-born median household income
is higher than the U.S.-born citizen median household income.
Table 4.25
2019 Median Household Income by citizenship and birth place
Naturalized citizens median household income higher than
U.S.-born
Alabama
Arkansas
Delaware
Georgia
Illinois
Indiana
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maryland
Michigan
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
New
Hampshire

New Jersey
North
Carolina
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South
Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Foreign-born median
income higher than U.S.born
Delaware
Georgia
Michigan
Mississippi
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia

Note. 2019 foreign-born median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (20012021).

Of the seven states in which the immigrant median household income is higher
than the U.S.-born citizen median household income, Mississippi (0.41) and West
Virginia (0.52) are rather restrictive, Georgia (0.22) is moderately restrictive, and
Virginia (0.01) is almost neutral but restrictive. Michigan (-0.04), Delaware (-0.38), and
Washington (-0.7) are integrative, although Michigan is only slightly integrative.
The descriptive relationship between state sentiment and immigrant household
median income completed for this case study decision analysis does not provide an
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explanation for why immigrant household median income exceeds U.S.-born household
median income in seven states or why naturalized citizen median household income
exceeds that of U.S.-born citizen households in 27 states. While it may be that in some
states immigrant median household income is skewed higher due to multiple families
living (and working) under one roof, this is less likely to be the situation for naturalized
citizens than for migrant non-citizen immigrants and it is not likely to drive the observed
data in so many states. The observations relating to immigrants in median household
income do not follow the common narrative of immigrants as poor, and the data explored
in the section of this document focusing on education do not support assumptions that
most immigrants are uneducated. A close look at immigrant participation in industry by
state provides an even broader context for understanding how immigrants are employed
in different states.
Top immigrant employing industries in each state
Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2011) consider the strength of industry
in influencing state-level U.S. immigration policy and finds industry interest groups may
influence state-level policy outcomes more than citizen ideology and public opinion. In
addition, immigrants in the United States are overrepresented in certain industries
(Brookings Partnership for a New American Economy, n.d.). This section examines
changes in the percent of the immigrant population in the labor force in each state and
explores top immigrant employing industries. The goal in this section is to understand
where immigrants impact industry most and also to identify the states in which the
presence of immigrant workers may be more visible due to rapid increases or by making
up significant portions of the labor force. I chose to limit this review to labor force
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changes from 2000 through 2019 and the percent of immigrant workers in the 2019 work
force in order to focus attention on the target timeline of 2005 through 2019.
Figure 4.9
Percent Change in Foreign-born Workers Employed in U.S. Labor Force from 2000 to
2019 by State Sentiment Score

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Foreignborn median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021).

All states observed an increase in the percent of immigrant workers in the labor
force from 2000 to 2019. Illinois reflected the lowest percent change and North Dakota
observed the highest percent change. These data points correspond to a relatively low
immigrant population change in Illinois (only New York has a lower rate of change based
on that state’s immigrant population) and a 157% immigrant population increase in North
Dakota, the greatest percent change of all states except South Dakota (169% change).
The United States experienced a 71.4% increase in the percentage of immigrant workers
in the labor force from 2000 to 2019. Figure 4.9 shows 2019 state sentiment and the
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percent change in the immigrant labor force by state from 2000 to 2019. The figure
shows no trend in the rate of change experienced by states based on the state’s sentiment.
Somewhat more interesting to the state-by-state analysis are Figures 4.10, 4.11,
and 4.12 when taken together. Figure 4.10 shows the percent of the labor force that is
made up of immigrant workers in each state in 1990 and this is plotted against the 2019
state sentiment score. Figure 4.11 shows the same data in 2000, and Figure 4.12 shows
the data in 2019.
Figure 4.10
Percent of the U.S. Labor Force that is Made Up of Immigrant Workers in Each State in
1990 by State Sentiment Score

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Foreignborn median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021).
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Figure 4.11
Percent of the U.S. Labor Force that is Made Up of Immigrant Workers in Each State in 2000 by State
Sentiment Score

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Foreignborn median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021).

Figure 4.12
Percent of the U.S. Labor Force that is Made Up of Immigrant Workers in Each State in 2019 by State
Sentiment Score

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Foreignborn median household income data sourced from Migration Policy Institute (2001-2021).
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In Figures 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12, the states in which immigrants make up a greater
portion of the labor force tend to be more integrative than restrictive in 2019.
Immigrants’ share of the labor force increased somewhat from 1990 to 2000 and more so
from 2000 to 2019, a length of time almost twice as long. This finding is descriptive
evidence that demographics through immigrants’ growing presence in the U.S. labor
force could influence state-level integrative legislative sentiment because while some
integrative states were integrative prior to 2019 many others states became more
integrative throughout the target timeline.
Table 4.26
Sample of Top Immigrant-Employing Industries by State in 2018
National
Alabama
Arizona
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing,
1. Construction (8%)
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing,
and Hunting (26%)
2. Other Services (6%)
and Hunting (40%)
2. Construction (23%)
3. Accommodation and Food
2. Admin and Support; Waste
3. Admin Support; Waste
Service (6%)
Mgmt.; Remediation Services
Mgmt.; Remediation Services
4. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing,
(27%)
(22%)
and Hunting (5%)
3. Construction (27%)
4. Other Services (21%)
5. Manufacturing (5%)
4. Manufacturing (21%)
5. Accommodation and Food
5. Other Services (20%)
Service (20%)
Note. Data for top-immigrant employing industries by state in 2018 sourced from American Immigration
Council (n.d.-b).

Comparing industry data by state presents many challenges due to the diversity of
geographies, populations, and resources across states. In this section, I look at which
industries employ the greatest percentage of immigrant workers by state and compare
those percentages to the industries in which immigrant workers populate the greatest
share of the work force in the United States. Industry data for this portion of the state-bystate analysis are collected from the American Immigration Council’s State by State Fact
Sheets (American Immigration Council, n.d.-b, n.d.-c). At the time of initial data
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collection and decision analysis, the fact sheets utilized 2018 U.S. Census data, so this
discussion references that year. In this analysis, the specific industry is not what is of
interest. Rather, the percentage of the work force across the top five industries in a state is
important to understanding immigrants in industry by state. Table 4.26 illustrates top
immigrant-employing industries at the national level as compared to the top immigrantemploying industries in U.S. states.
At the national level, immigrants make up between 20% and 26% of each of the
top five industries in the nation. This means that for U.S.-born individuals working in
these industries, one in five to one in four of their workmates is foreign born. I compare
the top five immigrant employing industries in each state to these percentages. In
Alabama, the percentage of immigrant workers employed in the top immigrantemploying industry in that state is 8%. This suggests that in the most immigrantpopulated industry in the state, fewer than one in ten employees is an immigrant. Industry
in the state of Arizona is more representative of the national workforce, except that 40%
of that state’s top immigrant employing industry is made up of immigrants. The
workplace is an important point of contact for many U.S.-born citizens to engage with
and become aware of immigrants in their communities, so one might expect that public
opinion or sentiment in states with very low levels of immigrant workers, like Alabama,
is different than in states where immigrant contact in the workplace is high, like in
Arizona.
Table 4.27 shows the breakdown of states by the percentage of immigrant
employees present in the state’s top immigrant-employing industry in 2018. There are a
couple of things we might expect given the lists presented in Table 4.27. First, we might
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expect states with higher percentages of immigrant workers employed in top immigrantemploying industries to have higher foreign-born populations overall since higher
populations likely yield more workers. This is indeed the case with some exclusions.
Table 4.27
States by Percentage of Foreign-born Workers Employed in Top Immigrant-Employing
Industries in 2018
Up to 10%
Mississippi (7%)
Maine (7%)
Wyoming (8%)
Ohio (8%)
Alabama (8%)
Missouri (8%)
Wisconsin (10%)
Vermont (10%)
Kentucky (10%)

11-20%
21-30%
31-40%
41% and over
West Virginia
Colorado (21%)
Connecticut (31%) Florida (41%)
(11%)
Georgia (23%)
Montana (31%)
Washington (42%)
Michigan (11%)
N. Carolina (23%)
Hawaii (33%)
California (63%)
Pennsylvania
New Hampshire
Texas (27%)
(12%)
(23%)
Nevada (37%)
Iowa (13%)
Virginia (26%)
Alaska (38%)
North Dakota
Illinois (26%)
New Jersey (38%)
(13%)
U.S. National
New York (39%)
Louisiana (13%)
(26%)
Arizona (40%)
S. Carolina (14%)
Massachusetts
Tennessee (14%)
(27%)
Arkansas (14%)
New Mexico (28%)
Minnesota (16%)
Oregon (28%)
Oklahoma (16%)
Rhode Island
S. Dakota (16%)
(29%)
Indiana (17%)
Idaho (29%)
Kansas (18%)
Maryland (30%)
Utah (19%)
Delaware (19%)
Nebraska (20%)
Note. Data for top-immigrant employing industries by state in 2018 sourced from American Immigration
Council (n.d.-b).

Pennsylvania has a relatively large immigrant population (922,585), while
immigrants make up only 12% of the top immigrant-employing industry in that state.
This may suggest that the state’s economy is better diversified and that immigrant
workers are diverse in terms of work-related skills, so immigrants are more dispersed
throughout the state’s workforce. Alaska, on the other hand, has an immigrant population
of only 60,784, yet immigrants make up 38% of that state’s top immigrant-employing
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industry, indicating that the state economy is more limited for immigrant workers and
that the immigrant population is more homogeneous in terms of skills.
The effect of immigrants in the workforce is nuanced and, like so many other
aspects of immigration federalism, dependent on many other factors. First, with the given
data, it is unknown if immigrants are employed in several industries beyond the top five
listed or if the bulk of the state’s immigrant population is employed in those five
industries listed. Understanding more clearly a state’s overall top industries and to what
extent immigrant workers play a role in each of them will help to frame the context of
industry and immigration in each state. The broad nature of my initial state-level data
analysis limits me from assessing all 50 states against multiple factors. This is better
suited for the deep coverage of case study states. For now, it is important to recognize
which states have industry trends similar to the overall national trends and which states
appear to function quite differently.
Legislative control in each state over time
Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) argue that political ideology drives statelevel immigration change via the Polarization Change Model. The authors suggest
ideological interest groups work across states to lead immigration policy change, but for
such interest groups to gain traction, a state legislature sentimental to such ideologies is
necessary. In this section, I review legislative control in each state focusing my review
from 2005 through 2019. Because historical trends are significant to understanding a
state’s specific political ideological leanings, I reference legislative control reaching back
to 1992. Data relating to legislative control by state was collected from Ballotpedia.org, a
digital encyclopedia of American politics and elections created to provide neutral and
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accurate information about politics at all levels of government since 2007 (Ballotpedia,
n.d.-a).
A detailed review of dominant political parties in state senates, houses, and
governorships reveals a list of states that are historically and remain Republican and
others that are historically and remain Democratic. These states are likely to govern under
a trifecta, or a single party government that occurs when both chamber of the legislature
and the governor share a political party. All of the Republican states include at least 16
years of Republican trifecta except Florida, which includes one year of Democratic
trifecta since it appears to have flipped from Democratic control in the early 1990s. States
falling into the Democratic column include at least 10 years of Democratic trifecta except
Illinois, which includes two years of Republican trifecta. In short, these lists illustrate the
states in which partisan control can be confidently assumed from year to year. Other
states fall into several categories in between these two categories. Table 4.28 shows a
break-down of partisan control in the 50 state legislatures.
In Table 4.28, Republican dominant states are those states in which Democrats
have not held much control, but where they have had a greater and more consistent
presence than those states listed in the Republican column. Republican dominant states
have at least 10 years of Republican trifecta but also include more Democrat
representation in governorship and/or legislative chambers between 2005 and 2019.
Democrat dominant states are similar. Maryland and Massachusetts stand out as unique
in that their legislative chambers are significantly Democrat controlled while their
governorships are historically Republican except for during 2007-2014.
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Table 4.28
Dominant Political Control by State from 1992 to 2019
Republican

Republican
Dominant
Indiana
Kansas
Pennsylvania
Michigan
Wisconsin
Montana

Flip D to R*

Bipartisan

Democrat
Dominant
Maine
Marylandα
Massachusettsα

Democrat

Arizona
Mississippi
Virginia
Oregon
Idaho
Missouri
Iowa
Washington
North Dakota
North
Colorado
Rhode Island
Florida (since
Carolina
Nevada
Connecticut
‘93)
Louisiana
Minnesota
Delaware
Wyoming
Arkansas
New
Flip R to D 2002 Illinois
Utah
Tennessee
Hampshire
New Jersey
Hawaii
South Dakota
Oklahoma
New York
California
South Carolina
Alabama
Vermont
Ohio
Texas
New Mexico
Alaska
Georgia
Nebraska¥
West Virginia
(since’99)
Kentucky
Note. Data relating to political control by state sourced from https://ballotpedia.org/States
*These states shifted from D to R in 2012 under the Obama administration except: Texas, which made the
shift in the late 1990s, Georgia flipped in 2002, West Virginia flipped in 2015, and Kentucky appears to be
in the process of making this shift since 2017.
¥
Nebraska’s legislature is nonpartisan so only the governor’s political party is represented here.
α
Maryland and Massachusetts are both states dominated by Republican governors while legislative
chambers remain under Democratic control.

The column labeled Flip D to R represents states that follow a trend of shifting
from partisan Democrat to partisan Republican during the Obama administration. Most of
this shift occurred in 2012 but four of the states included in this column shifted at other
times. Table 4.28 describes the various shifts within the group. Only one state, New
Jersey, shifted from predominantly Republican to predominantly Democrat, and this state
did so before the target timeline for this study in 2002. The final column lists states that
appear to be more or less bipartisan because they have fewer trifecta years or a balance of
Republican and Democrat trifecta when they are present. Minnesota appears the most
bipartisan because only two of the last 29 years were dominated by Democrats and there
were no Republican trifectas in Minnesota. Colorado, on the other hand, experienced 8
Democrat trifectas and 4 Republican trifectas in the last 29 years. While this reflects 12
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years of partisanship within the state, the nature of partisanship continues to remain in
flux. Therefore, Colorado and the other states in the Bipartisan column of Table 4.28 are
the most likely of the states to experience shifts in partisan control of their state
legislature and governorship.
Of the 13 Democrat or Democrat dominant states, only Hawaii has a restrictive
sentiment score. All other states in Democrat or Democrat-dominant groups have
integrative scores. Delaware is the only state in this group to experience demographic
change of the foreign-born population in that state of more than 100% from 2000 to 2019.
Of the 17 Republican or Republican dominant states, 10 have restrictive sentiment scores
and seven have integrative sentiment scores. Three of these states have experienced a
foreign-born population change of more than 100% from 2000 to 2019. Five of the seven
bipartisan states are integrative, while the remaining two are slightly restrictive. None of
the bipartisan states have experienced drastic changes in their foreign-born populations.
New Jersey is the only state to have flipped from Republican controlled to
Democrat controlled, and the state has an integrative sentiment score (-0.71) with a
40.5% increase in the foreign-born population from 2000 to 2019. The twelve states that
flipped from Democrat to Republican are predominantly southern states and have
predominantly restrictive sentiment scores. Only Louisiana and Missouri have integrative
scores in the group that flipped from Democrat to Republican, yet the restrictive
sentiment scores of other states in the group reach from slightly restrictive to very
restrictive. All states in this group experienced increases in the immigrant population of
greater than 40% and Kentucky and Tennessee have each seen an increase of greater than
100% from 2000-2019.
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The trends noted here suggest that Republican-controlled states tend to be more
restrictive than Democrat-controlled states. Given the many states that shifted from
Democrat control to Republican control in the past decade, it may also be that restrictive
states are better drawn to Republican control than to Democrat control. For the purpose
of this study and, more specifically, for the selection of case study states, considering
states with historically stable partisanship separately from those with more recent shifts
or unsettled partisanship could prove beneficial for comparative purposes.
Table 4.29
States with Direct Democracy Mechanisms (Citizen-Initiated Statute)
YES: citizen-initiated statute
Alaska
Nebraska
Arizona
Nevada
Arkansas
North Dakota
California
Ohio
Colorado
Oklahoma
Idaho
Oregon
Maine
South Dakota
Massachusetts
Utah
Michigan
Washington
Missouri
Wyoming
Montana

NO: citizen-initiated statute
Alabama
New Hampshire
Connecticut
New Jersey
Delaware
New Mexico
Florida
New York
Georgia
North Carolina
Hawaii
Pennsylvania
Illinois
Rhode Island
Indiana
South Carolina
Iowa
Tennessee
Kansas
Texas
Kentucky
Vermont
Louisiana
Virginia
Maryland
West Virginia
Minnesota
Wisconsin
Mississippi

Note. Data relating to direct democracy (citizen-initiated statute) by state sourced from
https://ballotpedia.org/Forms_of_direct_democracy_in_the_American_states

Related to legislative control is direct democracy. Silva (2018) argues that those
states with direct democracy mechanisms in place may observe greater action on the part
of the state legislature because lawmakers are more motivated to prevent citizens from
acting on their own through ballot initiatives. Table 4.29 lists 21 states in which direct
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democracy mechanisms allow citizens to initiate statutes and 29 states in which citizens
are not permitted to do so.
Silva (2018) would expect the states without direct democracy mechanisms to
have passed fewer statutes than those with direct democracy mechanisms, and this is the
case when average and median numbers of laws passed per state are compared. On
average, direct democracy states passed 59 laws (median = 42) while no direct
democracy states passed only 41 laws (median = 32). My analysis is not sufficient to
confirm statistical significance but it suffices to suggest that expected trends are present
and that direct democracy mechanisms will be worth exploring once case study states are
decided upon.
Public opinion of immigrants and immigration in each state
Public opinion is significant to the understanding of immigration federalism in the
United States because it links the policy domain to society, and it also helps to
contextualize intergovernmental relationships. In this section of the document, I review
public opinion of immigrants by state in two areas highlighted in the 2015 Public
Religion Research Institute (PRRI) American Values Atlas survey (Jones, Cox, Cooper,
& Lienesch, 2016).
PRRI publishes findings relating to attitudes toward immigration with some
frequency, but the 2016 report is the most recent report to include state-level findings.
The first area examined is support of a path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants
and the second is whether one thinks that immigrants strengthen America. In all states
except for South Dakota, more than 50% of respondents support a path to citizenship.
Figure 4.13, depicting the relationship between support for a path to citizenship and 2019
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state sentiment, shows a slight trend of increasing support for a path to citizenship with
increased integrative sentiment. The most restrictive states are the least supportive,
excluding South Dakota.
Figure 4.13
Percent of Respondents Who Support a Path to Citizenship for Unauthorized Immigrants
in 2015 by 2019 State Sentiment

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Public
opinion data sourced from Public Religion Research Institute (Jones, Cox, Cooper, & Lienesch, 2016).

A similar trend is observed in response to the question “Do immigrants strengthen
America?” Figure 4.14 shows that the most restrictive states are the least likely to believe
immigrants strengthen America. Hawaii and Arizona stand out as restrictive states in
which an unusually high number of respondents see immigrants as strengthening the
country. More than 50% of respondents in Arizona, a very restrictive state, see
immigrants as strengthening the country. And Hawaii, also restrictive although not as
restrictive as Arizona, has the highest percentage of respondents who support the idea
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that immigrants strengthen the country. Massachusetts, an integrative state, ties with
Hawaii for the highest percentage of respondents (60%) who support of the idea that
immigrants strengthen the country. Otherwise, the most integrative states are the most
likely to feel immigrants strengthen America. Hawaii and Arizona have particularly
unique immigrant histories in the United States, which may affect how residents in those
states engage with ideas and narratives about immigrants and immigration.
Figure 4.14
Percent of Respondents Who Agree That Immigrants Strengthen Society in 2015 by 2019
State Sentiment

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author. Public
opinion data sourced from Public Religion Research Institute (Jones, Cox, Cooper, & Lienesch, 2016).

The 2019 PRRI Immigration Report does not show state-level attitudes relating to
immigrants, but the national-level findings show that 67% of Americans surveyed
support the creation of a path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants in the United
States and 60% of Americans surveyed agreed that immigrants strengthen America
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(PRRI, 2020, March). There is a growing difference in the level of support among
Republicans and Democrats which indicates that immigration is becoming a more
partisan issue across the United States.
Discussion and Case Study Selection
The state-by-state data collection process was broad reaching and only touched
the surface of each area of interest impacting the domain of immigration in the United
States. This section describes my process for case selection and two points are worth
noting. One, I completed the initial case study decision and analysis a year prior to the
completion of this project, so the demographics data used for the analysis and discussion
reflects 2018 U.S. Census outcomes. This is due to the fact that the Migration Policy
Institute released their State Immigration Profiles updated with 2019 data after I
completed the decision-making analysis. I have since returned to the source and updated
my data analysis and charts with 2019 data. This is why the prose in previous sections
references 2019 U.S. Census data from MPI but the analysis that follows does not. Two,
the decision-making process is designed to cull states from the list that are “not so
interesting” for the purposes of examining their relationship to immigrants and
immigration more closely. In truth, every state is a point of fascination for this project,
yet, alas, decisions must be made to eliminate most states, and so I explain my process
for doing so in this section.
I constructed a point system to analyze which states stand out as most interesting
in the context of this study, keeping in mind that the final selection of case study states
should reflect regional and/or socio-economic diversity in comparison to other selected
states. In this analysis, I took into account the number of laws passed and the nature of
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the 2019 state sentiment score. States were highlighted for having consistently integrative
or restrictive sentiments and also for having a sentiment near the average U.S. sentiment
score. For each category a state fell into, the state was assigned a value of ‘1’. My
analysis document consisted of one spreadsheet with all states listed in rows. Points of
interest for analysis were identified as column headers.
Other areas incorporated into the point system include those states that
experienced either a decrease or the greatest increase in the percent of the immigrant
population that has less than a high school education or a college degree or more, those
states with the highest immigrant median household income, and states in which
naturalized citizens or the immigrant population had a median household income higher
than that of the U.S.-born population in that state. States that had very high, very low, or
close to national average rates of immigrant presence in top immigrant-employing
industries got a point. States that flipped legislative control under the Obama
administration or states that continue to be bipartisan were granted a point as were states
whose political leanings were overarchingly Republican or Democrat. Direct democracy
states also received a point. In total, 20 categories were included in the count analysis,
and points were tallied for each state.
Tennessee and South Carolina each topped the list with seven points. Nine states
had six points and seven states had five points. The remaining 32 states had four (20
states), three (five states), two (six states), or one (one state) point. Table 4.30 lists the top
18 point-earning states after the initial decision analysis process. The purpose of the point
analysis was to sort out states that were poorly representative of the topics that are
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presented as significant to state-level immigration policy in the literature. The second
step of the analysis involves only the top 18 point-earning states presented in Table 4.30.
Table 4.30
Top 18 States after Initial Point Analysis for Case Study Decision Making
State
South Carolina
Tennessee
Arkansas
Delaware
Idaho
Illinois
Kentucky
Mississippi
North Dakota

TOTALS State
TOTALS
7 Washington
6
7
Wyoming
6
6
Alabama
5
6
California
5
6
Colorado
5
6 Connecticut
5
6
Missouri
5
6
Oklahoma
5
6
Oregon
5

Note. This is the list of states remaining after count analysis one. The purpose of the point analysis was to
sort out states that were poorly representative of the topics that are presented as significant to state-level
immigration policy in the literature.

Regional diversity is an important aspect of this project. I am interested in case
study states that represent different geographies of the United States in order to explore
the impact of regional culture, history, and governance practices. For this reason, I
organized the top 18 point-earning states into seven common U.S. geographic regions:
Southeast, Pacific, New England, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, Southwest, and Rocky
Mountains. Each region is represented by at least one state in the list. Table 4.30 shows
the top 18 states divided into U.S. geographic regions.
My next step was to eliminate those states that have not passed a sufficient
number of immigration-related laws for an in-depth case study within the target timeline.
Three states, Kentucky (14 laws), Delaware (13 laws), and Wyoming (11 laws) were
eliminated in this fashion and Table 4.31 notes this with strikeouts through those states.
Waiting until this stage of analysis to eliminate these states allowed me to observe them
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for the presence of properties more closely related to immigration policy, and their
presence in the initial count analysis list suggests they may be states to observe going
forward as immigration case study states in development.
Table 4.31
Top 18 States by Region after Count Analysis One
Rocky
Southeast
Pacific
New England Mid-Atlantic Midwest Southwest
Mountains
South
Washington Connecticut
Delaware
Illinois
Oklahoma
Idaho
Carolina
Oregon
Missouri
Colorado
Tennessee
California
North
Wyoming
Arkansas
Dakota
Mississippi
Alabama
Kentucky
Note. Regional diversity is an important aspect of this project, so the top 18 point-earning states are
organized here into seven common U.S. geographic regions: Southeast, Pacific, New England, MidAtlantic, Midwest, Southwest, and Rocky Mountains.

Finally, I repeat the point system analysis, limiting this round to seven categories,
including the most and least integrative or restrictive, those shifting sentiment the most,
those reflecting stark relationships between sentiment and population change, changes in
education levels, immigrant employment trends, political ideology, and direct democracy.
Once points were allocated, I selected the top point-earners from each region. Table 4.31
shows the top point-earners by region from the second round of decision analysis.
Tennessee and Arkansas in the Southeast, Washington and Oregon in the Pacific, North
Dakota in the Midwest, and Colorado in the Rocky Mountain region stand out as states of
greatest interest. Connecticut and Oklahoma are represented in Table 4.31 as top states in
their regions, but they were eliminated from the analysis for having the fewest points. In
the Pacific region, Washington and California exhibited the same outcome for the second
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analysis, but Washington was selected over California because it carried a 6-point score
from the first count analysis and California carried a 5-point score.
The six remaining states listed in Table 4.32 are initial case study states, and a
definitive decision will be made only after initial inquiry into each of these states is made.
It is expected that I will select one state from the Southeast and Pacific regions and select
either North Dakota or Colorado. This section closes with a discussion about the data
collected in the state-by-state analysis as it relates to these six states in particular. A
closer look at demographic change at the county level within each state and a search for
the presence of public opinion and attitudes relating to immigrants or immigration in
local news outlets and by local interest groups also helps to direct my final case study
selection.
Table 4.32
Top Eight States by Region after Count Analysis Two
Rocky
Mountains
Colorado

Southeast
Pacific
New England Midwest
Southwest
Tennessee
Washington Connecticut
North Dakota Oklahoma
Arkansas
Oregon
Note. This table depicts the outcome of count analysis two which assessed states against seven categories:
the most and least integrative or restrictive, those shifting sentiment the most, those reflecting stark
relationships between sentiment and population change, changes in education levels, immigrant
employment trends, political ideology, and direct democracy. Connecticut and Oklahoma are top states in
their regions, but they were eliminated from the analysis for having the fewest points of all eight states.

Pew Charitable Trusts (2014), in an analysis of foreign-born population changes
across U.S. counties since 1990, designates Washington and Colorado as new immigrant
destination states, while overall population decreases occurred in several counties in
North Dakota. North Dakota sees overall population loss in most counties and heavy
increases due to the immigrant population only in Dunn County, an area heavily involved
in oil processing and agriculture. Colorado sees substantial growth in population due to
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immigrants in most counties. Initial searches for immigrant-related news in each state
reveal that immigrants and refugee settlement have only become hot topics for discussion
in North Dakota since the Trump administration has taken office. Prior to the Trump
administration, there was little conflict relating to attitudes about immigrants expressed in
local news. Colorado has a broader representation of perspectives on immigrants and
immigration throughout the target timeline. Where industry is concerned, Colorado has a
stronger representation of immigrant workers in the state workforce than North Dakota
has. Finally, Colorado is the only state listed in Table 4.32 with a state legislature that is
more or less bipartisan. North Dakota is historically a Republican state.
Washington sees heavier gains due to immigrant population growth than Oregon,
and these gains are not limited to the metro area, as they are more readily in Oregon (Pew
Charitable Trusts, 2014). The presence of immigrants in top immigrant-employing
industries in Washington is higher than the national average, while Oregon observes
average levels of immigrant employment in top immigrant-employing industries. Both
states are integrative, although Washington state ranks as one of the most integrative of
all states. Oregon’s immigrant population increased by more than 100% from 1990-2000,
although Washington has long had an overall larger immigrant population than Oregon.
Washington’s top immigrant-employing industry is 42% immigrant workers, which is far
above the national average. However, the next top immigrant-employing industry in the
state falls back to 23%, which is in line with the national average. Oregon’s
representation of immigrant employees in top immigrant-employing industries is in line
with national averages.
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Arkansas and Tennessee are restrictive states that both see immigrant driven
population increases, but Arkansas has several more counties that suffer overall
population decreases. Arkansas’ population loss was slowed by immigrant population
gain in those counties. Representation of immigrants in top immigrant-employing
industries is lower than average with immigrants making up 14% of the top industry in
each state. This is in line with most other southern states. Georgia, North Carolina, and
Virginia have immigrant representation in top immigrant-employing industries that is
closer to national averages, while Alabama and Mississippi have much less representation
in top immigrant-employing industries. Both Tennessee and Arkansas experienced a flip
in their state legislatures from Democrat to Republican during the Obama administration,
but Tennessee is the only state of the six listed in Table 4.32 to not have a direct
democracy mechanism in play. Finally, Tennessee stands out in the analysis as one of
only four states to experience 100% foreign-born population growth from 1990-2000 and
2000-2018.
Conclusion to Comprehensive Coverage
Initial analysis suggests that Tennessee, Colorado, and Oregon or Washington are
best suited as case study states for this study. Out of convenience, I chose to begin with
data collection in Oregon. As my home state and as a state in which my professional
network includes many connections at the local level, Oregon is a logical starting point.
Two significant factors limited me from exploring the list further for this research study.
The first is the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, which prevented my ability to travel
and collect data in person for this project. The second is scope. The richness of data
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collected at the state and local levels in Oregon proved extensive and sufficient enough
for structuring the immigration federalism framework and for subsequent theory building.
Deep Coverage Case Study: Oregon State
This Oregon state case study includes detailed coverage of demographic data and
a collection of grey material resulting in an historic case of immigrants and immigration
for the state. An assessment of demographic change over the target timeline employs U.S.
Census data from 2000, 2010, 2015, and 2019 at the county level. I report the change in
total population by race and ethnicity, total population education attainment, employment
status and industry for employed civilians, median household income, and nativity and
the year of entry for the foreign-born population. Statistical data for the foreign-born
population is available at the county level, but population data cannot be cross-tabbed by
other statistical factors.
I chose to focus first on the state of Oregon because it was one of the six top states
of interest after the comprehensive state-level case analysis was completed and because
Oregon is currently my home state. An in-depth review of a familiar state allowed me
greater perspective and resources for making connections and drawing conclusions. I
reviewed to the point of saturation major state news outlets, reports from influential
interest groups and foundations at the state-level, and other grey material for messaging
relating to immigration policy and attitudes or opinions toward immigration at the statelevel during the target time period. When sourcing news media at the state and local
levels, I remained cognizant of the fact that many smaller news outlets are now owned by
national conglomerates and likely carry the sentiments espoused by those larger
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corporations. Efforts were made during data collection to identify media outlet ownership
and record known ideological perspectives wherever possible.
As with other case studies in this project, I begin with an historical review of
Oregon in order to frame the context of immigration policy in the present day. Next, I
discuss demographic change, including population changes from 2000 through 2019 by
county. I also review the NCSL State Legislation data specific to Oregon in detail this
case study.
Oregon State Historical Review
The history of people in what is today the U.S. state of Oregon begins thousands
of years ago and was maintained by the oral traditions of the more than 60 indigenous
tribes whose territory spanned the diverse environmental regions that make up today’s
Oregon state in the Pacific Northwest (Cain & Rosman, 2017; Robbins, 2002). The
implementation of the “Doctrine of Discovery”, initiated when Christopher Columbus
happened upon the Americas in 1492, also framed the future for indigenous populations
across the United States (Cain & Rosman, 2017). The region was explored by European
traders approaching from the coast since the early 1500s, including by the Spanish
beginning in the mid-1500s (Reinhardt, 2020). The explorers Lewis and Clark reached
the Pacific Coast from inland in 1805, opening the west to pioneer settlement from the
eastern United States. The decades following Lewis and Clark’s exploration saw travelers
to Oregon territory first by foot and then, when the Oregon Trail had been developed
sufficiently, by wagon.
Oregon joined the Union as a state in 1859, a time during which the federal
government prioritized the freeing of lands in the west for the purpose of white settlement
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(Robbins, 2002). Congress passed the Oregon Donation Land Law of 1850 to serve as a
mechanism for the dispossession of indigenous people from their land and for white
settlement (Robbins, 2002). And a number of treaties were negotiated with Oregon Tribes
in 1855, resulting in the creation of reservations and the forced removal of indigenous
populations from their ancestral lands (Robbins, 2002). These actions reflect the notion
provided by the authority of the Doctrine of Discovery that “the newly arrived United
States has an overriding sovereignty over the sovereignty of the indigenous groups,
tribes, nations” (Miller quoted in Cain & Rosman, 2017).
Oregon’s geography is diverse and consists of several distinct regions. The state’s
geographical diversity plays a significant role in the lifestyles and experiences in each
region. The Oregon coast experiences drastically different weather than the Willamette
Valley in northern central Oregon or the High Desert in the Eastern half of the state, and
mountains have prevented easy travel among regions for much of history. The evolution
of agricultural industries in the state can be attributed to its diverse geographies, which, in
turn, has influenced migration and immigration throughout the history of the state. The
fertile lands of the Willamette Valley and Hood River required additional workers to
sustain production especially at harvesting times early in the settlement of the state
(Sifuentez, 2016; Ng, 1989). And the development of dams in the early twentieth century
along the Columbia, Snake, and Willamette River valleys increased agricultural
production in eastern Oregon, which resulted in a need of farm hands in the east (Garcia
& Garcia, 2005).
Oregon is a state of demographic contradictions. It is viewed as one of the most
racially homogenous states in the United States, and much of this homogeneity, scholars
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argue, is owed to the exclusionary design of its institutions and the continuous reification
thereof (Bussel and Tichenor, 2017). Recent demographic assessments put the foreignborn population in Oregon at 9.7% of the total population in 2019 (MPI, 2001-2021).
This is almost twice the percentage of the population that was foreign-born (4.9%) in
1990 (MPI, 2001-2021). While it is correct to say the state’s immigrant population has
increased significantly since the late twentieth century, a more comprehensive view of
the state’s demographic history reveals substantial racial and ethnic diversity throughout
Oregon’s statehood.
The land we now know as Oregon, along with the rest of the U.S. west coast, was
populated by Anglo settlers throughout the nineteenth century, primarily via teams of
wagon trains crossing the Oregon Trail. With newcomers came new diseases. The
devastating effects of diseases such as small pox, measles, diphtheria, and typhus had, by
the early twentieth century, already ravaged indigenous populations as far west as the
Pacific Ocean in a series of what is estimated to be 90 separate epidemics of European
diseases that crossed what is the United States today (Wilkinson, 2005). The region’s
indigenous populations had already been decimated by disease and violence over the
course of two centuries when wagon trains began to arrive en masse (Barber, 2019;
Wilkinson, 2006). Therefore, indigenous populations had a considerably less imposing
presence upon the arrival of pioneer settlers to Oregon, giving greater strength to myths
of European superiority for those new arrivals.
Bussel and Tichenor (2017) review 150 years of Oregon history and outline a
lasting debate regarding immigration in Oregon. On one side are those espousing a EuroAmerican settler-colonialist traditional sentiment. Over time, these individuals have
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preferred immigration to be limited to “the best” immigrants, defined as those who could
integrate successfully and often limited to Germans, Scandinavians, and other Northern
European immigrants (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017, p. 464). The founding of the state as a
non-slave state, while also constitutionally excluding Black people, served to support the
Euro-American settler-colonialist traditions throughout history. Thee institutional
boundaries supporting the supremacy of Anglo Oregonians set the stage for how the state
would evaluate internal and external migrants from the outset (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017).
Ramsey (2003) points out that Oregon has no major city bearing an indigenous name
(Klamath Falls or Coos Bay are the state’s best examples). In comparison, Washington
accepted native names for major cities such as Seattle, Tacoma, Spokane, and Yakima (p.
xxi).
On the other side of the immigration debate in Oregon are those espousing more
tolerant attitudes, celebrating diversity, and valuing the progress immigrants have
achieved in their communities and for the state’s economies and societies. The voices for
these more supportive attitudes were often led by immigrants themselves through groups
such as Siempre Adelante and Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste (PCUN), but
Oregon state senators in the 1950s and 1960s and more recently have also been vocal in
their support for robust immigration and immigrants’ access to services (Bussel &
Tichenor, 2017, p. 473).
Bussel and Tichenor (2017) describe the friction between these two sentiments
into the modern day. The attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent shift toward
national security concerns at the federal level have left this tension palpable in Oregon.
Organizations seeking limits to legal immigration and harsher action against unauthorized
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immigrants have gained support, while pro-immigrant rallies have grown in number and
in impact, and industry support for immigrants participating in such rallies has blossomed
(Bussel and Tichenor, 2017, p. 478). In 2017, Bussel and Tichenor reported that Oregon
has taken the middle ground in terms of state-level immigration policy (2017, p. 480), yet
very recent legislation at the state-level indicates that the state is growing more accessible
for immigrants. At the local level, Oregon immigrants continue to arrive, work, and
organize. How immigrants reach Oregon has been impacted by point of departure, point
of arrival, workforce needs, and, in some ways, by federal-level policy.
Migrant farmers and loggers were sought out by early Oregonian leaders to help
settle the state and strengthen industries (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017; Trice, Martinez &
Ho, 2017). As one example, in Maxville Oregon, a logging town in northeast Oregon,
migrants from Arkansas were invited to migrate to harvest big timber in the 1920s. Gwen
Trice tells the story of how her African American family came to be in Oregon, logging
in the state with Japanese, Greek, Hawaiian, Latino, Guamanian, Native, and Chinese
loggers (Trice, Martinez & Ho, 2017, p. 599). Oregon’s lumber industry is owed to the
work of migrants, immigrants, and native people of color, yet all were excluded by state
law from the right to own land (Barber, 2019).
The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 placed restrictions on importing Chinese
labor, resulting in an increase in Japanese labor in Oregon in the late 1800s for the
purpose of building railroad infrastructure throughout the state (Ng, 1989). Ng (1989)
reports the Japanese immigrants also found work in agricultural, fishing, and lumber
industries. Many first-generation Japanese immigrants settled in the Hood River area
where they labored removing stumps from previously felled trees in exchange for the
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privilege to become tenant farmers. Some Japanese immigrants afforded to buy their own
land, while others continued to labor for local land owners (Ng, 1989). Ng (1989)
suggests that the Hood River orchard industry familiar to us today is a result of the
Japanese farm land owners’ decision to plant fruit trees there in the early twentieth
century.
As is the case with many immigrant populations, men arrived first in the Hood
River valley. Japanese women immigrated primarily after 1910 and prior to the
Immigration Act of 1924, bringing with them the opportunity for the development of
community among the Japanese in the Hood River valley (Ng, 1989). The presence of
several Japanese halls and churches as well as Japanese community groups by 1925 is
evidence of strong and growing immigrant communities. Ng (1989) describes initial
acceptance of Japanese immigrants in industry groups such as the Hood River Fruit
Grower’s Association, which resulted in important economic integration for the
population. This security was later eroded with the establishment of exclusionary
organizations and laws that limited the advancement of Japanese farmers at the federal
level and at the local level. In 1923 Oregon passed the Alien Land Law, designed to
restrict the ability of Japanese immigrants to own or lease land in the state (Nishihara,
2007).
In 1942, following the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, Executive Order
No. 9066 called for the internment of all Japanese Americans, including American
citizens (National Archives, 2020). Many Japanese in Oregon at this time were U.S.-born
children of Japanese immigrants (Ng, 1989). The state of Oregon was active in its interest
to incarcerate Japanese residents. At the Salt Lake City Governor’s meeting on April 7,
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1942, the executive secretary to the governor of Oregon presented the state’s plan “for
the forced removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II”
(Densho Encyclopedia Contributors, 2020). Known as the Oregon Plan, it was
responsible for the establishment of the first Japanese labor camp in Nyssa, Oregon.
The internment order was kept in place until 1945 and forced Japanese and
Japanese American Hood River residents to leave their land and their lives for internment
camps throughout the Pacific Northwest. The War Relocation Authority, influenced by
the aforementioned Oregon Plan, provided for at least one alternative to internment in the
sugar beet fields of eastern Oregon (Sifuentez, 2016). Instead of internment, Japanese
were permitted to assist in the harvesting of beets and onions on farms near Ontario and
Nyssa, Oregon and across the border in Idaho (Sifuentez, 2016). Many moved their
families to camps in the region and many, eventually finding a niche in onion farming
after the internment order was lifted, never left (Sifuentez, 2016).
The same year Exec. Order No. 9066 ordered the internment of Japanese and
Japanese Americans, the Mexican Farm Labor Program, colloquially known as the
Bracero Program, was signed, initiating the importation of Mexican laborers for
agricultural work in the United States (Bracero History Archive, n.d.). Sifuentez (2017)
presents the impact of the Bracero Program in the Pacific Northwest, illustrating the ways
in which early Mexican migrant workers challenged unfair systems while taking pride in
their work. The Bracero Program was a guestworker program initiated as an agreement
by the governments of the United States and Mexico during World War II, when many
able-bodied American men left the fields and rural areas of the United States to
participate in wartime production.
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Sifuentez (2017) explains how the Bracero Program, lacking proper resources for
ensuring that growers paid agreed upon wages and provided reasonable housing, pushed
many Mexican workers into undocumented status when they broke contracts deemed
unfair. While this occurred nationwide, it led to unique outcomes in the Pacific
Northwest. In Washington, Oregon, and Idaho, migrant workers were far from the
Mexican border and, therefore, far from replacement workers. This meant that their value
and their ability to organize for higher wages was far greater than migrant workers’
elsewhere in the country who were more easily replaced.
The distance also served to keep workers in the area longer, leading to the
development of strong migration networks. In the Pacific Northwest, Sifuentez (2017)
found, the Bracero Program led to an increase in the number of undocumented workers as
well as in increase in the number of rooted Mexican-American communities in Oregon.
Most notable in Sifuentez’s (2017) article is the fact that, while Mexican migrant workers
found the Bracero Program to be unfair and, in many ways, inhumane, they also used the
program to connect to alternative opportunities, develop skills, and put down roots. And
in eastern Oregon, Mexican farmworkers found support from Japanese American
residents who arrived while the internment order was in place and who chose not to leave
once the order was lifted. Where Mexican workers experienced obstinance and mistrust
from many Anglo growers, second generation Japanese growers were often willing to
rent housing and loan money to Mexican workers (Sifuentez, 2016), providing Mexican
workers with a foothold toward economic security in the United States.
Nagae (2012) reminds us that Portland, Oregon had the second largest Chinese
community in the United States after San Francisco in 1890. Nagae’s (2012) work
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focuses on the trials of immigration and citizenship in Oregon for Asian women, and her
article provides ample context for understanding the restrictions faced by Asians overall
in Oregon. Oregon’s constitution excluded Chinese from the right to vote in 1857, and in
1866 “marriage between white persons and persons with a quarter or more of ‘negro
blood,’ including Chinese and ‘Kanaka,’ or native Hawaiian” was prohibited by the
Oregon legislature (Nagae, 2012, p. 348). Nagae (2012) illustrates several cases in which
legal recourse won some Asians their right to citizenship in Oregon, but “the twin evils of
racism and sexism” were experienced from one generation to the next (p. 350).
Another immigrant population whose economic and cultural contributions in
Oregon often go unrecognized are the Roma. Roma were first mentioned in an Oregon
newspaper in 1893 and most every mention of Roma since that time racializes the group,
blatantly othering them as dangerous and untrustworthy (Silverman, 2017). Initially
living nomadically in family groups, the Roma were observed to rent storefront space in
downtown Portland in which they would live and work, often selling wares and services.
Over time, the Roma population settled, buying homes in southeast Portland and
continuing to offer services from their homes. Silverman (2017) reviews a complex
Romani history which centers on Roma in Oregon and links the racist underpinnings of
Oregon Romani history directly to the state’s negative sentiments toward Asian
American and African American populations (p. 525). In an anthology centered on the
racialization of indigenous populations and other ethnic minorities in Oregon, Xing et al.
(2007) find that immigrant groups face challenges that parallel those faced by nonimmigrant people of color in the state.
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American Indians, who had been forcefully removed from their ancestral lands in
Oregon for the purpose of releasing land for Anglo settlement in the nineteenth century
(Robbins, 2002), were continuously dispossessed of their land and of their culture
throughout Oregon history until the restoration of sovereignty in the 1970s (Fixico, D.
n.d.). When the termination of tribes was initiated in 1953 by House Concurrent
Resolution 108, calling for a legal end to reservations, an end to tribal sovereignty, and
for the final integration of American Indians into mainstream American society, Oregon
lawmakers were on the front end of submitting bills of withdrawal of trust to Congress
(Fixico, D. n.d.). The Klamath Tribe was among the first in the nation to succumb to
termination and the Siletz, Grand Ronde, Coquille, Coos, Lower Umpqua, Siuslaw, and
others followed in 1954 (Fixico, D. n.d.).
Termination was initiated under the guise of freedom, “mak[ing] the Indians
within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to
the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United
States, and to end their status as wards of the United States” (Fixico, D. n.d., p. 1), but it
led to the loss of tribal land rights and health and education services, and in Oregon it
forced control of vast natural resources including timber from American Indians to the
federal government and into non-Indian private ownership (Wilkinson, 2005). In Oregon
and across the United States, termination instigated the awareness of the need for selfactualization within and among Indian populations. By the mid-1960s, the modern tribal
sovereignty movement was well underway across the United States. American Indian
tribal leaders worked, often on united fronts, to break the BIA’s paternalistic hold,
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enforce treaty rights, and achieve economic progress while preserving ancient traditions,
yet in Oregon and elsewhere, so much had already been lost (Wilkinson, 2005).
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) also encouraged Indians to relocate to urban
centers during the termination time period, which occurred reluctantly and resulted in
new relationships and identities (Wilkinson, 2005). Today, Portland, Oregon is home to
the ninth largest urban Indian population in the United States and includes 28 Native
organizations (Curry-Stevens, Cross-Hemmer, & Coalition of Communities of Color,
2011). American Indians in contemporary Oregon are resilient in the face of this recent
history which continues to impact their population today in the form of poverty,
unemployment, and poor graduation rates (Curry-Stevens, Cross-Hemmer, & Coalition of
Communities of Color, 2011), challenges faced most significantly in Oregon by
populations of color, including immigrants.
More recently, Guatemalan immigration to Oregon serves as a reflection of the
strength of transborder communities, which are defined by Stephen (2017) as “the
foundations for multi-generational networks connecting settled communities in the
United States with home communities” (p. 561). Stephen (2017) outlines specific
connections between Oregon and Guatemala, pointing to established Guatemalan
communities in the Portland Metro area, Woodburn, St. Paul, and other rural areas linked
to agricultural work (p. 560), and tying Guatemala’s history, particularly its history of
violence against indigenous groups through the 1980s and into the present, to triggering
the immigration of Guatemalans to Oregon.
Attention to Latina history and citizenship in Oregon is notably slim (Mendoza,
2012). The work of women in constructing and maintaining community is an oft
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overlooked aspect of immigration that is significant to the sustainability of existing
communities and to the development of transborder communities that support the
integration of existing immigrant populations and encourage further migration. The
success of immigrants in Oregon is, in many ways, owed to the success of the immigrants
who preceded them. Transborder communities (Stephen, 2017) serve as passageways for
arrival, but inter-immigrant group networks are also an important part of Oregon’s
immigration story. A more detailed description of Latino immigration and migration to
Oregon is necessary because the population covers a broad range of cultures and is not
monolithic.
While the Bracero Program brought Mexican guestworkers to Oregon in
significant numbers through 1947, the social networks constructed during this time
encouraged Tejanos, U.S.-born Latinos primarily from Texas, to migrate to the Pacific
Northwest (Sifuentez, 2016). The groups were culturally different, yet shared in the
experience of indifferent and sometimes poor treatment by Anglo growers. In time,
newcomer migrant families settled and found work alternatives to farm work, which left
growers once again in need of importing labor (Sifuentez, 2016). The trend of settling
and then shifting into non-migratory occupations is observed among Asian immigrant
populations as well (Ng, 1989).
The presence of Latino farm workers in the United States and in Oregon has long
been known. Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Nordoeste (PCUN), Oregon’s only
farmworker union, was founded in 1985 and is the outcome of years of successful
organizing for migrant worker’s rights. PCUN was initiated by Mexican workers
throughout Oregon and the Pacific Northwest (Sifuentez, 2017). The organization and
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others like it have served to create cultural citizenship for some Oregon immigrants
through grassroots organizing around immigration and other issues. Cultural citizenship
is a worthwhile concept for considering the place of immigrants in the state of Oregon.
Where legal citizenship labels immigrants as legal or illegal, cultural citizenship provides
a model for recognizing immigrants as “legitimate political subjects claiming rights for
themselves and their children based on their economic and cultural contributions
regardless of their official legal status” (Stephen, 2003, p. 27). Cultural citizenship serves
to illuminate the value of all immigrants in Oregon, including women and their children.
One point is noted in several resources, which is the fact that, where industry
requires workers, those immigrants otherwise considered “less valuable” to society were
welcomed into the state of Oregon, albeit with limitations designed to ensure the
maintenance of their lowly positions (Barber, 2019; Sifuentez, 2017; Trice, Martinez &
Ho, 2017; Stephen, 2017; Bussel and Tichenor, 2017). Immigrant and migrant groups—
and the children thereof—are not unaware of the societal challenges that they face as
newcomers to Oregon, yet each group’s history reflects a lasting effort to take
opportunity as it comes and to persist.
While Xing et al. (2007) point out Oregon’s lack of leadership in questions
relating to civil rights legislation for its minority populations, the state is known as the
first state to pass a sanctuary state bill prohibiting the use of state and local resources to
enforce federal immigration law (Wilson & De La Torre, 2017). The law has been in
place since 1987 and was designed, as sanctuary laws are, to ensure due process on the
part of federal law enforcement agencies. The law was passed with no organized
opposition (ACLU of Oregon, 2002), and it has been amended somewhat with various
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unsuccessful attempts to repeal it, most recently in 2018 (Oregonians for Immigration
Reform, 2017).
The history of immigrants and immigration in Oregon is rich and complex, and it
is also reflective of national and state sentiments toward populations of color from its
inception. From this point, I shift to an explanation of population change in Oregon with
a focus on the target timeline for this case study project: 2005 to 2019.
Oregon State Demographics by County 2005-2019
In this case study, I explore population change in Oregon by county. The goal of
this analysis is in part to understand the geography of Oregon’s contemporary immigrant
populations in order to build a rich case study for the state, but it is in larger part intended
to direct the identification and selection of community-level case study locations.
U.S. Census data for this case study are downloaded via Social Explorer where
decennial census data are available for the year 2000 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a) and
5-year American Community Survey (ACS) estimates are available for the years 20062010 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021b), 2011-2015 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021c), and
2015-2019 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d). The 5-year estimates have been released
only since 2009, prohibiting a comparable 2005 data set. 1-year ACS estimates have been
available since 2005, but there are several reasons that this data does not suffice for the
work at hand (U.S. Census Bureau, 2020a). First, 1-year estimates represent the smallest
sample size of all available Census estimates and only sample areas with a population of
greater than 60,000. This leads to some counties being omitted from the 1-year estimate.
The 1-year 2005 data, for example, includes data representing 15 of 36 counties in
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Oregon. The 1-year data are the most current, but they are also less reliable than the 5year estimates, which include data for all population areas.
For reasons described here, the population change assessment for Oregon includes
decennial U.S. Census data for the year 2000 as a baseline year and 5-year ACS estimate
data for the years 2010, 2015, and 2019. It should be noted that the utilization of 5-year
estimates requires that data in the 2019 estimate overlaps data in the 2015 estimate, since
the former also includes the ACS data collected in 2015. This overlap is not expected to
cause an issue in providing a snapshot of demographic change in the state.
Once I downloaded the total population and the immigrant, or foreign-born,
population for each county, I calculated what percent of the population of each county
was foreign-born. Then, I calculated the average foreign-born population by percentage
of the whole for each county to use as an arbitrary baseline value to help organize
counties of interest. I would begin by looking more closely at counties that had foreignborn populations above the average by percentage in 2000, 2010, 2015, and 2019. The
majority of contemporary Oregon immigrants are Latino, so changes in Latino
populations by county in Oregon are observed in this case study as well. In addition, and
as I have done elsewhere in this project, I use the Hispanic/Latino population as a proxy
for gauging the presence of individuals who, regardless of nativity or citizenship status,
may be presumed to be immigrants by other residents.
The average foreign-born population increased from 2000 to 2010 from 5.57% to
6.44% and then dropped slightly to 6.33% and 6.34% in 2015 and 2020, respectively. In
2000, 13 counties had a foreign-born population that was, by percentage, larger than
average compared to the total population. These 13 counties maintained above average
235

immigrant populations by percentage through 2019 with the exception of Jefferson
County, whose 2019 immigrant population fell 0.1% shy of the average percentage in
that year. Table 4.33 shows the 13 counties with above average immigrant populations by
percentage in 2000. Values for each of those counties in 2010, 2015, and 2019 are also
included in Table 4.33.
Table 4.33
Oregon Counties with Consistently Higher Than Average Foreign-born Populations by
Percentage from 2000 through 2019 And the Percent Change from 2000 to 2019
FIPS

County Name

2000
(5.6%)
7.62%

2010
(6.4%)
8.29%

2015
(6.3%)
9.67%

2019
(6.3%)
9.80%

Change
2000-2019

41003

Benton County

2.17%

41005

Clackamas County

7.12%

8.47%

8.17%

8.17%

1.05%

41027

Hood River County

16.44%

17.29%

14.81%

15.99%

-0.44%

41031

Jefferson County

9.91%

8.93%

7.05%

6.18%

-3.73%

41045

Malheur County

8.22%

9.81%

10.99%

9.51%

1.29%

41047

Marion County

12.63%

14.14%

13.18%

12.58%

-0.04%

41049

Morrow County

14.52%

15.92%

16.70%

16.68%

2.16%

41051

Multnomah County

12.71%

13.74%

14.19%

13.82%

1.10%

41053

Polk County

6.45%

7.07%

7.47%

7.77%

1.32%

41059

Umatilla County

8.41%

10.19%

10.53%

10.41%

2.00%

41065

Wasco County

6.17%

9.16%

8.08%

8.03%

1.86%

41067

Washington County

14.24%

16.76%

16.90%

17.71%

3.47%

41071 Yamhill County
7.57%
7.99%
8.74%
8.08%
0.51%
Note. U.S. Census and ACS data sourced from Social Explorer Tables (2021a; 2021b; 2021c; 2021d).

The percentage of foreign-born individuals by total population appears to be
steadily increasing in some counties (Benton, Washington and Polk Counties, for
example) and to drop in other counties (Marion and Jefferson counties, for example),
although this study cannot definitively claim whether there is an increase or decrease
without looking at the accompanying details relating to the margin of error for these data.
Hood River County experienced a significant decrease in the percentage of foreign-born
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individuals from 2010 and 2015 and has since observed an increase. Overall, this data
confirm that Oregon’s immigrant population is dynamic.
Table 4.33 also shows the overall change in the foreign-born population by
percentage from 2000 to 2019. Washington County experienced the greatest increase,
with the county’s 2019 value 3.5% greater than the 2000 foreign-born percentage.
Jefferson County, on the other hand, experienced one of the smallest overall shifts with
the county’s 2019 value 3.73% less than the 2000 foreign-born percentage.
I explored the Hispanic population in each county in Oregon in the same fashion,
focusing on the counties with the highest Hispanic population by percentage in each year.
Table 4.34 presents nine counties in which an above average percentage of the population
identifies as Hispanic or Latino in each recorded year. All counties recorded an increase
in the percentage of denizens identifying as Hispanic or Latino from 2000 through 2019,
but Morrow and Umatilla Counties observed the biggest leaps.
Table 4.34
Oregon Counties with Consistently Higher Than Average Hispanic Populations by
Percentage from 2000 through 2019 And the Percent Change from 2000 to 2019
FIPS

41027
41031
41045
41047
41049
41053
41059
41067
41071

County Name

Hood River County
Jefferson County
Malheur County
Marion County
Morrow County
Polk County
Umatilla County
Washington County
Yamhill County

2000
(7.7%)

25.02%
17.74%
25.62%
17.10%
24.43%
8.78%
16.11%
11.17%
10.61%

2010
(10.2%)

28.40%
19.50%
30.31%
23.12%
29.81%
11.55%
22.25%
15.03%
14.04%

2015
(11.3%)

30.54%
19.60%
32.69%
25.34%
34.01%
12.83%
25.25%
16.15%
15.43%

2019
(12.1%)

31.42%
19.97%
33.73%
26.58%
36.50%
13.90%
26.79%
16.66%
15.87%

Change
20002019

6.40%
2.23%
8.11%
9.48%
12.07%
5.12%
10.68%
5.49%
5.26%

Note. U.S. Census and ACS data sourced from Social Explorer Tables (2021a; 2021b; 2021c; 2021d).
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All of the counties included in Table 4.34 are also included in Table 4.33 which
suggests that the dominant immigrant populations in these nine counties are likely
Hispanic. Benton, Clackamas, and Multnomah counties, then, can be expected to reflect
more diverse immigrant population growth. I confirmed this by reviewing statistics
relating to the language spoken at home for each of these counties in 2019. Populations in
Benton, Clackamas, Multnomah, and Washington counties are more linguistically diverse
than populations in the other counties listed in Tables 4.33 and 4.34. The latter three
counties are also the most populated counties in the state of Oregon. In all counties listed
in Table 4.33, Spanish is the most common language other than English spoken at home.
Appendix D details the percentage of each county population that speaks a language
other than English at home in 2019 and includes Oregon state data for comparison.
I cross referenced these counties with the names of cities and regions referenced
in literature discussing immigrants and immigration in Oregon, finding that locations in
Hood River County (Tamura, 1993; Ng, 1989), Marion County (Nelson, 2008; Nelson;
2007; Nelson & Hiemstra, 2008; Kissam, 2007), Malheur County (Sifuentez, 2017), Polk
County (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017), and the counties making up the Portland Metropolitan
area (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017; Jurjevich & Dann, 2012) are among those mentioned
consistently. This means two things for my work. First, these counties could be of interest
because there is a history on record to use as a springboard. Second, other counties could
be of interest because there is not a history on record for immigrants in these regions.
Median household income dropped in the state of Oregon after the great
recession. Table 4.35 shows the median household income for the whole population and
for the Hispanic population in state of Oregon in 2000, 2010, 2015, and 2019. In 2000,
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the statewide median household income was $62,980 and in 2019 it lagged at $62,818.
All income is adjusted to reflect 2019 dollars. In 2010 the median household income was
$57,885 and in 2015 it was $55,287. Oregonians are not better off in 2019 than they were
in 2000, but the Hispanic population is doing comparatively better now than in 2000. In
2000, Oregon Hispanics earned a median household income of $49,124, 78% of the
statewide median household income. Hispanic incomes also fell after the recession years
(to $43,945, 76% of the statewide median, in 2010 and $43,774, 79% of the statewide
median, in 2015), but have recovered more efficiently to $52,537, or 84% of the
statewide median household income, in 2019.
Table 4.35
Oregon Median Household Income and Hispanic Householder Median Household
Income in 2000, 2010, 2015, And 2019 And Including the Ratio of Hispanic Earnings as
Compared to Earnings Overall
Year
2000

2010

2015

2019

Hispanic Income
Divided by Statewide
Income

Dollars adjusted to reflect 2019 values
Oregon Median Household Income

Median
Income
$62,980

Oregon Hispanic or Latino Householder
Household Income
Oregon Median Household Income

$49,124
$57,885

78.0%

Oregon Hispanic or Latino Householder
Household Income
Oregon Median Household Income

$43,945
$55,297

75.9%

Oregon Hispanic or Latino Householder
Household Income
Oregon Median Household Income

$43,774
$62,818

79.2%

Oregon Hispanic or Latino Householder
Household Income

$52,537

83.6%

Note. U.S. Census and ACS data sourced from Social Explorer Tables (2021a; 2021b; 2021c; 2021d).

The income analysis for this case study does not explore whether this is a function
of changing household living situations, but it is in line with national trends observed in
the federal-level case study that suggest Americans have struggled to return to pre239

recession workforce participation and wage rates. The analysis also does not assess
whether citizenship status impacts the median income of foreign-born householders in
these counties, which is a known factor in median income outcomes (Jurjevich & Dann,
2012). In some counties in Oregon, Hispanic householders earn more by measures of
median household income than the total population in that county. Appendix E includes a
table that compares the overall median household income to Hispanic median household
income by county and the state of Oregon. The percent difference between the values is
included in Appendix E. These data are not discussed in detail in this section because
they did not have an impact on community case selection, but it may be of interest to
some readers to see the income diversity across Oregon counties.
Table 4.36
Educational Attainment for the Adult (25 Years and Older) Population in Oregon in 2000
And 2019, Including the Hispanic Population in 2000
Educational Attainment for Population in
2000
2019
Oregon 25 Years and Over
Population 25 Years and Over:
2,250,998
2,898,950
Less than High School
334,811 14.9% 269,250 9.3%
Bachelor's Degree or more
564,566 25.1% 975,920 33.7%
Hispanic or Latino population 25+ years:
125,163
Less than High School
64,058 51.2%
Bachelor's Degree or more
12,050 9.6%
Notes. 2000 and 2019 U.S. Census and ACS data sourced from Social Explorer Tables (2021a; 2021d).

The analysis of educational attainment in Oregon from 2000 to 2019 is in line
with national trends. Table 4.36 shows the educational attainment for Oregonians 25
years and older in 2000 and 2019. The percentage of the adult population without a high
school education fell from 15% in 2000 to 9% in 2019 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a;
2021d). In 2000, the Hispanic population was considerably less educated than the
statewide population. Fifty one percent of the adult Hispanic population in Oregon did
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not finish high school in 2000, and only 10% had a college degree or more (Social
Explorer Tables, 2021a). All Oregon counties observed a decrease in the percentage of
adults who did not finish high school from 2000 to 2019 and only two counties, Morrow
County and Sherman County, observed a decrease in the percentage of their population
that had a bachelor’s degree or more (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a; 2021d). All other
counties experienced gains in the percentage of adults with a college degree or more.
Morrow County is of particular interest here because it is one of Oregon’s most heavily
immigrant-populated counties and it is also one of Oregon’s most heavily Hispanicpopulated counties.
The data thus far illustrate a diverse state in which national trends are observed to
play out. First, immigrant and Hispanic populations are growing but more so in some
areas of the state than others. Second, the great recession had an impact on household
income and suggest that, after a dive before 2010, the 2019 median income is again at
parity with the 2000 median income. Again, however, the shifts in income appear to
occur at different rates for different ethnic groups. Third, adults in Oregon are better
educated in 2019 than in 2000.
Immigrants’ employment in industry in Oregon is also in line with national
trends. Table 4.37 shows the top five immigrant-employing industries in the United
States and in Oregon. These data were collected from the American Immigration Council
and reflect industry trends in 2018 (American Immigration Council, n.d.-b). In the United
States and in Oregon, the agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting industry is the top
employing industry for immigrants. Immigrants make up 26% of employment in this
industry nationally and 28% in Oregon. Construction (23% in the United States and 14%
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in Oregon); Administration support, waste management, and remediation services (26%
in the United States and 18% in Oregon), and Accommodation and food services (20% in
the United States and 16% in Oregon) are three additional industries that are top
immigrant-employing industries at the national and Oregon state-levels.
Table 4.37
Comparison of Top Immigrant-Employing Industries in the United States and Oregon in
2018
United States
1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and
Hunting
2. Construction
3. Admin Support; Waste Mgmt.;
Remediation Services
4. Other Services
5. Accommodation and Food Service

Oregon
26% 1. Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and
Hunting
23% 2. Manufacturing
26% 3. Admin and Support; Waste Mgmt.;
Remediation Services
21% 4. Accommodation and Food Services
20% 5. Construction

28%
21%
18%
16%
14%

Note. Data sourced from American Immigration Council (n.d.-b): Immigrants in Oregon Fact Sheet for
2018

Immigrant-employing industry data were not available for this research project at
the county level, but an analysis of available industry details at the county level allowed
me to ascertain which Oregon counties are supported by the top industries listed in Table
4.37. In order to observe any visible industry shifts from 2000 to 2019, I compared data
in these two years. In 2000, the agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting industry
employed more than 10% of the population in 14 counties in Oregon, including four
counties with the greatest immigrant population by percentage noted in Table 4.33: Hood
River County, Jefferson County, Malheur County, and Morrow County (Social Explorer
Tables, 2021a). In 2019, only 10 counties employed more than 10% of the population in
the agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting industry, and Jefferson County was no
longer represented here (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d).
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Manufacturing employed more than 10% of the population in 26 Oregon counties
in 2000 and only 17 counties in 2019. In 2000, four of these counties employed more
than 20% of their working population in manufacturing, but by 2019 the highest
manufacturing-employing county was Washington County at 17.5%. The share of
workers in the construction industry fell from 2000 to 2019 in most counties, but the
number of counties that observed growth in the arts, entertainment, recreation,
accommodation and food service industry was significant, as was the growth in the
professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management services
industry.
This superficial review of Oregon industry trends from 2000 to 2019 lacks
nuance. The analysis does not serve to illustrate immigrant employing industries in
Oregon counties, but it does relay some important information to help frame what one
might expect at the local level. Of the five 2018 top immigrant-employing industries in
Oregon, three of them are decreasing in their presence at the county level and two are
increasing. This analysis does not take into account population change or the impacts of
changing populations on industry, but it does clearly indicate that immigrant-employing
industries in some Oregon counties are dynamic.
A closer look at county dynamics could direct community case study selection, so
this section reports the top industries in 2000 and 2019 for four counties selected from the
12 counties identified to have the largest immigrant populations in the state by percentage
and presented in Table 4.33. This limited analysis includes Hood River and Malheur
Counties, two counties frequently mentioned in literature about immigrants in Oregon.
Washington County is included because it is among the most populous and most racially
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and ethnically diverse counties in Oregon. Finally, Jefferson County is included as a
representative county of central Oregon.
The top employing industries in four Oregon counties (Hood River, Malheur,
Washington, and Jefferson Counties) in 2000 and 2019 are presented in Appendix F and
discussed here. In Hood River County, the top employing industries in 2000 are also the
top employing industries in 2019. Educational, health and social services continues to be
the county’s top employing industry and agriculture-related industries the second. Retail
trade fell behind Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services, and,
while manufacturing fell by almost 0.5%, it remains the fifth top employing industry in
the county. Three of Hood River’s top employing industries are also among Oregon’s top
immigrant-employing industries: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting,
Manufacturing, and Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services.
The percentage of the population employed in Jefferson County’s Manufacturing
industry fell from 2000 to 2019 from 20% to 14% and participation in Education, health,
and social services increased from 16.5% to 21%. The two industries effectively switched
places in the Jefferson economy. Retail trade and Arts, entertainment, recreation,
accommodation and food services both saw an increase in the percentage of the
population employed in these industries, although Retail trade saw a more substantial
increase. Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting is no longer among Jefferson
County’s top employing industries. Public administration took the place of agriculture on
the list of top employing industries in the county. In 2000, Jefferson County’s top
employing industries included the same three immigrant-employing industries that Hood
River continues to include: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting, Manufacturing,
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and Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services. In 2019, this list
only included two: Manufacturing and Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation
and food services.
In Malheur County, Educational, health, and social services remained a stable top
employing industry from 2000 to 2019. Retail trade increased its presence by almost two
percent of the population employed in that industry while Agriculture, forestry, fishing,
and hunting decreased by almost two percent. Manufacturing decreased by one percent,
and Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services overtook Public
administration as the fifth top employing industry in the county. In 2000, Malheur
County’s top employing industries included two that are also Oregon’s top immigrant
employing industries: Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting and Manufacturing. By
2019, Arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services was also a top
employing industry in Malheur County.
Washington County, the most populated of the counties in this sample, saw
decreases in the percentage of the population employed in manufacturing. This is a trend
observed in all of the sample counties. Educational, health, and social services are now
Washington County’s top employing industry. Professional, scientific, management,
administrative, and waste management services increased by its percentage of the
population employed by this industry. Retail trade decreased by a few points of a percent
but remains the fourth top employing industry in the county. Finally, Finance, insurance,
real estate and rental and leasing dropped sufficiently enough that Arts, entertainment,
recreation, accommodation and food services moved into the chart as the fifth top
employing industry in the county. In 2019, Washington County’s top employing
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industries included three of Oregon’s top immigrant-employing industries: Arts,
entertainment, recreation, accommodation and food services, Professional, scientific,
management, administrative, and waste management services, and Manufacturing.
In closing, the state of Oregon and its counties are dynamic. Populations are
growing, becoming better educated, and managing through economic challenges.
Industry is responding to these changes, too. The community level case study will be an
opportunity to explore these variables at a more intimate level. For now, this case study
turns back to the state of Oregon to examine immigration policy at the state-level from
2005 through 2019.
NCSL Oregon State Legislative Data 2005-2019
This case study reviews data from the National Conference of State Legislatures
(NCSL) database of State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants (NCSL, 2020b)
for the state of Oregon from 2005 through 2019. The NCSL “tracks and reports on state
laws and resolutions that address legal immigrants, migrant and seasonal workers,
refugees and unauthorized immigrants” (NCSL, 2020b), and so the dataset is useful for
observing legislative trends within and among U.S. states.
The state of Oregon has passed 70 bills related to immigrants and immigration
from 2005 to 2019. The calculated sentiment score, which is outlined in the
comprehensive 50-state review of state-level legislation, for the state of Oregon is -0.56,
indicating integrative preferences. Figure 4.15 reflects the shift of sentiment in Oregon
toward more integrative policies after 2012, which is in line with expected trends noted
by Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015). There are no enacted laws relating to
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immigrants or immigration in Oregon on record in 2005 or 2006, so the sentiment score
for the state is initiated in 2007.
NCSL categorizes legislation into 11 groups: budgets; education; employment;
health; human trafficking; identification, drivers’ licenses, and other licenses
(identification); law enforcement; legal services; miscellaneous; public benefits; and
voting and elections. Table 4.38 outlines the number of laws passed in Oregon in each
NCSL legislation category and identifies how they were coded for sentiment.
Figure 4.15
Trends of Oregon State Sentiment Score from 2007 through 2019, Where -1 Is Integrative
and +1 Is Restrictive

Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author.

The NCSL State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants data include all
legislation that the organization deems impactful to any immigrant population in the
United States, so it can be expected that some laws are impactful on a lesser scale than
others. For example, in 2013, OR H 2948 authorized dentists licensed in other countries
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to participate in educational dental activities for up to five days a year under certain
conditions. While the impact of this law appears to be in reparation of a technicality and
to the benefit of a handful of individuals in the Unites States for short-term visits, it is
labeled integrative in the sentiment coding process because it broadens the definition of
who qualifies for dental licensure in the state for a particular purpose.
Table 4.38
The Number of Laws Passed in Oregon by NCSL Legislation Category
NCSL Legislation
No. of Oregon Laws enacted 2007-2019
Category
Integrative (-1) Restrictive (1) Neutral (0)
Budgets
1
Education
16
1
Employment
4
4
Health
11
1
Human trafficking
2
Identification, drivers’
licenses, and other licenses
5
5
1
Law enforcement
8
3
Legal services
1
Miscellaneous
3
Public benefits
3
Voting and elections
1
Note. State sentiment data is sourced from NCSL (2020b) and coded and calculated by this author.

Human trafficking laws are another example of laws that have an impact on a
small population of some of the most marginalized non-citizens in the Unites States. In
Oregon, a law passed in 2007 specifies the definition of some forms of human trafficking
and another law in 2017 clarifies that a prostitution conviction can be vacated where
evidence of human trafficking is present. Both of these laws are coded integrative
because they intend to make identification of human trafficking and recovering from
human trafficking more possible. The following discussion about laws impacting
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immigrants in Oregon highlights trends observed in the direction of legislation over time,
while attempting to illuminate some of the laws carrying more significant impacts for
immigrants in Oregon.
In Oregon from 2005 through 2019, education (17) is the most common type of
legislation affecting immigrants and immigration in Oregon, with health (12),
identification (11), and law enforcement (11) coming in close behind. Eight laws relating
to employment were passed in Oregon from 2007 through 2019. Miscellaneous and
public benefits each include three laws passed, two laws related to human trafficking
were passed, and budgets, voting and elections, and legal services each include only one
law passed in Oregon since 2007. The impact of each of these state laws varies depending
on the type of rule implemented and the population targeted. Individual laws and groups
of laws are discussed here to contextualize the role of immigrant and immigration-related
legislation in Oregon.
Education
Laws enacted in Oregon relating to education have been overarchingly
integrative. Of 17 laws enacted from 2007 through 2019, only one related to education is
restrictive. In 2007, OR H 2208 restricted eligibility for state financial aid to non-citizen
veterans enrolled in part-time coursework or professional training. Rules passed in 2007
and 2010 allocate funds for the education of migrants and providing resident qualification
to foreign exchange students, respectively. In 2011, two laws related to education signal a
more comprehensive and progressive strategy for understanding immigrant representation
in the state. OR H 2939 (2011) requires submission of an annual report detailing the use
of physical restraint and seclusion and including demographic information including
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migrant status and English language proficiency. OR S 242 (2011) broadens eligibility to
serve on the Oregon Student Access Commission to any Oregon resident, rather than only
citizen residents. Taken together, these laws indicate an awareness of the need to know
how and why various populations are impacted by school policies and an initial
acknowledgement of the value of immigrant representation.
From 2013 through 2019, the Oregon state legislature slowly rolled back
restrictions to resident tuition, state financial aid, and access to scholarships for
immigrants in the state. By 2019, many non-citizen residents can access higher education,
including graduate education, at in-state tuition rates. This includes a 2017 law (OR S 20)
exempting non-citizens and non-lawful resident students from paying non-resident tuition
under certain conditions.
Other education-related laws expand equity to education by requiring cultural
competency oversight at institutions of higher education (OR H 2864, 2017), defining
social minorities to include refugees and immigrants (OR H 2845, 2017), facilitating the
creation of school-based health centers with immigrants and refugees among the focus
populations (OR H 3165, 2019), or requiring curricular inclusion relevant to immigrant
and refugee populations (OR H 2023, 2019).
Health
The first health-related legislation included in the NCSL data for the state of
Oregon during the target timeline was passed in 2013. Four bills were passed in that year
and one of them was the only restrictive health-related bill included in the data through
2019. OR H 2859 (2013) prohibits self-attestation of immigration status for the purposes
of receiving medical assistance, meaning one must have proof of eligibility to receive
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assistance. Also in 2013, OR H 2134 required that the Oregon Health Authority and the
Department of Human Services adopt uniform standards for the collection of
demographic data to learn how to better serve the health needs of refugees and
immigrants. This law was the first of many designed to improve health services to
immigrant populations.
In 2014, funds were allocated to the Oregon Health Authority to study the
feasibility of a basic health program intended to include immigrant populations in Oregon
(OR H 4109). 2015 saw laws passed requiring the use of qualified health care interpreters
to ensure accurate communication (OR H 2419) and limited licenses to practice medicine
for individuals licensed in other states or abroad (OR S 684). Each of these rules
expanded access to care or information. Finally, in 2016 and 2017 saw expansions to
health care for some immigrants meeting certain criteria (OR H 4017, 2016), all women
(OR H 3391, 2017), and all children (OR S 558, 2017), regardless of immigration status.
As with education-related legislation, health-related legislation expands its focus on
equity and serving immigrants from 2013 through 2017 to provide some health services
to undocumented residents in the state.
Identification and Driver's Licenses, Other Licenses
Eleven laws relating to immigrants and identification and driver’s license or other
licenses (identification) are passed in Oregon from 2005 through 2019. Through 2011,
identification-related laws passed in Oregon are restrictive (5) or neutral (1) in nature,
while all laws passed in 2013 and thereafter are integrative (5). Much of what is restricted
in relation to driver’s licenses, permits, and identification cards before 2012 is then
voided with more integrative laws after 2012. For example, a 2008 law requires proof of
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legal presence and a social security cared to obtain a driver’s license or identification card
(OR S 1080a), while a 2019 law eliminates the requirement of proof of legal presence for
a driver’s license or identification card (OR H 2015). The only law in this category not
related to state driver’s licenses or identification cards is a 2011 law requiring that any
applicant for a hand gun must be a U.S. citizen or a permanent legal resident in the
process of acquiring citizenship status (OR S 68).
Law Enforcement
Of eleven law enforcement-related laws passed in Oregon from 2009 through
2019, three are restrictive and eight are integrative. In 2009, the state of Oregon restricted
the governor from pardoning a deportation without agreement from the U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (OR H 3508), and a 2012 law requires that the individual
hired for a newly created role or liquor enforcement inspector be a U.S. citizen (OR S
1528). The third restrictive rule, enacted in 2017, prohibits the appointment of
immigrants to various types of police officer positions in Oregon (OR H 2954).
The following law enforcement-related laws passed in 2013 and 2016 are
designed to prevent individuals seeking immigration services from being taken advantage
of by unqualified individuals, and they are coded as integrative. A common law
enforcement-related rule across states in the United States requires that a notary public
may not act as an immigration consultant and, more specifically, that a State Bar or
federal authorization is required of anyone offering immigration consultation. In Oregon,
these rules were introduced in 2013, and a 2016 law amplified the significance of the
rules by clarifying that “acting as an immigration consultant” is defined as obstruction of
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government and “instilling fear of immigration status” is defined as extortion (OR H
4128).
Three integrative laws passed in 2019 are designed to protect immigrants
involved in the legal system from discrimination. OR S 962 aids individuals seeking U
nonimmigrant visa status by directing agencies to verify to the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services any assistance provided in investigating criminal activity on the
part of the individual seeking status. Another rule prohibits the court from inquiring about
an individual’s immigration status at any time during a criminal proceeding (OR H 2932).
Finally, OR H 3224 requires that the district attorney of each county in Oregon consider
certain collateral consequences, including immigration consequences, in the development
of policies relating to charging decisions and sentencing. Taken together, these three laws
indicate a conscious effort on that part of the Oregon legislature to safeguard individuals
whose immigration status is tenuous or undocumented from undue discrimination.
Employment
As with other categories in the NCSL data, employment-related laws in Oregon
have grown more integrative over time. Two laws were passed in 2007, one of which was
integrative. The law requires farm labor contractors to provide workers’ compensation
insurance to farmworkers (OR S 202, 2007). Enacted in the same year, OR H 2247
restricts individuals in violation of U.S. immigration laws from collecting workers’
compensation in contexts unrelated to farmworkers.
An additional three laws were passed in 2011 and 2013, and all were restrictive.
OR H 2743 (2011) is very specific as it relates to the workers’ compensation of only
podiatric physicians and surgeons. Nonetheless the law specifies that some immigrants
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not residing in the United States are not included in certain claims benefits. OR H 2743 is
an example of restrictive legislation that has little impact on the general immigrant
population in Oregon, yet it is coded and included in the data all the same. OR H 2094
(2011) has a decidedly greater impact on immigrant employees in Oregon because it
allows for workers’ compensation payments to be discontinued if the recipient is in
violation of federal immigration laws. In 2013, OR H 3315 requires notification to the
U.S. Department of Labor of noncompliance with H-2B visa regulations in specific
contexts.
In 2019 three integrative laws were passed, each designed to reduce barriers to
employment for immigrants. OR S 855 (2019) requires professional state licensing
boards to reduce barriers to recredentialing for skilled immigrants and OR S 854 (2019)
requires professional state licensing boards to accept an individual taxpayer identification
number for employment instead of a social security number. These rules are designed to
ease the process by which skilled immigrants obtain employment in Oregon. OR S 370
(2019) is designed to provide immigrants who may be working in violation of U.S. labor
regulations with timely information that a federal agency is inspecting their employment
eligibility verification credentials.
Other Oregon Legislation Relating to Immigrants and Immigration
The remaining 11 bills passed in Oregon from 2005 through 2019 that relate to
immigrants and immigration fall into one of six categories: budgets, human trafficking,
legal services, public benefits, voting and elections, or miscellaneous. One integrative
law relating to budgets is included in the NCSL dataset. In 2010 OR H 5100 included
increases in funding services related to workplace and community transition training and
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for costs of incarcerating illegal aliens. Two human trafficking laws, on passed in 2007
and another passed in 2017, intend to make identification of human trafficking and
recovering from human trafficking more possible. The law passed in 2007 (OR S 578)
specifies the definition of some forms of human trafficking and the law passed in 2017
(OR S 249) clarifies that a prostitution conviction can be vacated where evidence of
human trafficking is present.
One law related to legal services (OR H 2356, 2007) states that active Oregon Bar
status is required by those providing immigration consultation. This law is
complementary to laws categorized under law enforcement that are discussed earlier in
this section. Three public benefits related laws were passed in 2009 (2) and 2019 (1), all
of which are integrative. In 2009, OR S 630 created a task force on Disproportionality in
Child Welfare Foster Care and requires that one representative of the Refugee Child
Welfare Advisory Committee be included on the task force and OR H 2508 (2019)
appropriated funds to support refugee populations in Oregon. Another law in 2009 relates
specifically to procedures involved in intercountry adoptions (OR S 10, 2009).
A single Oregon law potentially impacting immigrants and immigration relates to
voting and elections and was coded as neutral because it is a procedural change that is
limited to individuals who qualify as voters in the state. Three rules falling into the
miscellaneous category were passed in Oregon in 2007 (1) and 2015 (2). The 2007 law
allows for the Governor to prohibit price gouging during a “declaration of abnormal
disruption of market” including an emergency crisis of increased migrant population
unmanageable to a county (OR S 118). One law in 2015 creates a task force on
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immigration consultant fraud and another outlines requirements for demonstrating a
foreign adoption is legal and valid.
Contemporary Oregon is largely an integrative state where immigration policy is
concerned. This is in line with Colbern and Ramakrishnan (2021), who find Oregon to be
among the top five most inclusive U.S. states. The data reviewed in this section illustrate
that the Oregon state legislature has used lawmaking in primarily integrative ways for
issues affecting immigrants and immigration from 2007 through 2019. This is, however,
not the result of a legislature inherently benevolent to the needs and concerns of
immigrants. Oregon has a robust collection of organizational institutions working for the
rights of immigrants, which is explored in the next section of this case study.
Oregon was identified in the comprehensive coverage for this case study as a
solidly Democratic state, so more integrative legislation can be expected. The racial
representation of the Oregon state legislature also appears to follow expected trends for
Democrat dominant legislatures, but data covering the race and gender of state legislators
are not robust. The NCSL published state legislator demographics in 2015 and 2020, but
the data available for Oregon is missing substantial amounts of data regarding race. From
2015 to 2020, the Oregon state legislature shifted from 31% female and 69% male to
40% female and 60% male (NCSL, 2020a). At the same time, NCSL reports Oregon’s
state legislature shifted from 94% white in 2015 to 84% white in 2020 (NCSL, 2020a).
Details regarding the race of the 16% of legislators who are not white in 2020 is not
available.
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Oregon State Support and Organizational Resources for Immigrants 2005-2019
A 2000 New York Times article refers to a time when Asian countries referred to
Portland, Oregon as Deportland because of an Oregon-based immigration official’s
extraordinarily high rate of deportations (Verhovek, 2000). Yet, it seems that from
legislation to programs for immigrants facilitated by the state, Oregon supports the
integration of immigrants. Where the state government is itself inactive, nonprofit
organizations and the citizenry fill the gaps and push the state to act.
First, federal funds are administered through states for Migrant Education
programs and Adult Basic Education, which includes courses to improve English
language proficiency. In theory, these programs are mandated in all states by the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), but the extent to which a state
makes them accessible may vary. There are currently 18 school districts and Educational
Service Districts (ESD) with Migrant Education Programs in the state of Oregon
(Oregon.gov, n.d.), and the Migrant Education service was mentioned as a beneficial
program in informant interviews at the local level. There are no state agencies dedicated
to immigration policy in Oregon, but some state legislators have explored the functions of
Offices for New Americans in other U.S. states with the intention of developing such an
office in Oregon (Friedman, 2018).
Second, Oregon is known as the first state to pass a so-called sanctuary state law
in 1987, but it is also the state in which, in 2014, a federal magistrate judge clarified that
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainers are requests rather than mandates
(Semple, 2014). This ruling had a nation-wide effect on how local law enforcement
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responded to ICE requests and strengthened the understanding of and the utility of the
Oregon sanctuary law (Informant Communications, 2021).
Related to relations with ICE is the notion of the detention of immigrants for
purposes relating to deportation. In 2005 there were 12 detention facilities that were used
to detain immigrants in the state of Oregon and in 2019 there was one, which ceased the
detention of immigrants that year. All detainees are currently transported to Tacoma,
Washington or elsewhere outside of Oregon for detention. Oregon’s various county jails
which once served as detention centers ceased detentions between 2008 and 2019 (Global
Detention Project, 2021).
Third, the state is home to a variety of advocacy organizations and other resources
intended to assist immigrants’ access to services. As discussed earlier, immigrants’ rights
and advocacy organizations have long flourished in Oregon, and the current list of
immigrant-serving organizations is robust. Appendix G includes a list of active Oregon
advocacy and rights organizations and a list of legal support programs available
throughout the state. The list focuses on programs serving the entire state of Oregon, so it
does not include a multitude of local and regional advocacy and community centers, such
as the Latino Community Association of central Oregon, Centro Cultural, serving the
greater populations of Washington County, Unete in Southern Oregon, or Comunidades,
a community organization based in the Columbia River Gorge. While the list in
Appendix G is undoubtedly incomplete, it is indicative of the organizational network that
has grown from the advocacy work of immigrant communities in Oregon’s early and
mid-twentieth century. It is also indicative of the developing advocacy relationship
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among Oregon immigrants, people of color, and the rural poor because many of the
organizations on the list intentionally serve intersecting populations.
Conclusion to Deep Coverage Oregon Case Study
This deep coverage case study of the state of Oregon frames a context for
immigration at the community level in the state. The history of Oregon is one of
exclusion and Anglo settlement, and it is a state with dueling sentiments toward that
history. The infrastructure for organizing and advocating for the rights of immigrants is
well established in the state.
Despite exclusion efforts, Oregon has been a home to immigrants since its
inception. From 2000 through 2019 the immigrant population has continued to increase
and the state’s population has diversified. The great recession led to economic distress
that impacted industry and from which some populations were still recovering in 2019.
Oregon’s more recent legislative history shows a commitment to integration for
immigrants in the state. This deep coverage case study helps frame the nature of a state
more fully than was possible with the comprehensive coverage alone and will be
fundamental to the analysis of contemporary immigration federalism in this research
study.
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Local-Level Case Studies
This section includes three local-level case studies that reflect the historical
context and current situation of the following cities in Oregon: Sandy, Nyssa, and
Madras. Case study development at the local level included review of existing data and
the collection of primary data by using semi-structured interviews with public
administrators and local leaders to gain an understanding of how the community
functions in relation to immigration policy. The purpose of these case studies is primarily
to illustrate civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration from 2005 through
2019. However, many of my informants’ relationships with their respective cities began
several years before the target timeline and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and
social unrest in 2020 are undoubtedly represented in their responses. It is clear that
history plays a significant role in informants’ perspectives of civic capacity, which means
that a historical review is also included in each city case study. In each case, the historical
review is followed by a comprehensive review of factors relating to immigration policy
from 2005 through 2019.
The population statistics used in the development of these case studies are
downloaded from the 2000 decennial Census (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a), the 20062010 American Community Survey 5-year estimates (Social Explorer Tables 2021b) and
2015-2019 American Community Survey 5-year estimates (Social Explorer Tables,
2021d). ACS 5-year estimate data is collected continuously over the course of five years
and collated into the values that are presented here. The 2000 decennial census is
compatible with the ACS 5-year estimate data for the items discussed in this case study
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2020b), but with smaller populations it is important to keep in mind
260

that the 5-year estimates are not reflective of a population snapshot for a given point in
time. Instead, it is useful to consider trends observed over time in order to understand the
nature of population change.
The case studies frequently use common labels to refer to populations of certain
ethnic and racial backgrounds. In these case studies, Latino and Hispanic are terms that
are interchangeably used to refer to the minority group in the United States whose
common language is Spanish and whose countries of origin are in Latin America and
Spain. The author admits that this label is imperfect at best. The decision to use Latino
and Hispanic in this work rests in the nature of resources used for this historical review.
Some sources cited for this case study refer to this minority group as Hispanic while
other sources refer to this group as Latino, so the case study follows. See Mora (2014) for
an in-depth exploration of the term Hispanic in the United States and Vidal-Ortiz and
Martinez (2018) for further discussion regarding the evolution of Latin American
identity, including a more recent term, Latinx, used among academic and activist circles.
Indigenous American and American Indian are interchangeably used in this case
study to refer to those people native to the land that was eventually settled as the State of
Oregon. Wherever possible, the names of specific tribes are used in this paper. Lastly,
Anglo refers to white U.S. Americans whose first language is English, regardless of
actual ethnicity. As with other labels used to delineate populations, it is imperfect.
However, the use of the term throughout this research project by many who self-identify
as Anglos gives credence to its respectful use in Oregon.
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Sandy, Oregon
The city of Sandy, Oregon is located in Clackamas County, around 27 miles east
of Portland, Oregon’s largest city. The city is named after the Sandy River, whose banks
meander near its eastern boundary. Although originally a logging and sawmill town,
more recently Sandy boasts a diverse economy that relies heavily on professional
occupations, management, sales, and construction, but also supports occupations in the
local agricultural industry (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d). Sandy is bisected by
Highway 26, and therefore serves as a gateway to recreation activities on and around
Mount Hood and the Cascade Range, while also supporting the city’s economy as a
transportation throughway connecting the Portland metropolitan area to central and
eastern Oregon, and to the rest of the contiguous United States. The city is surrounded by
farms and landscaping nurseries, and migrant farm workers have long been a part of the
fabric of the community.
Sandy, Oregon: Historical Context
Sandy was incorporated in 1911. The founding pioneers would have preferred to
incorporate earlier, but the city struggled to reach the state’s minimum population
requirement of 200 people for several years (Suter-Warner, n.d.). Prior to the arrival of
European settlers, the land that is now Sandy was included in the frequented territories of
the Clackamas Indians and several other Indian tribes now affiliated with the
Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde (Oregon State University, 2020). Throughout the
nineteenth century, indigenous tribes in the Pacific Northwest experienced continuous
conflict with Anglo settlers and repeated exposure to European diseases such as
smallpox, both of which served to reduce their populations (Pacific Oregon University,
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2021). By 1843, the population of pioneer settlers in Oregon surpassed that of indigenous
populations due to the arrival of Anglos on the Oregon Trail, as well as indigenous deaths
caused by exposure to disease and conflict (Pacific Oregon University, 2021). The forced
removal of Tribal members by the U.S. government between 1853 and 1855 also served
to significantly reduce barriers to entry for the Anglo population to the region now known
as Sandy (Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde, 2021).
Prior to incorporation, Sandy served as a pioneer trading post, with the city’s first
hotel built around 1873. From 1846 through the 1880s, an estimated 50,000 Oregon Trail
pioneers passed through what is now Sandy through the Barlow Road, originally an
Indian Trail running along the south side of Mount Hood that was utilized and broadened
by pioneers to serve as a last leg of the Oregon Trail. By the latter half of the nineteenth
century, railroads had eliminated the need for the Barlow Road, but its several decades of
use substantially contributed to the settling of cities like Sandy across the western United
States as we know it today (Suter-Warner, n.d.).
Migrant loggers were sought out by early Oregonian leaders to help settle the
state and strengthen industries (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017; Trice, Martinez, & Ho, 2017).
As one example, in Maxville, Oregon, a logging town in northeast Oregon, migrants from
Arkansas were invited to come harvest big timber in the 1920s. Gwen Trice tells of how
her African American ancestors came to be in Oregon, logging in the state with Japanese,
Greek, Hawaiian, Latinx, Guamanian, Indigenous American, and Chinese loggers (Trice,
Martinez, & Ho, 2017). In this sense, the city is no different than other early Oregon
logging towns that experienced success because of migrants and immigrants coming to
the region to take advantage of employment opportunities. While, a detailed history of
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Sandy’s logging industry, and thereby the city’s early immigration history, was
unavailable for this study, one informant for this case study reported that the city’s early
housing stock indicates the community was socio-economically diverse and integrated
rather than segregated into class-based neighborhoods (Personal Communication, 2021).
Sandy continues to be a gateway between Oregon’s rugged and rural east and the
metropolitan west, and the city continues to employ what locals refer to as the “pioneer
spirit” to drive innovation and progress in the city today.
Sandy, Oregon: Case Study Introduction
Five informants shared insights, experiences, and memories to help frame the
context of civic capacity in Sandy, Oregon from 2005 to 2019 for this case study. All
informants served the city of Sandy as a public administrator or elected official for a
period of time during the target timeline. Additionally, all informants were asked to speak
of experiences occurring during the years 2005 to 2019, but in each case an informant’s
broader experience with the city informed their understanding of Sandy during the target
timeline. Informants one, two, three, and four were longtime Sandy residents by 2005,
and informants two, three, four, and five remained Sandy residents at the time of the
interviews.
Informants were asked to share stories that illustrate the city’s capacity to meet
the needs of residents more generally, as well as to reflect on the city’s policies and
processes as they related to serving and engaging immigrants. Informant interviews
revealed a commitment to moving public services forward in the face of consistent
population growth and limited resources. The four informants who spoke of Sandy as
early as 2005 each shared a similar narrative about Sandy from their own perspective.
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These individuals worked closely with one another to bring about service changes that
remain integral to the day-to-day functions of the city of Sandy today. Informant five
corroborates this history while highlighting the challenges and demands of governance
under substantial changes in leadership and the unexpected pressures of the COVID-19
pandemic.
Sandy, Oregon: 2005-2019
When asked to reflect on Sandy as it relates to immigrants and immigration,
informants noted a diverse yet small population of foreign-born individuals primarily
from Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America. An increasing Spanish-speaking
population in Sandy was evident to a number of informants who pointed to the 2004
construction of Sandy Vista, a farmworker housing complex developed within the city
limits, as evidence of expanding international migrant communities in the area. Yet,
informants also spoke of Sandy’s founding as an Oregon Trail terminus whose earliest
non-indigenous settlers were also migrants from elsewhere, searching for settlement. This
comparison was not intended to negate the challenges contemporary incoming
immigrants may experience, but it served to illuminate the nature of Sandy as a
community under constant population change.
Sandy, Oregon: 2005-2019—Demographic Change
The population of Sandy, Oregon has grown steadily since the city was
incorporated in the early twentieth century and it is expected to continue experiencing
substantial growth through at least 2067 (Jurjevich, Chun, Rancik, & Proehl, 2017).
Sandy is a city that has experienced constant population growth throughout its history,
barring a slight decrease in population in the early 1900s. Table 4.39 shows that every
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decade since 1920 has brought a population increase to the city of Sandy at an overall
average increase of about 50% each decade. This rate of growth makes governance
unique in Sandy because of the continuous need to look to the future to ensure capacity
keeps up with demand.
Table 4.39
Sandy Oregon Population 1900-2019
Sandy, Oregon Historical
Population 1910-2019
Census
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010

Pop.
96
250
242
284
473
1,003
1,147
1,544
2,905
4,152
5,385
9,570

%±
—
160.4%
−3.2%
17.4%
66.5%
112.1%
14.4%
34.6%
88.1%
42.9%
29.7%
77.7%

2019 (est.) 11,070
15.7%
Source: 1910-2010 U.S.
Decennial Census; 2019
American Community Survey
5-year Estimates

This section of the case study reviews changes in Sandy’s foreign-born population
from 2000 to 2019 to construct a context for who makes up this population and how it
relates to the overall city population. While the data indicate a decrease in recently
arriving immigrants to Sandy, they also show that the Sandy economy and community
can support both established and new-coming immigrants.
The foreign-born population in Sandy is slowly rising, although it substantially
declined in 2010 population estimates. Table 4.40 shows Sandy’s foreign-born population
estimates in 2000, 2010, and 2019. In 2000, Sandy’s foreign-born population was 309, or
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5.8%, of the city’s total population. 2010 5-year American Community Survey estimates
record a drop in the foreign-born population by percentage and by real numbers. In 2010,
the foreign-born population fell to 221, representing only 2.5% of the overall population.
Such declines in foreign-born populations were not uncommon in the United States
following the 2007-2009 great recession and have been observed to increase again as
local economies strengthen. In 2019, the foreign-born population in Sandy is estimated to
have increased to 750, or 6.8% of the total population.
The year of U.S. entry for foreign-born individuals in Sandy is also illustrated in
Table 4.40 and illustrates the fact that the city of Sandy supports both long established
and newly arrived immigrants. In 2019, 29% of the population arrived before 1990, 30%
arrived between 1990 and 2000, and 33% arrived between 2000 and 2010. Only 7% of
the foreign-born population in Sandy arrived in the United States since 2010.
This research study does not calculate the margin of error of ACS data, so the
numbers reflected in Table 4.40 should be viewed with caution. Looking across the
decades, the arrival period for foreign-born residents appears to change dramatically. In
2010, no foreign-born residents who entered the United States from 1990 to 1999 were
estimated to reside in Sandy, while in 2019, 228 individuals were estimated to have
arrived within the same time period. Earlier, in 2000, 186 foreign-born individuals
resided in Sandy who had entered the United States between 1990 and 1999. According
to this data, 186 immigrants left Sandy by 2010 and then 228 immigrants moved into the
city by 2019. There is a possible explanation for this oddity, which relates to the nature of
the ACS 5-Year estimate data leaving room for inaccuracies, especially where small
populations are concerned.
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Table 4.40
Year of Entry for Foreign-Born Population in Sandy 2000, 2010, and 2019
2000
Year Of Entry for The
Foreign-Born
Population

Foreign-born Population:
1995 to March 2000
1990 to 1994
1985 to 1989
1980 to 1984
1975 to 1979
1970 to 1974
1965 to 1969
Before 1965

% of
Pop. FB
Pop.
309
82
104
10
11
32
6
29
35

26.5%
33.7%
3.2%
3.6%
10.4%
1.9%
9.4%
11.3%

2010
Year Of Entry for The
Foreign-Born
Population

Foreign-Born Population:
2000 or Later
1990 to 1999
1980 to 1989
Before 1980

% of
Pop. FB
Pop.
221
42
0
36
143

19.0%
0.0%
16.3%
64.7%

2019
Year Of Entry for The
Foreign-Born
Population

Foreign-Born Population:
2010 or Later
2000 to 2009
1990 to 1999
Before 1990

% of
Pop. FB
Pop.
750
53
249
228
220

7.1%
33.2%
30.4%
29.3%

Note. This table shows how year of entry for foreign-born individuals varies in each year presented. Data
are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2006-2010 and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social
Explorer Tables (2021a, 2021b, 2021d).

While we cannot know if there were no foreign-born residents in Sandy in 2010
who had arrived in the United States between 1990 and 1999, we can assume that there
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were far fewer than in either 2000 or 2019, which is of interest to understanding civic
capacity as it pertains to immigrants and immigration in Sandy. The year of entry data
leave open the possibility that Sandy serves at least some immigrant populations as a
gateway city to employment and settlement, just like it has historically served the broader
population. An analysis of the most common birth places for the foreign-born population
in Sandy indicates how the geographic and cultural origins of the city’s immigrant
population have changed since 2000.
The most common places of birth for the foreign-born population in Sandy are
different in each decade. This fact supports the notion that Sandy deals with constant
population change even where the immigrant population is concerned. From a
perspective of public service delivery and governance, Sandy faces an additional
challenge of maintaining equitable and accessible services for a growing immigrant
population whose cultural and language backgrounds consistently change over time. Data
pertaining to the birthplaces of immigrants in Sandy from 2000, 2010, and 2019 are
discussed here. See Appendix H for the table reflecting this data.
In 2000, a majority (52%) of Sandy’s immigrants were from Europe, while only
10% were from Asia and 38% were from Latin America. Ukrainian immigrants were the
largest immigrant group in Sandy, making up 33% of the total immigrant population.
2010 shows a decline in the European population to 35% of the overall immigrant
population in Sandy reporting no Ukrainian-born immigrants. Immigrants born in Asian
countries increased to 19% of the immigrant population in 2010, and Latin Americans
dropped to 21% of the immigrant population. A substantial Australian population is
reported to make up 25% of the Sandy immigrant population in 2010. In 2019, Europeans
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make up 33% of the foreign-born population, Asians account for 23%, and Latin
Americans make up 40%. North Americans born in Canada account for the remaining 3%
of the foreign-born population in Sandy in 2019.
Sandy’s substantial apparent changes in the makeup of its immigrant population
from 2000 to 2019 are undoubtedly due in part to the data’s statistical margin of error
discussed at the open of this section. The abrupt appearance and disappearance of a
substantial Australian population was, for example, unfamiliar to my interview
informants. Yet, the fact that some groups decrease over several 5-year estimate time
periods and others steadily gain in population, lends credence to the notion that Sandy’s
immigrant population is dynamic.
In 2000, Sandy’s largest immigrant group was Ukrainian-born, but this group’s
population fell to 4% of the city’s immigrant population by 2019. Mexican-born
immigrants, who made up 28% of the immigrant population in 2000, were the largest
foreign-born group (39% of the immigrant population) in Sandy by 2019. At the same
time, the Asian immigrant population increased and diversified to include East Asians
(from Hong Kong and Japan), South Eastern Asians (from Vietnam), and South Central
Asians (from a broad region including Iran, India, and other surrounding countries).
These groups are culturally and linguistically diverse and fundamentally change the
needs related to service delivery and accessibility.
Finally, the Latino population in Sandy increased substantially from 4.1% of the
population in 2000 to 10.2% of the population in 2019. Table 4.41 shows Sandy’s
Hispanic population in 2000, 2010, and 2019. This can be compared to the 2.7% of the
overall Sandy population that was both Latino and foreign-born in 2019. Considering
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changes in the overall Latino population in conjunction with changes in the immigrant
population is valuable because racial and ethnic discrimination is a common challenge in
communities that experience immigration, particularly in the contemporary United States
where media attention to immigration since the early 1990s has been observed to
influence negative attitudes towards immigration and the Latino population more
generally (Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2013). Therefore, while the population of Latino
immigrants in Sandy remains minimal at 40.2% of the immigrant population and 2.7% of
the overall population, the presence of Latinos is substantially higher. In some cities,
other racial or ethnic backgrounds can be considered in relation to immigrant populations
of similar racial and ethnic backgrounds. In Sandy, however, where 83% of the
population was White non-Hispanic in 2019, no other race included in the ACS makes up
a substantial percentage of the population (Black or African American and non-Hispanic
(0.6%), American Indian and non-Hispanic (0.5%), Asian and non-Hispanic (2.3%), and
Two or more races and non-Hispanic (3.5%).
Table 4.41
Sandy Hispanic Population 2000, 2010, 2019
Sandy, Oregon Hispanic
Population 2000-2019
Year
2000
2010
2019

% of total
pop.
220
4.1%
884
9.2%
1,134
10.2%

Pop.

Source: 2000, 2010 U.S. Decennial
Census; 2019 American Community
Survey 5-year Estimates

In short, population change in Sandy is familiar, the presence of immigrants in the
city is moderate, and the overall population is predominantly Anglo. The city leaders who
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acted as informants for this study expressed community tension as a result of
demographic changes but concurred that immigration was not a driver for this tension.
Instead, the overall population growth brought U.S.-born families and individuals looking
for a more affordable lifestyle than what could be achieved in nearby urban areas where
the cost of housing had substantially increased. The friction between the desires of new
arrivals and those of longstanding homestead residents is reflected in one city manager’s
comments reflecting on the city early in the target timeline (around 2005), as well as the
current city manager’s observations about Sandy in 2019 and 2020, but neither of the
reflections involves sentiment—positive or negative—toward foreign-born immigrants.
As a city in a perpetual state of population growth, it seems Sandy can expect growing
pains as a reflection of moderate change over time.
Sandy, Oregon: 2005-2019—Industry Trends
Industry trends for Sandy, Oregon are stable. There was little change in top
employing industries in the area from 2000 to 2019. Data shown in Table 4.42 indicates
that the most employed Sandy residents aged 16 and over worked in education,
healthcare, and social services (18% in 2000 and 19% in 2019). Manufacturing and retail
trade were also both strong employers in 2000 and remained so in 2019. Manufacturing
supported the employment of 13% of the working population in 2000 and dropped
slightly to 11% in 2019, while retail trade increased from 11% to 14% in the same
timeframe. Agricultural and finance industries and public administration each increased
about 2.5% from 2000 to 2019, while the share of workers employed in wholesale trade
dropped by just over 2%. The percentage of the population that was employed in
construction and arts (including entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food
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services) experienced the greatest declines from about 10% to about 6% of the working
population. Employment in other industries changed by fewer than two percentage points
in the target timeframe.
Table 4.42
Percent of Civilian Population 16 Years and Over Employed by Industry in Sandy,
Oregon in 2000 and in 2019, Including the Percent Change Over Time
SE:T85. Industry By Occupation For
Employed Civilian Population 16
2000 2019 % Change
Years And Over

Employed Civilian Population 16
Years And Over:
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and
hunting, and mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Transportation and warehousing,
and utilities
Information
Finance, insurance, real estate and
rental and leasing
Professional, scientific,
management, administrative, and
waste management services
Educational, health and social
services
Arts, entertainment, recreation,
accommodation and food services
Other services (except public
administration)
Public administration

2,609 5,583
1.6%
10.0%
12.7%
6.4%
11.2%

4.1%
6.1%
11.3%
4.2%
14.2%

2.5%
-3.9%
-1.4%
-2.2%
3.0%

6.9% 5.9%
0.7% 0.8%

-1.0%
0.1%

7.9% 10.4%

2.5%

6.9% 8.2%

1.3%

18.3% 19.2%

0.9%

10.4% 5.7%

-4.7%

4.0% 4.5%
3.0% 5.6%

0.5%
2.6%

Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer
Tables (2021a, 2021d).
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While these numbers show the industries in which Sandy residents work, it would
be an error to assume all residents work in Sandy proper. Therefore, an increase in one
industry does not necessarily suggest that that industry is on the rise in Sandy. Table 4.42
does, however, reflect changing employment trends in the region, which could be
indicative of the economic direction in which Sandy is moving. Given that Sandy’s
overall employed population aged 16 and over increased by 214% from 2000 to 2019,
one might expect the data to reflect more change in terms of where newcomers found
employment. This is not the case in Sandy. Instead, employment trends show Sandy’s
existing industries can support substantial population growth. Data that specifically
outlines where Sandy’s immigrant population is employed is unavailable due to the city’s
small size and concerns about anonymity, but immigrants are undoubtedly a part of the
214% growth since 2000.
Sandy, Oregon: Governance and the Integration of Immigrants
The target timeline for this case study begins just as the Sandy Vista migrant
worker housing complex was completed and as the number of Latino immigrants began
to rise in Sandy. These factors are reflected in informant comments about official
discussions surrounding the need for increased programming to support migrant workers
who were most often Spanish-speakers and from Latin America. While the earlier
immigrant population was predominantly Russian-speaking and fewer in number, the
challenges highlighted by case study informants involved engaging the Latino
population. The topic is necessarily complex because the populations are complex.
Repeated efforts to bring the Latino community into the city’s inner-workings had
proven successful in Sandy. A city forum specifically designed to address issues related
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to how the city could better integrate Latino residents into the civic society was recalled
by two informants as having been a successful event for engaging ideas and advancing
awareness of population needs within the broader community. This forum occurred early
within the target timeline, when the Latino population was experiencing its initial growth,
but details regarding the exact date or notes relating to the outcomes were unavailable. A
city manager also recounted details about a summer internship program for high school
students and noted that one of his interns, the son of Mexican immigrants, is now a Sandy
police officer.
Table 4.43
Median Household Income and Median Income for Hispanic/Latino Householders in
Sandy, Oregon in 2000 and 2019 (in 2019 Dollars)
2000
2010
2019
Median
Median
Median
household
$64,825 household
$60,687 household
$73,443
income
income
income
Hispanic/Latino
Hispanic/Latino
Hispanic/Latino
householder
$36,557 householder
$77,059 householder
$76,250
median income
median income
median income
Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2006-2010 and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via
Social Explorer Tables (2021a, 2021b, 2021d).

Informants note that they frequently observed Latino immigrants and their
children, once settled, leaving migrant work to take up year-round positions and, in some
cases, start their own restaurants, construction companies, and other businesses. In Sandy,
the median household income for Hispanic or Latino householders increased dramatically
from $36,557 in 2000 to $76,250 in 2019 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a; Social Explorer
Tables, 2021d). The median household income for the overall population in Sandy was
$64,825 in 2000 and $73,443 in 2019, indicating that Latino households may have
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surpassed parity with the overall median income. Table 4.43 shows these data, which are
adjusted to reflect 2019-dollar values.
While anecdotes were common about immigrants or the children of immigrants
achieving academic, economic, and professional success in Sandy, one informant warned
that positive outcomes resulted from “a lot of guidance, a lot of time invested, and a lot of
trust” (Personal Communication, 2021). Guidance, time, and trust are required for the
success of any child, but the story that informants tell in Sandy suggests that while city
leadership made headway into breaking down barriers by facilitating bilingual materials
and programs and by attempting to facilitate Latino participation in community and
governance, there remained less visible cultural barriers to successful long-term
engagement.
The governing leadership team in Sandy recognized a need for Spanish language
services so that this growing community within Sandy could access information and
participate more readily. Spanish language guides were created for public busses, and the
parks department began collecting data via Spanish language surveys early on. In
addition, the city manager and mayor invited and encouraged a bicultural community
member to run for city council. She eventually did so, and she won the seat in 2008. An
experienced multi-cultural communicator and advocate for underserved communities,
this informant expresses pride for the work Sandy leadership has put into learning about
serving immigrant populations but has sobering reflections on the challenges that seem to
continuously go unacknowledged.
First, the informant estimated that 2%-3% of Latinos in Sandy do not speak
Spanish or English, leaving a small segment of the population without direct access to
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information in a context where general leadership assumed they did have direct access
because the complexities of the Latino population and their social networks are
misunderstood. Second, the lack of cultural understanding on the part of the broader
Sandy community impeded the engagement of Latinos in the city. Although, the lack of
Latino participation at cultural events and volunteer appreciation events was repeatedly
mentioned in frustration, an informant argues that the broader Sandy community was
unable to make the cultural shift necessary for the Latino population to truly feel
welcomed engaging. Third, and related to the previous challenge, is the fact that some
Latino immigrants are undocumented, which leaves them particularly vulnerable to
engaging safely in the broader community.
One informant describes an effort to open the police and fire departments to youth
through volunteer programs that would focus on activities like washing official vehicles.
The intention was to provide a low security activity for any student interested in an
opportunity to engage with police in a safe and friendly manner. Neither the police nor
the fire department could permit such engagement without proof of identification through
a social security number, a requirement that bars undocumented students from even
considering participating and one that serves only to further isolate those students.
There are several other indicators of immigrant integration that are present
throughout the Sandy community. Sandy’s high school website provides translation via
Google into multiple languages and the Clackamas County website can be accessed in 16
languages (Sandy High School, 2021; Clackamas County, 2021). Radio Lineup, an online
guide to local radio stations, indicates that eight Spanish language radio stations reach
Sandy (Radio Lineup, 2021a). The site also indicates four additional stations identified as
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“ethnic” can be accessed in Sandy, but the nature of the programming is unclear and
presumed to be in the English language.
The role of churches in cultivating social capital among immigrant congregants
has been explored to better understand how religious institutions can serve in bridging
social and cultural differences in surrounding communities (Stepick, Mahler, & Rey,
2009), so attention is also paid to local church services. Sermons are offered in Spanish at
St. Michael’s Catholic Church in Sandy, but Spanish language services at other places of
worship were not ascertainable. There might be little reason to expect Spanish language
services elsewhere. Only 2% of Clackamas County’s population identifies as Hispanic
and Catholic, while only 1% identifies as Hispanic and Protestant, according to the latest
Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) Census of American Religion (Jones, Jackson,
Orcés, & Huff, 2021). It should be noted that Hispanic identity is synonymous with
neither non-English speakers nor Spanish speakers, but the statistics undoubtedly indicate
where a need for Spanish language support may be greatest.
One informant points out that, overall, the Sandy community has a robust network
for civic engagement and that was not immigrant directed but did not exclude immigrant
residents. The informant notes that institutions like the Chamber of Commerce, the
historical society, and Kiwanis were active organizations engaging the community
regularly. The Community Action Center, which runs the local food bank and a thrift
store, serves the community and engages residents through volunteer opportunities. Yet
the comments of another informant regarding the Kiwanis Club’s resistance to the
establishment of a Spanish language Kiwanis Chapter indicates the continuous challenge
of eliminating barriers to entry for some residents (Personal Communication, 2021). A
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review of the Sandy Chamber of Commerce website also revealed no evidence of
directing services toward Latino business owners or entrepreneurs or immigrants with
limited English language proficiency (Sandy Area Chamber of Commerce, 2018).
A valuable practice for assessing the extent to which an immigrant population has
integrated into the fabric of a community is to observe the extent to which that population
is represented in leadership positions. While an official assessment is not possible of the
birthplace or citizenship of current city council members or other city leaders, a search
for newspaper articles and city documents that reference individuals’ race, ethnicity, or
nativity can be a helpful indicator of diversity in leadership. There is little evidence of
immigrant representation or U.S.-born Latino representation in top administrative or
elected positions in Sandy save one city council person, who resigned their seat in 2018
after almost 10 years serving the city (Allen, 2018a). This individual holds a unique and
integral position as a bridge between the mainstream and Latino cultures in the city, and
every other informant for this project mentioned this individual’s name as the point
person in engaging and understanding the needs of the Latino community.
The sentiment toward immigrants from the perspective of governance in Sandy
appears to have shifted from one of active efforts to integrate a population of newcomers
into civil society in the early years of the target timeline (2005) to one where services for
immigrants are folded into overall efforts to ensure government is accessible and
inclusive. This is to say that the immigrant population has not been forgotten in Sandy,
but rather it has been reprioritized in the face of other rising pressures.
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Sandy, Oregon: Current Challenges and Civic Capacity
Governance in a small Oregon city involves formal and informal networks, and
how a city leader attains information for decision-making can be indicative of the breadth
of governance networks. Informants for this case study reported obtaining information
from formal sources such as newsletters, the League of Oregon Cities, a variety of other
organizational meetings that relate to the management of cities, and their counterparts in
other West coast cities. Informal conversations with connections within Sandy and
elsewhere were also reflected on positively. One city manager remembered connecting
with leaders in Beaverton and Hillsboro, two Oregon cities with ethnically diverse
populations, to learn about their best practices for facilitating engagement with Latino
immigrant residents. Another city manager offered that most cities are experiencing
similar challenges around working with their existing population’s sentiment toward
continued population change, but also notes that a lot of city policy development has
been dominated by emergencies such as the COVID-19 pandemic, election-related
matters, and the increase in civil unrest.
Two unique projects were mentioned as significant representations of Sandy’s
civic capacity by all five informants. First in 1999, the city of Sandy was allowed to exit
the regional transportation district, making way for the city to create the Sandy Area
Metro (SAM), a bus system reliably connecting the town to nearby urban centers with
greater efficiency than the service provided by the transportation district (City of Sandy
Oregon, n.d.-a). The second project was the creation in 2002 of SandyNet, a utility
providing internet service to residents of Sandy and the outlying area (City of Sandy
Oregon, n.d.-b). By 2005, both these projects had been institutionalized as affordable
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services that increased residents’ accessibility to employment, social activities, and
information. One informant pointed out that SandyNet was integral to education equity
and access throughout 2020 and 2021 during the COVID-19 pandemic shutdown in the
state of Oregon, so the efforts made at the turn of the century continue to impact the
region’s capacity today.
Informants who participated in the creation of SAM and SandyNet seemed to
anchor their assessment of Sandy’s capacity to serve residents in the success of these
projects. In describing the context leading to the development of SandyNet, for example,
one informant stated that there was a sense among city leadership that “we [the Sandy
community] deserve this.” Other programs developed in the years prior to 2005 include
the city’s Summer Sounds program which coordinates music and movies in Meinig Park
throughout the summer (City of Sandy Oregon, n.d.-c). The idea to develop Summer
Sounds was borrowed from other west coast cities that were introducing such
programming at a similar time, and it reflects a common sentiment throughout informant
interviews that Sandy residents deserved certain services. This sentiment was expressed
when informants shared their memories of creating SAM and SandyNet. Where
leadership observed the city deserved a new service, they employed creative solutions to
achieve their goals.
This deserving attitude was not limited to city leadership. In 2008, residents voted
to approve a $115 million education bond that facilitated the building in 2012 of the new
Sandy High School (Fuggetta, 2012). This new school replaced the original high school,
which was over 100 years old and had less than half the space of the new school. The
success in passing this education bond was expressed by an informant as a unique
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episode of the whole community coming together to make something positive happen for
the area, stating, “it was like everybody decided “yeah, we deserve this, our kids deserve
this, our teachers deserve this” (Personal Communication, 2021).
When describing their memories of how these projects came about, from ideation
to implementation, informants, who were interviewed separately, consistently referenced
one another and their respective roles. City leadership seems to have grown and worked
as a team, but, years later, these individuals continue to express great respect for the roles
that others played in the tasks that they had achieved together. The four informants
present in Sandy from 2005 through at least 2010 spoke of the other informants as “being
go-getters” interested in asking questions and getting things done.
Contemporary challenges have shifted the city’s focus to issues relating more
directly to infrastructure and overall capacity. Many of Oregon’s cities are feeling the
pressure of demographic change as U.S. residents migrate to desirable climates in the
Pacific Northwest. There are simply more people in the region than ever before. While
the population is growing, the city government is small. The current city manager
describes department heads as “working department heads” who are writing staff reports,
managing projects, and supervising staff at the same time (Personal Communication,
2021). Overall capacity is a concern in a city with consistent growth projections.
In addition, an increase in population puts an additional strain on existing
infrastructure and constant development stresses the community’s expectations. Sandy is
currently working on rebuilding their wastewater treatment plant, the largest project the
city has ever undertaken (Personal Communication, 2021). Tradeoffs are also common in
small cities. Sandy recently added a public safety fee to utility bills in order to cover
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increased costs, but this led to a pause on reopening an aquatics center that would also
require a fee or other source of revenue to reopen.
Sandy Oregon: Local Governance under Regulation
Any city in Oregon is subject to state regulations, but Sandy’s geographical
position causes unique governance challenges. For one, Highway 26 serves as the city’s
main thoroughfare. Highway 26 is also managed by the Oregon Department of
Transportation, which puts some traffic control options largely out of the city’s hands. A
2018 article in the Sandy Post outlines the complexities of transportation management in
Sandy and amplifies the value of public transportation as a solution to traffic issues
(Allen, 2018b).
State-mandated land use regulations are frequently a point of tension in relation to
how cities manage growth, and Sandy is not an outlier in this respect. In a 2010
Oregonian article introducing the city’s first new mayor in 17 years, the then city
manager Scott Lazenby is quoted as saying, “Navigating Oregon's laws will be one of
[incoming mayor] King's major hurdles to clear,” adding that "council members often
find that their hands are tied by state government," (Allen, 2010). However, a Sandy
informant also acknowledged the benefit of the city’s geography falling just outside of
the jurisdiction of Metro, a regional government serving greater Portland. This situation
allows Sandy to grow without the additional limitations of the Metro urban growth
boundary, while still being physically close to the Metro economic area.
Sandy, Oregon: Conclusion
Interview informants described a city growing under the pressures that come with
such growth. Tensions between the desires of newcomers and long-time residents and
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friction around how to achieve growth are expressed but not overwhelming in the minds
of city leaders. Sandy is increasingly attractive to families looking to settle in a location
with rural connections, urban amenities, and more affordable housing options as
compared to the Portland metropolitan area.
This case study provides reason to believe that a coordinated leadership team can
positively impact civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration in a small
U.S. city. Whether coordination and motivation to create new opportunities began at the
leadership level and spread to the greater population in Sandy, or whether the greater
population sought such coordination and motivation in their leaders, is not knowable
based on the data collected for this case study. What is knowable is that the work the city
put into creating sustainable and functional bus and internet services, and the effort
individuals made to build a new high school are investments providing added capacity
amidst the challenges of today. The elected and administrative team that created this
added capacity also worked intentionally to pull the voices of immigrant residents into
positions and places of power. As members of that team moved into other roles, some
leaving the community altogether, a reduction in the immigrant voices heard in positions
and places of power was observed.
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Nyssa, Oregon
Nyssa, Oregon lies on the eastern border of Oregon, across the Snake River from
Idaho. The city is part of the Ontario Micropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), which consists
of Malheur (Oregon) and Payette (Idaho) Counties. The city’s location is remote when
considered in the context of the state of Oregon, but its proximity to the state of Idaho
and the Boise metropolitan area proves this small city to be economically tied to—and
not remote from—the state at its eastern border. This case study reviews Nyssa’s history,
population, and the city’s governance priorities to describe the city’s civic capacity as it
relates to immigrants and immigration.
Nyssa, Oregon: Historical Context
Nyssa was incorporated in 1903, although European pioneers had arrived in the
area as early as the mid-1800s. Early frontier families came in the search of gold and
wealth, and many eventually settled to farm lands off of the Snake and Owyhee Rivers.
Prior to the arrival of European settlers, the land that is now Nyssa was included in the
frequented territories of the Paiute Indians (Oregon State University, 2020). Throughout
the nineteenth century, indigenous American tribes in the Pacific Northwest experienced
continuous conflict with Anglo settlers and repeated exposure to European diseases such
as smallpox, both of which reduced their populations. In the Snake River region
including the area where Nyssa now lies, the forced removal of American Indians
initiated the Snake War (1864-8) and the Bannock War (1878) between Paiute, Shoshone,
and other American Indian tribes and the U.S. federal government (Pacific Oregon
University, 2021). The latter is known as the last “Indian War” in Oregon and few
references to American Indians in the Nyssa region are noted after this time.
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With European settlement, large-scale agricultural industries developed rapidly,
made possible at first by private irrigation projects and then expanding and advancing
with the support of the federal government after the passage of the Newlands
Reclamation Act of 1902 (Oregon History Project, 2021). Among the first reclamation
projects to be completed in the United States was the Owyhee Dam in 1932, which
significantly increased the agricultural capacity of the region surrounding Nyssa.
Sugar beets, onions, russet potatoes, corn, wheat, and mint are currently among
the top agricultural products in the Nyssa area, but sugar beets and onions are among the
most significant to Nyssa’s immigration history. The Amalgamated Sugar Company
planted sugar beets in 1935, and soon after, the company built a processing factory
(Bachman, 1962). Throughout the 1930s, farmers migrated from U.S. regions affected by
the Dust Bowl to settle and farm in the Nyssa area. Little information is available
regarding who these earliest migrant farmers were, but they often arrived with the support
of a federal Farm Security Administration program offering low-interest loans and other
aid (Tucker, 2002). Migration resulted in a 125% population increase in Nyssa during the
1930s and is reflected in Table 4.45.
In the 1940s, World War II affected the U.S. labor force in both urban and rural
locations while straining supply chains at the same time. In Nyssa, men left the region to
work elsewhere in factories outfitted to support the war effort, which left fields without
workers during a time when supply chains made staples such as sugar scarce across the
country. Farmers turned to migrant workers and farm worker programs to fill the labor
gap.
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Oregon’s agricultural and industrial interests relied on there being hands available
for harvesting crops. When the Mexican Farm Labor Program, known as the Bracero
Program, launched in 1942, it increased Mexican migration to the United States,
including to the Pacific Northwest. Many Mexican migrant workers who were stationed
in Nyssa found sufficient work year around, which allowed communities to settle and
continuously draw in new migrants (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017). Thus, the Mexican Farm
Labor Program led to substantial Mexican immigration, just as efforts to bring migrant
workers to the Pacific Northwest from other areas of the United States frequently led to
the permanent settlement of those workers and their families.
At the same time that Mexican migrants flowed into the area to work the land
during wartime, Japanese Americans were being forced from their homes and into
internment camps. Some were provided the option to relocate to a worker’s camp in
Nyssa as an alternative to internment. In this camp they also served the agricultural
industry in the region (Sifuentez, 2016). Many of these individuals were second
generation Japanese Americans whose families had farmed in the Hood River region, yet
they were forced from their homes and into internment during World War II just as those
Japanese who were not U.S.-born citizens were. While in Nyssa and the surrounding
area, some Japanese Americans recognized a niche in onion farming and, after internment
programs ended, they chose to remain rather than return to the region they were forced
from years earlier. The Japanese American population settled in large part in Ontario, 12
miles north of Nyssa and the largest city in Malheur County, and their presence proved
integral to the success of later Latino migrants to the area.
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The Bracero Program ended in the Pacific Northwest in 1947, ending the flow of
new migrants from Mexico and once again leaving the agricultural industry in need of
workers (Sifuentez, 2016), but the demographic context of the area surrounding Nyssa
had changed. Some Mexican migrant workers found year-round work and settled in the
area, bringing with and creating families on the way, and the Japanese American
population found success in onion farming and property ownership in the region. The
presence of these populations laid the groundwork for Tejanos, or migrant Latinos from
Texas, to follow in the wake of the Braceros Program in Oregon.
Tejanos were U.S.-born Latino Americans. In many cases, their families had lived
in Texas since statehood or earlier (Sifuentez, 2016). However, like Japanese Americans
who settled in the region, Tejanos were U.S.-born citizens who were often treated by
mainstream society as if they were immigrants who did not belong. While culturally quite
different from the Mexican migrants who worked the fields in Oregon before them, the
Tejanos benefited from the fact that the region was familiar with and considerably less
resistant to Latinos and Spanish speakers working the fields.
The Japanese American population was often willing to rent housing to Tejano
families when the local Anglo population would not. Likewise, the Japanese American
farm owners were quicker to hire Tejanos for year-round work and allowed Tejano social
events in their event halls (Sifuentez, 2016). Through these practices, Tejanos
experienced reduced barriers to housing, work, and social life because the Japanese
American population did not resist engaging with them in the same fashion the Anglo
population often did. Nyssa’s current ethnic diversity is owed primarily to second
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generation Japanese Americans and the Tejano migrant workers who settled after
Mexican Bracero Program laborers.
The migrant worker population in the Pacific Northwest was unique from the start
in its capacity to organize for better pay and safer housing (Sifuentez, 2016). In 1953,
Mexican immigrants in Nyssa formed Siempre Adelante (Always Forward), a rights
organization, in response to the killing of a Mexican by a young Anglo (Bussel &
Tichenor, 2017). This is reflective of the organizing capacity observed among Mexican
migrants and their descendants across the Pacific Northwest through the 1970s and into
the 1980s, which resulted in the formation of Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste
(PCUN), the only farmworker union in the state of Oregon (Sifuentez, 2016).
The presence of successful organizing suggests two things about the immigrant
population in Oregon and by relation Nyssa. First, it suggests that pay, housing, and the
general treatment of workers and their families was frequently unsatisfactory. Indeed,
there are numerous historical reviews of Mexican migrant workers taken advantage of by
employers and treated as unwelcomed nuisances beyond the work they carried out in the
fields (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017; Garcia & Garcia, 2005; Loprinzi, 1991). Second, the
presence of organizing also suggests that the immigrant population attained and
maintained the social and economic capacity to coordinate their efforts, share
information, and move into spaces of agency and ownership. The remainder of this report
looks at Nyssa’s contemporary history, focusing on 2005 through 2019, to explore and
describe the city’s current capacity as it relates to immigrant residents.
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Nyssa, Oregon: 2005-2019
Nyssa, Oregon, known as the Gateway to the Oregon trail, proudly wears its
pioneer heritage as many cities do in the western United States. In Nyssa, however, the
feeling of dedication to hard work and community self-reliance is not only reflective of
the city’s past. It is also an ever-present fact of life in the small eastern Oregon town.
Nyssa lies almost 400 miles from the Oregon state capital in an economic region that
competes primarily with neighboring communities in Idaho. Most of Malheur County,
including Nyssa, runs on Mountain Standard Time, while the rest of Oregon follows
Pacific Standard Time. The physical distance between Nyssa and the state capital only
serves to amplify the cultural and economic distance city leaders in Nyssa observe in
state policy decisions. In particular, state regulations surrounding doing business and
building practices in Oregon frequently restrict or limit Nyssa from competing more
aggressively with communities in nearby Idaho (Personal Communication, 2021).
In an interview with the Nyssa city manager in 2021, the benefits and challenges
of competing with Idaho were expressed. On the one hand, business is less costly and less
time consuming to establish in Idaho than it is in Oregon, so Nyssa is sometimes at risk
of losing the production facilities and other established businesses who may be tempted
to move over the border into Idaho. In many ways, state restrictions feel like barriers to
Nyssa’s full participation in economic competition in their region.
On the other hand, Idaho’s increased housing prices have also more recently
pushed housing values up in Nyssa, which could benefit city revenue as new construction
also increases over time. Many in the Nyssa community work in nearby communities,
including across the border in Idaho. Interstate travel for employment goes both ways,
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and farmworkers in Oregon typically earn better wages than in Idaho, pulling many
farmhands from Idaho into Oregon fields.
Members of the Nyssa community see themselves and their city as integral to the
U.S. food production cycle—what is grown must be harvested and what is harvested
must be prepared and shipped before planting begins again. Local news sources report
that when the annual harvesting work picks up, family members and friends of farming
families step in to help out wherever they can (Cockle, 2001), and migrant workers still
fill an important niche in the production cycle (Personal Communication, 2021). In 2005,
the city lost 190 permanent jobs and about 500 seasonal jobs when the Amalgamated
Sugar Beet factory closed, shifting sugar beet processing to remaining factories over the
border in Idaho (Meyer, 2005). The sugar factory had been a Nyssa institution since the
1930s, the pulse of the city beating to the thrum of the beet harvest and the factory’s
annual production campaign, so the impact of this loss in terms of jobs, as well as local
pride and purpose, was substantial.
The Argus Observer reported that when the factory closed, the school district and
other local employers reached out to family members of factory employees to ensure they
had sufficient social support when the news of layoffs hit (Keller, 2005). This closure
affected the entire community intimately, and references to the Amalgamated Sugar
Company in local news articles and academic reports about Nyssa serve as evidence of
the significant role the factory played throughout the city’s history. The loss of almost
700 jobs, 500 of which were seasonal, almost certainly affected immigrant workers in the
area, but none of the sources found and referenced for this case study mention the affect
the factory closure had on immigrants and their families in Nyssa.
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Nyssa, Oregon: 2005-2019—Industry Trends
In 2000 and 2019, agriculture, manufacturing, retail trade, and occupations related
to education, health, and social services were Nyssa’s top industries by occupation for the
employed population over the age of 16. (In this section, the 2000 census data are used as
the baseline year because the 2005 census industry related data are not as complete.) The
industrial landscape in the city changed substantially in this period. In 2000,
manufacturing was Nyssa’s top industry and employed 18% of the working population in
the city. By 2019, the percentage of workers employed in manufacturing had dropped to
15%. On the other hand, educational, health, and social services was Nyssa’s number two
employing industry in 2000, when 16% of the employed population worked in this
industry. In 2019, the percentage of employed civilians in Nyssa working in education
and health related industries has increased to 22%. Retail trade was and remains Nyssa’s
third most common industry for employment. In 2000, 12% of the working population
was employed in this industry, while 16% of the employed population was working in
retail trade in 2019. Industries related to agriculture experienced a 2% increase in
employment from 2000 (when 11% of the employed population worked in this industry)
to 2019 (when 13% of the employed population worked in this industry). Table 4.44
illustrates the total number of Nyssa residents over the age of 16 and in the civilian
population by industry in 2000 and in 2019 and presents the percentage of that working
population in each industry.
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Table 4.44
Percent of Civilian Population 16 Years and Over Employed by Industry in Nyssa,
Oregon in 2000 and in 2019, Including the Percent Change Over Time
Industry By Occupation for
Employed Civilian Population 16
Years and Over
Employed Civilian Population 16 Years
and Over
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and
hunting, and mining:
Construction
Manufacturing
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
Transportation and warehousing,
and utilities:
Information
Finance, insurance, real estate and
rental and leasing:
Professional, scientific,
management, administrative, and
waste management services:
Educational, health and social
services:
Arts, entertainment, recreation,
accommodation and food services:

2000

2019

1,096

1,233

10.6%

12.7%

+

2.10%

4.7%
18.4%

1.4%
14.8%

-

3.30%
3.60%

6.1%

5.9%

-

0.20%

12.0%

16.2%

+

4.20%

4.2%

6.2%

+

2.00%

0.9%

0.0%

-

0.90%

3.2%

4.9%

+

1.70%

4.7%

3.6%

-

1.10%

15.8%

21.7%

+

5.90%

6.4%

8.3%

+

1.90%

%
Change

Other services (except public
3.7%
1.7% 2.00%
administration)
Public administration
9.4%
2.7% 6.70%
Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer
Tables (2021a, 2021d).

Other industries that experienced a moderate shift between 2000 and 2019 include
construction, which fell from 5% in 2000 to 1% in 2019, and public administration,
which fell from 9% in 2000 to 3% in 2019. Other industries grew or declined by no more
than 2% of the employed population during the target timeframe. While these numbers
show the industries in which Nyssa residents work, it would be erroneous to assume that
all residents work in Nyssa proper. Therefore, an increase in one industry does not
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necessarily suggest that that industry is on the rise in the city of Nyssa. Table 4.44 does,
however, reflect changing employment trends in the region, which could be indicative of
the economic direction in which Nyssa is moving.
Data specifically outlining where Nyssa’s immigrant population is employed is
unavailable due to the city’s small size and concerns about anonymity. However, in the
United States in 2010, immigrants were overrepresented in three of Nyssa’s top four
industries: manufacturing, construction, and agriculture (Brookings Partnership for a
New American Economy, n.d.). It stands to reason that the Nyssa workforce includes
immigrants across industries, and, perhaps, concentrated in Nyssa’s most valuable
industries.
Nyssa, Oregon: 2005-2019—Demographic Change
Nyssa’s population has grown steadily decade on decade from about 450 residents
in 1910 to 2,862 residents in 1980, when the population fell to 2,629 in 1990. By 2000,
however, the population had rebounded to 3,163, a 20% increase. As is true in many rural
towns in Oregon and across the United States, Latinos, both new immigrants and the
U.S.-born Latinos, helped to bolster the Nyssa population during the late twentieth
century and into the twenty-first century (Rojas-Burke, 2014). The population grew again
in 2010, and is estimated to have fallen slightly to 3,163 in 2019. The percentage of the
population that is Latino has only grown. In 2000, 57% of the Nyssa population identified
as Latino, while in 2019 69% did so.
The demographic make-up of Nyssa is of interest to discussions surrounding
immigration expressly because the city remains dependent on immigrants and also
because the city’s large U.S.-born Latino population provide evidence of a history
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steeped in the tradition of migrating to and then settling in Nyssa. Table 4.45 shows the
population of Nyssa over time and Table 4.46 shows the percentage of the population that
identifies as Latino since 2000.
Table 4.45

Table 4.46

Nyssa Oregon Population 1910-2019

Nyssa Hispanic Population 2000-2019
Nyssa, Oregon Hispanic
Population 2000-2019

Nyssa, Oregon Historical
Population 1910-2019
Census

Pop.

1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2019 (est.)

449
563
821
1,855
2,525
2,611
2,620
2,862
2,629
3,163
3,267
3,163

%±
—
25.4%
45.8%
125.9%
36.1%
3.4%
0.3%
9.2%
−8.1%
20.3%
3.3%
−3.2%

Year
2000
2010
2019

Pop.
1,809
1,976
2,169

% of total
pop.
57.2%
60.5%
68.6%

Source: 2000, 2010 U.S.
Decennial Census; 2019
American Community Survey 5year Estimates

Source: 1910-2010 U.S. Decennial
Census; 2019 American Community
Survey 5-year Estimates

In 2000, 21% of the population was foreign-born, or immigrant, in Nyssa, and in
2019 the foreign-born population is estimated to be 20% of the total population. These
values indicate a continued dependence on new immigrants in the city. A closer look at
the year of entry for the foreign-born population in 2000 and in 2019 reveals that
immigration to Nyssa is slowing. That is, in 2000, new arrivals since 1990 made up close
to 50% of the immigrant population in that year. In 2019, on the other hand, the greatest
percent of immigrants arrived since 2000 and before 2010. Arrivals from 2010 through
2019 make up only 19% of the current immigrant population. Table 4.47 includes
Nyssa’s 2000 and 2019 nativity by citizenship status as well as the year of entry for the
immigrant population.
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Like most towns in the United States, Nyssa’s history is rich with influence from
a diverse array of cultures, but the continuous influence of Mexican immigrants remains
significant. In 2000 and in 2019, 93% and 94% of the immigrant population in Nyssa was
born in Mexico, respectively (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a; Social Explorer Tables,
2021d). Other countries of birth represented in the 2019 immigrant population in Nyssa,
but in much smaller numbers, include Canada, Germany, the Philippines, China, and
Brazil (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d).
Table 4.47
Nativity by Citizenship and Year of Entry for Foreign-Born Population in Nyssa, Oregon
in 2000 and 2019
Nyssa city, Oregon 2000

Nyssa city, Oregon 2019

Nativity By
Nativity By Citizenship
Citizenship Status
Status
Total Population:
3,180
Total Population:
3,163
Native Born
2,525 79.4%
Native Born
2,538 80.2%
Foreign Born:
655 20.6%
Foreign Born:
625 19.8%
Naturalized Citizen
170
5.4%
Naturalized Citizen
187
5.9%
Not a Citizen
485 15.3%
Not a Citizen
438 13.9%
Year of Entry for the
Year of Entry for the
Foreign-Born
Foreign-Born Population
Population
Foreign-born
655
Foreign-Born Population:
625
Population:
1995 to March 2000
197 30.1%
2010 or Later
119 19.0%
1990 to 1994
129 19.7%
2000 to 2009
250 40.0%
1985 to 1989
81 12.4%
1990 to 1999
93 14.9%
1980 to 1984
72 11.0%
Before 1990
163 26.1%
1975 to 1979
44
6.7%
1970 to 1974
15
2.3%
1965 to 1969
32
4.9%
Before 1965
85 13.0%
Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer
Tables (2021a, 2021d).
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Nyssa, Oregon: 2005-2019—Governance and the Integration of Immigrants
Rojas-Burke (2014) reports that Spanish-speaking newcomers to Nyssa still face
discrimination despite the long-established Latino population there. This is a common
challenge in communities that experience continuous immigration, and it is a particular
challenge in the contemporary United States, where continuous media attention to
immigration since the early 1990s has been observed to influence negative attitudes
toward immigration and the Latino population more generally (Valentino, Brader, &
Jardina, 2013). While newcomers and immigrants may encounter discrimination in the
public arena, language support offered by agencies such as the Malheur County Health
Department and the Nyssa School District serve as an indicator of the region’s and city's
awareness in terms of the need to support non-English speakers. This is not to say that the
presence of language support eliminates bias or discrimination, but it may indicate the
intention on the part of a governing body to reduce barriers to information and access to
services.
A comprehensive audit of Spanish language or other language services in Nyssa
was not practical for this study, but details collected from local news outlets and local
organization websites indicate that some institutionalized bilingual practices exist in the
city. The role of churches in cultivating social capital among immigrant congregants has
been explored to better understand how religious institutions can serve in bridging social
and cultural differences in surrounding communities (Stepick, Mahler, & Rey, 2009), so
attention is also paid to local church services. Worship services are offered in Spanish at
St. Bridget’s Catholic Church in Nyssa, but Spanish language services at other places of
worship were not ascertainable. There might be little reason to expect Spanish language
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services elsewhere, since 14% of Malheur County’s population identifies as Hispanic and
Catholic, while only 2% identify as Hispanic and Protestant, according to the latest
Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) Census of American Religion (Jones, Jackson,
Orcés, & Huff, 2021). It should be noted that Hispanic identity is synonymous with
neither non-English speakers nor Spanish speakers, but the statistics undoubtedly indicate
where a need for Spanish language support may be greatest.
Radio Lineup, an online guide to local radio stations, suggests that four Spanish
language radio stations reach Nyssa, all of which are licensed in Idaho cities (Radio
Lineup, 2021b). Neither the Nyssa Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture nor the City
of Nyssa government website include information in languages other than English.
Furthermore, the Chamber of Commerce and Agriculture website includes no reference
to Hispanic or Latino business support more generally.
A valuable practice for assessing the extent to which a non-Anglo or immigrant
population has integrated into the fabric of a community is to observe the extent to which
that population is represented in leadership positions. In a 1991 master’s thesis, Loprinzi
reports that as of 1985, neither the Nyssa school board nor the city council included more
than one Latino at any time (Loprinzi, 1991). At present, the only Latina school board
member in Nyssa lost reelection in May 2021 (Frankel, 2021), and the racial or ethnic
diversity of the current city council is unconfirmed.
During the writing of this case study, a competitive school board election saw
four incumbent board members defeated by newcomers and one incumbent successfully
defend her seat (Malheur County Clerk, 2021). Two board positions were not up for
reelection in 2021. Some candidates that ran for a school board seat in this recent election
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identified as having immediate immigrant or migrant familial connections and was
generationally diverse (Frankel, 2021). This heated election may serve as an indicator
toward greater representation of the broader Nyssa population in leadership positions in
the future.
In most cases, leadership positions through 2019 in Nyssa, whether elected or
administrative, are not held by individuals who identify publicly as Latinos, as
immigrants, or as the children of immigrants. Latinos and immigrants succeeding as
leaders in the small business community in Nyssa have sometimes identified themselves
as such (Rojas-Burke, 2014; Cockle, 2001). This suggests that, while 68.6% of the
population in Nyssa are Latino and 19.8% are immigrants, these populations continue to
lack representation in top leadership positions.
Nyssa, Oregon: Current Challenges and Civic Capacity
Governance in a small Oregon city involves formal and informal networks, and
how a city leader attains information for decision-making can be indicative of the breadth
of governance networks. The city manager reports obtaining information from formal
sources such as newsletters from the Governor’s Office, the League of Oregon Cities, and
a variety of other organizational meetings that relate to the management of cities, yet
most information emerges through informal conversations with connections in other local
communities (Personal Communication, 2021). The city manager maintains friendships
with local state senators and representatives and communicates regularly with city
managers in nearby Oregon communities like Ontario and Vale. These relationships may
serve as support for small communities like Nyssa, which may otherwise feel
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underserved by a state government that directs more attention to the needs and desires of
urban populations.
The city manager has observed some growth in businesses in Nyssa since 2017
and he argues that the city is focusing on their agricultural industry roots in terms of
expected growth in the future. He is not interested in attracting businesses such as “big
box stores” to Nyssa because residents who want such stores already travel north to
Ontario or east to Boise, Idaho. Instead, as industry drives further population growth the
city manager hopes to see a wider variety of stores that serve community niches. The
Nyssa community is rich in pride for their city and for each other but financially poor. In
2019 the median household income in Nyssa was estimated to be $41,750, just 66.5% of
the $62,818 median household income in the state of Oregon (Social Explorer Tables,
2021d).
For city leadership in Nyssa, successful governance is about getting services to
residents while on a tight budget. Being a small and remote city has added challenges
when things need to get done. In 2017, high arsenic levels in the water system required a
reconstruction of Nyssa’s water system and the city manager had to garner the attention
of potential contractors in person to get the project on their radar (Caldwell, 2018). The
added effort resulted in multiple bids for the project that would otherwise have remained
widely unknown to contractors, and the work was completed in 2018. Projects such as
this do not call for the consideration of specific interests or needs from the perspective of
Nyssa leadership. Rather, it is important to ensure all city residents have access to healthy
water services, so special attention to the immigrant population, for example, is not
needed.
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Since the closing of the sugar factory in 2005, Nyssa has experienced a slowdown
in both business and population growth. However, Capital Press reports that the city is
looking to the future with plans to construct a reload center that will serve as an industrial
park for transferring agricultural products from truck to train (Carlson, 2021). Not all of
the city’s endeavors to facilitate an increase in business are met with community support.
The Malheur Enterprise reported this spring that residents objected heavily to a rezoning
decision taken by the city council and intended to facilitate the construction of the reload
center (Caldwell, 2021). This reported conflict of interest reflects civic engagement on
the part of some residents and challenging decision making on the part of city leaders.
Another governance challenge in Nyssa is the changing role of the federal government in
rural U.S. towns.
Aid from the Farm Security Administration boosted Nyssa’s agricultural industry
in the 1930s and federal guest worker policies of the 1940s helped to sustain the industry
through the war and beyond, but more recent federal level policies have created barriers
for some rural cities. Nyssa’s water treatment project was triggered by a 2001 change in
Environmental Protection Agency standards for drinking water and came with little
funding or implementation assistance for the community (Caldwell, 2018). The project
resulted in a $12 increase per household per month in the baseline cost for water services
in the city, a fact that was expressed with frustration by city leaders who were aware of
the financial impact this has on residents. Federal level mandates of this type seem to
contradict the federal level support Nyssa and its residents once enjoyed for their
agricultural endeavors, and this can be an unsettling reality for a town with limited
resources.
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The anecdotes noted in this section serve as examples of the types of projects that
take priority in Nyssa to ensure that the city can maintain basic functions and continue to
support an agriculture economy. Immigrant populations are not called out in Nyssa
governance practices and policymaking. Instead, city leadership perceives immigrants to
be served as members of the greater community, just as other Nyssa residents (Personal
Communication, 2021).
Nyssa, Oregon: Social Capital
Nyssa, known as the Thunderegg Capital of the World, hosts an annual festival to
celebrate the geode-like rocks in July, and the Nyssa Nite Rodeo occupies the city for two
days in June. These events celebrate a culture and pride based on Nyssa’s unique
geography and agricultural roots, and they likely serve to strengthen social capital among
residents. Social capital is the network of relationships among people who live and work
in a community which reinforce shared norms and values. Shared norms and values, in
turn, reinforce civic capacity.
Social capital in Nyssa seems to translate into a “hardworking spirit” and a
commitment to thriving. Individuals often fill in the gaps where they see a need in the
community. In one example during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, a Nyssa
resident created a space to facilitate online learning for the children of several families
whose parents couldn’t indefinitely take time off work (Cappelletti, 2021). Social capital
appears to play a significant role in civic capacity in Nyssa, whether it be in the
community’s concern and support for families of the sugar factory when it closed or an
individual resident opening their home to support students’ learning.
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What is less clear is to what extent social capital in Nyssa bridges groups
otherwise closed off from one another. Immigrant families, who make up 19.8% of the
Nyssa population, may be well connected to one another, yet they may have limited
networks with the non-immigrant population which could limit opportunities to further
integrate into the community.
Nyssa, Oregon: Conclusion
This case study reviews the city’s history, population, and governance priorities to
describe civic capacity, or the ability for a community to face changes and solve
problems in ways that influence the impact of that change, as it relates to immigrants and
immigration in Nyssa. The review frames a city deeply connected to its agricultural
history and proud of its capacity to thrive, even under state and federal limitations.
Immigrants and immigration are as integral to the city now as they were at its
inception, with almost 20% of the city’s 2019 population being foreign-born. The inmigration of immigrants has served to prevent overall population decline in the city over
the past two decades, and direct services for speakers of languages other than English,
primarily Spanish speakers, are available in some contexts. Diverse representation of the
population in government and special district positions, however, is limited.
Nyssa’s population is driven by a “hardworking and community-centered spirit”
which is amplified by the city’s removed location. Governance priorities at the city level
focus on providing services to all residents equally while facilitating an attractive place
for businesses.

303

Madras, Oregon
Madras lies in central Oregon near the southeast border of the Warm Springs
Indian Reservation and serves as the county seat of Jefferson County. Major industries in
the area include manufacturing and seed and vegetable production made possible by
twentieth century developments in irrigation technology. The latter drew the need for
migrant labor in and around Madras from the mid-twentieth century to the present. The
City of Madras has a uniquely diverse population with 40% of the population identifying
as Hispanic and almost 10% of the population identifying as American Indian or Alaskan
Native Alone in the 2019 American Community Survey. The 2019-2020 high school
student body population was 36% Hispanic, 31% American Indian, and 29% White nonHispanic (National Center for Education Studies, n.d.), an uncommonly diverse student
population for a school serving rural Oregon.
Situated on the junction of State Highways 26 and 97, Madras serves as a
transportation gateway for travelers from the Portland metro area and Interstate 84 from
the north to southern central Oregon and eastern Oregon. Significant shifts in industry
within the city and surrounding area, population dynamics, and the city’s geographic
position affect decision making in the city and test its civic capacity. This case study
reviews Madras’ history, population, and the city’s governance priorities to describe the
city’s civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and immigration.
Madras, Oregon: Historical Context
Madras was incorporated as a city in 1910 in the Willow Creek Basin, although
Anglo pioneers had arrived in numbers to the area as early as the early-1800s. Two
railroads, the Oregon Trunk Railroad and the Deschutes Railroad Co. both arrived in
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Madras in 1911 (Ahern, n.d.), ensuring the city some geographical relevance early in the
twentieth century. Prior to the arrival of European settlers, the land that is now Madras
was included in the frequented territories of the Warm Springs, Wasco, Paiute, and other
American Indian tribes (Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs, 2021).
The devastating effects of diseases such as smallpox, measles, diphtheria, and
typhus had, by the early twentieth century, already ravaged native populations as far west
as the Pacific Ocean since the early sixteenth century in a series of what is estimated to
be 90 separate epidemics of European diseases that crossed what today is the United
States (Wilkinson, 2005). When a federal mandate called for the removal of American
Indians from their native lands in the mid-1850s, tribes in the Pacific Northwest had
already suffered substantial population loss. The Middle Oregon Treaty of 1855 created
the 578,000-acre Warm Springs Indian Reservation. In accordance with the treaty,
control of 10 million acres of Indian territory in today’s northeast and middle Oregon was
ceded to the U.S. federal government while the Warm Springs and Wasco bands of
American Indians, and later the Paiute, occupied the reservation (Kratz, 2018). The land
that is Madras was included in the 10 million acres once stewarded by American Indians
and is situated only a few miles from the southeast border of the Reservation. Its
proximity to the Reservation has influenced the city’s cultural and demographic footprint
in unique ways, yet the relationship between Anglo and American Indian in Madras
remains one framed by the tensions inherent to the history of tribal sovereignty coupled
with the complexities of U.S. federalism.
Created in 1824, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) has managed the relationship
between the U.S. federal government and Indian tribes. For most of its history, and
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certainly in the decades following the Middle Oregon Treaty, the BIA had acted in a
strongly paternalistic fashion toward tribes, controlling budgets, education, healthcare,
and land management (Wilkinson, 2005). BIA officials also prohibited traditional
celebrations, enforced the militaristic assimilation education of Indian children, and took
charge of the allocation of land allotments authorized by the General Allotment Act of
1887 (Wilkinson, 2005). This act was in effect until 1934 and took land out of
reservations, granting some lots to individual tribal members and other lots to nonIndians with the intention of converting the land for farming and taxation. The resulting
effect was the enormous loss of reservation land throughout the United States, including,
to some degree, on the Warm Springs Indian Reservation (Wilkinson, 2005).
As was common of many western towns at the turn of the twentieth century,
Madras’ initial Anglo population arrived as homesteaders hoping for success in creating
life and community in agriculture. What they encountered was rough, dry land which
yielded little after great effort. In New Era (2003), Jarold Ramsey describes the rugged
lifestyle required of early settlers to Madras and its surrounding areas (Ramsey, 2003).
The author recounts his family’s relationships with American Indians who came off the
Reservation to observe the arrival of newcomers who “seemed to be decent folks, but
didn’t know much of anything about the country and would probably need a lot of help”
(p. 8). Ramsey’s grandparents, who settled as homesteaders near Madras in 1902, learned
to manage their land with the assistance of Jim Jackson, a Wasco leader who offered
guidance and friendship. At the time of the writing of the book, the Ramsey and Jackson
families were enjoying their fourth generation of friendship.
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Ramsey reveals a sense of community in early Madras that is bound by the
knowledge that the survival of each depends on the survival of all, and that, beyond
survival, thriving is possible where values are shared and the land is respected as a
sustaining factor of life. This was an Anglo community that would claim to be tied to the
land. It is an example of the foundations of individualism in America, where
communities proudly govern themselves and succeed, just as Thomas Jefferson argued
they should at the founding of the United States. Ramsey’s account, however, indirectly
acknowledges that this community exists in a space made accessible to them only by the
forced removal of American Indians to the Warm Springs Reservation and that success in
this rough environment was reached with the help and shared knowledge of willing local
Indians. Noting that “there have been local moments of relatively easy, co-equal
interaction and interdependence between Indians and whites, within the long and mostly
dismal history of their relations in the West” (p. 38), Ramsey recognizes the unique and
special nature of his community’s shared good will with the Indians of the Warm Springs
Indian Reservation.
Land in the Madras area was rugged and difficult to farm until the Deschutes
Irrigation project reached Jefferson County’s North Unit Irrigation District in 1946
(Ahern, n.d.). Ample water reached communities across central and eastern Oregon only
after the passage of the Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902 made large scale projects like
the construction of dams possible (Oregon History Project, 2021). The central Oregon
economy was difficult to sustain before the Pelton and Round Butte dams, built in 1958
and 1964, respectively, were constructed and the population in central Oregon, and in
Madras in particular, began to swell. Ramsey (2003) depicts a rapid change in Madras
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during this time, where the values of the Anglo homesteaders are quickly eroded by the
values of incoming Anglos interested in land ownership and production defined as
progress.
The relationship to the land can be construed as the greatest difference between
these groups. Homesteaders, tied to the land and to their community for sustenance, have
responsibilities to the land and to their community members to thrive. Respect for the
land and commitment to shared values are significant to the survival of homesteaders.
Those arriving after irrigation in the Madras region saw the land as a tool for production,
and so their goal was to own land and then push it to produce as much as possible. This
relationship was not without respect for the land, but it was starkly different from the
earlier homesteader relationship, and it is the cultural shift Ramsey (2003) laments in his
central Oregon narrative.
A discussion about the relationship to the land in central Oregon cannot exclude
reference to the American Indian population and their relationship to the land, although
this relationship is not highlighted in most published histories found to focus on the
Madras region. Ramsey (2003) only briefly mentions that, while homesteaders felt tied to
the land that belonged to them, American Indians, instead, belonged to the land.
Wilkinson (2005) describes American Indians as a place-based people for whom the past
is indelible in ways most Americans of the United States cannot understand. This is a
notion of place that must reach so deeply into the earth and stretch 1,000 generations into
the past to the effect that, when homesteaders felt their world was coming to an end in the
1950s, after a scant 40 years of working the land, the Reservation population observed
the same time period as a blip in the history of this place.
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While this is an imperfect explanation, and one conceptualized through an Anglocentric upbringing where property is valued over coexistence, I hope that it is sufficient
for the purpose of this case study to highlight a significant historical cultural shift that
continues to impact contemporary culture and civic capacity in Madras. The cultural shift
driven by irrigation in the 1940s and 1950s in central Oregon brought significant
population growth and diversified Madras in terms of economic and social values, but
homesteader communities initiated this cultural shift with the construction of
communities based on land ownership in the space that was, only decades earlier, the
territory of communities with strikingly different values and ways of living with the land.
In the 1940s, World War II affected the U.S. labor force in both urban and rural
locations while straining supply chains at the same time. The presence of a World War IIera Army Air Corps base served to support the Madras economy during the war and
prevented the city from being drained of eligible working men during wartime, which
occurred in many other rural Oregon towns at the time. In fact, the Air Corps airfield
contributed to a population increase in Madras of 305% from 1940 to 1950. Table 4.48
shows details relating to historical population growth in Madras. The need for
farmworkers in the Madras area increased rapidly after the advent of irrigation within the
years after the close of the war.
Today, Madras’ Latino population is the most mature in central Oregon and was
initially attracted to the region by agricultural work opportunities (Personal
Communication, 2021). When the Mexican Farm Labor Program, known as the Bracero
Program, launched in 1942, it increased Mexican migration to the United States,
including to the Pacific Northwest. Many Mexican migrant workers stationed throughout
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Oregon found sufficient work year-round, which meant that communities could settle and
continuously draw in new immigrant migrants (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017). Thus, the
Mexican Farm Labor Program led to substantial permanent Mexican immigration, just as
efforts to bring migrant workers to the Pacific Northwest from other areas of the United
States frequently led to the permanent settlement of those workers and their families. The
Bracero Program had ended in the Pacific Northwest in 1947, just as the need for
additional farmworkers in Madras was growing. The thread of Mexican laborers already
established in Oregon undoubtedly led to migration to the Madras area as well. The
presence of these populations also laid the groundwork for Tejanos, or migrant Latinos
from Texas, to follow in the wake of the Braceros Program in Oregon.
Tejanos were U.S.-born Latino Americans. In many cases, their families had lived
in Texas since statehood or earlier (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017). Although Tejanos were
U.S.-born citizens, they were often treated by mainstream Anglo society as if they were
immigrants who did not belong. While culturally quite different from the Mexican
migrants who worked the fields in Oregon before them, the Tejanos benefited from the
fact that, by the time of their arrival, the region was familiar with and considerably less
resistant to Latinos and Spanish speakers working the fields (Sifuentez, 2016).
The migrant worker population in the Pacific Northwest was unique from the
beginning in its capacity to organize for better pay and safer housing (Sifuentez, 2016).
Details relating to the initial arrival of the Latino population to Madras are limited, but
there is ample information available about the migration of migrant Latinos and other
immigrant migrant workers to other areas of Oregon (Hood River, the Willamette Valley,
Nyssa and Malheur County to name only a few). There is little reason to assume Madras
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is outstanding in its history in this regard, so this case study assumes the likelihood that
former Braceros and Tejanos played a role in establishing Madras’ Latino immigrant
population and thereby laid the foundation for the city’s significant Hispanic population
today.
The organizing capacity observed among Mexican migrants and their descendants
across the Pacific Northwest through the 1970s and into the 1980s is substantial. This
effort to organize resulted in the formation of Pineros y Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste
(PCUN), the only farmworker union in the state of Oregon (Sifuentez, 2016). Over time,
a number of organizations were created to serve and support Latino populations in
various areas of Oregon. The Latino Community Association, founded in central Oregon
in 2000 and that expanded into Madras in 2013, works to empower Latino families in
Madras and other Central Oregon cities (Personal Communication, 2021).
The presence of successful organizing suggests two things of the immigrant
population in Oregon, and by relation Madras. First, it suggests that pay, housing, and the
general treatment of workers and their families was frequently unsatisfactory. Indeed,
there are numerous historical reviews of Mexican migrant workers taken advantage of by
employers and treated as unwelcomed nuisances beyond the work they carried out in the
fields (Sifuentez, 2016; Garcia & Garcia, 2005; Loprinzi, 1991). Second, however, the
presence of organizing also suggests that the immigrant population attained and
maintained the social and economic capacity to coordinate their efforts, share
information, and move into spaces of agency and ownership.
What is unique to Madras’ history is that Anglo population growth and Latino
population growth occurred at the same time. While Anglo homesteaders arrived in small
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numbers in the early 1900s, the population of Madras failed to maintain itself or grow
until the 1940s. For four decades, the rugged and isolated world Ramsey (2013) describes
dominated the frontier. From 1940 to 1950, however, the city’s population exploded by
205% (see Table 4.48). Most Anglos arrived in Madras with immigrant migrant workers
simultaneously.
The 1950s were also significant for the Warm Springs Indian Reservation
population. The reservation consists of little in arable land but it is dominated by timber,
which the tribe began to harvest in 1942. Timber sales afforded tribal members small per
capita payments, but overall income levels remained well below those in non-Indian
communities (Wilkinson, 2005). When the termination of tribes was initiated in 1953 by
House Concurrent Resolution 108, calling for a legal end to reservations, an end to tribal
sovereignty, and for the final integration of American Indians into mainstream American
society, the Warm Springs Reservation population was largely in poverty and facing
elimination (Wilkinson, 2005). Then, in 1958, tribal members made a unified decision to
revitalize their Reservation community. The tribe was due $4 million in compensation for
the flooding of traditional fishing grounds on Celilo Falls, and such payments were
typically paid to individual members on a per capita basis (Wilkinson, 2005). In this case,
however, tribal members chose to grant the tribe three-quarters of the compensation
funds for investment.
The Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs’ investment led to the reacquisition of
lands lost through allotment and productive financial enterprises, but perhaps more
importantly, it carried the tribe into the post-termination era (Wilkinson, 2005). By the
mid-1960s, the modern tribal sovereignty movement was well underway across the
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United States. American Indian tribal leaders worked, often on united fronts, to break the
BIA’s paternalistic hold, enforce treaty rights, and achieve economic progress while
preserving ancient traditions. The collective efforts that Warm Springs tribal members set
into motion a decade earlier aided them in achieving sovereignty (Wilkinson, 2005).
After irrigation reached Madras, the city of migrants matured in tandem with the
maturation of the neighboring Warm Springs Indian Reservation. Yet, a review of
Madras’ civic capacity today reveals lasting impressions about who belongs and who
does not. Published literature, informant reflections, and demographic and employment
trends reveal a community that remains racially and culturally divided. However, a close
look at the cultural communities within the greater Madras community shows the effort
made in recent years to construct pathways for non-Anglos, particularly Latinos, to local
leadership positions. It is notable that many of those paths are forged by immigrants
themselves. The remainder of this report looks at Madras’ contemporary history, focusing
on 2005 through 2019, to explore and describe the city’s current civic capacity as it
relates to immigrant residents.
Madras, Oregon: Case Study Informants
Nine informants shared insights, experiences, and memories to help frame the
context of civic capacity in Madras, Oregon from 2005 to 2019 for this case study. All
informants served the City of Madras or Jefferson County for a period of time during the
target timeline for this project as public administrators, public servants, elected officials,
or organizational leaders. Many are long-term residents of Madras or the nearby area and
have personal experience with city government, businesses, and public schools. Each
informant was asked to speak of experiences occurring during the years 2005 to 2019, but
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in each case an informant’s broader experience with the city and surrounding region
informed their understanding of Madras during the target timeline.
Informants were asked to share stories that illustrate the city’s capacity to meet
resident needs more generally as well as to reflect on the city’s policies and processes as
they related to serving and engaging immigrants. Next, I review statistics relating to
population change and industry trends in Madras in order to frame the more substantive
conversation surrounding governance and the integration of immigrants in the city.
Madras, Oregon: 2005-2019—Population Change
Table 4.48 shows the evolution of Madras’ population from 1910 to the present
day. After the population boom in 1950, Madras’ population has continued to grow
steadily with each passing decade. In 2000, the population was 5,078, a 47.5% increase
from the previous decade. By 2010, the population increased by 19% to 6,046 and in
2019, the population is estimated to be 6,777. Population increases have been smaller
since 2000, but at 19% and 12%, growth in Madras remains substantial.
A thorough discussion of American Indian history and population change is
integral to understanding civic capacity and impacts on immigrants and immigration in
Madras, as is a discussion of the Hispanic population in the city. The history of
immigration policy in the United States is defined by the nation’s interpretation of race
and policies framed to ensure the “othering” of races deemed incompatible with the
dominant Anglo presence in the United States (King, 2001). While not meeting the
working definition of foreign-born immigrant in this project, American Indians have,
since the founding of the United States, been subject to race-specific assimilation tactics
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and Americanization programs which parallel immigration policies implemented for the
purpose of selecting and assimilating incoming New Americans (King, 2001).
Table 4.48

Table 4.49

Madras Historical Population
and Population Change 1910-2019

Madras Hispanic Population 2000,
2010, and 2019

Madras Historical Population
Census
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
2019

Pop.
364
337
291
412
1,258
1,515
1,689
2,235
3,443
5,078
6,046
6,777

Madras, Oregon Hispanic
Population 2000-2019

%±
—
−7.4%
−13.6%
41.60%
205.30%
20.40%
11.50%
32.30%
54.00%
47.50%
19.10%
12.10%

% of total
pop.
1,815
35.7%
2000
2,309
38.3%
2010
2,697
39.8%
2019
Source: 1910-2010 U.S. Decennial
Census; 2019 American
Community Survey 5-year
Year

Pop.

Source: 1910-2010 U.S. Decennial
Census; 2019 American
Community Survey 5-year
Estimates

The Madras population is growing more diverse with Hispanic and American
Indian/Alaskan Native individuals making up an increasing majority of the population,
while the foreign-born, or immigrant, population in Madras is decreasing. Table 4.49
depicts the Hispanic population in Madras from 2000-2019. In 2000, Hispanics made up
35.7% of the overall population in the city, while they made up 39.8% by 2019.
In the American Community Survey and other Census surveys, Hispanic is noted
as an ethnicity, not a race, meaning any individual who identifies as Hispanic also
identifies as one or more races. In Madras, the growth in the population of individuals
who identify their race as White Alone has been driven by the Hispanic population at
least since 2000. Table 4.50 shows that the percentage of the overall population that
identifies as White non-Hispanic (referred to as Anglo elsewhere in this case study) has
315

Table 4.50
Madras Hispanic Population by Race (White, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Some
Other Race) in 2000, 2010, and 2019
2000
Pop.

Not Hispanic or Latino:
White Alone
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone
Some other race Alone
Hispanic or Latino:
White Alone
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone
Some other race Alone

% of Total Pop.

3,263
2,825

64.3%
55.6%

258

5.1%

3
1,815
402

0.1%
35.7%
7.9%

54

1.1%

1,244

24.5%

2010
Pop.

Not Hispanic or Latino:
White Alone
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone
Some Other Race Alone
Hispanic or Latino:
White Alone
American Indian and Alaska Native Alone
Some Other Race Alone

% of Total Pop.

3,725
3,011

61.7%
49.9%

422

7.0%

0
2,309
1,647

0.0%
38.3%
27.3%

0

0.0%

574

9.5%

2019
Pop.

Not Hispanic or Latino:
White Alone

% of Total Pop.

4,080
3,274

60.2%
48.3%

543

8.0%

0
2,697
1,672

0.0%
39.8%
24.7%

American Indian and Alaska Native Alone

102

1.5%

Some Other Race Alone

820

12.1%

American Indian and Alaska Native Alone
Some Other Race Alone
Hispanic or Latino:
White Alone

Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2006-2010 and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via
Social Explorer Tables (2021a, 2021c, 2021d).
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decreased from 55.6% in 2000 to 48.3% in 2019, while the percentage of the population
that identifies as White Hispanic has increased from 7.9% to 24.7%. At the same time,
Hispanics who identify as Some other race Alone decreased from 24.5% in 2000 to
12.1% in 2019. The reason for these shifts might simply be caused by increase in the
overall Hispanic population, yet it might also indicate a more significant shift in racial
identity within the Madras Hispanic population.
Another population that increased significantly in Madras since 2000 is the
American Indian/Alaskan Native population, which grew from 6% of the population in
2000 to almost 10% of the population in 2019. Table 4.51 shows the Madras American
Indian/Alaskan Native population in 2000, 2010, and 2019. Table 4.50 shows that while
the Hispanic American Indian population has increased in Madras, the majority of the
growth observed in the American Indian/Alaskan Native category has been from
individuals identifying as American Indian, non-Hispanic.
Table 4.51
Madras American Indian/Native Alaskan Population 2000-2019
Madras, Oregon American Indian
Population 2000-2019
% of total
pop.
312
6.1%
2000
422
7.0%
2010
645
9.5%
2019
Source: 1910-2010 U.S. Decennial
Census; 2019 American
Community Survey 5-year
Year

Pop.

The Madras foreign-born, or immigrant, population decreased from 22.5% of the
city’s population in 2000 to 13.2% of the population in 2019. For comparison, the
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foreign-born population makes up 9.7% of the Oregon state population in 2019, while the
U.S. foreign-born population is 13.7% in the same year. While the Madras foreign-born
population remains at parity with the U.S. average in 2019, the city continues to have a
higher overall representation of immigrants than the state of Oregon.
Table 4.52
Nativity by Citizenship and Year of Entry for Foreign-Born Population in Madras,
Oregon in 2000 and 2019
Madras, Oregon 2000

Madras, Oregon 2019

Nativity By Citizenship
Status

Nativity By Citizenship
Status

Total Population:
Native Born
Foreign Born:
Naturalized Citizen
Not a Citizen

5,011
Total Population:
3,882 77.5%
Native Born
1,129 22.5%
Foreign Born:
173 3.5%
Naturalized Citizen
956 19.1%
Not a Citizen

Year Of Entry for The
Foreign-Born Population

Foreign-born Population:
1995 to March 2000
1990 to 1994
1985 to 1989
1980 to 1984
1975 to 1979
1970 to 1974
1965 to 1969
Before 1965

6,777
5,883
894
385
509

86.8%
13.2%
5.7%
7.5%

894
23
83
351
437

2.6%
9.3%
39.3%
48.9%

Year of Entry for the
Foreign-Born Population

1,129
152
332
308
170
96
40
0
31

13.5%
29.4%
27.3%
15.1%
8.5%
3.5%
0.0%
2.8%

Foreign-Born Population:
2010 or Later
2000 to 2009
1990 to 1999
Before 1990

Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer
Tables (2021a, 2021d).

Table 4.52 shows the nativity and year of entry for the foreign-born population in
Madras in 2000 and 2019. In 2000, the majority of foreign-born residents in Madras
entered the United States after 1985 and before 1995. This remains more or less the same
in 2019. Only about 12% of the foreign-born population in Madras in 2019 arrived in the
United States later than 2000. This data suggests that the growing Hispanic population in
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Madras is no longer being driven by immigrant newcomers as it was in earlier decades,
but the city’s immigrant population remains substantial and is largely made up of Latino
residents.
In 2000 and 2019, 90% of the foreign-born population in Madras was Latino. The
remaining 10% of the foreign-born population was European or Asian. In 2000, there was
also a fraction of the population from Australia (Oceania). In both years, more than 80%
of the foreign-born population was from Mexico, making Mexican nativity dominant
among the Madras foreign-born population.
Table 4.53
Place of Birth for Foreign-Born Population in Madras, Oregon in 2000 and 2019
Place Of Birth for The
Foreign-Born
Population (ACS
Compatible Version)

Foreign Born (excluding
born at sea):
Europe:
Asia:
Oceania:
Americas:
Cuba
Mexico
El Salvador
Peru

2000
1,129
29 2.6%
72 6.4%
7 0.6%
1,021 90.4%
10 0.9%
919 81.4%
24 2.1%
68 6.0%

Place of Birth for the
Foreign-Born
Population

Foreign-Born Population:
Europe:
Asia:
Americas:
Mexico
Peru

2019
894
57 6.4%
30 3.4%
807 90.3%
782 87.5%
25 2.8%

Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer
Tables (2021a, 2021d).

Like many towns in the United States, Madras’ history is rich with the influence
of a diverse array of cultures, but the continuous influence of Mexican immigrants
remains significant. In 2000 and in 2019, 81% and 88% of the immigrant population in
Madras was born in Mexico, respectively (Social Explorer Tables, 2021a; Social
Explorer Tables, 2021d). Other countries of birth represented in the 2019 immigrant
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population in Madras, but in much smaller numbers, included China, Vietnam, Peru,
France, and the United Kingdom (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d). These data are
compiled estimates from surveys collected over the course of 5 years, so details regarding
the size of the current Madras immigrant population may differ from the numbers
represented in Table 4.53. However, the general trends and estimated shares of the
population are representative of the Madras population.
Madras, Oregon: 2005-2019—Industry Trends
Industry trends and employment in Madras have substantially changed since
2000. Whereas manufacturing employed over 33% of workers in Madras in 2000, that
industry employed 17.5% of workers by 2019. Employment in Educational services,
healthcare, and social assistance, however, increased from 13% of Madras workers in
2000 to almost 25% in 2019. Table 4.54 outlines the percent of employees by industry in
2000 and 2019 and reveals a substantial shift in employment in the city throughout the
target timeline for this project.
By 2019, almost 16% of workers employed in manufacturing in 2000 were no
longer employed in manufacturing industries. Other services, not including public
administration services, also decreased in their share of employed workers in Madras
from 2000 to 2019 by almost 4%. Educational services, healthcare, and social assistance
employed 12% more workers in Madras in 2019 than in 2000, and employment in
construction increased by 4% of the population between 2000 and 2019. All other
industries either increased or decreased at a rate of less than 1.5% from 2000 to 2019,
save Retail trade, where employment increased only moderately by 2.4% of the
population.
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Table 4.54
Percent of Civilian Population 16 Years and Over Employed by Industry in Madras,
Oregon in 2000 and in 2019, Including the Percent Change Over Time
Industry By Occupation for Employed Civilian
Population 16 Years and Over

Manufacturing
Other Services, Except Public Administration
Finance and Insurance, and Real Estate and Rental and
Leasing
Wholesale Trade

2000

2019

%
Change

2088
33.3%
4.7%

2856
17.5%
0.8%

36.80%
-15.8%
-3.9%

3.1%

1.7%

-1.4%

1.0%

0.7%

-0.3%

Professional, Scientific, and Management, and
Administrative and Waste Management Services

4.5%

4.3%

-0.2%

Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation, and
Accommodation and Food Services
Information

11.9%
0.3%

12.0%
0.6%

0.1%
0.3%

4.7%

5.1%

0.4%

1.6%

2.7%

1.1%

7.4%
11.9%

8.8%
14.3%

1.4%
2.4%

2.5%

6.5%

4.0%

Public Administration
Transportation and Warehousing, and Utilities
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting, and Mining
Retail Trade
Construction
Educational Services, and Health Care and Social
Assistance

13.1%

24.9%

11.8%

Note. Data are sourced from the 2000 Census and 2015-2019 ACS 5-year Estimates via Social Explorer
Tables (2021a, 2021d).

The drastic shift in the economy is undoubtedly related, at least in part, to the loss
of manufacturing and other industries in Madras during the Great Recession. In its
recovery since the recession, the Madras economy is growing most strongly in
construction and industries linked to education, healthcare, and social services. While the
gain in employment in these areas, at 15.8% of the employed population, is at parity with
the loss of employment in manufacturing, the industries are not necessarily parallel
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employers. This means that those who lose work in manufacturing might not have easily
attained work in education or healthcare. With a 36.8% increase in the overall employed
population in Madras from 2000 to 2019, it may be safe to assume that new arrivals are
primarily finding employment in education, health, and social service industries in
Madras.
Even with great losses since 2000, manufacturing remains the second largest
employer in Madras, employing 17.5% of the working population. Two interstate
highway systems, a municipal airport, and continued rail services provide important
infrastructure to the Madras industrial community. The St. Charles Health System and
Mosaic Medical offer services in Madras and employ a growing number of professionals
and healthcare support occupations, which have increased in their share of the employed
population in Madras by 9.8% and 4%, respectively from 2000 to 2019.
Data outlining specifically where Madras’ immigrant population is employed is
unavailable due to the city’s small size and concerns about anonymity. According to a
2010 Brookings Institution report, immigrants in the United States were overrepresented
in three of Madras’ top five industries: construction occupations, office and
administrative support, and transportation occupations (Brookings Partnership for a New
American Economy, n.d.). It stands to reason that the Madras workforce includes
immigrants across industries, and, perhaps, concentrated in some of Madras’ most
valuable industries.
The production of irrigated seed crops, potatoes, and mint as well as hay and
livestock operations remain healthy industries in the Madras area (Jefferson County, n.d.b). Employment in farming occupations dropped by 1.8% from almost 6% in 2000 to 4%
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in 2019. The decrease in employment in farming occupations could be an indicator as to
why immigrant arrivals decreased during the same time period, since migrants who are
immigrants tend to settle not only where social networks are strong, but also where work
is prolific.
Two significant areas of immigrant employment are not captured in ACS data,
including employment in private households, which is the most over-represented industry
for immigrants in the United States (Brookings Partnership for a New American
Economy, n.d.), and home-based businesses which are common particularly among
Latino entrepreneurs in Madras (Personal Communications, 2021). The dearth of data in
these areas makes it challenging to understand Madras’ true economic situation, but the
likely presence of informal economic networks supports the notion of the Madras
population as divided in various ways. Informalization of economies occurs in contexts
of growing inequality in earnings and profit-making capabilities, it involves both
consumers and producers, and it is occurring in populations across the United States
(Sassen, 1994).
An informant familiar with the Madras business community explained that the
city’s industrial corporations are generally well-entrenched in the community through
multi-generational ties to the city and the surrounding Jefferson County region (Personal
Communication, 2021). One example is the Bright Wood Corporation, a wood
manufacturing plant that was mentioned by several informants as a significant employer
and industry anchor in Madras. The company was established in the city in 1960 and,
while it suffered its first employment setbacks in its history during the great recession
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from 2007 to 2010, the company is a consistent entity in the Madras local economy
(Stovall, 2010).
The Deer Ridge Correctional Institution, a state prison located in Madras, opened
in 2007 with the expectation that its employment opportunities would draw skilled
professionals to the city. As of yet, the facility remains below capacity for employment,
and the decision-making process leading to its development has attracted the attention of
scholars exploring economic development and prisons in the United States. In a 2013
article, Anne Bonds (2013) argues that Madras’ intention in bringing a correctional
institution to the area reflected “long-established power relations and assumptions that
negatively position Latinos and Native Americans while reaffirming the social and
economic status of whites” (p. 1393). Throughout informant interviews for this case
study, shared anecdotes and resources affirmed the notion that racial divisions continue to
exist in Madras and that the implementation of the city’s economic development plan has
not focused sufficiently on exploring or ameliorating this division.
Major industrial and light industrial organizations in Madras, such as Bright
Wood Corporation, are most frequently Anglo owned and operated, as are most
professional services in the city. Latinos, and immigrants in particular, are more likely to
own and operate retail outlets and restaurants (Personal Communication, 2021).
Anecdotally, employment of first and second-generation Latinos is concentrated in the
service industry, healthcare industry and throughout the school district in staff and
administrative positions (Personal Communications, 2021). The teacher and coach
populations were reported by informants to be overwhelmingly white and two informants
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mentioned that American Indians and Latinos who earn education degrees often seek
work outside of the Madras area (Personal Communications, 2021).
While a number of manufacturing employers went out of business during the
recession (between 2007 and 2010) and others experienced setbacks, retail and restaurant
businesses are at an even greater risk of failure due to unexpected changes in lease
agreements and environmental influences such as recessions, pandemics, and natural
disasters. Informants reported a thriving Latino business community in Madras, but noted
the challenges many of these business owners faced as the city strived to develop
economically, resulting in rising rents and landowner neglect of rental property (Personal
Communications, 2021). While the Latino immigrant community in Madras is wellestablished and intergenerational, there remains a need for support in navigating
unfamiliar institutional systems like school and healthcare systems and urban renewal
grant programs. Such programs are centered on helping small businesses make
improvements and build wealth, but, one informant notes, if a business owner does not
have the institutional knowledge surrounding how to learn about and then apply for such
funds, they are left behind (Personal Communication, 2021). This is an example of an
area where Madras immigrants in need of both language and cultural support relating to
the economics and policy practices of the city lack access to opportunities for wealth
development.
Racial divisions about the nature of healthcare resources are also identified by
informants. When asked to share other organizations that may be of interest to me in
learning about the immigrant experience in Madras, three informants suggested Mosaic
Medical as a valuable resource for immigrants. Both St. Charles Health System and
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Mosaic Medical have a significant presence in Madras, but Mosaic Medical centers itself
in the service of individuals of all backgrounds in ways that St. Charles does not. This
fact is indicated through the messaging on the organizations’ websites. According to the
Mosaic Medical website, the institution “welcomes all races, religions, countries of
origin, languages, genders, abilities, sexual orientations, ages” and was created to serve
“Central Oregonians from all walks of life” (Mosaic Medical, 2021) Information
regarding who St. Charles serves is not clearly stated on the website and the
organization’s mission, “in the spirit of love and compassion, better health, better care,
better value,” fails to mention its service to individuals or communities (St. Charles
Health System, 2021). Perhaps more significantly, it is highlighted in the shared
experience of informants of color for this case study, whose experiences at St. Charles
involved clear racial profiling in service delivery (Personal Communication, 2021).
This section covering the Madras economy is largely devoid of reference to
employment of the American Indian population in Madras. This is largely due to the fact
that informants were primed to consider interview questions in relation to immigrants in
the city, and so the American Indian population was likely not considered in most
responses. Secondly, occupational data by race is largely unreliable without calculations
beyond the scope of this project, particularly for cities with a population of less than
65,000 like Madras. Therefore, my work in this respect is limited to informant data and
information collected via local news articles, newsletters, and websites. With that stated,
the lack of mention of American Indian employees or employers suggests that the
population is not readily “seen” in Madras, either because of desired or undesired
integration into the mainstream population, the lack of awareness of others, or not being
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present in the workforce. Since American Indians make up almost 10% of the population
of Madras, the latter seems unlikely.
Madras, Oregon: Major Amenities
Madras leadership has focused on economic development in the city throughout
the target timeline for this case study, and the city has succeeded in bringing several
amenities and attractions to serve its growing population. The following outlines only a
brief representation of what the City of Madras has to offer. The Madras Aquatic Center
Recreation District was formed in 2004 to serve the community with swimming and other
sports recreation programs (MACRD, n.d.), and Desert Peaks Golf Club is a year-round
municipal golf course in Madras. Since 2011, Madras has been home to a Central Oregon
Community College Campus. A performing arts center, a well-developed trails and parks
system, a new movie cinema, and the public library each play a role in Madras’ capacity
to engage a diverse population.
Madras’ municipal airport is a unique amenity and owed to the fact that the Army
Air Corps built training facilities in the area during WWII. Annual civic events like the
Airshow of the Cascades have grown dramatically, attracting thousands where they
previously attracted only hundreds. The Cascades East Transit Bus System connects
Madras to Warm Springs and Redmond seven days a week. Within Madras city limits,
the system provides rural dial-a-ride services on weekdays from 7am to 4pm (Cascades
East Transit, 2016). The significance of the bus system to the greater Madras community
is highlighted in the comments of a community member in city council meeting minutes
for October 11, 2016 (The City of Madras, 2016a).
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Such types of events and amenities serve to foster healthy communities, thus,
increasing civic capacity, yet these amenities and events were not noted by informants
during our discussions about immigrants in the community, nor were they mentioned in
relation to a question posed about Madras’ capacity to achieve goals more generally. The
2016 Madras Urban Renewal Action Plan honors these achieved goals and acknowledges
the value of a diverse population in describing the “Madras Advantage,” yet broader
descriptions of diversity among the population, including where Latino and American
Indian business interests lie and what their needs are, are missing (The City of Madras,
2016b). It is the intention of the remainder of this case study to address where interests
and values lie among Madras’ diverse citizenry and describe, if possible, the various
notions of community that prevent these amenities from being top of mind.
Madras, Oregon: The Community Integration of Immigrants
The presence of various non-profit services for the Latino population and
statements from several informants confirm that the Latino community, and by extension
the Latino immigrant community, is well-established with strong social networks in
Madras. Yet immigrant support, including accommodations for language and culture, are
not broadly apparent in government activities, and opportunities for leadership in the
greater community have proven to be hard won by Latinos. The process of building this
case study revealed a knowledgeable and motivated immigrant population, largely
Latino, striving for a meaningful voice in Madras decision making. This section of the
case study describes ways in which the community supports (or does not support) the
integration of immigrants through language support and institutional knowledge sharing.
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Race and racism are also discussed in this section, since discrimination based on race
serves to prevent individuals of that race from truly belonging to the broader group.
There was consensus among most informants that overt racism has become less
common in Madras over time, although a rise in anecdotal evidence of overt racism had
been observed by at least two informants since the years following the election of Donald
Trump to President (Personal Communications, 2021). However, informants of color and
at least a few Anglo informants recognized regular instances of covert racism, often in
the form of microaggressions, in social, professional, and governance-related
interactions.
Discrimination against long-established Latino populations can be a common
challenge in communities that experience continuous immigration, and it is a particular
challenge in the contemporary United States, where continuous media attention to
immigration since the early 1990s has been observed to influence negative attitudes
toward immigration and the Latino population more generally (Valentino, Brader, &
Jardina, 2013). Language support offered by local governments, school districts, and
other institutions serve as an indicator of the region’s and city's awareness in terms of the
need to support non-English speakers. This is not to say that the presence of language
support eliminates bias or discrimination, but it may indicate the intention on the part of a
governing body to reduce barriers to information and services access.
The City of Madras and the Jefferson County websites have no clearly available
Spanish language resources for city and county-related procedures or events (The City of
Madras, n.d.-a; Jefferson County, n.d.-a). However, one informant noted that Spanish
translations of the city website and other important documents was in the works (Personal
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Communication, 2021). The Madras-JC Chamber of Commerce and Visitors Center
website is English language only and includes no reference to Hispanic or Latino
business support more generally (Madras-JC Chamber of Commerce and Visitors Center,
n.d.). One informant familiar with Latino business leaders and entrepreneurs in Madras
and Central Oregon noted that few Latino businesses participate in the Chamber of
Commerce in Madras, Redmond, or Bend (Personal Communication, 2021). The
informant suggested that this was primarily because Latino business leaders did not feel
welcomed to do so but also notes a powerful secondary reason may be because many
Latino business owners do not have the capacity to participate in Chamber activities
effectively. In other words, for the time a business owner puts into Chamber membership,
the benefits do not fit the needs of Latino business owners.
The Spanish language section of the Jefferson County Library website includes
information in Spanish about obtaining a library card and book recommendations, but
Spanish language details about other services and opportunities, such as computers and
printing and volunteering, are not apparent (Jefferson County Library District, 2021). An
informant familiar with the Madras government noted that, since a Spanish-English
bilingual employee was hired to a city clerk position in 2019, the number of Spanishspeaking individuals who have engaged in understanding city and county processes has
increased (Personal Communication, 2021). It should, however, be noted that this
information was anecdotal. It does not appear that the city is collecting data relating to
the race or ethnicity of those accessing services over time, so impacts to accessibility
cannot be assessed by the public.
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Jefferson County School District 509J, serving Madras, makes the district student
handbook and other documents available online in English and in Spanish, but the vast
majority of resources on the website are available only in English (Jefferson County
School District 509J, n.d.). An informant who is an immigrant and grew up in Madras
shared that at age seven they translated paperwork for their parents because materials and
information were not available in Spanish (Personal Communication, 2021). This is not
an uncommon task for young immigrants in the United States, but in a region whose
Latino history is as old as its Anglo history, the lack of language support is significant.
The presence of two Native American community liaisons, a Hispanic community
liaison, and a homeless liaison on staff at the school district indicates an awareness of the
need for support for students and families with cultural backgrounds and experiences
outside that of the Anglo mainstream population.
A comprehensive audit of Spanish language or other language services in Madras
beyond what is included above was not practical for this study, but details collected from
local news outlets and local organization websites indicate that bilingual practices are
uncommon where services are intended for the population at large in the city. (Where
services are intended for primarily Latino audiences, like at the Latino Community
Association (n.d.), bilingual—or Spanish language only—services are the norm.) Radio
Lineup, an online guide to local radio stations, suggests that only one Spanish language
radio station reaches Madras (Radio Lineup, 2021c).
Religious support for speakers of other languages can be an indicator of
community civic capacity and several informants for this project emphasized that the
faith community serves as a supportive resource for the Latino immigrant community in
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Madras. The role of churches in cultivating social capital among immigrant congregants
has been explored to better understand how religious institutions can serve in bridging
social and cultural differences in surrounding communities (Stepick, Mahler, & Rey,
2009), so attention is also paid to local church services. Six percent of Jefferson County
residents identify as Hispanic Catholic, while 3% identify as Hispanic Protestant,
according to the latest Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) Census of American
Religion (Jones, Jackson, Orcés, & Huff, 2021). Worship services are offered in Spanish
in at least three places of worship in Madras: Iglesia Bautista Conservadora Bilingue, St.
Patrick Catholic Church, and the Madras Free Methodist Church. Spanish language
services at the many other places of worship in Madras were not evident, but there is also
reason to believe the Spanish speaking faith community is largely informal in nature and,
therefore, not directly accessible through online research practices. There may be faithbased organizations serving the community out of homes or using spaces otherwise
occupied by other organizations and not traditionally advertised.
One informant noted that the Latino faith-based community and the Latino
business community in Madras were significant outlets for the Latino population to
develop leadership skills. It is far less common to see Latino representatives serve on
local school, government, and non-profit boards than in the Latino faith or business
communities (Personal Communication, 2021). From the perspective of Anglo
leadership, however, this was poorly understood. Speaking to the role of faith
communities in the strength of social networks in the Madras Latino community, one
informant familiar with the city government suggested I talk to the Padre at St. Patrick
Catholic Church to learn more (Personal Communication, 2021). Another informant, also
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with the city government, stated “there isn’t necessarily a pastor or priest here that we
could connect to” as a resource to becoming familiar with Latino social networks
(Personal Communication, 2021). Both of these informants identified themselves as
Anglo, but the former noted that that in their role with the city, “I was the one who had
both the time and the interest to put myself into a position to learn about these issues”
(Personal Communication, 2021), suggesting that awareness of bridges to the Latino
community required intentional outreach.
Throughout the analysis of informant data, it became clear that there are
significant differences in the level of awareness individuals have about informal social
and economic networks within the Madras community. Anglos who expressed greater
understanding of Latino and immigrant communities also expressed intentional
engagement directly with those communities, whether socially or professionally. Those
Anglos who did not express an intentionality in their relationships with Latinos and
immigrants were largely less aware of existing resources for those populations.
Research for this case study suggests that support for Madras’ non-English
speaking population is lacking during the target timeline for this project. In 2019, 16% of
the Jefferson County population was estimated to speak a language other than English at
home (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d). The same statistic for Madras is unavailable, but
existing statistics provide strong evidence that a significant number of Madras
households are not primarily English-speaking households. Only 6.2%, or 1,529
individuals, of the Jefferson County population was foreign-born in 2019 compared to
13.2%, or 894 individuals, of the Madras population. This means that 60% of the
county’s foreign-born population resided in Madras in 2019, so it may be assumed that a
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majority of Jefferson County’s population that speaks a language other than English at
home also lives in Madras.
Not all non-English speaking individuals are Spanish speakers, but given the
statistics outlined in a previous section, Madras’ foreign-born population largely hails
from Mexico and Peru, two countries in which Spanish is a dominant language, and
nearly 40% of the city’s population identifies as Hispanic. While Hispanic identity is
synonymous with neither non-English speakers nor Spanish speakers, the statistics
undoubtedly indicate where a need for Spanish language support may be greatest.
Furthermore, without visible support for the city’s second most frequently spoken
language, support cannot be expected for those who speak languages other than English
or Spanish at home. Given the foreign-born population in Madras, this includes, at the
very least, speakers of Chinese and languages indigenous to Mexico and Peru.
Furthermore, while it is true that many households that speak a language other than
English at home include family members who also speak English as a second language, it
is not correct to assume that providing information in English is sufficient for tasks
related to community building and facilitating community participation, both topics that
can involve emotional responses and require trust. Opportunities to engage in your first
language increase the potential for participation and an overall feeling of belonging.
Madras, Oregon: Leadership and Representation
A valuable practice for assessing the extent to which a non-Anglo or immigrant
population has integrated into the fabric of a community is to observe the extent to which
that population is represented in leadership positions. At the time that I researched
Madras’ city government in 2021, the city employed only one Latino individual who had
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been hired as a customer accounting clerk in 2019. The history of elected positions in the
city suggests the Latino community may be seeking greater diversity and struggling to
obtain and then maintain it.
In 2006, Madras elected its youngest mayor, a 26-year-old who campaigned on
transparency, business development, and “government for the rest of us.” The election
was also considered newsworthy at the time because Mayor Jason Hale was half Korean
and bilingual, a first in Madras history (Gill, 2006). Hale was a political outsider when
elected, and the sense was clear that Madras voters wanted a break from the status quo.
Two years later, Melanie Widmer was elected mayor and at the time was the longest
serving city councilor in Madras history with 12 years of tenure (Gill, 2012). At 38-yearsold and being a woman, Widmer can be considered an elected official whose
demographics do not fit the status quo of small city politics in the United States, which
tend to be dominated by older white men. Widmer served three terms as mayor before
stepping down.
Both Hale and Widmer faced competition when they won their initial mayoral
elections, whereas Widmer’s successor and the current mayor of Madras, both Anglo
men, ran unopposed (Gill, 2015; Roberts, 2018). In the recent history of Madras mayoral
races, greater competition has yielded greater diversity. A review of city council meeting
minutes over the target timeline for this case study reveals that council positions are
frequently initially filled by appointment and then appointed incumbents run for
reelection when their appointed term is up.
City councils are historically made up of residents who are economically fairly
well off and who hold positions of power, either as business owners or business
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managers. Informants familiar with Latino communities across Oregon note that Madras’
Latino community does not have the same hold on power walking into council and board
positions that Anglos do (Personal Communications, 2021). Furthermore, mayor and
councilor positions are volunteer roles in most small cities, so those with greater external
responsibilities—including fulltime work, young children, and responsibilities to
extended family—are less likely to have time to commit to service positions.
However, in 2016, Denise Piza, a woman in her thirties and a mother of five, won
election as the city’s the first Latina city councilor via a write-in campaign, breaking
many of the norms observed in small U.S. city government. Piza viewed her role as
elevating voices within the community that had historically not had access to city
government (Gill, 2017a), and her work in the Madras community left an impact on city
leaders and other community members (Personal Communications, 2021).
In 2017, Rosalind Canga was appointed to a Madras city council seat. An
immigrant from the Philippines, Canga cited her experience as a minority in the United
States as a strength to her role serving the Madras community (Gill, 2017b). At the
writing of this case study, Canga remains the only person of color on the Madras city
council. Piza left the council when family commitments pulled her from the Madras
community (Hogan, 2019) and her successor, Leticia Montano-Hernandez, also Latina
and appointed to council in October of 2019, left the council between December 8, 2020
and January 12, 2021.
In reflecting on these recent changes on the city council, one informant familiar
with the city government said “I feel really good about diversity there” (Personal
Communication, 2021), but others noted that Latina councilors who left before the end of
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their terms found barriers to their participation frustrating (Personal Communication,
2021). No mention regarding their resignations is noted in council meeting minutes.
The Impact of Diversity
Piza’s work on the council during her tenure was referred to by several informants
and is notable in the discussion focusing on civic capacity in Madras. Informants who
were local government leaders stated that diversity matters throughout their interviews
and that including immigrant and Latino voices in decision making was important, but
they also repeatedly noted that they were unable to facilitate engagement. They just did
not know how to connect to minority populations in the city.
In November of 2017, Piza succeeded in passing Resolution No. 27-2017
“declaring the City of Madras a Welcoming City and affirming membership in the
National Welcoming American Initiative” (The City of Madras, 2017a). While a
resolution of this nature takes multiple parties to come into fruition, Piza is clearly a
notable shepherd for this resolution. In council meeting minutes for October 10, 2017,
Piza is recorded as calling for the council to “revisit the inclusivity resolution and get it
on a work session or council agenda” and the October 24, 2017 council meeting minutes
recorded a follow-up regarding the resolution before its passage at the following council
meeting.
One of Piza’s efforts to create a more inclusive council for Madras community
members was the recommendation to create a community advisory committee whose role
would be to engage Spanish speakers and serve as a Latino advisory board to the council.
It was introduced in city council meeting minutes on April 24, 2018 (The City of Madras,
2018) but never came to fruition. The committee was described by one informant as
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having been recommended by Piza and seconded by Mayor Embanks, yet broader
support from other council members appeared to be absent (Personal Communication,
2021), and follow-up discussions are not apparent in later council meeting minutes. By
the end of 2018, Mayor Embanks had stepped down as mayor to take a position as a city
councilor and Piza’s advisory committee idea was not picked up by the following mayor.
On several occasions in meeting minutes, Piza is recorded to have translated
materials and interpreted for various community meetings, and informants noted that she
was responsible for facilitating a meet and greet for the city manager and downtown
Latino business owners (Personal Communication, 2021). Such activities indicate Piza’s
significance as a bridge between the Latino community and government processes in
Madras.
One meeting Piza played a role in bears detailing in this case study. It was held in
February of 2017, one month after Piza was sworn into office on the council. By the start
of 2017, anxiety was high within Latino communities in central Oregon due to increased
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) activity in the area and the threat of
deportation expressed by the Trump Administration. The City of Madras responded with
a public meeting at which the Madras chief of police “provide[d] accurate information as
it relates [to] federal and local roles, authority and responsibilities” regarding law
enforcement (Personal Communication, 2021) and emphasized and clarified Oregon’s
sanctuary state law (ORS 181A.820).
The meeting was reported as a great success in city council meeting minutes and
by several informants. The meeting was held in Spanish and those who did not speak
Spanish were interpreted to through headsets, a first for Madras city government. One
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informant aware of the unique nature of this meeting in Madras reported the meeting
served as “a privilege for the mayor and for [the chief of police] and all of [the other city
representatives in attendance] to be trusted with the stories of our community members”
(Personal Communication, 2021). Anglo informants who were present at this meeting
expressed appreciation for, and even enjoyment of, the novelty of attending a meeting at
which their language was not the dominant language (Personal Communications, 2021).
Almost 70 people attended the meeting, according to the February 14, 2017,
council meeting minutes, and Mayor Embanks is reported to have “indicated that he had
apparently been underestimating Councilor Piza as he didn’t think they would get that
many people there” (The City of Madras, 2017b, p. 11). While the meeting minutes state
that meetings of this nature would continue to occur, there is no mention of such
meetings in following council meetings through 2019 and informants for this project
referred to no additional Spanish language meetings, much less one of this scale. Thus,
the Spanish-language-dominant community meeting has remained novel in Madras.
The meeting minutes reporting the details of this meeting reveal that the meeting
was planned on very short notice, so much so that Mayor Embanks apologized to the
council after the fact for not having invited everyone. The turnout for this meeting can
only be credited to individuals trusted by the Latino community and willing and able to
reach out household by household to disseminate information in Spanish and encourage
attendance. Such individuals are invaluable as a bridge across cultural barriers and are
often recognized by many in the community.
Almost all informants for this project named Piza directly or referenced her as
“the first Latina councilor” and identified her as a cultural bridge during the time she
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served the City of Madras. Blanca Reynoso was another individual recognized by
multiple informants as a bridge to the Latino immigrant community. Reynoso is a Madras
business owner and a long-time commissioner on the Madras Redevelopment
Commission, but is also noted by informants as a community member integral to
connecting people and communities (Personal Communication, 2021). One city
employee, when describing how they work with the dynamics of the Madras population,
said “we lean on folks like Blanca who can help us communicate” (Personal
Communication, 2021).
Madras, Oregon: Trust and Race Relations
Data collected for this case study suggest that the actual experience of people of
color in Madras is different from how Anglos who are in positions of power believe that
experience to be. Informants personally familiar with Madras immigrant, Latino, or
American Indian populations, either by identifying as a member of one of these
populations or due to intentional and extended employment serving one of these
populations directly, revealed a context in which non-Anglo leaders with knowledge,
skill, and a desire to build community were met with doubt and incomplete efforts to
engage populations. On the other hand, informants who were Anglo, and did not work
with other racial or ethnic groups, directly emphasized the value and desire for diversity
in the city government and describe the Madras population as ethnically mixed, where
everyone is treated as equals.
An informant working in city leadership emphasized that participation from the
Latino community was desired but “it seems like participation has been challenging, and
I don’t know why” (Personal Communication, 2021). This was echoed in the memories
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of another informant, who shared that they had observed a frustration on the part of city
employees who felt there were voices missing from the conversation in Madras, but how
to get them into the conversation was unknown to anyone (Personal Communication,
2021). Individuals with direct connections to non-Anglo populations in Madras were
equally frustrated, but they also understood and expressed a solution.
One individual referring to engaging the Latino community effectively
commented, “you need to be visible in the community. You need to build trust” (Personal
Communication, 2021). The informant offered the examples of going door to door to
meet Latino business owners downtown and Spanish-language community meetings as
trust building exercises. Another informant in the city government stated of relations with
the Latino community, “we have a long, long history of eroding every opportunity for
trust” (Personal Communication, 2021), and suggested that much work was yet to be
done. There are overlays of cultural differences and different understandings of what
community is in the City of Madras.
American Indian and Latino relations are also evolving in Madras. Informants
with close connections to the Warm Springs Indian Reservation and the Madras
American Indian population reported a notable rate of intermarriage among Indians and
Latinos (Personal Communications, 2021), and within the American Indian community,
reflections about past anti-immigrant and racist sentiments are beginning to garner more
attention and are being discussed more openly (Personal Communication, 2021).
Relations between American Indians and U.S. immigrants, particularly immigrants of
color, have been fraught with complexities. On one hand, an informant explained,
American Indians observed immigrants of color being negatively impacted by the
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restrictive policies and practices of the dominant Anglo culture, much in the way that
assimilation and allotment policies repeatedly deconstructed American Indian cultures.
On the other hand, American Indians felt threatened by any further impact immigrant
populations may have on resources already largely lost since the arrival of Anglo settlers
(Personal Communication, 2021).
Traumas endured collectively can result in lasting and confusing or unclear
tensions, and in the United States, those tensions are frequently expressed as racialized
contexts. An informant who identified as an American Indian with ties to the Madras
community outlined how U.S. federal policies effectively institutionalized the
racialization of American Indian membership, using the blood quantum system as an
example. Blood quantum, or the extent to which one is biologically related to a tribe, was
a system initially designed by the U.S. federal government to limit tribal citizenship, thus,
limiting the number of individuals with rights to sovereignty (Chow, 2018). Blood
quantum rules have historically been arbitrary, yet such rules in the Warm Springs tribe
continue to bar membership to individuals who grew up in the community but do not
have sufficient ‘Warm Springs blood’ to be enrolled (Personal Communication, 2021).
Federal policies recognized as having been detrimental to the American Indian
population in the past continue to affect the population in unexpected ways today, leading
one informant to say, “these federal policies were extremely effective in not only wiping
us out, but giving us the weapons to wipe each other out” (Personal Communication,
2021). This example lays bare the fact that policies and procedures for governance carry
forth history in ways that remain unseen without thorough introspection.
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Reviewing informant data and other collected materials indicates two worlds. In
one world, city leadership—almost all Anglo—successfully facilitates economic
development and wonders why a majority of the Latino and American Indian residents
are not heralding the latest investment or the introduction of a new brewery in town.
While in the other world, Latinos and American Indians are seeing their communities’
values misinterpreted and without representation, yet their efforts to manage those values
for themselves are exhausting on an individual level and trust is continuing to deteriorate
on a collective level. One informant framed the context exactly when they said, “I feel
like that’s maybe the piece that the city was missing is rather than trying to insert the
Latino community into existing dominant culture models of governance and community
engagement, flip it and you be open with the idea of engaging with them in what they are
already doing. And giving them the power and control, the drive, the tools” (Personal
Communication, 2021).
In a 2013 article exploring economic development, racialization, and privilege in
Madras, the author illustrates the history of a racial hierarchy in Madras that is
constructed and maintained by unchallenged policy processes and leadership narratives
(Bonds, 2013). In discussions about race in Madras with informants for this project, it
was noted that “the city government doesn’t necessarily do things like combat racism, but
it certainly upholds it” (Personal Communication, 2021). Another stated, “as soon as
Latinos and Native Americans start to rise to positions of power, all of a sudden, things
get a little less comfortable for the Anglos that have been there forever and, you know,
really see it as theirs” (Personal Communication, 2021).
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The conflicting values Ramsey (2003) alludes to in the post-homesteading era are
paralleled in some ways in modern day Madras. There remains in Madras an overarching
persistence of Anglo ownership that is supported by existing governance practices and
norms. Different, however, are the stations of the immigrant and American Indian
populations in the city today. The immigrant community has evolved since the 1940s into
a sophisticated network of multigenerational families, new arrivals, and educated
individuals with a clear understanding of what their communities need. The American
Indian population has challenged the federal government and won their sovereignty once
and for all. Together, immigrants and American Indians (including Alaskan Natives)
made up over 22% of the Madras population in 2019 (Social Explorer Tables, 2021d).
Madras, Oregon: 2005-2019—Projects and Intergovernmental Relationships
While barriers to entry and a lack of action to recognize and remove those barriers
was expressed throughout informant interviews and supported by secondary data
analysis, what is also clear about Madras is that the city has the infrastructure, the
interest, and the capacity to make things happen for the community. One informant noted
“the potential for the coolest stuff is rife all over the place” (Personal Communication,
2021). The following section illustrates capacity in Madras using two recent
achievements: a unique community event and the development of a housing district. The
section is followed by a brief review of intergovernmental and interorganizational
relationships, which are significant to city capacity because they illustrate how wellconnected and how reliant the city is on other jurisdictions and organizations.
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2017 Solar Eclipse—A unique opportunity
The Solar Eclipse event planning provides a unique opportunity for assessment of
civic capacity in Madras. Intergovernmental cooperation and coordination are reflected in
Madras City Council meeting minutes throughout the planning period prior to the August
2017 event, when city officials readied the town to accommodate up to 200,000 guests
(The City of Madras, n.d.-b). From a public safety perspective, the Madras city police
coordinated with county, state, and other local police departments to ensure traffic routes
and safety protocols were appropriate. The city worked to coordinate medical emergency
organizations and communicated regularly with ODOT to ensure traffic flow was
maintained. The Madras airport closed to make their tarmac available for overflow
parking, which required FAA approval. Food and grocery providers were among the
many businesses the city worked with to ensure there would be sufficient food available
for the course of the event. At least one city employee participated in a Regional Public
Information Officers Group and participated in communications across the region to
ensure media and stakeholders were updated appropriately.
One informant said the eclipse was transformative in how it changed the way
people in Madras saw themselves (Personal Communication, 2021). The Madras
Downtown Association was born of the eclipse event and the association’s First Thursday
events, noted as cross-cultural by one informant, continue after a necessary hiatus
through the summer of 2020 (Madras Downtown Association, n.d.). The one-time event
tested Madras capacity and resulted in lasting community events and connections.
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2019 Madras Housing and Urban Renewal District
Madras passed the first urban renewal housing district in the state in 2019 (City of
Madras, 2019). Housing has been a growing concern in Madras and throughout Jefferson
County over the target timeline for this project (Personal Communications, 2021) and the
renewal district was the city’s response to land use challenges imposed on the county and
city by state law. The housing district was noted as a success by informants with
knowledge of its details (Personal Communications, 2021), with one informant stating it
was “one of the most progressive, forward thinking, innovative housing action plans I
have ever seen.”
The city government was described by an employee as having very few silos, and
when it came to the development of the housing district, city finance, community
development, and public works departments worked well together to ensure
communication was clear and that goals were met (Personal Communication, 2021). The
heavy lifting for the housing district also came on the heels of the solar eclipse in Madras,
which served as a primer for the community and for the city to feel confident about what
they could achieve together.
Madras, Oregon: Intergovernmental Relations
Federal
One informant, whose work centers on the Latino community in central Oregon,
detailed the limiting impact of federal immigration policy on Latino populations, noting
that individuals with no immigration status have few opportunities to gain such status,
and without status, access to benefits even for citizen family members is limited
(Personal Communication, 2021). Federal policy limits the extent to which many
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immigrants can engage and participate, which keeps families, particularly low-income
families, from enjoying economic growth. Referencing the Trump Administration’s strict
interpretation of the public charge rule (USCIS, 2019), the informant notes that current
federal policy puts individuals and families in communities like Madras at risk.
State and Local
The same informant noted, however, that many state-level barriers to immigrants
have been removed in Oregon over the past several years. For example, since the
enactment of SB 1563 in 2018 (Oregon Legislative Assembly, 2018) in-state tuition is
now available to long-term residents regardless of immigration status, and proof of legal
residence is no longer required to obtain an Oregon driver’s license or state ID (Oregon
Driver & Motor Vehicle Services, n.d.).
Intergovernmental relations are significant for building and development
departments across central Oregon. The city of Madras relies on county building
inspectors to approve projects throughout the city, which can slow work down
significantly because the Warm Springs Reservation and other counties also rely on
Jefferson County inspectors at times (Personal Communications, 2021). In general, there
is a shortage of building inspectors in the states of Oregon, and this causes frustration for
builders as well as for city administrators interested in seeing projects come to fruition
more quickly.
County and city administrators suggested the relationships each jurisdiction has
with the Warm Springs Reservation are minimal. In general, business to business
relationships are more common than government to government relationships (Personal
Communication, 2021). Yet, friction between local governments and the Reservation
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were noted where property taxes and schools were part of the conversation. In 2012, a
Jefferson County School District Bond Measure was approved for $26.6 million to build
a K-8 school on the Warm Springs Reservation and a 600-seat performing arts center
located at Madras High School (Ballotpedia, n.d.-b). One informant emphasized that
there were likely great benefits to students living on the Reservation to be able to be
educated on the Reservation through middle school, but that the situation is a source of
friction within the broader Jefferson County community due to a perceived lack of parity
in property tax payments (Personal Communications, 2021).
The Indian General Allotment Act of 1887 explains that the land of sovereign
American Indian tribes, held in trust by the federal government, is immune from state
taxation, so residents of the Warm Springs Reservation, as a sovereign nation, do not pay
property taxes (IRS, 2021). At the same time, the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act (1965) (ESEA) calls for the non-discriminatory education of all children in the
United States. In particular, Title VI of the ESEA notes “it is the policy of the United
States to fulfill the Federal Government’s unique and continuing trust relationship with
and responsibility to the Indian people for the education of Indian children” (Elementary
and Secondary Education Act, 1965).
A second example of city-sovereign intergovernmental relations was shared by a
city administrator. In 2018, the Warm Springs Travel Plateau Center, located within
Madras city limits, opened to serve the public. While the land was long owned by the
Tribe, it was part of property annexed into Madras in 2003. In my initial discussion on
the topic, an informant expressed tension around the provision of city services. Because
the Tribes do not pay property taxes, an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) was
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organized for the purpose of providing necessary city services and collecting payment for
them (Madras Trust Site Redevelopment Intergovernmental Agreement, 2017). The
relationship is unique in its governance structure, yet standard when observed through the
IGA process. Still, the sentiment surrounding the project reflects lasting resentment
toward Warm Springs for not paying for services through property taxes. Even as news
outlets report that the land had been under Warm Springs’ ownership for 40 years
(Roberts, 2017), city officials understand the land to have been donated to Warms
Springs with the City of Madras’ cooperation prior to development (Personal
Communication, 2021).
The friction noted in informant comments in relation to each of these examples
reflects the nature of intergovernmental relationships involving local governments and
sovereign nations in the United States and deserves greater exploration in future projects.
For the purpose of the present case study, these examples illustrate the mechanical
complexity of intergovernmental relations while also showing evidence of a more
nuanced complexity relating to expectations of fairness and universal employment of
institutions such as taxation.
Organizational
Madras is home to a variety of formal organizations that make up the fabric of the
city’s civic capacity, including Kiwanis and Rotary International. Latinos rarely
participate as members of these groups (Personal Communication, 2021). Resources
targeting Latinos in the Madras area include the Latino Community Association, the
Oregon Human Development Corporation (with an office in Bend), and the Oregon Child
Development Coalition Migrant Head Start. Migrant families in the Madras area are also
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eligible to benefit from the Migrant Education Program, which is federally funded and
designed to support the educational needs of children who move across school boundaries
with their parents with some frequency (High Desert Education Service District, n.d.).
The Latino Community Association of Central Oregon has had a direct presence
in Madras since opening a branch office there in 2013 and has served the Latino
population across the region since 2000. An organization with the capacity and broad
reach of the Latino Community Association is typically a boon to the communities in
which it does its work because such organizations can often serve to bridge cultural and
social differences that otherwise may keep populations from hearing one another’s needs.
In Madras, the Latino Community Association (n.d.) provides workforce education and
training, promotes health programs, and organizes cultural events like the annual Latino
Fest.
The Let’s Talk Diversity Coalition (LTDC) served Jefferson County and the
Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs communities from 2011 until 2019 and was based
in Madras. LTDC was a program supported by the Oregon State Office of Equity and
Inclusion and intended to address issues relating to diversity, equity and inclusion (Let’s
Talk Diversity Coalition, n.d.).
It should be noted that, while the organizations listed here are integral to
supporting community members, such formal organizations do not play a role in the local
government. They do, however, serve to provide community members social outlets and
opportunities for leadership development, which can translate into a more engaged public
(Skocpol, 2003). The Community page of the website for the City of Madras lists local
organizations including links to both the local chapter of Rotary and Kiwanis
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International clubs, but no links to organizations specifically targeted to Latino or
American Indian populations appear to be present (The City of Madras, n.d.-c).
Madras, Oregon: Conclusion
The story of Madras from 2005 to 2019 is a story of two cities. Madras through
the lens of city leadership and governance is a typical rural U.S. city coping with the
pressures of growth. A focus on economic development has improved a variety of
recreational amenities in the city park system, beautified entry and exit ways to and from
the city, and attracted a brewery, a cinema, and other popular businesses. Yet, in
discussions with nine informants and a review of local materials including news articles
and city and organizational meeting documents and reports, the non-Anglo population
clearly faces barriers to participation and engagement.
Madras through the lens of advocates for the Latino population and non-Anglo
leaders is a U.S. city that has not come to terms with the strength of its historical
diversity. Indeed, much of the city’s history and diversity was left unreferenced in
informant discussions for this case study. Leaders of color have pushed their way into
Madras city and regional government in the recent past, leaving lasting impacts on fellow
council and committee members and on their communities. Yet, retention of diverse
representatives has proven difficult for the City of Madras.
Madras shows great potential for high civic capacity given the broad range of
amenities and a government whose planning has led to action in a variety of projects. At
the same time, the city holds itself back in the form of maintaining barriers to full
community participation for those whose values and needs are not met through
contemporary practices of economic development and governance.
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Informant interviews revealed a community held apart by conflicting values
relating to what constitutes community and resulting in the prevention of participation by
entire segments of the population. Significant efforts to improve this gap have been made
in Madras and are discussed in this case study, but they are led predominantly by
leadership rising from the Latino population in the city. The lack of diversity in
government positions and the challenges facing non-Anglos who do engage in elected
positions suggest that not only values but also institutional constructs hold communities
apart in the city. However, Madras offers a robust social infrastructure that, if recognized
and utilized, could, with the development of trust, build connections between divided
communities.
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Chapter 5: Findings and Discussion
This chapter reports the findings of this research study and discusses those
findings in the context of immigration federalism and public administration. First, the
findings section reveals the nature of the relationship between federal and state-level
immigration policymaking and implementation. Second, the findings of the QCA analysis
are reported to illustrate the diversity within and among the three local-level case study
cities. Third, findings for the qualitative review report about factors relevant to civic
capacity at the local level. Then the discussion section incorporates these findings into a
framework for immigration federalism with an emphasis on the local-level context and
closes with a note regarding social equity and public administration.
Findings
I construct a new narrative of immigration in the United States through this broad
reaching and in-depth qualitative research study. First, a novel description of
contemporary federal-level immigration policy integrated with an understanding of its
relationship to state and local immigration policy actions presents a snapshot of the
context of immigration federalism in the United States today. Second, the framework and
resulting case studies reframe our understanding of the trends observed in federal and
state-level policy creation and their impacts at the local level. Third, the case study
analysis develops our understanding of the diversity of local communities and the
position of local government and community leaders amidst the changing nature of
demographics in the United States. Finally, the analysis adds to existing but nascent
literature exploring the complex nature of rurality in the United States.
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The framework for immigration federalism constructed to complete this research
and outlined in the table in Appendix A includes three levels of government: federal,
state, and local. The framework integrates socio-political, socio-economic, and sociocultural institutional mechanisms and shows if and how they relate to one another and to
immigration policy at multiple levels of government, which provides a rich narrative of
contemporary immigration federalism. Using the resources that the framework’s structure
provided, I created five case studies (one federal level, one state level, and three local
level) to reflect the contemporary context of immigration federalism.
There are several things the framework and case studies help us do. First,
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) results and qualitative content analysis of case
studies clarify the relational variation observed in state immigration policy and responses
to such policies among different communities. The framework and resulting case studies
are a resource for discussing questions relating to what community characteristics or
conditions lead to certain policy types or community responses. This study finds that, at
the local level, policy decisions and community response are heavily dependent on
historical framing and contemporary dynamics of power within residential populations
and leadership.
This framework serves as a data warehouse from which answers to the research
questions for this study can be drawn. The following section is framed around the
research questions:
1) When the history and institutional context of federal, state, and local-level
immigration policy are observed and compared, what conclusions can be
drawn about the impacts and influences of one upon the other?
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2) Is immigration policy at the local level generalizable in the United States or
are local contexts so diverse that generalizations about immigrants and
immigration cannot be reliably constructed?
First, I share findings from a comparative content analysis indicating the
relationships between federal and state-level immigration policy. I pay attention to
historicity, because the literature claims, and these data show, that history plays a
significant role in understanding policy relationships (Neustadt & May, 1986) and in
constructing social reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). I also focus on the 2005-2019
timeline to align a contemporary perspective of immigration policy. Second, I focus on
findings from the QCA process in which I compare all three local case studies to identify
commonalities within and among the cases. The analyses in this section reveal that there
are fewer similarities among the localities than there are differences. The impacts of
federal and state-level policies are touched on where applicable. Third, findings relating
to the presence of evidence concerning civic capacity in each local case study are drawn
out after the more general local-level findings are shared. Finally, findings end by
highlighting the impact, both historical and contemporary, of immigrants to the presence
of each locality.
Relationships between Federal and State-Level Immigration Policy
A comparative content analysis of the federal-level, comprehensive coverage
state-level, and deep coverage state-level case studies confirms that history plays a role in
the making of place, and the federal government’s indifference to constructing an
overarching, robust vision of immigration has led to reactive policies enacted under the
authority of executive order.
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Admitted to the Union in 1859, two years prior to the start of the U.S. Civil War,
the state of Oregon was founded from the start with a constitution that embodied antiimmigrant and racist sentiments (Bussel & Tichenor, 2017). This reflects racialization at
the national level, where southern slave states designed policies to prevent Blacks from
leaving their jurisdictions and northern states designed policies to prevent Blacks from
entering their jurisdictions (Neuman, 1993). Black individuals were constitutionally
barred from residing in Oregon, and Chinese individuals were constitutionally prohibited
from voting.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 defined the term ‘citizen’ for the first time at the
federal level and granted citizenship to any individual born in the United States without
regard to race or ethnic background. The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868 ensured birthright citizenship through the power of the U.S. Constitution. Yet in
Oregon, interracial marriage was outlawed in 1866. The case studies and the analysis
process for this project do not explore the development and culture surrounding the
enactment of state laws of this nature. However, for this project, the alignment observed
in the federal-level and state-level policy-making infers that the Oregon state law
attempted to prevent people of color from declaring legal citizenship after the U.S.
Constitution granted broad citizenship and other rights in 1866. Such policy response
practices are in line with practices observed by Okrent (2019) to have prevented two
generations of Jews, Italians, and other European Americans out of the United States. In
the United States, national historicity framed how writers of state constitutions framed
immigrants, indigenous populations, and other people considered to be suboptimal, or
those not of northern European descent.
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In the decades after the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted, the relationship
between federal and state jurisdictions were shaped through the courts. Chy Lung v.
Freeman (1876) and Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) granted the federal government control
regarding who could enter the United States and defined laws relating to both
immigration and alienage. Yet, the authority granted to federal and state governments to
create laws affecting alienage remains murky, and the courts continue to be the avenue
for further defining state rights in developing policy that affects immigrants.
There is record of politically powerful states directly influencing federal
immigration rules, but such universal power from the state level is even less common
today. Asian exclusion laws introduced in the 1870s and 1880s were largely influenced
by the state of California’s lobbying activities (Waters & Pineau, 2015), but their success
at the national level reflected broad readiness on the part of U.S. Americans to racialize
Asians, particularly the Chinese.
At the time the Chinese Exclusion Act was enacted in 1882, the city of Portland,
Oregon was home to the second largest Chinese population in the United States after San
Francisco, California. In the decades after implementation of the Chinese Exclusion Act,
the Oregon Chinese population declined and the Japanese population increased
dramatically, indicating that states will respond to exclusion rules with alternative and
similarly skilled arrivals. The notion of state-level influences on federal immigration
policy and the flexibility with which states are observed to fulfill their need for laborers
confirms that federal-level policy concerning immigrants and immigration is not driven
by a unified and long-term vision for immigration to the United States. Instead,
immigration policy at the federal level is reactive, and it often results in unintended
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outcomes. The lack of an overarching federal level conceptualization of immigration also
led to policies that result in constructions of immigration that include undocumented, or
illegal, statuses (Waters & Pineau, 2015).
Many influential federal-level immigration policies enacted since WWII have
been introduced by executive administration through the authority of memoranda and
executive orders, including rules forcing the internment of Japanese individuals and the
creation of the Bracero Program, and more recent rules creating Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) and limiting entrance to nationals of several Muslimmajority countries. This study shows the nature of federal-level executive administration
has changed from 2005 through 2019, with the Trump administration, active from 2016
through 2019, becoming far more active in issuing immigration policy via executive
order and agency memorandum. The policies enacted under Trump are not in line with
broad public sentiment, and court systems have grown more active in response to the
aggressive policies of the Trump administration. Finally, refugee admission numbers
decreased dramatically under the Trump administration and this is reflected in steep
decreases in refugee numbers at the state level during those years. The findings observed
in this study are at odds with the assumptions inherent to the steam-valve theory, which
argues that tension at the local level pushes up through the state level until policy action
occurs at the federal level (Spiro, 2001). Instead, federal level immigration policy appears
to be driven, at least in the case of the Trump administration, by political interests largely
disconnected from the local level.
Demographic changes at the national-level and in representation within the
federal government are similar to those at the state level in many cases, but this seems
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more a function of overall population changes than one of state-level policy influence.
Populations are growing more diverse through immigration and birthright across the
country. Evidence suggests that women and people of color are diversifying the Oregon
state legislature in a similar fashion to diversification at the federal level, although more
data are needed to confirm this. The diversification of representation in leadership—or at
least the attempt to diversify representation—at the local level is also observed in case
study cities.
At the national level, wages stagnated during the target timeline for U.S.-born
white workers while foreign-born white, foreign-born Asian, and U.S.-born Asian
workers remained competitive with one another, even throughout the slump caused by
the recession from 2008 to 2010. Furthermore, the U.S.-born White non-Hispanic labor
force participation rate was the only group to suffer a sustained decrease in participation
for the decade following the recession. During the same time period, the rise of the white
Nationalist movement, touting anti-immigrant sentiments, is observed in national
discourse while state policy sentiment grows more integrative overall.
Local Level Qualitative Analysis of Interview Data
Descriptive data about interview informants for this research study are included in
Appendix I. At the outset of this research project, I was hoping the qualitative analysis of
informant interviews at the local level might allow for at least a glimpse of hierarchical
policy influences passed from the federal and state levels to the local level, and recursive
influences from the local level to other levels of government. However, the results were
diverse enough that drawing conclusions based on the qualitative analysis of interview
data alone was unrealistic.
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The qualitative analysis of 19 interviews resulted in 165 discrete codes, including
24 code groups and 27 independent codes, or codes that do not fit under the umbrella of
the 24 code groups. Appendix J reports these codes. Twenty-four code groups can be
interpreted as 24 conceptual categories, but the conceptual properties revealed in the
analysis were so diverse that finding meaning among them was challenging through
qualitative coding alone. This analysis, however, did serve me in the construction and
writing of case studies.
My analysis of co-occurrence among conceptual categories in the interviews
revealed that trust is observed to relate to cultural competence, and intergovernmental
relations (IGR) is integral to a city’s capacity to achieve goals. In three interviews
focusing on three different Oregon cities, informants expressed the notion that cultural
competence among the dominant culture and efforts to develop cultural competence
within the dominant culture increase the level of community trust, particularly in
immigrant and Latino communities. In three cities, informant interviews confirmed that
IGR is a significant factor in achieving local government goals. And in multiple
interviews in two case study cities, the feeling that “we, as a community, deserve this”
served as a clear indicator of civic success.
The relationship between trust and cultural competence stands out in the case
studies, as does the logical relationship between IGR and overall capacity to get things
done. However, the qualitative analysis results indicate that the nature of local
communities necessitates far more nuance than the comparison of interview data on the
topic.
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QCA of Local Case Studies—Sandy, Nyssa, Madras
The QCA analysis of three local case studies revealed that Sandy, Nyssa, and
Madras shared 22 common conceptual properties categorized under 13 conceptual
categories. Ten of these conceptual properties could be historical or present-day aspects
common to any city in the United States like “Historicity: Tribal Territory” and “IGR:
State land use laws”. See Appendix K for the complete QCA truth table and output of
conceptual categories and properties for this project. Coding for each city revealed 67
conceptual properties under 22 conceptual categories in Sandy, 71 conceptual properties
under 17 conceptual categories in Nyssa, and 78 conceptual properties under 24
conceptual categories in madras.
I had hoped that the results of the QCA analysis would indicate what conditions
are necessary and sufficient for local jurisdictions to engage in restrictive or integrative
immigration policy practices, but the reality of local-level immigration-related policy
practices are really much less intentional and arguably non-existent from the perspective
of government leadership. The vast majority of conceptual properties contributing to a
city’s civil society are unique, or at least not ubiquitous in all cities. The universal history
of the United States is that lands settled and cities established were once indigenous tribal
territory, European settlement of these cities occurred only after the forced removal of
indigenous populations from the territory, and the forced movement of indigenous
populations continued through much of the twentieth century. The three Oregon cities
were all incorporated in the early 1900s. None of them were founding cities, settled by
the time Oregon achieved statehood in 1859, but they were settled in later decades when
logging, agriculture, and the promise of land drew people to the western United States.
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Infrastructure, such as roads, railways, and irrigation, plays a significant role in
place-making in the early U.S. west, and all three city case studies reference the
importance of various types of infrastructure to the city’s early stability and progress.
Nyssa and Sandy both take pride in their pioneer history as “gateway cities” along the
Oregon Trail. Railways had connected all three cities to ports and industrial hubs by the
late nineteenth century or early twentieth century, and this rail infrastructure continues to
have a contemporary influence on industry in those cities.
In Madras and Nyssa, irrigation technology played a significant role in
establishing agricultural industries and attracting stable populations. The Newlands
Reclamation Act is directly responsible for bringing public irrigation to Nyssa in the
1930s and to Madras in the late 1940s. Access to irrigable land led to the expansion of
agricultural industries, which also increased the need for farmworkers in these two cities.
Sandy, established on the banks of the Sandy River and nestled into the foot hills of
Mount Hood, was initially supported by logging and by serving the needs of travelers
from the Oregon Trail.
Other similarities shared by the three case studies concerns recent functions of
community maintenance and governance. First, each case study city is governed by the
council/manager form of government. Therefore, the findings of this study cannot infer
how form of government may impact immigration policy at the local level. Second, all
three cities hold annual festivals that highlight and celebrate the community and its
history. Informant interviews for this research study indicate that the extent to which
these festival events are inclusive of all residents varies. Third, the three case studies
provide examples of creative governance solutions to challenges in service provision and
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all three provide clear evidence that both formal and informal networks serve governing
leaders in the identification of problems and development of solutions. Finally, while
inter-government relationships are common, most are experienced as mundane and a
necessary and common function of local governance. In each case study, however, state
land use laws stand out as limiting to a frustrating extent. In Sandy and Madras, land use
laws are observed to exacerbate issues with housing availability and increase the cost of
housing. In Nyssa, land use laws are perceived as a barrier to the local business economy
because rezoning and building under Oregon’s laws is much more difficult than in nearby
Idaho.
One aspect of immigration that is common to all three case studies is that
Mexican immigrants make up the largest percentage of the immigrant population and the
Latino population is growing. This demographic trend, while not ubiquitous, is common
across the United States. In all three cities, representation of immigrants and of Latinos
within city government leadership and as public employees is extremely limited and quite
recent. This may have implications for representation and identity.
Information and programs are available in Spanish in each of the cities, but the
extent to which information is available varies greatly. City leaders in Sandy spoke
frequently of creating surveys in multiple languages and including Spanish-speakers in
their data collection staff. They mentioned the evolution of bilingual signage in municipal
busses and noted the evolution of traveling library services designed to “meet the
Spanish-speaking population where it was.” Nyssa and Madras leaders did not speak so
directly of municipal efforts to increase access to information in Spanish.
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All of the cities have at least one church that provides regular services in Spanish,
but Madras has several such churches. Several Spanish language radio stations are
available in Nyssa and Sandy, but Madras receives only one Spanish language station.
Immigrants and Latinos are represented in business and entrepreneurship in each of the
three cities, although the extent to which city leadership appears aware of immigrant and
Latino engagement varies by city and by individual. No city websites or Chamber of
Commerce websites include information in Spanish or highlight the entrepreneurship of
immigrants.
The final aspect shared by all cities is their awareness and insistence that Oregon
law enforcement does not and cannot enforce federal law, citing Oregon’s “sanctuary
state” law (ORS 181A.820). This rule is front and center in discussions relating to ICE
operations in each area, but beyond that, city leadership had little to reference regarding
ICE.
QCA of Local Case Studies—Sandy and Nyssa
Sandy and Nyssa share four points in the case study data that are not present in
Madras. Two points reflect improved access to information for Spanish speakers. County
and school district websites in both cities utilize translation services to translate entire
web pages, or they make Spanish language forms accessible. This is not a function of
municipal decision-making since it is counties and school districts funding the services,
but it is indicative of the influences these cities navigate. Additionally, and as noted in the
section above, Nyssa and Sandy receive several Spanish language radio stations, whereas
Madras receives only one.
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Immigration is not a policy arena in municipal governance. In Nyssa and Sandy at
least one government employee expressed the fact that “immigrants are just served
equally” as part of normal small town governance functions, and a reference to tight
municipal budgets was also employed as an indicator of why immigrants were not
provided additional or separate consideration. In Madras, discussions with city and
community leadership about immigrants and immigration revolve around the city’s
diverse demographics. In Madras, awareness that various populations interact with the
city differently is top of mind. Even so, actions taken to understand or deliver
immigrants’ service needs are not present in the informant data.
The final commonality shared by Sandy and Nyssa is unique because it connects
U.S. climate history to its future. Both cities are affected by climate migration, although
Nyssa received climate migrants leaving behind the Dust Bowl in the 1930s, and Sandy is
experiencing large population influxes influenced in part by climate changes experienced
in other parts of the country, primarily in California.
QCA of Local Case Studies—Nyssa and Madras
In Nyssa and Madras, the arrival of new immigrants has subtly decreased in the
recent past but the Latino population has grown in both areas. The Bracero Program of
the 1940s was a driving influence in Mexican immigration. Braceros worked in Nyssa,
whereas Madras received Mexican migrants after the Bracero program was effectively
ended in the Pacific Northwest.
Industry plays a major role in the economic success of Nyssa and Madras, which
both had anchor employers who created employment stability in the cities for decades but
have left or reduced capacity since 2005. Madras has remaining anchor employers, while
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Nyssa is struggling to create an anchor lost early in the timeline for this case study. The
loss of employment experienced in the cities led to a significant redistribution of overall
employment and, in Nyssa, a decrease in population. Employment in the education
services, healthcare, and social services industry has increased and the manufacturing
industry has decreased in both cities. Case study informants unanimously noted the value
of immigrant employees to local industry, and demographic and industry statistics also
support this.
QCA of Local Case Studies—Madras and Sandy
Madras and Sandy are both gateway cities that serve Oregon’s broader economy.
The cities are throughfares for recreation as well as the transportation of goods by
highway and freight train. A level of team continuity or teamwork in approaching
challenging projects is evident in at least some projects in each city. The early Sandy
leadership team seems to be aware of this continuity, suggesting it was intentional, while
the continuity observed in Madras was identified more through triangulation of informant
evidence than through shared awareness.
In both Madras and Sandy, a small number (sometimes one) of independent
Latina immigrants serve to bridge the mainstream Anglo culture and the immigrant
population. This is a tenuous link in both communities and appears to be short lived
where support for intercultural work is not valued and supported. Related to cultural
bridges is the concept of trust, which is mentioned as a need and a challenge to working
with immigrant populations in both Madras and Sandy.
Evidence of such community members and discussions relating to trust were not
indicated in Nyssa, but this is also likely due to the fact that the case study was
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constructed with the assistance of a single informant. Historical references to immigrant
arrival in Nyssa support a context in which the dominant Anglo culture accepted Mexican
newcomers with only limited support.
Qualitative Review—Factors Relevant to Civic Capacity
Historicity
The history of the United States is universal in that the lands settled and
established as cities were once indigenous tribal territory, and European settlement of
these cities occurred only after the forced removal of indigenous populations from the
territory.
Infrastructure such as roads, railways, and irrigation play a significant role in
place-making in the early U.S. west. Pioneer identity and historical connections to the
Oregon Trail reify constructs about the supremacy of the Anglo population in the west.
Railways had connected some Oregon localities to ports and industrial hubs by the late
nineteenth century or early twentieth century, and this rail infrastructure continues to
have an influence on industry in those cities near rail services today.
Logging played a significant role in early Oregon industrial and immigration
history. In the arid eastern half of Oregon, irrigation technology established agricultural
industries and attracted stable populations. The Newlands Reclamation Act is directly
responsible for bringing public irrigation to eastern Oregon in the 1930s and the late
1940s. Access to irrigatable land led to the expansion of agricultural industries, which
also increased the need for farmworkers in these regions.
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Industry/Economy
This study reveals several observations regarding industry and immigration at the
local level. The framework primes scholars for further studies relating to industry interest
groups which will be able to confirm or challenge findings that suggest that these groups
may have a significant impact on immigration policy outcomes at the state level
(Nicholson-Crotty & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011). My findings are limited by the fact that
my data collection process necessarily prohibited travel to and engagement with case
study cities due to the COVID-19 pandemic. In this section, I report aspects of industry
and economics in these cities that would be of interest to explore more deeply for the
purpose of understanding industry interest groups at the local level.
Sandy stands out among the case study cities because it appears to have a diverse
enough economy that remained stable throughout the target timeline, including the Great
Recession from 2008 to 2010. Nyssa fared considerably worse as the city was supported
by a single large industry that left in 2005. Madras experienced some of the recessionrelated drawbacks that Nyssa experienced, but seemed to have a diverse enough economy
that other industries managed to survive. In addition, as gateway cities, Sandy and
Madras both likely benefit economically from nearby urban centers like Portland and
Bend, respectively. Nyssa’s economic region is smaller and is made more complex by
interstate relationships.
This research study did not collect the demographic details of management within
industrial workplaces, although there is evidence that at least one former Nyssa plant
manager was an immigrant. In general, findings show that immigrant entrepreneurs tend
to own and manage small businesses, often restaurants. Small businesses like those
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owned by immigrants are more vulnerable to economic disruptions such as the recession
(and COVID), but an assessment of small business losses during this timeline is
unavailable for this research.
Informants, including city leaders, in Sandy described their observations of
immigrants shifting (sometimes generationally, sometimes not) from farm work to indoor
labor and to entrepreneurship. Such observations were not shared by city leaders in
Madras or Nyssa.
Changing Demographics
Within cities, the pressure of demographic change is not immigrant driven but
newcomer driven. This is particularly so in Sandy, where newcomers are “Californians”
or individuals assumed to be migrating to Sandy from areas, frequently from California,
where the price of housing is substantially higher than in Oregon. Housing is a pressure,
but tight housing markets are not a function of immigrant presence, nor are they seen as
such by locals.
In Madras, where 49.3% of the population is Latino or American Indian and
13.2% of the overall population is made up of immigrants, neither the immigrant nor the
non-Anglo populations are viewed as a threat to housing or otherwise considered
overwhelming. My case study data analysis suggests that they are for the most part
ignored.
Intergovernmental Influences (Local—State, Local—Tribal, Local—Other)
Shifts in federal policy can cause anxiety at the local level, but little else changes
in terms of an individual’s day to day life. Policies targeting undocumented individuals
are deeply personal and impact families with ties to undocumented individuals, but they
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do not impact every immigrant. It is important to reiterate that the undocumented status
exists in the policy void created by the federal level farmworker program in 1942 and
various other immigrant statuses created in 1965 and in the 1990s. Federal level support
for some immigrants comes in the form of grants to states and local agencies for the
purpose of providing basic adult education and migrant children’s education, but these
benefits are mandated by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965) (ESEA)
rather than a policy specific to immigrants or immigration.
Oregon’s geography, coupled with changes made to the Bracero Farmworker
Program in 1947, influenced the success of farmworker organizing in the state. When the
federal government reduced federal support for the Bracero Program by requiring that
farmers cover the cost of workers’ transportation from the border, the Pacific Northwest
was effectively eliminated from the program (Sifuentez, 2016). Oregon farms were
simply too far away from Mexico for farmers to afford the cost of transportation. The
success of Mexican farmworker rights groups like PCUN is directly related to the fact
that Mexican workers already in Oregon, or those who made the trip on their own, had
greater negotiating power due to the scarcity of labor (Sifuentez, 2016). This shows a
more nuanced context than common arguments surrounding the evolution of state
immigration policy in general and introduces the notion that immigrant activism
preceded, and perhaps helped to usher in, today’s existing progressive activism in
Oregon.
Oregon state immigration policy tends to be integrative and it has been
exceptionally integrative since 2012. Integrative state-level immigration policies can
ameliorate the anxiety caused by restrictive or extreme federal level practices, especially
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when those practices change with every presidential administration. Oregon’s and other
states’ efforts to provide access to driver’s licenses regardless of immigration status is an
example of a rule that helps to limit risk for undocumented individuals and their families.
Sanctuary laws are similar. Such laws do not prevent the enforcement of federal
immigration laws, but they do help ensure that due process is observed. Oregon was the
first state to create a sanctuary state law in 1987 in response to a discriminatory event that
occurred in Independence, Oregon in 1977 (University of Oregon, n.d.).
State-level restrictions on land use and business impact how small cities function,
but they also influence how well understood a small city feels by the state government.
Where small cities feel exceptionally isolated with policies that do not seem to fit their
needs, they are more likely to express greater animosity and skepticism toward the state
government. Furthermore, the impacts of state land use and business restrictions likely
have a greater negative impact on some immigrant populations overall since low-income
and unskilled individuals face the steepest barriers to land, home, and business
ownership.
In the case of Madras, historic generalizations appear to reign where city-tribal
relations are concerned. Both city and county leaders express a sentiment of frustration
when the fact that tribes do not pay property taxes arose. The capacity of the tribal
population to actively participate in economic and social practices has increased
dramatically since the 1970s, but acknowledgement of this is sparce during informant
interviews. This could be explained by the fact that, because the case study focused on
immigrants and immigration, informants were simply not primed to consider tribal
relations at any level of depth. What is clear, however, is that the municipal-tribal
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relationship is complex and quite different from the federal-tribal relationship, which is
explored to a greater depth in the literature.
Also reflected in the Madras case study is a complex relationship between tribal
communities and immigrant communities. An increase in American Indian and Latino
intermarriage and a changing dialogue among tribal members regarding immigrants is
challenging existing stereotypes and reframing past sentiments. Furthermore, the example
of blood quantum rules shows that governing policies and procedures carry forth history
in ways that can remain unseen without thorough introspection.
Information Networks—formal and informal
In general, the presence of formal and informal governance networks in case
study cities is expected. The ubiquity of governance networks and confirmation of the
complex nature of system dynamics involved throughout networks, including the value of
network analysis to answer questions relating to power, are confirmed in the literature
(Koliba, Meek and Zia, 2011; Wasserman & Foust, 1994). Also explored in the literature
are models explaining the significance of community level groups to the greater network
(Gulati, Lavie, & Madhavan, 2011), the role of public administrators in network
governance systems (O’Toole, 1997), and the development of social capital through
networks (Burt, 2004).
The analysis of local case studies shows that city managers participate in state and
international management associations (examples include the League of Oregon Cities,
Oregon City/County Management Association, ICMA, etc.), and confer with other cities
dealing with similar problems (including demographic change and budgeting concerns,
but also including housing). Some local government leaders rely on social media like
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Facebook to understand what community members are discussing. Individuals in
leadership positions report participation in local chapters of Rotary, Kiwanis, and similar
social clubs where they are available. City leadership aside, cities supported different
levels of formal and informal organizing for residents.
Rotary and Kiwanis clubs are English-language-only chapter organizations, so
participation is limited and not linguistically accessible to some immigrants. Cultural
barriers to entry are not considered here in depth because they can be facilitated only
after the more significant language barrier is diminished. One informant from Sandy
provides an example of struggling to open a Spanish language chapter that proved
unsustainable. The informant found that finding participants was not a concern but
training the participants in functional practices of chapter life, such as secretary and
treasury skills, demanded significant resources. The club collapsed when she decided she
needed to step back from it.
In Madras, the Latino Community Association
(https://latinocommunityassociation.org/) provides information and access to resources to
the Spanish-speaking and Latino communities in Madras. While organizational
leadership was aware of and networked with social services provided locally, city
leadership seemed entirely unaware of the organization’s presence as a resource for the
Latino and immigrant communities. Other cities were not found to have a similar
organization as a resource for Latino and immigrant populations.
Capacity to achieve goals generally
All cities show a strong capacity for creative problem solving and for
communities to come together to get things done. Where non-Anglos lead problem
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solving activities in Madras, they are rarely acknowledged for having done so. In Sandy,
informant memories frequently acknowledged non-Anglos who led various ideas. This
may, however, be more reflective of the values shared amongst this particular leadership
team than values shared within the governing institutions of the city since it was not
reflected in informant interviews beyond the tenure of the individuals in this team.
Leadership
Coordinated and attributed leadership stands out as a significant factor in
facilitating civic capacity and supporting immigrants at the local level. In Sandy and
Madras, the notion of a team effort among city leadership was reflected in various
activities, yet the shared effort appears intentional in one context and happenstance in
another. In Madras, city leadership pulled together to prepare for a solstice event that
brought upwards of 200,000 people into the city in a single day. A city without the
capacity to pull resources to prepare for the health and safety of such a population would
not have achieved the success that Madras achieved. Yet, at the same time, when
discussing events and policy changes that directly affect the immigrant population, such
as the 2017 public forum about local government’s relationship with ICE or affirming
membership in the National Welcoming American Initiative, the individuals responsible
for success receive little or no recognition for their roles.
The 2017 public forum was designed to educate residents about the city police
department’s relations with ICE, and it was identified by several informants as a
significant success that took leaders coordinating across the city government, and one
that is directly related to the topic of immigrants and immigration. City council meetings
contain limited details about the event but make it clear who was responsible for
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successful outreach to the Latino immigrant community. Two of three informants who
participated in the event, however, revealed very little connection to other event
coordinators or facilitators and neither mentioned the individual, an elected city leader
and an immigrant, who facilitated outreach. The leader who facilitated outreach was also
an informant for this research, and their explanation of the event was detailed and
mentioned other city leaders and the roles they played. Learning the extent to which this
informant led the success of this forum and the extent to which they are not recognized
for it by leaders who benefited from their efforts impacted the fashion in which I moved
forward with my research in Madras. Instead of noting the 2017 forum as an effort by the
city to engage the immigrant community, I spent additional time searching for reference
to this unique event in the local press. I came across none. I also reviewed city council
meeting minutes for references to planning or indicators of follow-up events, but the
forum was only mentioned as a side note by the mayor after the event took place.
In Sandy, the achievement of goals like the municipal bus service, the municipal
internet service, community surveys, and mobile library services were mentioned by
several leaders present during the time of development but attributed to other leaders who
had a role in their development. The leadership team worked with apparent intention to
bring others into their leadership space and empower them to lead new initiatives. This is,
in part, undoubtedly due to the fact that the team had worked with one another for a
while. However, informants reflected an awareness of one another’s strengths and
abilities, a shared goal of creating community, and the intention to coordinate with one
another and with the community at large.
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Comparing the two cities, Madras’ leadership was reactive, while Sandy’s
leadership was proactive in their engagement. It should be recognized that leadership
teams change with time and the leadership team referred to in Sandy dissolved between
2011 and 2018 as people moved on to different opportunities. Awareness of the
leadership team and intention to work together prompts attribution, which keeps leaders
committed to the process, potentially preventing attrition. In both Madras and Sandy,
attrition of immigrant and Latina leaders has resulted from a lack of recognition, a lack of
the value of leadership skills and the bridging of cultures, and a lack of attribution for
achievements.
Another point can be made from the informant data collected for this case study
project. Women of color are breaking through leadership ceilings at the local level and
are successfully engaging communities. They are also being held back from greater
success by other leaders and communities that do not recognize the strength of their
efforts for the broader community (not just immigrant communities). This is no surprise.
Immigrant women are noted in the literature for having created strong communities in
Oregon in the past (Ng, 1989), and women of color, including immigrants, are currently
taking on state and federal level leadership roles in record numbers (Center for American
Women and Politics, 2021).
Social Capital
Each of the three cities discussed in case studies have a small-town identity,
although Sandy is all too aware that it is growing fast. A small-town feel may indicate
strong social capital but does not guarantee it. In each city, local news articles revealed a
notion of community that illustrated ways in which community members would reach out
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to help others. This was particularly notable in Nyssa, the smallest and the most remote
of the three cities. Yet, it remains unclear whether all Nyssa communities benefited from
local outreach. Because there was limited reference to Nyssa’s immigrant community in
local news reporting, the level to which the community is integrated into mainstream
social capital activities remains unknown.
Madras and Sandy both reflect divisions between the Latino immigrant
communities and the mainstream Anglo communities. While Sandy worked to bridge the
gap in several ways, Madras has not coordinated efforts to do so. Madras might have
strong social capital within communities but that social capital infrequently extends
across communities. This leaves Madras divided in its actions and efforts relating to civic
capacity and it leaves those groups with less direct access to decision makers with overall
less influence.
Discussion
The findings of this study reveal a landscape of immigration federalism that is
neither top down nor easily explained by individual policy mechanisms. The case study
analysis further confirms that the components of civic capacity are complex and vary
from one local context to the next (Shinn, 1999). What the theoretical framework for
contemporary immigration federalism resulting from this work allows for is the
exploration of immigration policy mechanisms in context with other factors affecting
immigrants in the United States. The framework illustrates complex relationships among
levels of government and policy stakeholders and it tells a unique story at every turn.
This discussion section further explains the theory of immigration federalism
drawn from the case study development and analysis processes, both by describing the
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overall significance of the local-level context and by speaking directly to claims made by
other scholars in regards to immigration policy mechanisms. The section closes with a
discussion relating findings of this research to social equity. As the fourth pillar of public
administration, social equity offers an important point of analysis for immigration
federalism.
A Theory of Immigration Federalism: Context at the Local Level
Scholars of immigration federalism have already argued for refocusing attention
from the role of federal-level immigration policy toward greater attention to state-level
immigration policy (Spiro, 2001; Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan, 2015) and local-level
immigration policy (Rodriguez, 2008; Parlow, 2007). The results of my research also
deemphasize the role of federal-level immigration policy in two ways. First, history
makes it clear that immigration has never been a major policy arena for the federal
government. The Supremacy Clause may be the present-day reason for the federal
government’s exclusive claim to U.S. immigration law, but the federal government only
staked that claim in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Federal-level immigration
policy is observed as being reactive in that it responds to national sentiments in what feel
like tumultuous times, such as at the close of the American Civil War, after the close of
WWI and before the start of WWII, and after the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Second, tensions around immigration policy are rising again today, yet Congress
is bound by political gridlock and seems unable to act. The federal-level case study for
this research reveals that Congress has rarely been first to act on issues of immigration.
Many significant immigration-related policies from the federal level were introduced by
executive order, only some of which were then followed by legislation passed in
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Congress. Today’s inaction on immigration policy reform at the federal level is nothing
new and, it can be argued, is to be expected. The historical primacy of executive
administration in U.S. immigration policy directs the results of this research to
deemphasize the role of federal-level immigration policy.
Local-level case studies reveal that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and other federal law enforcement agencies and actions are a real threat to
immigrants’ livelihoods. Typically, however, policy shifts that occur with changes to
executive administration will alter the intensity with which enforcement is carried out,
rather than eliminating enforcement altogether. This distinction is reflected in one
informant’s comment that community members with connections to undocumented
immigrants relaxed after President Trump left office in 2021 (Personal Communication,
2021). This perspective is nuanced but important to the overall understanding of
immigration federalism and should not be interpreted as a claim that federal immigration
policy is without impact or insignificant. The overarching claim is that the day-to-day
local-level immigrant experience in the United States is considerably more affected by
local-level experience and context than federal-level policy.
One point must be highlighted to frame this discussion for 2021. The analysis of
executive administration relating to immigration from 2005 through 2019 reveals that
Trump employed immigration-related presidential documents for more aggressive policymaking than previous presidents and for more aggressive purposes. The voracity with
which the Trump administration reframed allowances for entry and the treatment of
individuals and families at the U.S.-Mexico border, and the psychological impacts these
actions had and have on individuals in the United States and outside the country are not
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being denied or diminished. It remains to be seen what lasting impacts the Trump
administration has on U.S. immigration policy, and this framework for immigration
federalism is structured to be able to make that assessment with further research over
time.
At present, this research indicates that executive administration policy changes
infrequently have overarching or immediate effects on immigrant populations at the local
level in the United States. For example, policies that focus on enforcement are largely
targeted at undocumented individuals. Court records and interest group reports show that
citizens and other documented immigrants suffer losses because of these policies, but an
aggregated view of the local level suggests that broad impacts can be small and that
local-level actions can reduce the fear that comes with the presence of such federal-level
policies. However, due to heterogeneity among local jurisdictions, comfort levels in one
jurisdiction may not be equal to comfort levels in a neighboring jurisdiction, and in areas
highly populated by undocumented immigrants, “everyone is affected” (Parks, 2017).
The findings of this research compel a discussion about how institutional
differences at different levels of government result in very different policy contexts and
different ways of framing norms and values around belonging. As an example, the
construct of citizenship has different properties at different levels of government in the
United States, yet all interpretations of citizenship frame who has access to what. At the
federal level, the notion of citizenship is a legal construct, defined in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and reified by the Fourteenth Amendment. Citizenship at the federal level
informs who may enter the United States freely (U.S. citizens), who may enter under
certain restrictions (e.g., certain visa types limit how long an individual may remain in
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the country and others restrict an individual’s ability to work while in the country), and
who may endeavor to gain U.S. citizenship.
However, the examination of citizenship within the United States has resulted in
various perspectives, each framed within the institutions significant to that perspective
and each having different implications for different populations. At the state and local
levels, Colbern and Ramakrishnan (2021) define citizenship as “the provision of rights by
a political jurisdiction to its members” (p. 36). This definition involves political
membership and has more to do who is participating than with what those individuals’
legal citizenship status is. Under Colbern and Ramakrishnan’s (2021) definition of
citizenship, more than 800,000 non-citizen immigrants in New York City have gained
citizenship through the recent expansion of voting rights to legal permanent residents in
that city (Ashford, 2022).
Evidence of the provision of rights through political membership is clear in state
level immigration policy. In some states, such as Oregon, undocumented immigrants can
now obtain a driver’s license, which confirms that even individuals without legal status
can expand their presence as citizens and gain access to political rights (Colbern &
Ramakrishnan, 2021). The notion of citizenship in relation to political membership is
particularly significant at the state level because, as Waters and Pineau (2015) explain,
success or failure of achieving the social and economic integration of immigrants has
important fiscal impacts on state and local governments in the form of social cohesion
and tax revenue. Therefore, states’ immigration policy practices can be seen as strategies
for optimal management of immigrant integration in the state, and increasing the
citizenship and political participation of immigrants is one way of achieving these goals.
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Decreasing the citizenship and political participation of immigrants is another strategy
observed at the state level.
At the local level, the notion of citizenship becomes a social process resulting
from mutual obligations between society and members of that society (Perrin, 2014). This
is reflected in this research study in statements made by multiple city managers that argue
immigrants are not different from other members of the community in terms of service
provision, or “everyone here is equal.” That is, citizenship, or access to city services, is
granted to residents because they are participating members of the community and
regardless of legal status. Similarly, Stephen (2003) observes cultural citizenship as the
recognition of immigrants as legitimate political participants regardless of legal
citizenship status. Framed in this way, the extent to which immigrants at the local level
are granted the benefits of citizenship varies according to the shared values and norms of
the greater community.
In the case study data for this research, immigrant populations lack direct
representation in governing bodies and their efforts to remedy that are often met with
resistance from non-immigrant Anglo individuals. The ability to represent one’s
population at the local level creates space for greater levels of citizenship in those
representing as well as in those being represented. However, where resistance is
experienced as covert racism or consistent micro-aggressions, as informants in Madras
described resistance to be, patterns of broken mutual obligations among society members
are difficult if not impossible to realize. Local institutions, then, may serve to maintain
the status quo simply by failing to acknowledge the biases working against immigrant
participation, which raises questions regarding the responsibility of local leadership to
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identify and deconstruct the institutional bias that denies access to citizenship.
Facilitating the integration of immigrant populations can reduce barriers and increase
immigrant civic participation, which, in turn, increases individual’s abilities to support
themselves financially and socially (Batalova, Fix, & Bachmeier, 2016). When
individuals and families are better able to support themselves financially and socially,
economic and social costs fall for all community members, and ethnocentricity also
recedes. This is, in effect, a localized explanation of Waters and Pineau’s (2015)
observations of immigrant integration at the state level.
The comparative analysis of the three local case studies provides a limited
platform from which to draw concrete findings but reveals a valuable context for further
exploration and research. Local level case studies reflect localities as places where
institutions do not autonomously exist from the people for the purpose of framing their
norms and values. Instead, and as Berger and Luckmann (1976) argue, the public
experiences existing institutions in the context of their own broader experience and from
that their values emerge, ready to be pressed back onto the institutions in the process of
legitimating (or challenging) those institutions as they stand. This process illustrates the
need for a strong understanding of local institutions for the purpose of observing civic
capacity (Vizzini & Morgan, 1999) and is reflective of the notion that both civic and
procedural republic traditions are at work at the community level (Vizzini & Morgan,
1999; Witt, 1999). However, in the context of this research, it is also illustrative of the
barriers to participation that existing for populations whose access to institutions is
limited and whose values and norms are, therefore, functionally different.
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When a change in federal-level immigration policy is implemented, the
community experiences it through the lenses with which they experience local life. This
perspective is one of social construction, where the interpretation of policy will depend
on the local context and the individual’s place within that local context. In this respect,
this research finds truth in Selznick’s (1994) argument that local diversity results in
federal and state-level policies that become functionally different policies at the local
level. States and local jurisdictions respond to federal policy changes according to their
historical and current cultural contexts and will, largely, respond in ways that provide the
most stability for their constituents. However, social groups within local jurisdictions also
interpret policies differently, largely because they are affected by policy differently.
Where immigrants are presumed to be “equal to everyone else” in terms of their needs
and expectations for service delivery, they are more likely to be left out of the
conversation and left behind in terms of citizenship and participation. On the other hand,
findings from this study indicate that where local jurisdictions seek out the voices of
immigrant populations and where they acknowledge the value of cultural citizenship by
facilitating bridges to participation in local governance, a shared understanding of values
and norms may be more likely. Further exploration of this notion would be of value.
Connections between federal-level immigration policy and the construction of the
Oregon state constitution and early sentiment toward people who are not European
settlers in the state are observed in this research. There is little reason to believe such
influences would not be observed in other states and among states joining the union at
similar times, although, in keeping with a Selznick (1994) perspective, how those
influences manifest in each state remains unknown without further inquiry. It was not
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within the scope of the comprehensive review of 50 states included in this study to
review the historical perspective on immigrants and immigration in each state, but this
study illustrates that doing so is of value to further understanding the impact and
influence of early federal and state-level immigration policy and sentiment at the local
level.
The state of Oregon’s restrictive beginnings have evolved into a state that passes
predominantly integrative immigration policy and is known for having the oldest
sanctuary state law on record in the United States. In Oregon, the state’s foundations
created an unwelcoming context for immigrant newcomers, particularly those individuals
who did not fit the racial and ethnic norms of “acceptable” immigrants. Yet, the state’s
geographic distance from popular points of entry, including the Atlantic coast, the
Mexican border, and the bay area of California, facilitated the establishment of strong
immigrant communities and empowered workers and activists to challenge poor working
conditions and low pay.
The consistent success of farmworkers in negotiating for higher wages and better
living conditions is an example of cultural citizenship that reflects empowerment and
agency, making it a valuable aspect of Oregon historicity in the context of understanding
immigration in the state, and it is worth exploring in the context of activism in Oregon
overall. Immigrants have had a direct impact on U.S. states. Their labor in lumberyards,
on railroads, in countless agricultural fields, and their entrepreneurship helped build the
infrastructure without which industry would not thrive today. The findings of this
research give reason to believe that less tangible outcomes of the immigrant presence,
including traditions of activism and resilience, could also have had substantial influence
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on the development of the norms and values of the dominant culture in the state of
Oregon.
Oregon’s sanctuary state law provides an example for the strength of Selznick’s
(1994) argument that local diversity results in federal and state-level policies that become
functionally different policies at the local level. Since 1987, Oregon has prohibited local
and state law enforcement from using public resources to arrest or detain people without
a warrant in cooperation with federal immigration enforcement officers (ORS 181A.820).
The interpretation of this law, however, has varied over time and by place. Until a 2014
court case made clear that ICE retainers did not hold the force of a warrant, local law
enforcement agencies across the state cooperated with ICE to different degrees. This
varied practice increased the level of risk some immigrant and non-Anglo individuals
faced moving throughout the state.
This research involved speaking to three law enforcement representatives in
Oregon, all of whom noted that the sanctuary law prevents their agencies from assisting
ICE to arrest individuals whose only crime is being without documentation in the United
States. Yet, informants familiar with the perspective of the Latino and immigrant
populations in central Oregon suggested that these populations lacked trust in relation to
the sanctuary law where the local police department and the county sheriff’s departments
were concerned. The sanctuary law is interpreted differently depending on the values and
norms held by the head of a given law enforcement department and may be swayed by
the promise of resources including network connections or the threat of lost elections, in
the case of a sheriff.
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In the broader context of immigration federalism going forward, this research
calls for caution in placing excessive value on ideology, demographic change, and
industry or interest groups in immigration policy to focus on awareness and governance
processes at the local level, particularly in small cities and in the rural United States.
Azemun and Kruggel (2021) argue that the rural United States is too often presumed by
progressive immigrant rights activists to be “lost” to the ideological right. This
assumption means that these communities are ignored in national conversations on
immigration and other issues. However, this research study provides evidence of how
incredibly important immigration actually is to the rural United States, both in its history
and in its future. An intentional focus on immigration policy in local communities
matters, and, as Azemun and Kruggel’s (2021) work shows, rural residents who are
encouraged to consider immigration issues in interpersonal interactions frequently do so
without ideological barriers.
My research shows that public sentiment against demographic change may not be
a function of experiences at the local level. In Sandy, informants tied demographic
change to increasing housing costs, and rapid growth seemed to make residents anxious
about the future, but informants explicitly reported that the foreign-born population was
not part of the equation. Likewise, in Nyssa and Madras, local foreign-born populations
were more likely to be left out in discussions relating to service provision, but informants
did not report that they were villainized or seen as a threat by other community members.
Therefore, the findings of this research indicate that demographic changes at the local
level do not inherently lead to anti-immigrant sentiment, but anti-immigrant sentiment
can be constructed through narratives repeated at other levels of information sharing.
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This finding speaks to the work of scholars that claim demographic change is a
main driver of immigration policy at the state level (Ybarra, Sanchez & Sanchez, 2016;
Marquez & Schraufnagel, 2013; Marquez, 2017). My work shows that demographic
change may not cause state-level law makers or interest groups to campaign for
restrictive immigration policy, but, rather, demographic change could influence other,
more directly causal, mechanisms of immigration policy. Instead of creating a need for
policy changes, I argue that demographic change is a fitting social phenomenon for
legislators whose ideological position is already aligned with immigration policy
preferences. Observing demographic change in their jurisdictions provides a logical
reason to push for restrictive rules, and sharing anti-immigrant narratives is a helpful
practice for gaining constituent support. Additional research is necessary to explore these
ideas further.
With this in mind, this study’s findings speak to the work of scholars claiming
that ideology is a main driver of immigration policy (Gulasekaram & Ramakrishnan,
2015; Chavez & Provine, 2009) and, more specifically, that restrictionist immigration
attitudes correlate with isolationist perspectives (Huber and Espenshade, 1997). My
research gives credence to arguments that ideology drives immigration policy, but it adds
nuance to understanding how. Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) emphasize the role
of “issue entrepreneurs” in immigration policymaking at subnational levels. Issue
entrepreneurs work off convenience and opportunism to reframe challenges and
disseminate information—sometimes misinformation—as it serves their policy needs (p.
97). While Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan (2015) focus on entrepreneurs as political
actors, it is logical that proponents of such actors would work to sway opinion at the local
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level where the integration of populations is weak and in states where legislators are
conservative. This is on balance with Azemun and Kruggel’s (2021) findings: whosever
ideology knocks first gets the greatest influence, particularly if the narrative they bring is
framed in the context of local values (Reyna, Dobria, & Wetherell, 2013).
The case study analysis for this research reveals a complex field for civil society
in which immigrant populations may or may not be integrated into the whole depending
on the nature of civic capacity in their local context. Where communities are more
segregated and structural holes to the social network (Burt, 2004) are unbridged, local
sentiment can be assumed to be more vulnerable to the influence of issue entrepreneurs.
As a Democrat-controlled state and one historically well-populated with pro-immigrant
activist interest groups, issue entrepreneurs with anti-immigration sentiments are unlikely
to successfully change policy in Oregon at the state level, but this research shows the
opportunity to influence narratives about immigration at the local level may be ripe in
some contexts. These inferences must be explored further by developing the framework
through the addition of more state and local-level case studies.
It is of interest to study more closely if there is a connection between Sandy’s
diverse economy and immigrants’ relative success in partaking in that economy. The data
collection for understanding economy and industry in each of the case study cities is
superficial, largely due to the restrictions of the COVID-19 pandemic, which prevented
me from visiting each location to observe the cities’ functions and talk to individuals on
the ground. However, the framework constructed for this research study could facilitate
such future research. This study found indications that many organizations exist at the
state and local levels whose missions include serving and supporting immigrant and
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migrant families. While the limitations of this study prevent it from responding directly to
Nicholson-Crotty and Nicholson-Crotty (2011), it does keep their inquiry close in mind.
Further research to understand any existing influence of industry interest groups in statelevel immigration policy decision-making would do well to explore relationships between
immigrant-serving organizations and industry as well as to observe information traveling
from national industry interest groups to groups working at the state level. The
framework is designed with just this kind of exploration in mind.
Agricultural industries have historically employed the immigrant populations in
the selected case study cities for this research study and many in these communities
continue to be so today. However, employment of immigrants in these communities have
diversified, and there are immigrant communities in Oregon and in other states that are
employed in high-skilled industries. As local-level cases are added to the framework, it
will be valuable to look at industry trends in communities that rely on diverse immigrant
workers because there may be a significant difference in the relationship between the
industry and the workers that affects how immigrants gain aspects of citizenship in these
communities.
The three local case studies developed for this project were identified by
informants as being rural cities, yet each was remarkably different in its rurality, which
brought light to questions about the plurality of the nature of civic capacity in various
U.S. rural communities. Two case study cities serve urban areas with recreation and
transportation options while the third is quite remote and maintains a smaller population.
Of the three case study communities observed in this research, none qualifies as rural
according to existing classification systems because they are all cities with several
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thousand residents. The rural identity of folks living in these cities, however, reflect
notions of pioneering and homesteading that keep identities connected to Anglo
settlement narratives.
Mukerjee (2021) explores the notion of rurality in the United States, emphasizing
the point that for most of U.S. history, rural has been defined as anything that is not
urban. Furthermore, rural classification systems are not comprehensive enough to
incorporate all non-urban communities conveniently. In her work exploring nonprofit
networks, Mukerjee (2021) explores the imbalance in urban-rural interdependence and
questions why rural networks rely heavily on urban networks when the reverse is not
reported to be the case. In considering rural gentrification, Nelson and Nelson (2010)
explore the possibility of a relationship between the migration patterns of high-wage
professionals and low-wage immigrants to rural spaces in the United States. My work
follows Mukerjee’s (2021) in finding that understanding the role of rurality and rural
spaces in the United States requires greater attention in the field of public administration
and suggests that rurality is, in some cases, less a function of communities and more an
identity within them.
The rural United States is not homogenous but, instead, quite heterogenous as
Selznick (1994) posits. In this study, immigration policy at the local level is framed by
the functionality of civil society. Civic capacity as it relates to immigrants and
immigration is a focus of this research because it is through robust and reliable civic
capacity that civil society functions at its best (Friedman, 2021). In all three local case
studies, the capacity to identify and achieve broad public goals was evident, but
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immigrant populations’ access to information and ability to engage in mainstream
intermediate associations and social activities is quite limited and often unwelcoming.
Immigrant populations in the case study cities have access to bonding social
capital but frequently lack bridging social capital. Putnam (2000) differentiates the two
types of social capital by arguing that bonding social capital includes intragroup
relationships that help keep you connected to your roots, but do not facilitate your
achievement of greater societal goals. Bridging capital is instrumental in “getting ahead”
both individually and as a society (Putnam, 2000). Immigrants, then, are effectively
relegated to rely on their own communities within the broader field of civil society,
largely disconnected from mainstream communities except by a few notable individuals
who act as cross-cultural bridges. Burt (2004) explores network gaps at the level of
organizations, finding that the most valuable individuals are those whose networks cross
structural holes, or points of contact that the organization itself does not maintain. This is
because those individuals have more relevant information, act more creatively, and
broker deals between populations. Burt (2004) finds that such network bridges result in
an increase in social capital for the organization overall and individuals in these positions
are compensated better than individuals who do not serve as bridges in this way. In the
case study cities, the presence, effectiveness, and value of bridges to cultural gaps is
apparent, but the compensation for and recognition of that value is missing.
When cross-cultural bridges move out of town or are otherwise no longer able to
function as a bridge, the immigrant community is functionally disconnected from
mainstream civil society until another bridge emerges. In cities where this service is
recognized and acknowledged, as it was for some time in Sandy, city leaders can play a
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significant role in empowering and supporting the important service of the cross-cultural
bridge. This research suggests that in some localities, immigrant populations maintain
rather robust social and economic networks within an isolated space in the local field of
civil society. Intentionally filling structural holes (Burt, 2004), or bridging cultural gaps,
is an important lever to facilitating social capital and developing civic capacity and
fomenting trust.
A Theory of Immigration Federalism: Social Equity and Public Administration
Immigrants faced and continue to face inequities in the United States, and
scholars of social equity explore the policy domain in observation of barriers and
promising practices (Medina, 2020), many of which are reflected in the local case studies
developed for this study. Johnson and Svara (2011) define social equity as “the active
commitment to fairness, justice, and equality in the formulation of public policy,
distribution of public services, implementation of public policy, and management of all
institutions serving the public directly by contract” (p. 282). More pertinent to the
ongoing conversation about social equity in immigration federalism is Johnson and
Svara’s (2011) attachment to this definition, which outlines the responsibility for public
administrators who are interested in advancing social equity:
“Public administrators, including all persons involved in public
governance, should seek to prevent and reduce inequality, unfairness, and
injustice based on significant social characteristics and to promote greater
equality in access to services, procedural fairness, quality of services, and
social outcomes. Public administrators should empower the participation
of all persons in the political process and support the exercise of
constructive personal choice” (p. 282).
My study finds that, where local-level civic leaders take the initiative to understand the
historical, racial, ethnic, and immigrant dynamics of their city, they express greater
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empowerment to make cross-cultural connections and they expressed greater awareness
of equity issues. While drawn from a limited number of case studies, the finding is
significant in its potential impact to developing civic capacity and facilitating citizenship
among immigrant communities at the local level. Therefore, further exploration of this
notion is deemed important. This finding also gives credence to the efforts of
organizations that take action to increase diversity and cultural awareness in service
delivery (Nishishiba, 2012) and it embodies the notion that “administrators re-inhabit the
locales they serve in order to become familiar with the informal as well as formal
community resources” (Shinn, 1999, p. 116).
Medina (2020) recommends six strategies to administrators to encourage
inclusion and improve service quality among immigrant populations (p. 132). These
recommendations include being aware of existing immigrant populations and observing
trends as they change. This means knowing what immigrant populations are present, how
long they have been present, and what their general linguistic or cultural needs are. In
only one of the case study cities did city leaders speak in detail to the immigrant
population in their community, despite each city having a long and intimate history of
immigration. Others lacked details and some informants conflated their city’s Latino and
immigrant populations.
Another recommendation from Medina (2020) is to communicate and form
partnerships with organizations representing immigrants (p. 132). Again, in only one of
the three case study cities did city leaders speak to organizations and institutions that
serve immigrants in their communities. In other communities, city leaders actually
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expressed frustration at the dearth of such organizations, even though such organizations
have had a strong presence within the community for years.
The purpose of this section of the discussion is to emphasize the significance of
public administration, and public administrators in particular, in local-level immigration
policy and social equity. City leadership can pass a resolution declaring the city a
Welcoming City, as Madras did in 2017 (The City of Madras, 2017a), or condemning
racism and affirming a commitment to equity as Sandy did in 2020 (Sandy City Council,
2020), but without a leadership team to model the values presumed to be inherent in such
resolutions, equity will exist on paper only.
Summary and Conclusion
This research study presents a new theory for immigration federalism. The study
constructs a process for case study development and comparative analysis that integrates
multiple levels of government for comparative analysis and is prompted by three
elements: a plethora of state-level studies seeking to theorize about the origins of state
immigration policy, the several perspectives on immigration federalism and the nature of
federalism more generally, and the appearance within each existing theoretical frame that
the only level of analysis of significance is the level in focus. This theoretical framework
project aimed to construct a “middle-range theory” (Merton, 1949) for immigration
federalism that explains observed relationships between and among levels of government
while taking history and the realities of local-level diversity into account. In this way, we
can explain the observable and empirical functions of immigration federalism more
accurately and we can use the framework to assess the validity of others’ claims.
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There are limitations to this research. The COVID-19 pandemic caused the
months-long shutdown of Portland State University, the state of Oregon, and much of the
world, just as IRB approval for this study was being processed. Indeed, I was granted
exempt certification to complete my research under the condition that “all in-person
interactions for the purpose of conducting human subjects research is suspended until
further notice” (Willis, 2020). As a result of the pandemic, my data collection was limited
to interviews via video conferencing. In an ideal situation, I would have traveled to each
cases study city and met with informants in person. I would have accessed local libraries
where available to review news archives unavailable online. What I could have gained in
the understanding of civic capacity and community presence from spending time in these
cities is surely vast but also unknowable.
I completed primary data collection and case study construction during 2021, only
one year after the onset of the dual pandemics of COVID-19 and racism leading to social
unrest. This fact undoubtedly impacts my findings and my perspectives of local-level
leadership more generally. The impacts of COVID-19 and social unrest on local
governments came through in interviews, although, in keeping with Selznick (1994), in
different ways and to different degrees depending on place. This experience has reframed
the perceived roles of local leaders for some time to come, and this, again, depends by
place.
One benefit in having focused the initial framework on 2005 through 2019 is that
it provides the field with a solid foundation on which to build observations about the
impacts on immigration policy and immigrant communities of COVID-19 and social
unrest. Five years from now, I can return to these cases and build on them to assess the
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lasting impact, if any, the pandemics have had on civic capacity and immigration
populations.
Next, the sizable scope of this project serves as a limitation in itself. This project
involved data collection and analysis of many areas of policy and institutions relating to
immigrants and immigration. Any one of them could have been framed as a valuable
research study on its own and I refrained from exploring any single element to that depth.
Instead, the project is necessarily perfunctory in some ways without, I hope, being too
shallow in my purpose.
One result of this broad scope is that my local-level analysis relies on only three
case studies, representing localities in a country with nearly 90,000 local governments
(Cooper, 2020). I recognize that generalizability to other local-level communities of
different sizes, locations, or in different state contexts is not possible through this
research, but I have attempted to remain close to theory in my work and the findings and
implications drawn from these case studies provide value for going forward.
Finally, how I handle U.S. Census statistical data in this research impacts how
confidently I can claim my observations at the local level. Because I do not account for
margin of error in my analysis, observations relating to industry employment statistics,
median household income, and population statistics are less reliable for basing claims on,
particularly where populations are less than 65,000 (Fuller, 2018). Ignoring statistical
uncertainty can have significant impact on policy decisions and outcomes, particularly at
the local level in the United States (Jurjevich et al., 2018).
Scope as a limitation is also viewed here as a strength. The framework as it exists
now can be built upon either broadly, by adding more suspected policy mechanisms for
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analysis, or deeply, by constructing cases with the addition of more data where it is
deemed applicable. This is beneficial to the study of civic capacity more generally
because it allows for creativity and interpretation in the conceptualization of unit of
analysis, which has long been a challenge in civic capacity research (Shinn, 1999).
The empirical and theoretical nature of this work is a point of its strength as a
research product. The immigration federalism framework is born of empirical
observation and drives theory that is empirically testable. Public administration and
political science scholars, and others particularly interested in federalism, who hold an
interest in the federal-state and state-local relationships within states other than Oregon
can develop the framework further by constructing state and local-level case studies
within their geographic and governance interests. A bigger catalog of cases at the
community level to explore the extent of the diversity of local contexts would help us
better understand the constraints history has on local place-making. This matters because,
in cases where community pride relies on holding onto an identity that ignores the
presence of other communities and even actively devalues them, the intentional remaking
of a shared identity only occurs where awareness is widespread.
Similarly, given the institutional perspective integrated into the framework, social
scientists interested in legal questions of federalism, representation in leadership,
ideology and public opinion, and other socio-political, socio-economic, and socio-cultural
influences can develop the framework further in these areas. It would be of benefit for
those who carry on this research to reconnect in a period of three to five years to
exchange case findings and confer regarding significant observations relating to the
framework.
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Public administration scholars of social equity and those interested in public
administration leadership will find this work valuable. While the strength of the
framework rests in its capacity to integrate multiple levels of government, the richness of
the local-level case study offers a tool for constructing broad institutional awareness of
civic capacity and structural holes or cultural gaps at the local level. With these tools,
leaders can confidently construct strategies for improving social equity across cultural
groups, building civic capacity, and building leadership capacity.
Another strength of this framework is its replicability in other policy domains.
Climate change policy in the United States is similar to immigration policy in that it is
observed by some to suffer inaction at the federal level (Engel, 2006) and in that state and
local governments have involved themselves actively in the domain of climate change
policy (Engel, 2006; Gerber, 2015; Krause, 2011). As climate change persists and
intensifies as an issue of U.S. public concern, implementing the present framework for
federalism in the climate change policy domain could prove beneficial for observing and
understanding the socio-historical nature of intergovernmental relations and the role of
public administrators in facilitating civic capacity as it relates to climate issues.
Similarly, authors of an opinion article in the New York Times outline a
remarkable difference in maternal health trends in the United States depending on a
woman’s local context (Sgaier & Downey, 2021). First, a woman’s access to healthcare
varies by state due to state-level legislation affecting women’s health choices. Second, a
woman’s healthcare experience varies depending on her race, the median demographics
and attributes of the physical environment of the area she lives, and the extent to which
implicit bias affects her interactions with healthcare workers. The opinions of the authors
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aside, the data referenced in the article make clear that a framework like this one, which
de-centers state and federal-level policy decisions to focus on civic capacity at the local
level can analyze healthcare concerns such as maternal health in a way that results in
decisions tailored for a given local context. Any policy domain that observes a growing
interest for policy development at subnational levels is prime policy material for this
framework construction.
Finally, social scientists interested in the impact of policy decisions made at any
level on small U.S. cities or the rural United States will benefit from the design and
function of this framework. In each local-level case study, the impact of history on
contemporary populations and the extent to which communities recognize each other and
feel empowered to participate differs. The application of the nested framework can be
employed to understand relationships between and civic capacity among various
populations, including understanding Tribal history and the current state of Tribes and
their relationships with local governance networks in the United States.
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Note. This is a schematic representation of the database created for this project. Each box along the federal-level row is a data set that represents a
significant aspect to immigration policy at the federal level, and state and local levels are similarly represented. Together, the collected materials
are qualitatively analyzed to construct the federal, state, and local-level case studies.

Appendix A: The Complete Framework for Immigration Federalism
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Appendix B: Sample Interview Probes
1. What is your history in the [LOCATION] community and what various roles have
you played within the community?
2. How would you characterize the [LOCATION] community as a whole?
3. In your experience, what is the role of the immigrant population in the
[LOCATION] community? Has industry been supportive of immigrants?
4. Have you observed discussions or social sentiment around changing city
demographics or immigrants in the [LOCATION] community? Does this have an
effect on City Council topics of discussion or the direction of government concerns?
Explain.
5. Does city council discuss topics related to the needs of specific populations within
[LOCATION]? What actions come of these discussions? Equity?
6. Do the police interact with federal agencies? Does ICE have a presence in
[LOCATION]?
7. What types of interactions did you have with people from the state/federal level in
relation to immigration? In terms of working with the dynamics of your population
and the people who make up that population, do state or federal-level policy ever
come into play?
8. Did you see these things happening elsewhere in Oregon? Were you aware of
communities dealing with immigration in similar or different ways? Did you draw on
any of those experiences in your own community?
9. Where did you get your information as a city administrator? Was this more formal
or informal in nature? How did you ensure that you heard from broad community
populations?
10. I want to hear about [LOCATION]’s capacity to achieve goals more generally. Tell
me about 3 of your favorite stories about [LOCATION] getting things done (not
specifically related to immigration) or NOT getting things done.
11. Who else should I talk to?

Note. These items are sample interview probes for semi-structured interviews. Interview
questions were adapted for each community and, due to the semi-structured nature of the
process, were altered based on informant expertise and direction.
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Appendix C: Charts Showing Changes in Education Attainment by State
Figure C1
Change in foreign-born adult population with less than a high school degree 1990 to
2000 versus 2019 state sentiment scores

Figure C2
Change in foreign-born adult population with less than a high school degree 2000 to
2019 versus 2019 state sentiment scores
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Figure C3
Change in foreign-born adult population with a college degree or more 1990 to 2000
versus 2019 state sentiment scores

Figure C4
Change in foreign-born adult population with a college degree or more 2000 to 2019
versus 2019 state sentiment scores
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Note. Appendix C Figures C1 through C4 show scatterplots illustrating the change in
educational attainment of the foreign-born population from 1990 to 2000 and from 2000
to 2019 against 2019 state sentiment scores.
Figures C1 and C2 show that states that were restrictive in 2019 experienced more
dramatic increases in the percentage of the adult foreign-born population who did not
have a high school degree from 1990 to 2000. This is in line with steep increases in the
overall foreign-born population in many states from 1990 to 2000. From 2000-2019
states experienced less dramatic increases in the percentage of the adult foreign-born
population without a high school degree, and state sentiment scores suggest a less
significant trend toward restrictive states experiencing greater increases in low-educated
immigrants. In both time periods, there were several states, both integrative and
restrictive, that saw a decrease in the percentage of the foreign-born population that did
not have a high school degree.
However, because both time periods saw record foreign-born increases, and because the
overall percentage of foreign-born individuals without a high school degree decreased in
from 2000 to 2019, the figures also indicate that the foreign-born population in most
states is becoming better educated.
Figures C3 and C4 show that the percentage of the foreign-born population with a college
degree or more is increasing in all states, regardless of state sentiment score. No states,
either integrative or restrictive, saw a decrease in the percentage of the foreign-born
population that had a college degree or more either from 1990 to 2000 or from 2000 to
2019.
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Appendix D: Languages Other Than English Spoken at Home by County in Oregon
Table D.1 Languages other than English spoken at home by percentage of the population
in select Oregon Counties in 2019
FIPS

41003
41005

41027
41031
41045
41047
41049
41051

41053
41059
41067
41071

County Name
Oregon State
Benton County
Clackamas County
Hood River County
Jefferson County
Malheur County
Marion County
Morrow County
Multnomah County
Polk County
Umatilla County
Washington County
Yamhill County

Languages other than English spoken at home in 2019
Other
Spanish Indo-European Asian/Islander
2.51%
3.16% 0.61%
9.08%
2.41%
5.32%
0.89%
5.39%
3.19%
2.91%
0.4%
5.61%
0.98%
0.82%
0%
27.44%
0.52%
0.43%
1.85%
13.44%
0.34%
0.54%
0.29%
24.13%
2.42%
2.13%
0.23%
20.6%
0.45%
0.61%
0.07%
32.78%
4.25%
5.93%
1.36%
8.42%
1.11%
1.72%
0.61%
10.55%
0.44%
0.54%
0.31%
21.56%
4.52%
6.8%
1.17%
12.29%
1.22%
0.84%
0.14%
11.6%

Note. In all counties listed, Spanish is the most common language other than English
spoken at home. This table details the percentage of each county population that speaks a
language other than English at home in 2019 and includes Oregon state data for
comparison. These data do not reflect margin of error calculations.
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Appendix E: Income Diversity in Oregon Counties
Table E. 1 Income Diversity in Oregon Counties: Overall median household income to Hispanic median
household income and percent difference by county and the state of Oregon. Margin of error not taken into
account.
2000
Place
Oregon
Baker County, Oregon
Benton County, Oregon
Clackamas County, Oregon
Clatsop County, Oregon
Columbia County, Oregon
Coos County, Oregon
Crook County, Oregon
Curry County, Oregon
Deschutes County, Oregon
Douglas County, Oregon
Gilliam County, Oregon
Grant County, Oregon
Harney County, Oregon
Hood River County, Oregon
Jackson County, Oregon
Jefferson County, Oregon
Josephine County, Oregon
Klamath County, Oregon
Lake County, Oregon
Lane County, Oregon
Lincoln County, Oregon
Linn County, Oregon
Malheur County, Oregon
Marion County, Oregon
Morrow County, Oregon
Multnomah County, Oregon
Polk County, Oregon
Sherman County, Oregon
Tillamook County, Oregon
Umatilla County, Oregon
Union County, Oregon
Wallowa County, Oregon
Wasco County, Oregon
Washington County, Oregon
Wheeler County, Oregon

Median Household
Income (A)
$62,980
$46,742
$64,490
$80,164
$55,876
$70,493
$48,551
$54,160
$46,358
$64,413
$51,138
$51,736
$50,118
$47,650
$58,993
$56,123
$55,187
$48,069
$48,543
$45,417
$56,863
$50,440
$57,749
$46,548
$62,053
$57,754
$63,537
$65,127
$54,092
$52,748
$55,796
$51,931
$49,454
$55,350
$80,229
$44,253

431

Hispanic or Latino
Householder (B)
$49,124
$37,519
$42,879
$58,428
$41,886
$50,988
$38,096
$33,105
$45,006
$41,526
$40,855
$25,782
$51,950
$42,466
$43,516
$43,473
$46,926
$35,500
$35,814
$26,494
$45,937
$51,565
$44,831
$39,412
$49,108
$42,369
$49,632
$47,951
$30,143
$30,785
$49,211
$46,852
$14,430
$46,017
$57,108
$36,942

B/A
78.0%
80.3%
66.5%
72.9%
75.0%
72.3%
78.5%
61.1%
97.1%
64.5%
79.9%
49.8%
103.7%
89.1%
73.8%
77.5%
85.0%
73.9%
73.8%
58.3%
80.8%
102.2%
77.6%
84.7%
79.1%
73.4%
78.1%
73.6%
55.7%
58.4%
88.2%
90.2%
29.2%
83.1%
71.2%
83.5%

Yamhill County, Oregon

$67,898

$55,491

81.7%

2010
Place
Oregon
Baker County, Oregon
Benton County, Oregon
Clackamas County, Oregon
Clatsop County, Oregon
Columbia County, Oregon
Coos County, Oregon
Crook County, Oregon
Curry County, Oregon
Deschutes County, Oregon
Douglas County, Oregon
Gilliam County, Oregon
Grant County, Oregon
Harney County, Oregon
Hood River County, Oregon
Jackson County, Oregon
Jefferson County, Oregon
Josephine County, Oregon
Klamath County, Oregon
Lake County, Oregon
Lane County, Oregon
Lincoln County, Oregon
Linn County, Oregon
Malheur County, Oregon
Marion County, Oregon
Morrow County, Oregon
Multnomah County, Oregon
Polk County, Oregon
Sherman County, Oregon
Tillamook County, Oregon
Umatilla County, Oregon
Union County, Oregon
Wallowa County, Oregon
Wasco County, Oregon
Washington County, Oregon
Wheeler County, Oregon
Yamhill County, Oregon

Median Household
Income (A)
$57,885
$46,656
$56,419
$72,864
$49,616
$64,864
$44,055
$54,124
$44,030
$62,363
$46,664
$49,528
$42,273
$45,871
$60,291
$51,871
$48,678
$44,695
$49,140
$48,302
$50,439
$46,696
$53,857
$45,998
$54,135
$51,589
$58,306
$59,900
$48,595
$46,313
$53,891
$49,544
$48,315
$49,510
$73,530
$39,252
$61,675

432

Hispanic or Latino
Householder (B)
$43,945
$36,447
$37,045
$53,031
$41,798
$65,456
$46,223
$35,281
$49,068
$50,226
$37,427
$45,263
$43,856
$25,772
$48,967
$38,088
$44,690
$42,597
$37,552
$26,195
$37,696
$35,367
$39,008
$32,256
$44,719
$47,105
$43,329
$42,819
$25,522
$34,165
$44,173
$60,341
$19,683
$36,793
$48,215
$46,040

B/A
75.9%
78.1%
65.7%
72.8%
84.2%
100.9%
104.9%
65.2%
111.4%
80.5%
80.2%
91.4%
103.7%
56.2%
81.2%
73.4%
91.8%
95.3%
76.4%
54.2%
74.7%
75.7%
72.4%
70.1%
82.6%
91.3%
74.3%
71.5%
52.5%
73.8%
82.0%
121.8%
40.7%
74.3%
65.6%
0.0%
74.6%

2015
Place
Oregon
Baker County, Oregon
Benton County, Oregon
Clackamas County, Oregon
Clatsop County, Oregon
Columbia County, Oregon
Coos County, Oregon
Crook County, Oregon
Curry County, Oregon
Deschutes County, Oregon
Douglas County, Oregon
Gilliam County, Oregon
Grant County, Oregon
Harney County, Oregon
Hood River County, Oregon
Jackson County, Oregon
Jefferson County, Oregon
Josephine County, Oregon
Klamath County, Oregon
Lake County, Oregon
Lane County, Oregon
Lincoln County, Oregon
Linn County, Oregon
Malheur County, Oregon
Marion County, Oregon
Morrow County, Oregon
Multnomah County, Oregon
Polk County, Oregon
Sherman County, Oregon
Tillamook County, Oregon
Umatilla County, Oregon
Union County, Oregon
Wallowa County, Oregon
Wasco County, Oregon
Washington County, Oregon
Wheeler County, Oregon
Yamhill County, Oregon

Median Household
Income (A)
$55,297
$44,349
$53,742
$71,183
$50,079
$57,386
$41,659
$40,041
$44,118
$55,275
$44,580
$47,797
$41,056
$40,553
$60,243
$47,511
$50,034
$40,645
$43,527
$34,930
$47,592
$45,431
$49,255
$38,220
$52,263
$54,946
$58,382
$56,999
$41,397
$45,949
$51,906
$47,289
$43,791
$46,857
$72,035
$36,136
$57,649

433

Hispanic or Latino
Householder (B)
$43,774
$32,103
$39,078
$52,091
$39,358
$29,241
$38,398
$58,783
$60,592
$40,635
$33,006
$41,622

$57,459
$38,473
$39,806
$36,802
$40,691
$31,313
$40,965
$43,716
$32,733
$33,935
$42,347
$49,850
$42,432
$55,481
$31,834
$46,146
$36,113
$43,974
$44,404
$48,078
$63,735
$46,203

B/A
79.2%
72.4%
72.7%
73.2%
78.6%
51.0%
92.2%
146.8%
137.3%
73.5%
74.0%
87.1%
0.0%
0.0%
95.4%
81.0%
79.6%
90.5%
93.5%
89.6%
86.1%
96.2%
66.5%
88.8%
81.0%
90.7%
72.7%
97.3%
0.0%
69.3%
88.9%
76.4%
100.4%
94.8%
66.7%
176.4%
80.1%

2019
Place
Oregon
Baker County, Oregon
Benton County, Oregon
Clackamas County, Oregon
Clatsop County, Oregon
Columbia County, Oregon
Coos County, Oregon
Crook County, Oregon
Curry County, Oregon
Deschutes County, Oregon
Douglas County, Oregon
Gilliam County, Oregon
Grant County, Oregon
Harney County, Oregon
Hood River County, Oregon
Jackson County, Oregon
Jefferson County, Oregon
Josephine County, Oregon
Klamath County, Oregon
Lake County, Oregon
Lane County, Oregon
Lincoln County, Oregon
Linn County, Oregon
Malheur County, Oregon
Marion County, Oregon
Morrow County, Oregon
Multnomah County, Oregon
Polk County, Oregon
Sherman County, Oregon
Tillamook County, Oregon
Umatilla County, Oregon
Union County, Oregon
Wallowa County, Oregon
Wasco County, Oregon
Washington County, Oregon
Wheeler County, Oregon
Yamhill County, Oregon

Median Household
Income (A)
$62,818
$45,998
$62,077
$80,484
$54,886
$62,257
$45,051
$49,006
$48,440
$67,043
$47,267
$47,500
$44,712
$40,735
$65,679
$53,412
$53,277
$45,616
$46,491
$37,898
$52,426
$47,882
$55,893
$43,313
$59,625
$54,269
$69,176
$62,691
$51,071
$49,895
$54,699
$52,171
$51,224
$53,105
$82,215
$40,926
$63,902

434

Hispanic or Latino
Householder (B)
$52,537
$49,917
$50,345
$67,083
$49,183
$48,603
$41,645
$41,113
$60,691
$54,503
$44,621
$53,553
$48,438
$30,417
$58,924
$43,416
$56,332
$36,606
$48,682
$24,573
$49,159
$49,265
$53,470
$42,739
$49,236
$51,500
$51,766
$54,286
$46,141
$46,667
$59,063
$50,703
$66,117
$61,163
$48,866

B/A
83.6%
108.5%
81.1%
83.3%
89.6%
78.1%
92.4%
83.9%
125.3%
81.3%
94.4%
112.7%
108.3%
74.7%
89.7%
81.3%
105.7%
80.2%
104.7%
64.8%
93.8%
102.9%
95.7%
98.7%
82.6%
94.9%
74.8%
86.6%
0.0%
92.5%
85.3%
113.2%
99.0%
124.5%
74.4%
0.0%
76.5%

Appendix F: Top Employing Industries in Four Oregon Counties
Table F.1 The top employing industries in four Oregon counties (Hood River, Malheur,
Washington, and Jefferson Counties) in 2000 and 2019
2000

County

Region
(Population)
North Central
Oregon
2000 (20,411)
2019 (23,209)

Hood River
Central Oregon
2000 (19,009)
2019 (23,607)

Jefferson
Eastern Oregon
2000 (31,615)
2019 (30,412)

Top Employing Industries
Educational, health and social
services
Ag, forestry, fishing and hunting,
and mining
Retail trade
Arts, entertainment, recreation,
accomodation and food services
Manufacturing

2019
Participation
by % of
Population Top Employing Industries
Educational, health and social
18.5% services
Ag, forestry, fishing and hunting,
14.0% and mining
Arts, entertainment, recreation,
11.5% accomodation and food services

Manufacturing
Educational, health and social
services
Arts, entertainment, recreation,
accomodation and food services
Ag, forestry, fishing and hunting,
and mining
Retail trade
Educational, health and social
services
Ag, forestry, fishing and hunting,
and mining
Retail trade
Manufacturing

Public administration
Portland Metro/
Mid-Valley
Manufacturing
Educational, health and social
2000 (445,342) services
Professional, scientific,
management, administrative, and
2019 (589,481) waste management services
Retail trade
Finance, insurance, real estate and
rental and leasing
Washington
Malheur
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Participation
by % of
Population
21.9%
15.6%
10.9%

10.3% Retail trade
9.2% Manufacturing
Educational, health and social
20.2% services

21.4%

16.5% Manufacturing

14.2%

10.4% Retail trade
Arts, entertainment, recreation,
10.3% accomodation and food services
9.3% Public administration
Educational, health and social
19.2% services

11.8%

14.7% Retail trade
Ag, forestry, fishing and hunting,
11.6% and mining
11.4% Manufacturing
Arts, entertainment, recreation,
7.5% accomodation and food services
Educational, health and social
20.1% services

13.4%

15.8% Manufacturing
Professional, scientific,
management, administrative, and
11.9% waste management services
11.5% Retail trade
Arts, entertainment, recreation,
8.3% accomodation and food services

9.4%
8.8%

11.6%
9.5%
19.7%

12.8%
10.4%
8.6%
19.9%
17.5%

13.4%
11.1%
8.1%

Appendix G: Active Organizations Serving Immigrant Communities in Oregon
Table G.1 List of Active Oregon Advocacy and Rights Organizations and Legal Support Resources Serving
Immigrant Communities in the State of Oregon
Organization
Name

Function

Organization Details

Year
Est.

Source Location

ACLU Oregon

Civil
Rights

A nonpartisan organization dedicated
to the defending and advancing civil
liberties and civil rights

ACLU
1920

https://aclu-or.org

Bienestar

Housing

Builds housing, hope, and community
for the wellbeing of Latinxs,
immigrants, and all families in need

1981

https://bienestar-or.org/

Casa of Oregon

Housing

improves lives in underserved
communities by building and
renovating affordable housing and
neighborhood facilities and providing
programs and resources that increase
families’ financial well-being

1977

https://casaoforegon.org
/

Causa

Advocacy

Founded to work towards legislation
that improves the lives of Oregon’s
immigrant community

1995

https://causaoregon.org
/

Euvalcree

Advocacy

Mobilizes and engages underserved
and underrepresented populations to
improve the lives of all children,
families and communities in rural
Oregon, Washington, and Idaho

2014

https://euvalcree.org/

Farmworker
Housing
Development
Corporation

Housing

Developing farmworker leadership
through affordable housing, social
services, education, and economic
development

1990

http://fhdc.org/

Immigrant and
Refugee
Community
Organization

Advocacy/
Education

Promotes the integration of refugees,
immigrants and the community at
large into a self-sufficient, healthy and
inclusive multi-ethnic society

1976

https://irco.org/

National
Immigration
Legal Services
Directory

Legal

A full list of legal assistance
organizations throughout the state

Oregon Center
for Public Policy

Policy

Uses research and analysis to advance
policies and practices that improve the
economic and social opportunities of
all Oregonians
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https://www.immigratio
nadvocates.org/nonprofi
t/legaldirectory/search?s
tate=OR
c. 2000

https://www.ocpp.org/t
ag/immigration/

1979

https://www.ohdc.org/

Oregon Human
Development
Corporation

Human
Services

provides workforce development and
associated services for farmworkers
and disadvantaged individuals
throughout Oregon

Oregon
Immigration
Resource

Legal

Resource for legal issues and advocacy
(parent organization: Causa)

Oregon Law
Center

Legal

Works to achieve justice for lowincome Oregonians

2013

https://oregonlawcenter.
org/

Unite Oregon

Advocacy

Works across Oregon to build a unified
intercultural movement for justice
(prior to 2015 was Oregon Action and
Center for Intercultural Organizing)

2015

https://www.uniteorego
n.org/
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https://oregonimmigrati
onresource.org/

Appendix H: Place of Birth of Foreign-Born Population in Sandy, Oregon
Table H.1 Place of Birth for Foreign-Born Population in Sandy Oregon: 2000, 2010,
and 2019. Margin of error not taken into account.
SE:T208. Place Of Birth For
The Foreign-Born Population
(ACS Compatible Version)

Foreign-Born Population:
Europe:
Northern Europe:
United Kingdom
Other Northern Europe
Western Europe:
Germany
Netherlands
Eastern Europe:
Czech Republic and
Slovakia
Ukraine
Other Eastern Europe
Asia:
Eastern Asia:
Hong Kong
Japan
Korea
South Eastern Asia:
Philippines
Americas:
Latin America:
Cuba
Central America:
Mexico
Guatemala

2000
309
161
33
7
26
12
6
6
116

52.1%
10.7%
2.3%
8.4%
3.9%
1.9%
1.9%
37.5%

8 2.6%
101
7
31
23
10
8
5
8
8
117
117
20
97
87
10

32.7%
2.3%
10.0%
7.4%
3.2%
2.6%
1.6%
2.6%
2.6%
37.9%
37.9%
6.5%
31.4%
28.2%
3.2%

Source: 2000 U.S. Decennial Census; 2006-2010
and 2015-2019 American Community Survey

SE:A07001. Place of Birth for
the Foreign-Born Population

Foreign-Born Population:
Europe:
Northern Europe:
United Kingdom:
Other Northern Europe
Western Europe:
Germany
Eastern Europe:
Poland

Asia:

South Eastern Asia:
Philippines
Americas:
Latin America:
Cuba
Central America:
Mexico
Guatemala
Oceania:
Australia
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2010

SE:A07001. Place of Birth for
the Foreign-Born Population

221
Foreign-Born Population:
77 34.8% Europe:
25 11.3%
Northern Europe:
14 6.3%
United Kingdom
11 5.0%
25 11.3%
Western Europe:
25 11.3%
Austria
Netherlands
27 12.2%
Eastern Europe:
Czech Republic and
27 12.2%
Slovakia
Russia
Ukraine
42 19.0% Asia:
Eastern Asia:
Hong Kong
Japan
South Central Asia:
42 19.0%
South Eastern Asia:
42 19.0%
Vietnam
46 20.8% Americas:
46 20.8%
Latin America:
17 7.7%
Cuba
29 13.1%
Central America:
9 4.1%
Mexico
20 9.1%
56 25.3%
Northern America:
56 25.3%
Canada

2019
750
249 33.2%
60 8.0%
60 8.0%
43
17
26
146

5.7%
2.3%
3.5%
19.5%

27 3.6%
90
29
175
50
32
18
111
14
14
326
301
11
290
290

12.0%
3.9%
23.3%
6.7%
4.3%
2.4%
14.8%
1.9%
1.9%
43.5%
40.2%
1.5%
38.7%
38.7%

25 3.3%
25 3.3%

Appendix I: Descriptive Data About Interview Informants
Table I.1 Descriptive Data About Interview Informants
Role in
Community
(2005-2019)
City Manager

Longevity in
Professional
Context in
Community
2012-present

Longevity in
Community

Notes re.
Sex and Ethnic
Immigration Identity

Lifetime
resident
Lifetime
resident

NA

Male, Anglo

U.S.-born/
migrant
family
NA

Female, Latina

ED of Latino
Community
Organization
ED of Latino
Community
Organization
County Sheriff

2015-present

Chief of Police
City Manager
City Manager
(former)
County
Employee (Public
Health)
City Manager/
Reserve Officer
Elected Official/
Various boards
and commissions
Elected Official
(former)/Various
boards and
commissions
City Manager
County
Administrator

1998-present
2014-present
2010-2018

2006-present
(has not lived
in Madras)
Lifetime
resident
1990s-present
2014-present
2010-2018

1980s-present

1980s-present

NA

Male, Anglo
Male, Anglo
Male, Ethnic
white
Female, Anglo

2014-present

2005-present

NA

Male, Anglo

2010s-present

Lifetime
resident

NA

2010s-present

Lifetime
resident until
2019

Immigrant

Female,
Indigenous
American
Female, Latina

2005-present
2007-present

NA
NA

Male, Anglo
Male, Anglo

City Employee
(Community
Development)
City Manager
(former)
Elected Official

2017-present

2005-present
2007-present
(has not lived
in Madras)
2017-present

NA

Female, Anglo

1990s-2013

1990s-2013

NA

Male, Anglo

1980s-2011

1980s-present

NA

Female, Anglo

2006-present
1980s-present
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NA
NA
NA
NA

Male,
ethnicity
unknown
Male, Anglo

City Employee
(Community
Services)
Elected Official
(former)/ City
Employee
City Manager
City Employee*

1980s-2017

1980s-present

NA

Female, Ethnic
white

2009-present

2004-present

Immigrant

Female, Latina

2019-present
2019-present

2019-present
NA
Male, Anglo
Lifetime
Immigrant
Female, Latina
resident
Note. *Indicates this interview was not included in the initial qualitative analysis of interview
data.
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Appendix J: Qualitative Analysis Coding for Interviews
The qualitative analysis of 19 interviews for this research study resulted in 165 discrete
codes, including 24 code groups and 27 independent codes, or codes that do not fit under
the umbrella of the 24 code groups. Code groups are listed in alphabetical order with the
group label listed in all capital letters.
Code
ACCESS
Accessibility: Barriers (Functional)
Accessibility: Barriers (Perceived)
Accessibility: General
Accessibility: Languages (other than English)
Accessibility: Negotiating Systems
CAPACITY
Capacity to Achieve Goals, General (Failed)
Capacity to Achieve Goals, General (Lack of)
Capacity to Achieve Goals, General (Success)
Capacity to Achieve Goals: Potential
Capacity: Consultants
Capacity: Cultural Competence
Capacity: Cultural Competence (Incentives for)
Capacity: Cultural Competence (Lack of)
Capacity: Deserving and Able Attitude
Capacity: Equity
CHANGE
Change: Community Driven
Change: Intentionality
Change: Leadership Driven
Change: Resistance to
COMMUNITY
Community: Security
Community: Segregated
Community: Segregated (Not)
Community: Tightknit
Community: Trust
Community: Trust (Lack of)
Community: Trust: ICE as Obstacle
DEFINITION
Definition: "Community" (Differences)
Definition: "Immigrant"
Definition: City Manager Role
DEI
DEI: Informant Stated
DEI: Policy and Plan
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DEMOGRAPHICS
Demographics: Countywide
Demographics: General
DIVERSITY
Diversity: Among Latino Population
Diversity: Diversification of new Hires
Diversity: Value
Diversity: Value (Superficial)
ENGAGEMENT
Engagement: Meet Population Where They Are
Engagement: Mentoring Success
Engagement: Non-White Participation Lacking
Engagement: Outreach
Engagement: Outreach (Reliance on Bridges)
Engagement: Outreach (unsuccessful)
Engagement: Relationship Building
Engagement: Respect and dignity
Engagement: Volunteering
HISTORICITY
Historicity: Context of Place
Historicity: Longevity of immigrant population
Historicity: Value
HOUSING
Housing: General Population
Housing: Workforce
ICE
ICE: Community Discussions
ICE: Concentration of Undocumented Population
ICE: Effects of Federal Administrative Change
ICE: Isolated Location
ICE: Presence
ICE: Presence (No)
ICE: Trump Administration
IGR
IGR: Complexities
IGR: Examples
IGR: Jurisdictional Responsiblity
IGR: Rural Oregon on Its Own
IGR: State (Border with Idaho)
IMMIGRANT EMPLOYMENT
Immigrant Employment: Agriculture and Nursery
Immigrant Employment: Creating Economic Value
Immigrant Employment: Other than Ag
INFORMANT
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Informant: Lack of Awareness/Oversimplification
Informant: Self-Identification
Informant: Sentiment
INFORMATION
Information: Formal
Information: Informal
Information: Other Cities
Information: Trump Administration
LAW ENFORCEMENT
Law Enforcement: Enforcement v. Jail Mgmt
Law Enforcement: Gang Activity
Law Enforcement: Outreach
Law Enforcement: Targeting
Law Enforcement: Targeting (Not)
Law Enforcement: Warrant/ICE
LEADERSHIP
Leadership (Latino)
Leadership (Latino): Lack of
Leadership (White): Learning
Leadership: Burn Out
Leadership: Diversification
Leadership: Gatekeeping
Leadership: Open
Leadership: POC are Capable
Leadership: Value of Relationships
ORGANIZATIONS
Organizations: Association of Eastern Oregon Counties
Organizations: American Legion
Organizations: Building Bridges Annual Seminars (Washington County)
Organizations: Catholic Charities
Organizations: Catholic Church—not really a bridge
Organizations: Centro
Organizations: COIC
Organizations: Collage of Cultures
Organizations: DEQ
Organizations: DLCD (Dept. of Land conservation and Development)
Organizations: Downtown Association
Organizations: Economic Empowerment Center
Organizations: EMERGE Oregon
Organizations: HFDC
Organizations: Hispanic Advisory Committee
Organizations: Hood River County
Organizations: Housing Works
Organizations: Latino Advisory Committee
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Organizations: Latino Chamber of Commerce
Organizations: Latino Community Association
Organizations: Latino Policy Advisory Council
Organizations: Library
Organizations: OHSU Nutritional Program
Organizations: Oregon Department of Transportation
Organizations: Portland State University
Organizations: Related to Local Social Capital
Organizations: USDA
POLICIES
Policies: 1986 IIRCA
Policies: 90s law
Policies: Bracero Program
Policies: Land Use Regulations
Policies: Oregon HB 3265
Policies: Oregon v. Trump 2020, 8 USC 1373
Policies: ORS Sanctuary State Law (ORS 181A.820)
Policies: Public Charge
Policy Example: Public Charge
Policy Example: Stimulus Payments
RACE
Race: Cultural Nervousness
Race: Racist Events/Beliefs
REPRESENTATION
Representation (Latino): Governance Roles
Representation (Tribal): Governance Roles
SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS
Socio-Economic Status: Survival Mode
Socio-Economic Status: Wealth Building
TENSION
Tension (Latino Population): Immigrant v. Non-Immigrant
Tension (Latino Population): Socio-Economic
Tension: Conservative White Leadership and Latino Community
Tension: Demographic Change
Tension: Growth
Tension: IGR
Tension: Political
*Accountability: Constituents
*Ag Technology Response to Increasing Wages
*Colorado: Tribes
*COVID-19
*Doing nothing is easy
*Equal Treatment
*Geography
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*Growth
*I heard “Mexicans are lazy, they come to steel our jobs, and they’re m…
*I just don’t want to paint a picture that we’re doing everything right
*Inclusivity
*Institutionalized Practice
*Invisible (Latino Population)
*It’s like, not even speaking different languages. It’s like someone’s…
*Lateral Oppression
*Local Government Policy Drivers
*Organizational change
*People of color are perfectly capable of leading everybody.
*Politicization of Citizenship
*Rurality
*Schools
*Social Capital
*Systemic Issues: Equity
*The Struggle
*Tied to the land
*Transformative Event: Eclipse
*Women Empowered
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Appendix K: Comparative Qualitative Analysis (QCA) Truth Tables
Truth table created for QCA analysis of three local case studies: Sandy, Nyssa, Madras.
Sensitizing concepts (conceptual categories and conceptual properties) for each city were listed in the table
and, where the same concept is present in another city, the number ‘1’ is placed in the column as an
indicator of similarity. Likewise, where a concept is not shared, a ‘0’ is input in the column to indicate
difference. Once complete, it is possible to identify and discuss sensitizing concepts that are present in all
three local case studies, present in only two of the three case studies, or present in only one of the studies.

Conceptual
Categories
(Civic) Challenge
Capacity
Capacity

Conceptual Properties
tight budget; tradeoffs limit services
municipal broadband
municipal bus

Sandy

Challenge

serving needs of changing population (cultures
and languages vary)

Sandy
Sandy

Contemporary
Migration
Demographics

Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy

Demographics
Demographics
Demographics
Demographics
Demographics
Demographics

Sandy

Demographics

City
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy

Sandy
Sandy

Economy
Economy

Sandy

Economy

Sandy
Sandy

Economy
Economy

Nyssa
1

Madras

climate; cost of living
consistent population growth
Great Recession affected immigrant population
numbers
immigration: consistent population change
immigration: Mexico dominant
Latino population growth
non-Spanish speaking Latinos
Ukrainian: immigrant majority (2000)

1

1
1

1
1

Tension: new arrivals versus homestead residents
(not immigrant related)
existing industry can support substantial
population growth
gateway city

1

Immigration: city as gateway for immigrants to
other locations possible
Latinos at parity with household income (not
considering MOE)
little change in industry (2005-2019)

Sandy

Economy

observed evolution of immigrant workforce from
migrant work to stable work and
entrepreneurship

Sandy

Economy

no support for Hispanic/Latino business via
Chamber
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1

1

Sandy

Engagement

Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy

Engagement
Geography
Geography
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity

Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy

Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Housing
Housing
ICE
Identity
Identity
IGR
IGR
Information
Information
Infrastructure
Infrastructure
Leadership
Leadership
Leadership

Sandy

Leadership

Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy

Participation
Religion
Representation
Representation
Representation
Representation

advance awareness of immigrant needs among
broader community
summer internship program (institutionalization
unconfirmed)
gateway bt metro and mountains
falling just outside regional government a boon
economy: lumber
Ag
all Sandy residents as migrants
Forced removal of tribes
Incorporation 1911
migrants and immigrants fill labor gaps
European arrival (largely via Oregon Trail) 1840s1880s
pioneer trading post
Railroads become dominate mode of arrival
Tribal territory
pioneer heritage
farmworker (immigrant)
Increasing values
OR localities do not enforce federal law
pioneer spirit
we deserve this
State: highway traffic control
State: land use laws
formal networks
informal networks
state highway
rail services
Creative Solutions
go-getters
team continuity (Intentional)

1

1

1
1

1
1

1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

immigrants and Latinos in business
Latino bridge of cultures impactful
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1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Tension: acknowledgement of effort necessary to
lift immigrants up
Lack of cultural understanding from Anglo
community
Hispanic, Catholic and Hispanic, Protestant
Latino bridge of cultures
little to none in gov’t

1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

Sandy

Role of Gov't

design programs to increase Latino engagement
(ex. facilitated bilingual materials and facilitate
Latino participation)

Sandy
Sandy

Role of Gov't
Role of Gov't

draw immigrants into gov’t (ex. encourage
bilingual resident to run for council)
immigrants served equally

Sandy

Role of Gov't

limited to infrastructure and overall capacity;
policy development dominated by emergencies

Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy
Sandy

Role of Gov't
Social Capital
Social Capital
Spanish language
Spanish language
Spanish language
Spanish language

Sandy

Undocumented

City
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa

Conceptual
Categories
(Civic) Challenge
(Civic) Challenge
Civic Engagement
Demographics
Demographics
Demographics
Demographics
Demographics
Demographics
Demographics
Economy
Economy
Economy
Economy
Economy
Economy
Economy

Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa

Economy
Geography
Historicity
Historicity

1

lack of trust between Latinos/immigrants and
Anglos
barriers remain for immigrants
robust opportunities
bus guides, parks department survey
church services (1)
radio stations (8)
County, city, and school websites YES
awareness of undocumented population left
vulnerable
Conceptual Properties
remote (unseen)
tight budget

1

1

1
1
1
1
Sandy

Madras

1

challenging leadership
immigrant population, stable
immigration: slowing
Immigration: Mexico dominant
Latino majority
Latino population growing

1

1
1

1

1

Latinos and immigrants bolster population
maintaining population a challenge since 1980
continued dependence on immigrants
Ag (still)
employment: immigrants in valuable industries
Employment: interstate travel
employment: loss of anchor company
Industry significant changes 2005-2019
loss of business to Idaho
no support for Hispanic/Latino business via
Chamber
Remote
Ag
anchor employer
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1

1

1

1

1

1
1

Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa

Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity

demographic change paves way for more
immigrants
Economy: private irrigation projects
Economy: rapid dev. Of Ag linked to irrigation
European arrival mid-1800s
Forced removal of tribes
IGR: Farm Security Admin (federal)

Nyssa

Historicity

IGR: Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902 (Federal)

Nyssa

Historicity

Nyssa

Historicity

1
1

1
1
1

1

immigrants reducing barriers for immigrants
(also: internment and Bracero)
immigrants: Anglo animosity affects housing and
opportunity
immigrants: pay, housing, treatment
unsatisfactory

Nyssa
Nyssa

Historicity
Historicity

Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa

Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Housing
Housing
ICE
Identity
Identity
IGR

isolation and self-resilience
Bordering State

Nyssa
Nyssa

IGR
IGR

federal policy shifts from support to limitations in
rural US: see EPA
informal yet functional

Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa

IGR
Information
Information

State: land use laws, etc.: barrier to full
participation in economic competition
formal networks
informal networks

Incorporation 1903
Japanese interment, state and federal support of
Mexican led Rights Organization
Migrant farmworkers fill WWII labor gap
migration (climate: Dust Boal migrants)
Othering of US citizens (Japanese); (Tejanos)

1

1

1

pioneer heritage
Social Capital: regional settling
social/economic capacity
Tejanos

1

Tribal territory
violence against Mexicans
WWII: population drain
Increasing Values
farmworker (immigrant)

1

1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

OR localities do not enforce federal law
Ag, rural
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Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa

Infrastructure
Leadership
Religion
Representation
Representation

Rail services
creative solutions
Hispanic, Catholic and Hispanic, Protestant
competitive at local level (recently)
immigrants and Latinos in business

1
1
1

1
1
1

1

1

Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa
Nyssa

Representation
Role of Gov't
Role of Gov't
Social Capital
Social Capital
Social Capital
Social Capital
Spanish language
Spanish language
Spanish language

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

Nyssa
Nyssa

Spanish language
Spanish language

1

1

City
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras

Conceptual
Categories
Capacity
County Seat
Demographics
Demographics
Demographics
Demographics
Demographics
Demographics
Disconnect
Discrimination
Diversity

Sandy

Nyssa

Latino population growth
Racially and culturally divided

1

1

consistent population growth
Anglo population decreasing*
immigration: decrease in recent arrivals
Immigration: Mexico dominant
Other and Anglo perspectives/experiences
Healthcare and elsewhere
non-English speakers (county)

1

Madras

Economic Inequity

Latino dominant businesses at greater risk of
setbacks

Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras

Economic Inequity
Economy
Economy
Economy
Economy

Madras

Economy

little to no immigrants and Latinos apparent in
gov't
immigrants served equally
purely functional; not social
Annual Festivals
caring/outreach (COVID)
immigrants not mentioned in outreach
integration of immigrant population unknown
church services (1)
County and school websites YES
Discrimination against
no city government support indicated via internet
radio stations (4)
Conceptual Properties
regional bus

1

1
1

Support for systems navigation needed
Industry significant changes 2005-2019
clearly impacted by great recession
Health care facilities

1

employment: immigrants in valuable industries

1

possible informal economy (home-based
businesses)
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Madras
Madras
Madras

Economy
Economy
Economy

Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras

Economy
Geography
Geography
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity

Madras
Madras

Historicity
Historicity

Madras

Historicity

Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras

Historicity
Historicity
Historicity
Historicity

Madras

Historicity

Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras

Historicity
Housing
Housing
ICE
IGR
IGR
IGR
IGR
Infrastructure
Infrastructure
Infrastructure
Intersectionalities
Leadership
Leadership

anchor employers
racialization of Latinos and American Indians
brain drain: educated non-whites leave Madras
no support for Hispanic/Latino business via
Chamber
Bordering Reservation
Gateway City
Incorporation 1910
European arrival early 1880s
Railroads in early 1900s
Tribal territory
Forced removal of Tribes
IGR: Bureau of Indian Affairs (Federal)
Ag
Economy: rapid dev. Of Ag linked to irrigation

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

IGR: Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902 (Federal)

1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

different values among different ethnic groups
WWII air force base prevented population drain
oldest farmworker population in central Oregon
Bracero led to Mexican immigration
details of Latino arrival limited
Warm Springs sovereignty 1950-1970

1

Demographics: city of migrants (Madras) and
Warm Springs mature in tandem
parallels in racialization of native and immigrant
populations
farmworker (immigrant)
Increasing values
OR localities do not enforce federal law
federal policies institutionalize racist ideas
State: land use laws
building inspectors limited
city and Reservation friction
Interstate highways
Municipal airport
rail services
Latino/Amer Indian intermarriage
Latinos: faith and business communities
lack of awareness/misconceptions re. needs
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1
1
1

1
1
1

1

1

1
1

1

Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras

Leadership
Leadership
Leadership
Leadership
Leadership
Participation

Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras

Participation
Potential
Religion
Representation

Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras
Madras

Role of Gov't
Social Capital
Social Capital
Social Capital
Spanish language
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barriers to participation for Latinos/immigrants;
retention weak
novelty, Spanish language meeting
Gatekeeping
Creative Solutions
team continuity (although unaware)
Anglos frustrated and perplexed
Lack of cultural understanding from Anglo
community
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civic capacity tools in place
Hispanic, Catholic and Hispanic, Protestant
Latino bridge of cultures impactful

1
1

lack of trust between Latinos/immigrants and
Anglos
Latino Community Association

1

1

formal organizations (not inclusive)
organizations targeting Latino populations
County and city websites NO
Library (some resources but few)
school (some resources but few)
radio stations (1)
church services (3)
awareness of undocumented population left
vulnerable
formal networks
informal networks
little to none in gov’t
immigrants and Latinos in business
immigrants served equally

452

1

1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

